knowing and intelligent waiver in Michigan

2022Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335, 344 ; 83 S Ct 792 ; 9 L Ed 2d 799 (1963) (“[A]ny person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.”); Argersinger v Hamlin, 407 US 25, 37 ; 92 S Ct 2006 ; 32 L Ed 2d 530 (1972) (“[A]bsent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.”); Scott v Illinois, 440 3 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that “[i]n all criminal pros

2015The United States Supreme Court held in Argersinger v Hamlin, 407 US 25, 37 ; 92 S Ct 2006 ; 32 L Ed 2d 530 (1972), that “absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.” Seven years later, the Court clarified what the “actual imprisonment standard” means: “[W]e believe that the central premise of Argersinger—that actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment—is eminently sound and warrants adoption of a

2026The knowing-and-intelligent inquiry was governed by People v Daoud, 462 Mich 621 (2000), which held that the defendant in that case had made a knowing and intelligent waiver because he had the base intellectual capability of understanding his rights and an intellectual understanding of his rights, despite expert testimony that his delusions had prevented him from understanding how his Miranda rights applied to his situation.

2026The knowing-and-intelligent inquiry was governed by People v Daoud, 462 Mich 621 (2000), which held that the defendant in that case had made a knowing and intelligent waiver because he had the base intellectual capability of understanding his rights and an intellectual understanding of his rights, despite expert testimony that his delusions had prevented him from understanding how his Miranda rights applied to his situation.

2015In particular, “[w]arnings of the pitfalls of proceeding to trial without counsel . . . must be rigorously conveyed.” Id. at 89 (citation, quotation marks, and alteration omitted). “[T]he existence of a knowing and intelligent waiver must depend in each case upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience and conduct of the accused.” Anderson, 398 Mich at 370 .

1994In People v Anderson, supra at 370 , this Court noted that the requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver stems from Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458 ; 58 S Ct 1019 ; 82 L Ed 1461 (1938), which endorsed a case-by-case approach when reviewing a waiver, including consideration of "the background, experience and conduct of the accused.” Anderson, supra at 370 .

2023“Although engaging in de novo review of the entire record, this Court will 1 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 ; 86 S Ct 1602 ; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966). 2 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436 ; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). -1- not disturb a trial court’s factual findings regarding a knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights unless that ruling is found to be clearly erroneous.” People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1, 30 ; 551 NW2d 355 (1996) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

2023“Although engaging in de novo review of the entire record, this Court will 1 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 ; 86 S Ct 1602 ; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966). 2 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436 ; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). -1- not disturb a trial court’s factual findings regarding a knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights unless that ruling is found to be clearly erroneous.” People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1, 30 ; 551 NW2d 355 (1996) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

2022“Factors to be considered when deciding whether defendant had made a knowing waiver of his right to counsel are defendant’s age, education, prior criminal experience, mental state, financial condition, and the various factors, pressures or inducements which led him to admit the allegations against him without the assistance of counsel.” Id. at 646 , quoting People v Kitley, 59 Mich App 71, 76 ; 228 NW2d 834 (1975) (quotation marks omitted).

1998Pursuant to MCR 6.445 and Kitley, supra, we find that due process is satisfied in a probation revocation proceeding if a trial court advises a defendant of his right to counsel and the appointment of counsel, if he is indigent, and determines if there is a knowing and intelligent waiver of that right.

2020In Harris, id. at 661-662 , the Court stated that “the trial court had no duty to advise [the defendant] of the right [to testify], nor -9- was it required to determine whether she made a knowing and intelligent waiver.”12 Harris is dispositive with regard to defendant’s claim that error occurred by virtue of the fact that the trial record shows no explicit waiver of his right to testify.

2015However, this Court has held that “there is no requirement in Michigan that there be an on-the- record waiver of a defendant’s right to testify. . . . [T]he trial court ha[s] no duty to advise [a defendant] of the right, nor [is] it required to determine whether [a defendant] made a knowing and intelligent waiver of that right.” People v Harris, 190 Mich App 652, 661-662 ; 476 NW2d 767 (1991).

