knowing and intelligent waiver in Nebraska

1981Ed. 2d 530 : “‘We hold, therefore, that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense ... unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.’” It was further stated in the dissent: “The court now holds that it was the duty of the trial court ... to inquire into the financial circumstances of the defendant and ascertain whether the defendant could afford a lawyer.” Id. at 100 , 277 N.W.2d at 558 .

1981In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 , 92 S.Ct. 2006 , 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972), the Court held that no person may be imprisoned for any offense absent a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel.

2025Id.

2025Id.

2021Ed. 2d 383 (1979); State v. Wilson, 252 Neb. 637 , 564 N.W.2d 241 (1997). 14 See State v. Wilson, supra note 13 . - 672 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 308 Nebraska Reports STATE v. WARLICK Cite as 308 Neb. 656 imprisoned is classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony. 15 But an indigent defendant who refuses to accept offered counsel without justifiable reason and elects to proceed pro se has not been deprived of his or her constitutional right to counsel. 16 [14-16] In order to exercise the right of self-representation, a defendant must first make a knowing and intelligent waiver of

2021Ed. 2d 383 (1979); State v. Wilson, 252 Neb. 637 , 564 N.W.2d 241 (1997). 14 See State v. Wilson, supra note 13 . - 672 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 308 Nebraska Reports STATE v. WARLICK Cite as 308 Neb. 656 imprisoned is classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony. 15 But an indigent defendant who refuses to accept offered counsel without justifiable reason and elects to proceed pro se has not been deprived of his or her constitutional right to counsel. 16 [14-16] In order to exercise the right of self-representation, a defendant must first make a knowing and intelligent waiver of

2000Faretta, supra; State v. Dodson, 250 Neb. 584 , 550 N.W.2d 347 (1996), overruled on other grounds, State v. Paul, 256 Neb. 669 , 592 N.W.2d 148 (1999); State v. Green, 238 Neb. 328 , 470 N.W.2d 736 (1991); State v. Jost, 219 Neb. 162 , 361 N.W.2d 526 (1985).

2000Faretta, supra; State v. Dodson, 250 Neb. 584 , 550 N.W.2d 347 (1996), overruled on other grounds, State v. Paul, 256 Neb. 669 , 592 N.W.2d 148 (1999); State v. Green, 238 Neb. 328 , 470 N.W.2d 736 (1991); State v. Jost, 219 Neb. 162 , 361 N.W.2d 526 (1985).

2000Faretta, supra; State v. Dodson, 250 Neb. 584 , 550 N.W.2d 347 (1996), overruled on other grounds, State v. Paul, 256 Neb. 669 , 592 N.W.2d 148 (1999); State v. Green, 238 Neb. 328 , 470 N.W.2d 736 (1991); State v. Jost, 219 Neb. 162 , 361 N.W.2d 526 (1985).

2000Faretta, supra; State v. Dodson, 250 Neb. 584 , 550 N.W.2d 347 (1996), overruled on other grounds, State v. Paul, 256 Neb. 669 , 592 N.W.2d 148 (1999); State v. Green, 238 Neb. 328 , 470 N.W.2d 736 (1991); State v. Jost, 219 Neb. 162 , 361 N.W.2d 526 (1985).

1999Id. (citing Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 , 106 S. Ct. 1404 , 89 L.

1999Id. (citing Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 , 106 S. Ct. 1404 , 89 L.

2025SUTTON Cite as 319 Neb. 581 which an appellate court reviews independently of the trial court’s determination. 12 [3] It is a mixed question of law and fact whether a custodial interrogation has occurred. 13 [4] It is a mixed question of law and fact whether there has been an unambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent or to have counsel. 14 [5] It is a mixed question of law and fact whether invoca- tion of the rights to remain silent or to have counsel have been scrupulously honored. 15 [6] Whether the Miranda warnings that were given were sufficient to form the basis of a knowing an

2025SUTTON Cite as 319 Neb. 581 which an appellate court reviews independently of the trial court’s determination. 12 [3] It is a mixed question of law and fact whether a custodial interrogation has occurred. 13 [4] It is a mixed question of law and fact whether there has been an unambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent or to have counsel. 14 [5] It is a mixed question of law and fact whether invoca- tion of the rights to remain silent or to have counsel have been scrupulously honored. 15 [6] Whether the Miranda warnings that were given were sufficient to form the basis of a knowing an

2025Although Price also argues that the interrogations violated California law because the State failed to prove they were recorded in their entirety, Price did not specifically assign this as error, and we will not address it. (i) Waiver of Miranda Rights Whether the Miranda warnings that were given were suf- ficient to form the basis of a knowing and intelligent waiver of the Fifth Amendment is reviewed de novo, but whether the waiver, based on the totality of the circumstances, was volun- tary is reviewed for clear error. 36 These rights must be know- ingly and voluntarily waived. 37 [24,25] A

