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66 Alabama opinions name it 3 courts 1971–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Weakley v. Stategreen2 sentences2016The judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain release by habeas corpus.” ’) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)); Weakley v. State, 721 So.2d 235, 236 (Ala.1998) (holding that the right to counsel at arraignment is a jurisdictional matter).” “““Thus it is the lack of counsel, coupled with the absence of a knowing and intelligent waiver thereof, that acts to deny the defendant counsel and to jurisdictionally bar his prosecution.’ ” ’ “[Thomas v. State,] 8 So.3d [1018] at 10 2014The judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain release by habeas corpus.’ ” (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938))); Weakley v. State, 721 So.2d 235, 236 (Ala.1998) (holding that the right to counsel at arraignment is a jurisdictional matter).’ ‘““Thus it is the lack of counsel, coupled with the absence of a knowing and intelligent waiver thereof, that acts to deny the defendant counsel and to jurisdictionally bar his prosecution. “ ‘ “ ‘The constitutional right of an accused to be represented by counsel invokes | 6 | 6 |
Wheeler v. Stategreen2 sentences2015Nevertheless, a court may infer a knowing and intelligent waiver if the defendant fails to retain counsel after repeated urging by the court or discharges counsel in midtrial after explicit warnings.” ’ Wheeler v. State, 553 So.2d 652, 653 (Ala.Crim.App.1989), quoting Project: Criminal Procedure, 76 Geo. 2011Nevertheless, a court may infer a knowing and intelligent waiver if the defendant fails to retain counsel after repeated urging by the court or discharges counsel in midtrial after explicit warnings.” ’ Wheeler v. State, 553 So.2d 652, 653 (Ala.Crim.App.1989), quoting Project: Criminal Procedure, 76 Geo. | 3 | 5 |
Jenkins v. Stategreen2 sentences2025As the Alabama Supreme Court stated in Ex parte Shelton, 851 So. 2d 96 (Ala. 2000): " 'To establish a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel, "the record at the outset of the trial should establish three factors: 1) that the defendant was informed that he had the right to counsel, 2) that the defendant was informed that if he could not afford counsel the state would appoint counsel to represent him, and 3) an affirmative showing by the defendant that, understanding these rights, he still elects to proceed without counsel." ' 12 CR-2023-0514 " 851 So. 2d at 101 (quoting Jenkins v. State, 482 2011To establish a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel, ‘the record at the outset of the trial should establish three factors: 1) that the defendant was informed that he had the right to counsel, 2) that the defendant was informed that if he could not afford counsel the state would appoint counsel to represent him, and 3) an affirmative showing by the defendant that, understanding these rights, he still elects to proceed without counsel.’ Jenkins v. State, 482 So.2d 1315, 1317 (Ala.Crim.App.1985). | 3 | 3 |
Coughlin v. Stategreen2 sentences2025App. 2008), and the cases cited therein. "[I]t is the lack of counsel, coupled with the absence of a knowing and intelligent waiver thereof, that acts to deny the defendant counsel and to jurisdictionally bar his prosecution." Coughlin v. State, 842 So. 2d 30, 33 (Ala. Crim. 2007Accord Coughlin v. State, 842 So.2d 30, 33 (Ala.Crim.App.2002) (“Thus it is the lack of counsel, coupled with the absence of a knowing and intelligent waiver thereof, that acts to deny the defendant counsel and to jurisdictionally bar his prosecution.”). | 3 | 3 |
Argersinger v. Hamlingreen2 sentences2000In concluding, in this second opinion, that Shelton did not have a constitutional right to counsel, the Court of Criminal Appeals relied on the following holding of the United States Supreme Court in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. at 37 -40: "[A]bsent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial. ".... 1999We apply the same rationale we applied in Benson v. City of Sheffield , 737 So.2d 1059 , 1061 (Ala.Cr.App. 1999): "In Argersinger v. Hamlin , 407 U.S. 25 , 37-40 (1972), the United States Supreme Court held: "`[A]bsent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at trial. ". . . . "`Under the rule we announce today, every judge will know when the trial of a misdemeanor starts that no imprisonment may be imposed, even though local law permits it, unless the accused is rep | 2 | 8 |