2023“Although engaging in de novo review of the entire record, this Court will 1 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 ; 86 S Ct 1602 ; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966). 2 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436 ; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). -1- not disturb a trial court’s factual findings regarding a knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights unless that ruling is found to be clearly erroneous.” People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1, 30 ; 551 NW2d 355 (1996) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

2023“Although engaging in de novo review of the entire record, this Court will 1 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 ; 86 S Ct 1602 ; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966). 2 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436 ; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). -1- not disturb a trial court’s factual findings regarding a knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights unless that ruling is found to be clearly erroneous.” People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1, 30 ; 551 NW2d 355 (1996) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

2022Pursuant to MCR 6.445, “due process is satisfied in a probation revocation proceeding if a trial court advises a defendant of his right to counsel and the appointment of counsel, if he is indigent, and determines if there is a knowing and intelligent waiver of that right.” Belanger, 227 Mich App at 647 .

2022Pursuant to MCR 6.445, “due process is satisfied in a probation revocation proceeding if a trial court advises a defendant of his right to counsel and the appointment of counsel, if he is indigent, and determines if there is a knowing and intelligent waiver of that right.” Belanger, 227 Mich App at 647 .

2016We therefore remand for the ministerial task of correcting the judgment of sentence to remove reference to the habitual offender charge or to indicate that it was dismissed. -1- Upon a defendant’s initial request to proceed pro se, a court must determine that (1) the defendant’s request is unequivocal, (2) the defendant is asserting his right knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily through a colloquy advising the defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, and (3) the defendant’s self-representation will not disrupt, unduly inconvenience, and burden the court and the a

2016We therefore remand for the ministerial task of correcting the judgment of sentence to remove reference to the habitual offender charge or to indicate that it was dismissed. -1- Upon a defendant’s initial request to proceed pro se, a court must determine that (1) the defendant’s request is unequivocal, (2) the defendant is asserting his right knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily through a colloquy advising the defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, and (3) the defendant’s self-representation will not disrupt, unduly inconvenience, and burden the court and the a

2004Accordingly, we adopt the standard of review that has been used for trial court decisions regarding waivers of Fifth Amendment rights, finding it equally applicable to decisions regarding waivers of Sixth Amendment rights: “Although engaging in a de novo review of the entire record.. . , this Court does not disturb a trial court’s factual findings regarding a knowing and intelligent waiver of [Sixth Amendment] rights ‘unless that ruling is found to be clearly erroneous.’ [People v Burrell, 417 Mich 439, 448 ; 339 NW2d 403 (1983).] Credibility is crucial in determining a defendant’s level of co

2004Accordingly, we adopt the standard of review that has been used for trial court decisions regarding waivers of Fifth Amendment rights, finding it equally applicable to decisions regarding waivers of Sixth Amendment rights: “Although engaging in a de novo review of the entire record.. . , this Court does not disturb a trial court’s factual findings regarding a knowing and intelligent waiver of [Sixth Amendment] rights ‘unless that ruling is found to be clearly erroneous.’ [People v Burrell, 417 Mich 439, 448 ; 339 NW2d 403 (1983).] Credibility is crucial in determining a defendant’s level of co

1983In his opinion for reversal in Esters, supra, p 64 , Justice Williams also attempted to distinguish Harris from Edwards on the baiss of the following language in Edwards, supra, 451 US 484 : "Schneckloth [v Bustamonte, 412 US 218, 226 ; 93 S Ct 2041 ; 36 L Ed 2d 854 (1973)] itself thus emphasized that the voluntariness of a consent or an admission on the one hand, and a knowing and intelligent waiver on the other, are discrete inquiries.

1983In his opinion for reversal in Esters, supra, p 64 , Justice Williams also attempted to distinguish Harris from Edwards on the baiss of the following language in Edwards, supra, 451 US 484 : "Schneckloth [v Bustamonte, 412 US 218, 226 ; 93 S Ct 2041 ; 36 L Ed 2d 854 (1973)] itself thus emphasized that the voluntariness of a consent or an admission on the one hand, and a knowing and intelligent waiver on the other, are discrete inquiries.

