knowing and intelligent waiver in California

2026We disagree. “[R]eadvisement is unnecessary where the subsequent interrogation is ‘reasonably contemporaneous’ with the prior knowing and intelligent waiver. [Citations.] The courts examine the totality of the circumstances, including the amount of time that has passed since the waiver, any change in the identity of the interrogator or the location of the interview, any official reminder of the prior advisement, the suspect’s sophistication or past experience with law enforcement, and any indicia that he subjectively understands and waives his rights.” (People v. Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 1

2024Our Supreme Court has held “ ‘readvisement is unnecessary where the subsequent interrogation is ‘reasonably contemporaneous’ with the prior knowing and intelligent waiver. [Citations.] The courts examine the totality of the circumstances, including the amount of time that has passed since the waiver, any change in the identity of the interrogator or the location of the interview, any official reminder of the prior advisement, the suspect’s sophistication or past experience with law enforcement, and any indicia that he subjectively understands and waives his rights.’ ” (Ramirez, supra, 13 Cal.5

2025Sovereign citizens are “a group whose members ‘believe they don’t have to answer to any government authority . . . .’ ” (Severson & Werson, P.C. v. Sepehry-Fard (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 938, 943 .) Appellate counsel is “not argu[ing] on appeal that [defendant’s] sovereign citizen ideology, by itself, was sufficient to overcome his constitutional right to self-representation” but “to the extent [defendant’s] beliefs played a role, they prevented the court from determining whether he understood the dangers of self-representation necessary for a knowing and intelligent waiver.” 2 Faretta v. Californ

2023A motion for self-representation made in passing anger or frustration, an ambivalent motion, or one made for the purpose of delay or to frustrate the orderly administration of justice may be denied.” (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 23 (Marshall); see People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1002 [“Equivocation of the right of self-representation may occur where the defendant tries to manipulate the proceedings by switching between requests for counsel and for self-representation, or where such actions are the product of whim or frustration.”].) “A knowing and intelligent waiv

2026(See People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 428 [the knowing and intelligent waiver inquiry “is directed at an evaluation of the defendant’s state of mind”].) Next, the prosecution objected on foundation grounds when defense counsel asked Tramel: “Is it safe to say that [defendant] did not comprehend completely what you were asking him?” Though the court did not explicitly sustain the objection, the court asked Tramel its own 12. question—if he had an opinion as to whether defendant understood the interaction with him.

2025(People v. Tom (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1210, 1225 .) “After a valid Miranda waiver, readvisement prior to continued custodial interrogation is unnecessary ‘so long as a proper warning has been given, and “the subsequent interrogation is ‘reasonably contemporaneous’ with the prior knowing and intelligent waiver.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] The necessity for readvisement depends upon various circumstances, including the amount of time that has elapsed since the first waiver, changes in the identity of the interrogating officer and the location of the interrogation, any reminder of the prior advisement,

2026(Ibid.) Whether a defendant satisfies that standard “ ‘must depend upon the unique circumstances of each case.’ ” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 166 .) Our Supreme Court has “persistently declined to mandate any specific admonitions describing aspects of the jury trial right.” (People v. Daniels (2017) 3 Cal.5th 961, 992 (lead opn. of Cuéllar, J.) (Daniels); Sivongxxay, at p. 167 [“Our precedent has not mandated any specific method for determining whether a defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of a jury trial in favor of a bench trial”].) “We instead examine the totality of

2026(Daniels, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 991 (lead opn. of Cuéllar, J.).) The People argue that Clark’s two years of representation by counsel, his silence when counsel announced the waiver, and his affirmation that he understood his rights demonstrate a knowing and intelligent waiver.

2007This court repeatedly has held that a Miranda readvisement is not necessary before a custodial interrogation is resumed, so long as a proper warning has been given, and “the subsequent interrogation is ‘reasonably contemporaneous’ with the prior knowing and intelligent waiver.” (People v. Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 170 [ 284 Cal.Rptr. 511 , 814 P.2d 290 ] (Mickle); see People v. Braeseke (1979) 25 Cal.3d 691, 701-702 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 684 , 602 P.2d 384 ], judg. vacated and cause remanded sub. nom.