Garrett v. Stategreen2 sentences1990Miranda v. State of Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)." Garrett v. State , 369 So.2d 833 , 836 (Ala. 1979). 1989Miranda v. State of Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)." (Emphasis in original.) Garrett v. State , 369 So.2d 833 , 836 (Ala. 1979). | 2 | 5 |
Powers v. Stategreen2 sentences2016See also Powers v. State, 38 So.3d 764 (Ala.Crim.App.2009); Presley v. City of Attalla, 88 So.3d 930 (Ala.Crim.App.2011).” Frost v. State, 141 So.3d 1103, 1106-07 (Ala.Crim.App.2012). 2012See also Powers v. State, 38 So.3d 764 (Ala.Crim.App.2009); Presley v. City of Attalla, 88 So.3d 930 (Ala.Crim.App.2011). | 2 | 2 |
Johnson v. Zerbstred2 sentences2016The judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain release by habeas corpus.” ’) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)); Weakley v. State, 721 So.2d 235, 236 (Ala.1998) (holding that the right to counsel at arraignment is a jurisdictional matter).” “““Thus it is the lack of counsel, coupled with the absence of a knowing and intelligent waiver thereof, that acts to deny the defendant counsel and to jurisdictionally bar his prosecution.’ ” ’ “[Thomas v. State,] 8 So.3d [1018] at 10 2016The judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain release by habeas corpus.” ’) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)); Weakley v. State, 721 So.2d 235, 236 (Ala.1998) (holding that the right to counsel at arraignment is a jurisdictional matter).” “““Thus it is the lack of counsel, coupled with the absence of a knowing and intelligent waiver thereof, that acts to deny the defendant counsel and to jurisdictionally bar his prosecution.’ ” ’ “[Thomas v. State,] 8 So.3d [1018] at 10 | 1 | 6 |
Carnley v. Cochrangreen2 sentences2011“The record fails to establish that [the defendant] ‘was offered counsel’ as required by Carnley, supra. Likewise the record fails to establish any of the three factors required by Jenkins, supra. The trial judge’s admonitions to [the defendant] to the effect that he needed a lawyer are a far cry from explanations of the right to counsel or offers of appointed counsel if [the defendant] could not afford to retain counsel. 1997If the record is not clear as to the defendant's waiver and request for self-representation, the burden of proof is upon the State." Tomlin v. State , 601 So.2d 124 , 128 (Ala. 1991), citing Carnley v. Cochran , 369 U.S. 506 , 516-517 [ 82 S.Ct. 884 , 890-891 , 8 L.Ed.2d 70 ] (1962). | 1 | 3 |
Davis v. Stategreen2 sentences1986The refusal to sign a written waiver of rights form without more does not preclude a knowing and intelligent waiver of those rights." Davis v. State , 440 So.2d 1191 , 1193 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983), cert. denied, Davis v. Alabama , 465 U.S. 1083 , 104 S.Ct. 1452 , 79 L.Ed.2d 770 (1984). 1986The refusal to sign a written waiver of rights form without more does not preclude a knowing and intelligent waiver of those rights.” Davis v. State, 440 So.2d 1191, 1193 (Ala.Cr.App.1983), cert. denied, Davis v. Alabama, 465 U.S. 1083 , 104 S.Ct. 1452 , 79 L.Ed.2d 770 (1984). | 1 | 3 |
Frost v. Stategreen1 sentence2016See also Powers v. State, 38 So.3d 764 (Ala.Crim.App.2009); Presley v. City of Attalla, 88 So.3d 930 (Ala.Crim.App.2011).” Frost v. State, 141 So.3d 1103, 1106-07 (Ala.Crim.App.2012). | 1 | 1 |
Berry v. Stategreen1 sentence2013“Unless a defendant has or waives assistance of counsel, the Sixth Amendment is a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence.” Berry v. State, 630 So.2d 127, 130 (Ala.Crim.App.1993). “[I]t is the lack of counsel, coupled with the absence of a knowing and intelligent waiver thereof, that acts to deny the defendant counsel and to jurisdictionally bar his” sentence. | 1 | 1 |