2023Factual findings are clearly erroneous when the reviewing court is left with a “definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake.” People v Wiley, 324 Mich App 130, 165 ; 919 NW2d 802 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2023Factual findings are clearly erroneous when the reviewing court is left with a “definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake.” People v Wiley, 324 Mich App 130, 165 ; 919 NW2d 802 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2023Despite defendant’s insufficient waiver, I agree with the majority that defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis alone. “[I]n protecting a defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, Miranda safeguards a fundamental trial right.” Withrow v Williams, 507 US 680, 691 ; 113 S Ct 1745 ; 123 L Ed 2d 407 (1993) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

2023Despite defendant’s insufficient waiver, I agree with the majority that defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis alone. “[I]n protecting a defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, Miranda safeguards a fundamental trial right.” Withrow v Williams, 507 US 680, 691 ; 113 S Ct 1745 ; 123 L Ed 2d 407 (1993) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

2014As is evident by the admissibility of a suspect’s Miranda waiver in the ordinary custodial interrogation situation, the majority would not so conclude. [Carroll, A Look at People v Bender: What Happens when the Michigan Supreme Court Oversteps Its Power to Achieve A Results- Oriented Decision, 74 U Det Mercy L Rev 211, 236-237 (1997) (citations omitted).] “prophylactic” character that “deprives the [Bender] rule of constitutional status,” post at 14, but rather the nature of the rule itself. 44 We therefore agree with Moran that an outside and unperceived development, such as an attorney’s pre

2000Similarly, the majority’s citation of Colorado v Spring, supra, provides little support for the proposition that the defendant must only possess a literal understanding of the Miranda warnings in order to provide a knowing and intelligent waiver.

1996And the most important fact in this regard is that deterrence is not the overarching consideration: the protection and vindication of constitutional rights is. n In sum, then, I join only the following parts of the lead opinion: I; iv(a), (b), (c) (except for the two references to the elements of a knowing and intelligent waiver “under Moran" ante, pp 30, 34; the relevant case in this regard is Spring, not Moran), (e); and v. Colorado v Connelly, 479 US 157 ; 107 S Ct 515 ; 93 L Ed 2d 473 (1986).

1996And the most important fact in this regard is that deterrence is not the overarching consideration: the protection and vindication of constitutional rights is. n In sum, then, I join only the following parts of the lead opinion: I; iv(a), (b), (c) (except for the two references to the elements of a knowing and intelligent waiver “under Moran" ante, pp 30, 34; the relevant case in this regard is Spring, not Moran), (e); and v. Colorado v Connelly, 479 US 157 ; 107 S Ct 515 ; 93 L Ed 2d 473 (1986).

2000STANDARD OF REVIEW In People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1, 30 ; 551 NW2d 355 (1996), this Court set forth the standards for our review of the trial court’s decision in this case: Although engaging in de novo review of the entire record, see People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331, 338 ; 132 NW2d 87 (1965), this Court will not disturb a trial court’s factual findings regarding a knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights “unless that ruling is found to be clearly erroneous.” [People v Burrell, 417 Mich 439, 448 ; 339 NW2d 403 (1983).] Credibility is crucial in determining a defendant’s lev

2000STANDARD OF REVIEW In People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1, 30 ; 551 NW2d 355 (1996), this Court set forth the standards for our review of the trial court’s decision in this case: Although engaging in de novo review of the entire record, see People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331, 338 ; 132 NW2d 87 (1965), this Court will not disturb a trial court’s factual findings regarding a knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights “unless that ruling is found to be clearly erroneous.” [People v Burrell, 417 Mich 439, 448 ; 339 NW2d 403 (1983).] Credibility is crucial in determining a defendant’s lev

1977People v Michael Brown, 72 Mich App 7 ; 248 NW2d 695 (1976), People v Hardin, 70 Mich App 204 ; 245 NW2d 566 (1976), compare People v Rial, 399 Mich 431 ; 249 NW2d 114 (1976).

1977People v Michael Brown, 72 Mich App 7 ; 248 NW2d 695 (1976), People v Hardin, 70 Mich App 204 ; 245 NW2d 566 (1976), compare People v Rial, 399 Mich 431 ; 249 NW2d 114 (1976).

2026“Coercive tactics that can overbear an individual’s will include both physical intimidation and psychological pressure.” Stewart, 512 Mich at 480, citing Townsend, 372 US at 307 .