2007This court repeatedly has held that a Miranda readvisement is not necessary before a custodial interrogation is resumed, so long as a proper warning has been given, and “the subsequent interrogation is ‘reasonably contemporaneous’ with the prior knowing and intelligent waiver.” (People v. Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 170 [ 284 Cal.Rptr. 511 , 814 P.2d 290 ] (Mickle); see People v. Braeseke (1979) 25 Cal.3d 691, 701-702 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 684 , 602 P.2d 384 ], judg. vacated and cause remanded sub. nom.

2026(In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857, 865 .) “However, a court may rely upon a defendant’s validly executed waiver form as a proper substitute for a personal admonishment.” (Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 83 .) [A] defendant who has signed a waiver form [waiving Boykin–Tahl rights] upon competent advice of his attorney has little need to hear a ritual recitation of his rights by a trial judge.” (In re Ibarra (1983) 34 Cal.3d 277, 286 (Ibarra), disapproved on another ground in People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1175-1178 .) “ ‘Only if in questioning the defendant and his attorney the trial

2024Just as a defendant may affirmatively waive constitutional rights to a jury trial, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, to the privilege against self-incrimination, and to counsel as a consequence of a negotiated plea agreement, so also may a defendant waive the right to appeal as part of the agreement.” (People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 79-80 (Panizzon).) “As a general proposition, a broad or general waiver, such as ‘I waive my appeal rights,’ will include error occurring prior to the waiver, but not subsequent error because the defendant could not make ‘a knowing and intelligent

2016A gang member who has been arrested, read his Miranda rights, interrogated and submitted to a polygraph test cannot assume that the preceding Miranda advisement did not apply to the gang affiliation questions and questionnaire: “‘[R]eadvisement is unnecessary where the subsequent interrogation is “reasonably contemporaneous” with the prior knowing and intelligent waiver.’” (People v. Pearson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 306, 316-317 .) In Pearson, the court held that the interview was reasonably contemporaneous with the defendant’s Miranda waiver, which had been provided 27 hours before the interview too

2015We disagree. “ ‘[R]eadvisement [of Miranda rights] is unnecessary where the subsequent interrogation is “reasonably contemporaneous” with the prior knowing and intelligent waiver. [Citations.] The courts examine the totality of the circumstances, including the amount of time that has passed since the waiver, any change in the identity of the interrogator or the location of the interview, any official reminder of the prior advisement, the suspect’s sophistication or past experience with law enforcement, and any indicia that he subjectively understands and waives his rights.’ [Citations.]” (Peop

2026(Ibid.) Whether a defendant satisfies that standard “ ‘must depend upon the unique circumstances of each case.’ ” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 166 .) Our Supreme Court has “persistently declined to mandate any specific admonitions describing aspects of the jury trial right.” (People v. Daniels (2017) 3 Cal.5th 961, 992 (lead opn. of Cuéllar, J.) (Daniels); Sivongxxay, at p. 167 [“Our precedent has not mandated any specific method for determining whether a defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of a jury trial in favor of a bench trial”].) “We instead examine the totality of

2026But our waiver jurisprudence rejects the notion that a knowing and intelligent waiver hinges on the recitation of a ‘ “talismanic phrase.” ’ [Citations.] The fact of the matter is that the dissenting justices, like defendant, would require a degree of elaboration and specificity in a jury waiver colloquy that has never been demanded for a jury waiver to be considered knowing and intelligent under constitutional standards.”17 ( Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 175–176, fn. & italics omitted.) 17 We note that in French, the high court concluded the defendant had not forfeited his constitution

2025California v. Braeseke (1980) 446 U.S. 932 , for the proposition that a “request to speak ‘off the record’ cannot constitute a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights which include the advisement that ‘anything [a suspect] says can be used against him in a court of law.’ ” (Braeseke, at p. 702, quoting Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 479 .) On their face, the exchanges between Hin and Detective Seraypheap could be understood as requests for and assurances of confidentiality.