Ruben Campaneria v. Theodore Reid, Superintendent, Fishkill Correctional Facility, Robert Abrams, Attorney General of the State of New Yorkgreen1 sentence2013Nonetheless, the record, and in particular the transcript of the recorded interview, reveals that, although he spoke in broken English with an accent and occasionally lapsed into Spanish, his command of English was sufficient for him to have understood the Miranda warnings given to him.” ' Campaneria v. Reid, 891 F.2d 1014, 1020 (2d Cir.1989). | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Moody v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cleckler v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Faretta v. Californiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Benson v. City of Sheffieldgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hines v. Riverside Chevrolet-Olds, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Oregon v. Bradshawgreen | 1 | 1 |
| McMahon v. Harrisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Edwards v. Arizonagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Powell v. Alabamagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Peter R. Fitzpatrick v. Louie L. Wainwrightgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Watters v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Marvin Jenkins, United States of America v. Ross Prock, United States of America v. Rich Whitegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hobbs v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2005Considering the totality of the circumstances present here, specifically, Collins's demeanor, her attempt to clarify exactly when, should she request one, she would be entitled to speak with an attorney, the interrogating officer's refusal even to acknowledge her when she asked how long she would have to wait to speak with an attorney, and the lack of an oral response indicating that she understood her rights, I am not persuaded that the "`high standards of proof" for a knowing and intelligent waiver were met in this case, McDevitt, 484 So.2d at 548 , quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 , 86 S.Ct 2005Considering the totality of the circumstances present here, specifically, Collins's demeanor, her attempt to clarify exactly when, should she request one, she would be entitled to speak with an attorney, the interrogating officer's refusal even to acknowledge her when she asked how long she would have to wait to speak with an attorney, and the lack of an oral response indicating that she understood her rights, I am not persuaded that the "`high standards of proof'" for a knowing and intelligent waiver were met in this case, McDevitt, 484 So.2d at 548 , quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 , 86 S.C | 15 | 1971–2005 |
Sasser v. State
green
2 sentences2000Here, "[e]ven considering evidence of the defendant's mental subnormality[,] which was not before the trial judge when he ruled on the admissibility of the statements, the defense testimony `does not show that [the defendant] was so mentally deficient that he was incapable of being able to make a knowing and intelligent waiver.'" Whittle v. State, 518 So.2d at 797 , quoting Sasser, 497 So.2d at 1134 . 2. 1990The expert testimony in this case regarding *Page 1123 the appellant's intellectual level or mental capacity does not foreclose the finding of a knowing and intelligent waiver as defined by constitutional requirements." See Sasser v. State , 497 So.2d 1131 , 1134 (Ala.Cr.App. 1986), in which this court held that a defendant with an I.Q. of 65 had made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary confession. | 3 | 1987–2000 |
Davis v. Alabama
green
2 sentences1986The refusal to sign a written waiver of rights form without more does not preclude a knowing and intelligent waiver of those rights.” Davis v. State, 440 So.2d 1191, 1193 (Ala.Cr.App.1983), cert. denied, Davis v. Alabama, 465 U.S. 1083 , 104 S.Ct. 1452 , 79 L.Ed.2d 770 (1984). 1986The refusal to sign a written waiver of rights form without more does not preclude a knowing and intelligent waiver of those rights.” Davis v. State, 440 So.2d 1191, 1193 (Ala.Cr.App.1983), cert. denied, Davis v. Alabama, 465 U.S. 1083 , 104 S.Ct. 1452 , 79 L.Ed.2d 770 (1984). | 3 | 1986–1993 |
Houston v. State
green
