knowing and intelligent waiver in Florida

2000On appeal, D.C.W. argues that at the time he entered into the plea, the trial court did not adequately determine if his waiver of counsel was voluntarily and knowingly made in accordance with Florida Juvenile Procedure Rule 8.165(b)(2), which governs the determination of whether a juvenile defendant has voluntarily waived his right to counsel. ' The rule requires the trial court to offer counsel to the juvenile and to make “a thorough inquiry into the child’s comprehension of that offer and the capacity to make that choice intelligently and understandingly....” As discussed in B.F. v. State, 7

2000The rule requires the trial court to offer counsel to the juvenile and to make "a thorough inquiry into the child's comprehension of that offer and the capacity to make that choice intelligently and understandingly...." As discussed in B.F. v. State, 747 So.2d 1061, 1065 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000): A knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel in a juvenile proceeding appears to require the court to: (1) inform the juvenile of the benefits he would relinquish and the danger and disadvantages of representing himself, (2) determine whether the juvenile's choice was made voluntarily and intel

2012See Lukehart v. State, 776 So.2d 906, 917 (Fla. 2000) (“[A] determination of the issues of both the voluntariness of a confession and a knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights requires an examination of the totality of the circumstances”).

2011“A suspect must articulate his desire to cut off questioning with sufficient clarity that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be an assertion of the right to remain silent.” Owen [II], 696 So.2d at 718 . “[A] determination of the issues of both the voluntariness of a confession and a knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights requires an examination of the totality of the circumstances.” Lukehart v. State, 776 So.2d 906, 917 (Fla.2000).

2016VI, U.S. Const.; see also.Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 , 92 S.Ct. 2006 , 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972) (holding that “absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel”).

2016VI, U.S. Const.; see also.Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 , 92 S.Ct. 2006 , 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972) (holding that “absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel”).

2025See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836 (“[H]is technical legal knowledge, as such, was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.” (emphasis supplied)); see also Noetzel v. State, 328 So. 3d 933 , 949 (Fla. 2021) (“[T]he technical skill of a criminal defendant to represent himself is not part of the Faretta inquiry . . . .”). 4 To the extent Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111 requires a “thorough inquiry . . . into both the accused’s comprehension of [the] offer [of counsel] and the accused’s capacity to make a knowing and intelligent waiver,” Fla. R.

2020As we have explained, “[a] criminal defendant has the right to self- representation, Faretta [v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975)], and a trial court ‘shall not deny a defendant’s unequivocal request to represent himself or herself, if the court makes a determination of record that the defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.’ Weaver v. State, 894 So. 2d 178, 192 (Fla. 2004) (quoting Fla. R.

1983The Court refused to extend the requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver to the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures since, it explained, the protections of the fourth amendment have nothing to do with promoting the ascertainment of truth at a criminal trial. 412 U.S. at 241-42 , 93 S.Ct. at 2055 .

1983The Court refused to extend the requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver to the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures since, it explained, the protections of the fourth amendment have nothing to do with promoting the ascertainment of truth at a criminal trial. 412 U.S. at 241-42 , 93 S.Ct. at 2055 .

2026See Tennis v. State, 997 So. 2d 375, 379 (Fla. 2008) (“Under our clear precedent, and that of the district courts of appeal, the trial court's failure to hold a Faretta hearing in this case to determine whether Tennis could represent himself is per se reversible error.”); State v. Young, 626 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 1993) (finding the harmless 5 Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d)(2) and (3) provide: (2) A defendant shall not be considered to have waived the assistance of counsel until the entire process of offering counsel has been completed and a thorough inquiry has been made into both the

2015See McCray v. State, 71 So.3d 848, 864 (citing Tennis, 997 So.2d at 378 ). “[I]t is error to deny a defendant’s unequivocal request to represent himself, regardless of his legal skills or the complexity of the case, if the trial court determines that the defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel and ‘does not suffer from severe mental illness to the point where the defendant is not competent to conduct trial proceedings by himself.’ ” Neal v. State, 132 So.3d 949, 950 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (citing Fla. R.Crim.

2020As we have explained, “[a] criminal defendant has the right to self- representation, Faretta [v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975)], and a trial court ‘shall not deny a defendant’s unequivocal request to represent himself or herself, if the court makes a determination of record that the defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.’ Weaver v. State, 894 So. 2d 178, 192 (Fla. 2004) (quoting Fla. R.

