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9 Wyoming opinions name it 1 courts 1978–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wyoming courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Miranda v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2002As noted by Justice Frankfurter in United States v. Monia, [ 317 U.S. 424 (1948), 63 S.Ct. 409 ] a witness in that setting "if ... he desires the protection of the privilege, ... must claim it or he will not be considered to have been 'compelled' within the meaning of the Amendment." Id. at 202. [122] Regarding the tax form disclosure cases, the Court has stated: Garner relies first on cases dealing with coerced confessions, eg., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), where the Court has required the exclusion of incriminating statements unless there has been 2002As noted by Justice Frankfurter in United States v. Monia, [ 317 U.S. 424 (1948), 63 S.Ct. 409 ] a witness in that setting "if ... he desires the protection of the privilege, ... must claim it or he will not be considered to have been 'compelled' within the meaning of the Amendment." Id. at 202. [122] Regarding the tax form disclosure cases, the Court has stated: Garner relies first on cases dealing with coerced confessions, eg., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), where the Court has required the exclusion of incriminating statements unless there has been | 1 | 2 |
Schneckloth v. Bustamontegreen2 sentences2002Id., at 467, 475-476, 86 S.Ct. at 1624, 1628-1629 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 719, 724-725 ; see Michigan v. Mosley, 428 U.S. 96 , 97, 96 S.Ct. 321, 324 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313, 319 (1975); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 246-247 , 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2057-2058 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 873-874 (1978). 2002Id., at 467, 475-476, 86 S.Ct. at 1624, 1628-1629 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 719, 724-725 ; see Michigan v. Mosley, 428 U.S. 96 , 97, 96 S.Ct. 321, 324 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313, 319 (1975); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 246-247 , 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2057-2058 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 873-874 (1978). | 1 | 2 |
Argersinger v. Hamlingreen2 sentences1998The Supreme Court held: “[Ajbsent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.” 407 U.S. at 37 , 92 S.Ct. at 2012 . 1998The Supreme Court held: “[Ajbsent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.” 407 U.S. at 37 , 92 S.Ct. at 2012 . | 1 | 2 |
Michigan v. Mosleygreen2 sentences2002Id., at 467, 475-476, 86 S.Ct. at 1624, 1628-1629 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 719, 724-725 ; see Michigan v. Mosley, 428 U.S. 96 , 97, 96 S.Ct. 321, 324 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313, 319 (1975); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 246-247 , 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2057-2058 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 873-874 (1978). 2002Id., at 467, 475-476, 86 S.Ct. at 1624, 1628-1629 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 719, 724-725 ; see Michigan v. Mosley, 428 U.S. 96 , 97, 96 S.Ct. 321, 324 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313, 319 (1975); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 246-247 , 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2057-2058 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 873-874 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
State v. DeLunagreen2 sentences1978See State v. DeLuna, 110 Ariz. 497 , 520 P.2d 1121 (1974). 1978See State v. DeLuna, 110 Ariz. 497 , 520 P.2d 1121 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wyoming. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Brisson v. State
green
1 sentence2011He also suggests that the Saratoga municipal court was required to advise him of the potential consequence that his conviction could be used to enhance future charges against him. [¶13] As an initial matter, we note that Appellant relies on Brisson v. State, 955 P.2d 888 (Wyo.1998) as support for the proposition that his prior conviction cannot be used for enhancement purposes. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Rodriguez v. State
green
1 sentence2011A defendant does not need to be given such advisements in order to effect a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel. [¶16] Finally, Appellant cites Rodriguez, 230 P.3d 1111 , as authority suggesting that his waiver of counsel was inadequate. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
United States v. Monia
green
2 sentences2002As noted by Justice Frankfurter in United States v. Monia, [ 317 U.S. 424 (1948), 63 S.Ct. 409 ] a witness in that setting "if ... he desires the protection of the privilege, ... must claim it or he will not be considered to have been 'compelled' within the meaning of the Amendment." Id. at 202. [122] Regarding the tax form disclosure cases, the Court has stated: Garner relies first on cases dealing with coerced confessions, eg., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), where the Court has required the exclusion of incriminating statements unless there has been 2002As noted by Justice Frankfurter in United States v. Monia, [ 317 U.S. 424 (1948), 63 S.Ct. 409 ] a witness in that setting "if ... he desires the protection of the privilege, ... must claim it or he will not be considered to have been 'compelled' within the meaning of the Amendment." Id. at 202. [122] Regarding the tax form disclosure cases, the Court has stated: Garner relies first on cases dealing with coerced confessions, eg., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), where the Court has required the exclusion of incriminating statements unless there has been | 1 | 2002–2002 |
United States v. Wesley Willie
green
1 sentence1998Van Riper, 882 P.2d at 234 (quoting Willie, 941 F.2d at 1389 ). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Van Riper v. State
green
1 sentence1998Van Riper, 882 P.2d at 234 (quoting Willie, 941 F.2d at 1389 ). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Greer v. Morrison
green
2 sentences1984R.3d 974 (1966), reh. denied California v. Stewart, 385 U.S. 890 , 87 S.Ct. 11 , 17 L.Ed.2d 121 (1966), does not suffice in the instance of a juvenile to demonstrate a knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights. 1984Giving of the warnings required by Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966), reh. denied California v. *924 Stewart, 385 U.S. 890, 87 S.Ct. 11 , 17 L.Ed.2d 121 (1966), does not suffice in the instance of a juvenile to demonstrate a knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
California v. Stewart
green
1 sentence1984R.3d 974 (1966), reh. denied California v. Stewart, 385 U.S. 890 , 87 S.Ct. 11 , 17 L.Ed.2d 121 (1966), does not suffice in the instance of a juvenile to demonstrate a knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
United States v. Acavino
neutral
2 sentences1981United States v. Grasso, 468 F.Supp. 264 (E.D.Pa., 1979), aff’d, 612 F.2d 575 (3d Cir. 1979), is an interesting case which explains with clarity the relationship which must exist between failure of formal compliance with the writing requirement, Rule 23(a), F.R.Cr.P., and substantive compliance through an express consent and a knowing and intelligent waiver of a right to a jury trial. 1981United States v. Grasso, 468 F. Supp. 264 (E.D.Pa., 1979), aff'd, 612 F.2d 575 (3d Cir. *784 1979), is an interesting case which explains with clarity the relationship which must exist between failure of formal compliance with the writing requirement, Rule 23(a), F.R.Cr.P., and substantive compliance through an express consent and a knowing and intelligent waiver of a right to a jury trial. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
United States v. Grasso
green
2 sentences1981United States v. Grasso, 468 F.Supp. 264 (E.D.Pa., 1979), aff’d, 612 F.2d 575 (3d Cir. 1979), is an interesting case which explains with clarity the relationship which must exist between failure of formal compliance with the writing requirement, Rule 23(a), F.R.Cr.P., and substantive compliance through an express consent and a knowing and intelligent waiver of a right to a jury trial. 1981United States v. Grasso, 468 F. Supp. 264 (E.D.Pa., 1979), aff'd, 612 F.2d 575 (3d Cir. *784 1979), is an interesting case which explains with clarity the relationship which must exist between failure of formal compliance with the writing requirement, Rule 23(a), F.R.Cr.P., and substantive compliance through an express consent and a knowing and intelligent waiver of a right to a jury trial. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.