2 sentences1986The factual circumstances of the appellant’s statements are like those of the cases mentioned in Inzer v. State, 447 So.2d 838 (Ala.Cr.App.1983), cert. denied, Ex parte Inzer, 447 So.2d 850 (1984) wherein “this court found the proper Miranda rights given, voluntariness predicate established, and, ultimately, a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver thereof regardless of the accused’s refusal to sign a waiver of rights form.” Id. at 847, citing Harris v. State, 420 So.2d 812 (Ala.Cr.App.1982); Proctor v. State, 391 So.2d 1092 (Ala.Cr.App.1980); Waters v. State, 360 So.2d 358 (Ala.Cr.App.), 1986The factual circumstances of the appellant’s statements are like those of the cases mentioned in Inzer v. State, 447 So.2d 838 (Ala.Cr.App.1983), cert. denied, Ex parte Inzer, 447 So.2d 850 (1984) wherein “this court found the proper Miranda rights given, voluntariness predicate established, and, ultimately, a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver thereof regardless of the accused’s refusal to sign a waiver of rights form.” Id. at 847, citing Harris v. State, 420 So.2d 812 (Ala.Cr.App.1982); Proctor v. State, 391 So.2d 1092 (Ala.Cr.App.1980); Waters v. State, 360 So.2d 358 (Ala.Cr.App.), | 3 | 1983–1986 |
Hines v. State
green
2 sentences1984Cf. Eddings v. State, 443 So.2d 1308 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983) (trainable mentally retarded defendant with I.Q. of 49 who was highly suggestible held not to have waived his rights); Hines v. State, 384 So.2d 1171 (Ala.Cr. 1983Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)'; Garrett v. State, 369 So.2d 833, 836 (Ala. 1979)." (Footnote omitted.) Hines v. State, 384 So.2d 1171 (Ala.Cr. | 3 | 1981–1984 |
Whitehead v. State
green
2 sentences2017Acklin argues next that his trial "counsel conducted an inadequate investigation such that Acklin could not possibly make a knowing and intelligent waiver of the abuse evidence." (Acklin's brief, p. 29.) Acklin cites decisions such as Whitehead v. State , 955 So.2d 448 , 460 (Ala. Crim. 2017Acklin argues next that his trial "counsel conducted an inadequate investigation such that Acklin could not possibly make a knowing and intelligent waiver of the abuse evidence." (Acklin's brief, p. 29.) Acklin cites decisions such as Whitehead v. State , 955 So.2d 448 , 460 (Ala. Crim. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Presley v. City of Attalla
green
2 sentences2016See also Powers v. State, 38 So.3d 764 (Ala.Crim.App.2009); Presley v. City of Attalla, 88 So.3d 930 (Ala.Crim.App.2011).” Frost v. State, 141 So.3d 1103, 1106-07 (Ala.Crim.App.2012). 2012See also Powers v. State, 38 So.3d 764 (Ala.Crim.App.2009); Presley v. City of Attalla, 88 So.3d 930 (Ala.Crim.App.2011). | 2 | 2012–2016 |
Cobble v. State
green
2 sentences2011In Cobble v. State, 710 So.2d 539 (Ala.Crim.App.1998), this Court reversed the appellant’s conviction upon determining that the appellant had been denied his constitutional right to counsel. 2001Nevertheless, a court may infer a knowing and intelligent waiver if the defendant fails to retain counsel after repeated urging by the court or discharges counsel in midtrial after explicit warnings."' Wheeler v. State , 553 So.2d 652 , 653 (Ala.Cr.App. 1989), quoting Project: Criminal Procedure , 76 Geo.L.J. 921, 928-30 (1988) (emphasis omitted)." Cobble , 710 So.2d at 541 . | 2 | 2001–2011 |
Davis v. United States
green
2 sentences1997Later, in Davis v. United States , 512 U.S. 452 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), the Court, addressing the question of how police officers should respond when a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is insufficiently clear to invoke the Edwards prohibition on further questioning, stated: "The right to counsel recognized in Miranda is sufficiently important to suspects in criminal investigations, we have held, that it 'requir[es] the special protection of the knowing and intelligent waiver standard.' Edwards v. Arizona , 451 U.S., at 483 [ 101 S.Ct., at 1884 ]. 1997Later, in Davis v. United States , 512 U.S. 452 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), the Court, addressing the question of how police officers should respond when a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is insufficiently clear to invoke the Edwards prohibition on further questioning, stated: "The right to counsel recognized in Miranda is sufficiently important to suspects in criminal investigations, we have held, that it 'requir[es] the special protection of the knowing and intelligent waiver standard.' Edwards v. Arizona , 451 U.S., at 483 [ 101 S.Ct., at 1884 ]. | 2 | 1997–2005 |