2018A criminal defendant has the right to self-representation, Faretta , 422 U.S. at 819, 95 S.Ct. 2525 , and a trial court "shall not deny a defendant's unequivocal request to represent himself or herself, if the court makes a determination of record that the defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel." Weaver v. State , 894 So.2d 178 , 192 (Fla. 2004) (quoting Fla. R.

2011These changes responded to the supreme court’s pronouncement in State v. Bowen, 698 So.2d 248, 250 (Fla.1997), that under Far-etta it is the defendant “who must be free personally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his advantage.” And although he may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of respect for the individual.

2007As the Supreme Court stated in Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399 , 113 S.Ct. 2680, 2686-87 , 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993), "the competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, not the competence to represent himself." Similarly, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d)(3) states, "Regardless of the defendant's legal skills or the complexity of the case, the court shall not deny a defendant's unequivocal request to represent him or herself, if the court makes a determination of record that the defendant has made a knowing and

1996See Sirmons v. State, 620 So.2d 1249 (Fla.1993) (absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, a plea agreement does not waive a juvenile’s right to a written determination of the suitability of adult sanctions).

1994As to criteria (6), and without supporting findings of fact, the court orally found that adult sanctions were required “for the protection of the community and the necessary rehabilitation of the child.” While Bryan could make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to these findings as a part of his plea bargain, Sirmons v. State, 620 So.2d 1249,1252 (Fla.1993), the record herein reflects no such waiver, oral or written.

2018McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942))); see also Neal v. State, 132 So. 3d 949, 950 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (explaining that “it is error to deny a defendant’s unequivocal request to represent himself, regardless of his legal skills or the complexity of the case, if the trial court determines that the defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel and ‘does not suffer from severe mental illness to the point where the defendant is not competent to conduct trial proceedings by himself’” (quoting Fla. R.

2015See McCray v. State, 71 So.3d 848, 864 (citing Tennis, 997 So.2d at 378 ). “[I]t is error to deny a defendant’s unequivocal request to represent himself, regardless of his legal skills or the complexity of the case, if the trial court determines that the defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel and ‘does not suffer from severe mental illness to the point where the defendant is not competent to conduct trial proceedings by himself.’ ” Neal v. State, 132 So.3d 949, 950 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (citing Fla. R.Crim.

2016Id. at 193-94.

2012See also Haliburton I, 476 So.2d at 193-94 .

2012See Blair v. State, 698 So.2d 1210 (Fla.1997) (holding that the constitutional right to a six-member jury may be waived by a knowing and intelligent waiver); Fla. Fertilizer & Mfg.

1998See Francis, 413 So.2d at 1178 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)); see also Blair v. State, 698 So.2d 1210, 1217-18 (Fla.1997).

2010This Court has repeatedly held that “even after a defendant makes a knowing and intelligent waiver of this right, a trial judge ‘may in his or her discretion either require an advisory jury recommendation, or may proceed to sentence the defendant’ without one.” Reynolds v. State, 934 So.2d 1128, 1148 (Fla.2006) (quoting State v. Carr, 336 So.2d 358, 359 (Fla.1976)).

2006Carr, 336 So.2d at 359 (emphasis supplied).

2009C.K. v. State, 909 So.2d 602, 604 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); D.C.W. v. State, 775 So.2d 363, 364 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); B.F. v. State, 747 So.2d 1061, 1065 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).

2009C.K. v. State, 909 So.2d 602, 604 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); D.C.W. v. State, 775 So.2d 363, 364 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); B.F. v. State, 747 So.2d 1061, 1065 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).

2009C.K. v. State, 909 So.2d 602, 604 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); D.C.W. v. State, 775 So.2d 363, 364 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); B.F. v. State, 747 So.2d 1061, 1065 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).

2009C.K. v. State, 909 So.2d 602, 604 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); D.C.W. v. State, 775 So.2d 363, 364 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); B.F. v. State, 747 So.2d 1061, 1065 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).

2005See B.F. v. State, 747 So.2d 1061, 1065 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); see also T.M. v. State, 811 So.2d 837 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).

2005See B.F. v. State, 747 So.2d 1061, 1065 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); see also T.M. v. State, 811 So.2d 837 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).