2025Although Price also argues that the interrogations violated California law because the State failed to prove they were recorded in their entirety, Price did not specifically assign this as error, and we will not address it. (i) Waiver of Miranda Rights Whether the Miranda warnings that were given were suf- ficient to form the basis of a knowing and intelligent waiver of the Fifth Amendment is reviewed de novo, but whether the waiver, based on the totality of the circumstances, was volun- tary is reviewed for clear error. 36 These rights must be know- ingly and voluntarily waived. 37 [24,25] A

2025SUTTON Cite as 319 Neb. 581 which an appellate court reviews independently of the trial court’s determination. 12 [3] It is a mixed question of law and fact whether a custodial interrogation has occurred. 13 [4] It is a mixed question of law and fact whether there has been an unambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent or to have counsel. 14 [5] It is a mixed question of law and fact whether invoca- tion of the rights to remain silent or to have counsel have been scrupulously honored. 15 [6] Whether the Miranda warnings that were given were sufficient to form the basis of a knowing an

2025SUTTON Cite as 319 Neb. 581 which an appellate court reviews independently of the trial court’s determination. 12 [3] It is a mixed question of law and fact whether a custodial interrogation has occurred. 13 [4] It is a mixed question of law and fact whether there has been an unambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent or to have counsel. 14 [5] It is a mixed question of law and fact whether invoca- tion of the rights to remain silent or to have counsel have been scrupulously honored. 15 [6] Whether the Miranda warnings that were given were sufficient to form the basis of a knowing an

2025SUTTON Cite as 319 Neb. 581 which an appellate court reviews independently of the trial court’s determination. 12 [3] It is a mixed question of law and fact whether a custodial interrogation has occurred. 13 [4] It is a mixed question of law and fact whether there has been an unambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent or to have counsel. 14 [5] It is a mixed question of law and fact whether invoca- tion of the rights to remain silent or to have counsel have been scrupulously honored. 15 [6] Whether the Miranda warnings that were given were sufficient to form the basis of a knowing an

2025SUTTON Cite as 319 Neb. 581 which an appellate court reviews independently of the trial court’s determination. 12 [3] It is a mixed question of law and fact whether a custodial interrogation has occurred. 13 [4] It is a mixed question of law and fact whether there has been an unambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent or to have counsel. 14 [5] It is a mixed question of law and fact whether invoca- tion of the rights to remain silent or to have counsel have been scrupulously honored. 15 [6] Whether the Miranda warnings that were given were sufficient to form the basis of a knowing an

2025Whether those facts meet constitutional standards is a question of law, which an appellate court reviews independently of the trial court’s determination. 34 [23] Whether the Miranda warnings that were given were sufficient to form the basis of a knowing and intelligent waiver of the Fifth Amendment is reviewed de novo, but 32 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L.

2025Whether those facts meet constitutional standards is a question of law, which an appellate court reviews independently of the trial court’s determination. 34 [23] Whether the Miranda warnings that were given were sufficient to form the basis of a knowing and intelligent waiver of the Fifth Amendment is reviewed de novo, but 32 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L.

2025Although Price also argues that the interrogations violated California law because the State failed to prove they were recorded in their entirety, Price did not specifically assign this as error, and we will not address it. (i) Waiver of Miranda Rights Whether the Miranda warnings that were given were suf- ficient to form the basis of a knowing and intelligent waiver of the Fifth Amendment is reviewed de novo, but whether the waiver, based on the totality of the circumstances, was volun- tary is reviewed for clear error. 36 These rights must be know- ingly and voluntarily waived. 37 [24,25] A

2025Although Price also argues that the interrogations violated California law because the State failed to prove they were recorded in their entirety, Price did not specifically assign this as error, and we will not address it. (i) Waiver of Miranda Rights Whether the Miranda warnings that were given were suf- ficient to form the basis of a knowing and intelligent waiver of the Fifth Amendment is reviewed de novo, but whether the waiver, based on the totality of the circumstances, was volun- tary is reviewed for clear error. 36 These rights must be know- ingly and voluntarily waived. 37 [24,25] A

2025SUTTON Cite as 319 Neb. 581 which an appellate court reviews independently of the trial court’s determination. 12 [3] It is a mixed question of law and fact whether a custodial interrogation has occurred. 13 [4] It is a mixed question of law and fact whether there has been an unambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent or to have counsel. 14 [5] It is a mixed question of law and fact whether invoca- tion of the rights to remain silent or to have counsel have been scrupulously honored. 15 [6] Whether the Miranda warnings that were given were sufficient to form the basis of a knowing an