Scott v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1994In 1979, the United States Supreme Court in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 , 99 S.Ct. 1158 , 59 L.Ed.2d 383 (1979), clarified the Argersinger rule by holding that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments require that no indigent criminal defendant, convicted of a misdemeanor offense, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the state has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense, but do not require a state trial court to appoint counsel for an indigent criminal defendant who is charged with a misdemeanor offense for which imprisonment upon conviction is authoriz 1994In 1979, the United States Supreme Court in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 , 99 S.Ct. 1158 , 59 L.Ed.2d 383 (1979), clarified the Argersinger rule by holding that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments require that no indigent criminal defendant, convicted of a misdemeanor offense, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the state has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense, but do not require a state trial court to appoint counsel for an indigent criminal defendant who is charged with a misdemeanor offense for which imprisonment upon conviction is authoriz | 2 | 1993–1994 |
Ex Parte Waters
green
2 sentences1986The factual circumstances of the appellant's statements are like those of the cases mentioned in Inzer v. State , 447 So.2d 838 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983), cert. denied, Ex parte Inzer , 447 So.2d 850 (1984) wherein "this court found the proper Miranda rights given, voluntariness predicate established, and, ultimately, a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver thereof regardless of the accused's refusal to sign a waiver of rights form." Id. at 847, citing Harris v. State , 420 So.2d 812 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982); Proctor v. State , 391 So.2d 1092 (Ala.Cr.App. 1980); Waters v. State , 360 So.2d 358 (Ala.Cr 1986The factual circumstances of the appellant’s statements are like those of the cases mentioned in Inzer v. State, 447 So.2d 838 (Ala.Cr.App.1983), cert. denied, Ex parte Inzer, 447 So.2d 850 (1984) wherein “this court found the proper Miranda rights given, voluntariness predicate established, and, ultimately, a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver thereof regardless of the accused’s refusal to sign a waiver of rights form.” Id. at 847, citing Harris v. State, 420 So.2d 812 (Ala.Cr.App.1982); Proctor v. State, 391 So.2d 1092 (Ala.Cr.App.1980); Waters v. State, 360 So.2d 358 (Ala.Cr.App.), | 2 | 1986–1986 |
Waters v. State
green
2 sentences1986The factual circumstances of the appellant's statements are like those of the cases mentioned in Inzer v. State , 447 So.2d 838 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983), cert. denied, Ex parte Inzer , 447 So.2d 850 (1984) wherein "this court found the proper Miranda rights given, voluntariness predicate established, and, ultimately, a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver thereof regardless of the accused's refusal to sign a waiver of rights form." Id. at 847, citing Harris v. State , 420 So.2d 812 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982); Proctor v. State , 391 So.2d 1092 (Ala.Cr.App. 1980); Waters v. State , 360 So.2d 358 (Ala.Cr 1986The factual circumstances of the appellant’s statements are like those of the cases mentioned in Inzer v. State, 447 So.2d 838 (Ala.Cr.App.1983), cert. denied, Ex parte Inzer, 447 So.2d 850 (1984) wherein “this court found the proper Miranda rights given, voluntariness predicate established, and, ultimately, a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver thereof regardless of the accused’s refusal to sign a waiver of rights form.” Id. at 847, citing Harris v. State, 420 So.2d 812 (Ala.Cr.App.1982); Proctor v. State, 391 So.2d 1092 (Ala.Cr.App.1980); Waters v. State, 360 So.2d 358 (Ala.Cr.App.), | 2 | 1986–1986 |
Harris v. State
green