2004See In the Interest of J.H., 580 So.2d 162, 163 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (finding that where a form failed to state that the appellant had a right to have a “ ‘supervising attorney personally present when required by the trial judge’ ” and where the appellant was not advised of this right when she entered her plea, the “appellant could not have intelligently waived her right to be represented by a lawyer”) approved, 596 So.2d 453 (Fla.1992).

2004See In the Interest of J.H., 580 So.2d 162, 163 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (finding that where a form failed to state that the appellant had a right to have a "`supervising attorney personally present when required by the trial judge'" and where the appellant was not advised of this right when she entered her plea, the "appellant could not have intelligently waived her right to be represented by a lawyer") approved, 596 So.2d 453 (Fla.1992).

1998See Francis, 413 So.2d at 1178 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)); see also Blair v. State, 698 So.2d 1210, 1217-18 (Fla.1997).

1998See Francis, 413 So.2d at 1178 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)); see also Blair v. State, 698 So.2d 1210, 1217-18 (Fla.1997).

2016As the Supreme Court later explained in Scott. v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 , 99 S.Ct. 1158 , 59 L.Ed.2d 383 (1979), “[W]e believe that the central premise of Argersinger — that actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment — is eminently sound and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel.” The majority relies on In re Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 313 , 9 S.Ct. 77 , 32 L.Ed. 405 (1888), a nineteenth century case in which the United States Supreme Court held that the due process

2016As the Supreme Court later explained in Scott. v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 , 99 S.Ct. 1158 , 59 L.Ed.2d 383 (1979), “[W]e believe that the central premise of Argersinger — that actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment — is eminently sound and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel.” The majority relies on In re Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 313 , 9 S.Ct. 77 , 32 L.Ed. 405 (1888), a nineteenth century case in which the United States Supreme Court held that the due process

2013A determination of “a knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights requires an examination of the totality of the circumstances.” Jennings v. State, 718 So.2d 144, 149 (Fla.1998).

2002In Jennings v. State, 718 So.2d 144 (Fla.1998), the court held that a determination of both the voluntariness of a confession and a knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights requires an examination of the totality of the circumstances.

2011“A suspect must articulate his desire to cut off questioning with sufficient clarity that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be an assertion of the right to remain silent.” Owen [II], 696 So.2d at 718 . “[A] determination of the issues of both the voluntariness of a confession and a knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights requires an examination of the totality of the circumstances.” Lukehart v. State, 776 So.2d 906, 917 (Fla.2000).

2009“A suspect must articulate his desire to cut off questioning with sufficient clarity that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be an assertion of the right to remain silent.” Owen, 696 So.2d at 718 . “[A] determination of the issues of both the voluntariness of a confession and a knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights requires an examination of the totality of the circumstances.” Lukehart v. State, 776 So.2d 906, 917 (Fla.2000).

2026See Tennis v. State, 997 So. 2d 375, 379 (Fla. 2008) (“Under our clear precedent, and that of the district courts of appeal, the trial court's failure to hold a Faretta hearing in this case to determine whether Tennis could represent himself is per se reversible error.”); State v. Young, 626 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 1993) (finding the harmless 5 Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d)(2) and (3) provide: (2) A defendant shall not be considered to have waived the assistance of counsel until the entire process of offering counsel has been completed and a thorough inquiry has been made into both the

2022See Young, 626 So. 2d at 657 (“[A] trial judge is not compelled to allow a defendant to delay and continually frustrate his trial.”); Jones, 449 So. 2d at 257 (“[N]either the exercise of the right to self-representation nor to appointed counsel may be used as a device to abuse the dignity of the court or to frustrate orderly proceedings.”).

2007As the Supreme Court stated in Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399 , 113 S.Ct. 2680, 2686-87 , 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993), "the competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, not the competence to represent himself." Similarly, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d)(3) states, "Regardless of the defendant's legal skills or the complexity of the case, the court shall not deny a defendant's unequivocal request to represent him or herself, if the court makes a determination of record that the defendant has made a knowing and

2007As the Supreme Court stated in Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399 , 113 S.Ct. 2680, 2686-87 , 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993), "the competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, not the competence to represent himself." Similarly, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d)(3) states, "Regardless of the defendant's legal skills or the complexity of the case, the court shall not deny a defendant's unequivocal request to represent him or herself, if the court makes a determination of record that the defendant has made a knowing and