2025California v. Braeseke (1980) 446 U.S. 932 , for the proposition that a “request to speak ‘off the record’ cannot constitute a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights which include the advisement that ‘anything [a suspect] says can be used against him in a court of law.’ ” (Braeseke, at p. 702, quoting Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 479 .) On their face, the exchanges between Hin and Detective Seraypheap could be understood as requests for and assurances of confidentiality.

2024“Section 317, subdivision (b) requires appointment of counsel for an indigent parent or guardian in a juvenile dependency case ‘unless the court finds that the parent or guardian has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel as provided in this section.’ A waiver of counsel is valid if the juvenile court has apprised the parent of 5 The court made no finding regarding Mother’s mental competence. 6 Mother filed a writ petition (K.B. v. Superior Court, G063227), which was summarily denied by this court on October 27, 2023. 7 The court also declared A.B. a dependent of the court, but Mothe

2023A knowing and intelligent waiver does not require a full Faretta- type9 admonition and inquiry by the juvenile court, and “[a] parent may waive counsel at any point.” (In re Angel W. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1083, 1084 (Angel W.); see also Janet O. v. Superior Court (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1064 [construing section 317 to permit relieving counsel from appointment once parent no longer desires counsel].) At the same time, parents also have “a statutory right to self-representation in a proceeding to terminate parental rights.” (Angel W., at p. 1082; § 317, subd. (b).) Thus, “the court mus

2024“Section 317, subdivision (b) requires appointment of counsel for an indigent parent or guardian in a juvenile dependency case ‘unless the court finds that the parent or guardian has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel as provided in this section.’ A waiver of counsel is valid if the juvenile court has apprised the parent of 5 The court made no finding regarding Mother’s mental competence. 6 Mother filed a writ petition (K.B. v. Superior Court, G063227), which was summarily denied by this court on October 27, 2023. 7 The court also declared A.B. a dependent of the court, but Mothe

2021Dept. of Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Change Systems, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1135, 1144 .) Thus, “ ‘[a] trial court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong legal standards applicable to the issue at hand.’ ” (Doe 2 v. Superior Court (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1504, 1517 .) “Section 317, subdivision (b) requires appointment of counsel for an indigent parent or guardian in a juvenile dependency case ‘unless the court finds that the parent or guardian has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel as provided in this section.’ ” (A.M., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 923.) “Section 317, sub

2026(In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857, 865 .) “However, a court may rely upon a defendant’s validly executed waiver form as a proper substitute for a personal admonishment.” (Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 83 .) [A] defendant who has signed a waiver form [waiving Boykin–Tahl rights] upon competent advice of his attorney has little need to hear a ritual recitation of his rights by a trial judge.” (In re Ibarra (1983) 34 Cal.3d 277, 286 (Ibarra), disapproved on another ground in People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1175-1178 .) “ ‘Only if in questioning the defendant and his attorney the trial

2017The trial court "need only determine whether defendant had read and understood the contents of the form, and had discussed them with his attorney." ( In re Ibarra, at p. 286, 193 Cal.Rptr. 538 , 666 P.2d 980 .) However, if the judge has reason to believe defendant does not fully understand his rights, the judge "must conduct further canvassing of the defendant to ensure a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights." ( Ibid . ) The Supreme Court later authorized this procedure in the context of a waiver of the right to appeal.