2 sentences1986The factual circumstances of the appellant's statements are like those of the cases mentioned in Inzer v. State , 447 So.2d 838 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983), cert. denied, Ex parte Inzer , 447 So.2d 850 (1984) wherein "this court found the proper Miranda rights given, voluntariness predicate established, and, ultimately, a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver thereof regardless of the accused's refusal to sign a waiver of rights form." Id. at 847, citing Harris v. State , 420 So.2d 812 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982); Proctor v. State , 391 So.2d 1092 (Ala.Cr.App. 1980); Waters v. State , 360 So.2d 358 (Ala.Cr 1986The factual circumstances of the appellant’s statements are like those of the cases mentioned in Inzer v. State, 447 So.2d 838 (Ala.Cr.App.1983), cert. denied, Ex parte Inzer, 447 So.2d 850 (1984) wherein “this court found the proper Miranda rights given, voluntariness predicate established, and, ultimately, a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver thereof regardless of the accused’s refusal to sign a waiver of rights form.” Id. at 847, citing Harris v. State, 420 So.2d 812 (Ala.Cr.App.1982); Proctor v. State, 391 So.2d 1092 (Ala.Cr.App.1980); Waters v. State, 360 So.2d 358 (Ala.Cr.App.), | 2 | 1986–1986 |
Inzer v. State
green
2 sentences1986The factual circumstances of the appellant's statements are like those of the cases mentioned in Inzer v. State , 447 So.2d 838 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983), cert. denied, Ex parte Inzer , 447 So.2d 850 (1984) wherein "this court found the proper Miranda rights given, voluntariness predicate established, and, ultimately, a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver thereof regardless of the accused's refusal to sign a waiver of rights form." Id. at 847, citing Harris v. State , 420 So.2d 812 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982); Proctor v. State , 391 So.2d 1092 (Ala.Cr.App. 1980); Waters v. State , 360 So.2d 358 (Ala.Cr 1986The factual circumstances of the appellant’s statements are like those of the cases mentioned in Inzer v. State, 447 So.2d 838 (Ala.Cr.App.1983), cert. denied, Ex parte Inzer, 447 So.2d 850 (1984) wherein “this court found the proper Miranda rights given, voluntariness predicate established, and, ultimately, a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver thereof regardless of the accused’s refusal to sign a waiver of rights form.” Id. at 847, citing Harris v. State, 420 So.2d 812 (Ala.Cr.App.1982); Proctor v. State, 391 So.2d 1092 (Ala.Cr.App.1980); Waters v. State, 360 So.2d 358 (Ala.Cr.App.), | 2 | 1986–1986 |
Ex Parte Inzer
neutral
2 sentences1986The factual circumstances of the appellant's statements are like those of the cases mentioned in Inzer v. State , 447 So.2d 838 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983), cert. denied, Ex parte Inzer , 447 So.2d 850 (1984) wherein "this court found the proper Miranda rights given, voluntariness predicate established, and, ultimately, a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver thereof regardless of the accused's refusal to sign a waiver of rights form." Id. at 847, citing Harris v. State , 420 So.2d 812 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982); Proctor v. State , 391 So.2d 1092 (Ala.Cr.App. 1980); Waters v. State , 360 So.2d 358 (Ala.Cr 1986The factual circumstances of the appellant’s statements are like those of the cases mentioned in Inzer v. State, 447 So.2d 838 (Ala.Cr.App.1983), cert. denied, Ex parte Inzer, 447 So.2d 850 (1984) wherein “this court found the proper Miranda rights given, voluntariness predicate established, and, ultimately, a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver thereof regardless of the accused’s refusal to sign a waiver of rights form.” Id. at 847, citing Harris v. State, 420 So.2d 812 (Ala.Cr.App.1982); Proctor v. State, 391 So.2d 1092 (Ala.Cr.App.1980); Waters v. State, 360 So.2d 358 (Ala.Cr.App.), | 2 | 1986–1986 |
Proctor v. State
green
2 sentences1986The factual circumstances of the appellant's statements are like those of the cases mentioned in Inzer v. State , 447 So.2d 838 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983), cert. denied, Ex parte Inzer , 447 So.2d 850 (1984) wherein "this court found the proper Miranda rights given, voluntariness predicate established, and, ultimately, a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver thereof regardless of the accused's refusal to sign a waiver of rights form." Id. at 847, citing Harris v. State , 420 So.2d 812 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982); Proctor v. State , 391 So.2d 1092 (Ala.Cr.App. 1980); Waters v. State , 360 So.2d 358 (Ala.Cr 1986The factual circumstances of the appellant’s statements are like those of the cases mentioned in Inzer v. State, 447 So.2d 838 (Ala.Cr.App.1983), cert. denied, Ex parte Inzer, 447 So.2d 850 (1984) wherein “this court found the proper Miranda rights given, voluntariness predicate established, and, ultimately, a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver thereof regardless of the accused’s refusal to sign a waiver of rights form.” Id. at 847, citing Harris v. State, 420 So.2d 812 (Ala.Cr.App.1982); Proctor v. State, 391 So.2d 1092 (Ala.Cr.App.1980); Waters v. State, 360 So.2d 358 (Ala.Cr.App.), | 2 | 1986–1986 |
Ex Parte Shelton
green
2 sentences2025As the Alabama Supreme Court stated in Ex parte Shelton, 851 So. 2d 96 (Ala. 2000): " 'To establish a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel, "the record at the outset of the trial should establish three factors: 1) that the defendant was informed that he had the right to counsel, 2) that the defendant was informed that if he could not afford counsel the state would appoint counsel to represent him, and 3) an affirmative showing by the defendant that, understanding these rights, he still elects to proceed without counsel." ' 12 CR-2023-0514 " 851 So. 2d at 101 (quoting Jenkins v. State, 482 2025As the Alabama Supreme Court stated in Ex parte Shelton, 851 So. 2d 96 (Ala. 2000): " 'To establish a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel, "the record at the outset of the trial should establish three factors: 1) that the defendant was informed that he had the right to counsel, 2) that the defendant was informed that if he could not afford counsel the state would appoint counsel to represent him, and 3) an affirmative showing by the defendant that, understanding these rights, he still elects to proceed without counsel." ' 12 CR-2023-0514 " 851 So. 2d at 101 (quoting Jenkins v. State, 482 | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Thomas v. State green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| State v. McDevitt green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Ex Parte Dunn green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Whittle v. State green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Ex Parte Gaddy green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Alabama v. Johnson green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Ex Parte Johnson green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Ex Parte Kyzer yellow | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Johnson v. State green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Gaddy v. Alabama green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Tomlin v. State green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Application of Stevenson green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Teske v. State green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Glasser v. United States green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| McLeod v. State green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Prock v. United States green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Garner v. United States green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| United States v. John Clayton Massey green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| In Re the Personal Restraint Frampton green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Westbrook v. Arizona green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Minor v. State green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Jose Bueno, Leon Trevino and Victor Alegria, Cross-Appellants v. City of Donna, Cross-Appellees green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Alabama v. Zuck green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.