2016Do you understand that?" Mother responded, "Yes." Mother Knowingly and Intelligently Waived Her Right to Counsel Section 317, subdivision (b) provides that, when the child in a dependency case "has been placed in out-of-home care, or the petitioning agency is recommending that the child be placed in out-of-home care, the court shall appoint counsel for [an indigent] parent or guardian, unless the court finds that the parent or guardian has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel . . . ." "Section 317, subdivision (b) has been interpreted to give a parent . . . a statutory right to sel

2016“A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” (Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 464 , italics added; see People v. Spencer (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 931, 940 , criticized on another ground in People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1225-1226 .) For instance, the test for determining whether there is a knowing and intelligent waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel focuses on the accused’s understanding of the implication of waiving his or her right; “a waiver of a constitutional right cannot be considered ‘intelligent’ unless the d

2025Pineda acknowledges our Supreme Court’s “repeated” holding “ ‘that a Miranda readvisement is not necessary before a custodial interrogation is resumed, so long as a proper warning has been given, and “the subsequent interrogation is ‘reasonably contemporaneous’ with the prior knowing and intelligent waiver.” ’ [Citation.] We have recognized five factors to be weighed when considering that totality of circumstances: ‘1) the amount of time that has passed since the initial waiver; 2) any change in the identity of the interrogator or location of the interrogation; 3) an official reminder of the p

2025Pineda acknowledges our Supreme Court’s “repeated” holding “ ‘that a Miranda readvisement is not necessary before a custodial interrogation is resumed, so long as a proper warning has been given, and “the subsequent interrogation is ‘reasonably contemporaneous’ with the prior knowing and intelligent waiver.” ’ [Citation.] We have recognized five factors to be weighed when considering that totality of circumstances: ‘1) the amount of time that has passed since the initial waiver; 2) any change in the identity of the interrogator or location of the interrogation; 3) an official reminder of the p

2024(Franzen, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1202 ; R.I. v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 299-300 [ 64 L.Ed.2d 297, 307 ].) If a defendant, after invoking his Miranda rights, initiates a statement to the police, “ ‘nothing in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments . . . prohibit[s] the police from merely listening to his voluntary, volunteered statements and using them against him at the trial.’ ” (People v. Bradford, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1034 , quoting Edwards v. 10 Ariz. (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 485 [ 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 387 ].) “Moreover, if the defendant’s statement is not only voluntary, but constitutes a

2024(Franzen, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1202 ; R.I. v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 299-300 [ 64 L.Ed.2d 297, 307 ].) If a defendant, after invoking his Miranda rights, initiates a statement to the police, “ ‘nothing in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments . . . prohibit[s] the police from merely listening to his voluntary, volunteered statements and using them against him at the trial.’ ” (People v. Bradford, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1034 , quoting Edwards v. 10 Ariz. (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 485 [ 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 387 ].) “Moreover, if the defendant’s statement is not only voluntary, but constitutes a

2017Although an "exploration into ... possible defenses and possible punishments" may be useful to help a defendant understand "just what he is getting himself into" ( Lopez , supra , 71 Cal.App.3d at p. 573 , 138 Cal.Rptr. 36 ), it is not required for a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel under Faretta .

2017Although an "exploration into ... possible defenses and possible punishments" may be useful to help a defendant understand "just what he is getting himself into" ( Lopez , supra , 71 Cal.App.3d at p. 573 , 138 Cal.Rptr. 36 ), it is not required for a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel under Faretta .

2013Thus, although removal of appointed counsel does not involve a defendant’s constitutional rights, some consideration should be given to the right of a defendant “to decide for himself who best can conduct the case must be respected wherever feasible.” (Maxwell v. Superior Court (1982) 30 Cal.3d 606, 615 , fn. omitted, disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th 390 .) Prior to removing appointed defense counsel, we believe the better course is for the court to advise the defendant of the problem and, if possible, to secure a knowing and intelligent waiver.

1988(Id., at p. 672, fn. 7.)” (Sanford, supra, at p. 17 , fn. omitted.) The Sanford court correctly goes on to state that under Maxwell v. Superior Court (1982) 30 Cal.3d 606 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 177 , 639 P.2d 248 , 18 A.L.R.4th 333 ]: “When the issue is raised by defense counsel or a defendant the court must obtain a knowing and intelligent waiver on the record of defendants’ constitutional rights to effective assistance of counsel.

1995The court stated: “[I]t is settled that ‘The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’ (Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) supra, 304 U.S. 458 , 464 . . . ; accord, In re Johnson (1965) supra, 62 Cal.2d 325, 335 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 228 , 398 P.2d 420 ].) This rule applies to minors as well as adults, and the age of the defendant is simply a factor, although an important one, to be weighed with many others i

1995The court stated: “[I]t is settled that ‘The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’ (Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) supra, 304 U.S. 458 , 464 . . . ; accord, In re Johnson (1965) supra, 62 Cal.2d 325, 335 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 228 , 398 P.2d 420 ].) This rule applies to minors as well as adults, and the age of the defendant is simply a factor, although an important one, to be weighed with many others i

2022Appellant’s petition asserted his pleas were not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because defense counsel made certain claims to coerce him to agree to the plea bargain; that as a Spanish-speaking person, he did not understand the meaning of a “life” term as it was used in the plea agreement or discussed at the plea hearing; the interpreter never mentioned a “life” sentence; and the record was allegedly “silent” to show he was advised of, and gave a knowing and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights as required by Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 and In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d

2013(Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 243 ; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 132 .) 6 must conduct further canvassing of the defendant to ensure a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights.” (In re Ibarra, supra, 34 Cal.3d 277 at p. 286 .) We do not read this as imposing a talismanic duty on the trial court to ask the defendant “Do you understand your rights?” or, still less to go through each right individually and grill the defendant as to his or her comprehension of the right.

2025Section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(4) provides in relevant part that the trial on a petition to extend commitment “shall be by jury unless waived by both the person and the prosecuting attorney.” “[A] defendant’s waiver of the right to jury trial may not be accepted by the court unless it is knowing and intelligent, that is, ‘ “ ‘made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it,’ ” ’ as well as voluntary ‘ “ ‘in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or decep

2025Section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(4) provides in relevant part that the trial on a petition to extend commitment “shall be by jury unless waived by both the person and the prosecuting attorney.” “[A] defendant’s waiver of the right to jury trial may not be accepted by the court unless it is knowing and intelligent, that is, ‘ “ ‘made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it,’ ” ’ as well as voluntary ‘ “ ‘in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or decep

2026(Trujillo, at pp. 855–858 [finding forfeiture under a statute entitling the defendant a hearing for the court to determine ability to pay and dictating that the defendant could waive the right to the court’s determination of ability to pay only by a knowing and intelligent waiver]; People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 592, 597 [finding forfeiture under a statute requiring the court to order payment of a 4 fee “ ‘[i]f the person has the ability to pay’ ”].) Courts of appeal have applied forfeiture principles to the theft fine statute, which likewise involves the consideration of ability

2014The defendant must waive the right to a determination by the court of his or her ability to pay and the payment amount by a knowing and intelligent waiver.” 10 Relying on People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589 (McCullough), the Attorney General argues that defendant’s failure to object to imposition of the fee forfeited the issue on appeal.4 McCullough held that a defendant forfeits a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence of his ability to pay a booking fee if he has failed to object when it was imposed.

2016“A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” (Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 464 , italics added; see People v. Spencer (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 931, 940 , criticized on another ground in People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1225-1226 .) For instance, the test for determining whether there is a knowing and intelligent waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel focuses on the accused’s understanding of the implication of waiving his or her right; “a waiver of a constitutional right cannot be considered ‘intelligent’ unless the d

1995The court stated: “[I]t is settled that ‘The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’ (Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) supra, 304 U.S. 458 , 464 . . . ; accord, In re Johnson (1965) supra, 62 Cal.2d 325, 335 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 228 , 398 P.2d 420 ].) This rule applies to minors as well as adults, and the age of the defendant is simply a factor, although an important one, to be weighed with many others i