2020The defendant and his counsel were given the opportunity at the sentencing hearing to present any miti- gating factors they wished the court to consider, and defense counsel affirmed that there was no other legal reason why the court should not impose a sentence at that time.26 [14] A knowing and intelligent waiver may be demon- strated by or inferred from the defendant’s conduct.27 Iddings’ 24 See, State v. Sayers, 211 Neb. 555 , 319 N.W.2d 438 (1982); Sedlacek v. State, 147 Neb. 834 , 25 N.W.2d 533 (1946); State v. Robeson, supra note 22 . 25 State v. Robeson, supra note 22 . 26 See, State v

2020The defendant and his counsel were given the opportunity at the sentencing hearing to present any miti- gating factors they wished the court to consider, and defense counsel affirmed that there was no other legal reason why the court should not impose a sentence at that time.26 [14] A knowing and intelligent waiver may be demon- strated by or inferred from the defendant’s conduct.27 Iddings’ 24 See, State v. Sayers, 211 Neb. 555 , 319 N.W.2d 438 (1982); Sedlacek v. State, 147 Neb. 834 , 25 N.W.2d 533 (1946); State v. Robeson, supra note 22 . 25 State v. Robeson, supra note 22 . 26 See, State v

2020The defendant and his counsel were given the opportunity at the sentencing hearing to present any miti- gating factors they wished the court to consider, and defense counsel affirmed that there was no other legal reason why the court should not impose a sentence at that time.26 [14] A knowing and intelligent waiver may be demon- strated by or inferred from the defendant’s conduct.27 Iddings’ 24 See, State v. Sayers, 211 Neb. 555 , 319 N.W.2d 438 (1982); Sedlacek v. State, 147 Neb. 834 , 25 N.W.2d 533 (1946); State v. Robeson, supra note 22 . 25 State v. Robeson, supra note 22 . 26 See, State v

2020The defendant and his counsel were given the opportunity at the sentencing hearing to present any miti- gating factors they wished the court to consider, and defense counsel affirmed that there was no other legal reason why the court should not impose a sentence at that time.26 [14] A knowing and intelligent waiver may be demon- strated by or inferred from the defendant’s conduct.27 Iddings’ 24 See, State v. Sayers, 211 Neb. 555 , 319 N.W.2d 438 (1982); Sedlacek v. State, 147 Neb. 834 , 25 N.W.2d 533 (1946); State v. Robeson, supra note 22 . 25 State v. Robeson, supra note 22 . 26 See, State v

2020The defendant and his counsel were given the opportunity at the sentencing hearing to present any miti- gating factors they wished the court to consider, and defense counsel affirmed that there was no other legal reason why the court should not impose a sentence at that time.26 [14] A knowing and intelligent waiver may be demon- strated by or inferred from the defendant’s conduct.27 Iddings’ 24 See, State v. Sayers, 211 Neb. 555 , 319 N.W.2d 438 (1982); Sedlacek v. State, 147 Neb. 834 , 25 N.W.2d 533 (1946); State v. Robeson, supra note 22 . 25 State v. Robeson, supra note 22 . 26 See, State v

2018Therefore, we hold that Cotton made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the con- flict of interest on the record. (iii) Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Accepting Cotton’s Waiver [30,31] When determining whether or not to disqualify a defense counsel, the court must balance two Sixth Amendment rights: (1) the defendant’s right to be represented by counsel of choice and (2) his or her right to a defense conducted by an attorney who is free of conflicts of interest.58 The U.S. Supreme Court has also recognized an independent interest of the courts in ensuring that criminal trials are conduc

2018Therefore, we hold that Cotton made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the con- flict of interest on the record. (iii) Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Accepting Cotton’s Waiver [30,31] When determining whether or not to disqualify a defense counsel, the court must balance two Sixth Amendment rights: (1) the defendant’s right to be represented by counsel of choice and (2) his or her right to a defense conducted by an attorney who is free of conflicts of interest.58 The U.S. Supreme Court has also recognized an independent interest of the courts in ensuring that criminal trials are conduc

2018Therefore, we hold that Cotton made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the con- flict of interest on the record. (iii) Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Accepting Cotton’s Waiver [30,31] When determining whether or not to disqualify a defense counsel, the court must balance two Sixth Amendment rights: (1) the defendant’s right to be represented by counsel of choice and (2) his or her right to a defense conducted by an attorney who is free of conflicts of interest.58 The U.S. Supreme Court has also recognized an independent interest of the courts in ensuring that criminal trials are conduc

2006In State v. Dunster, 262 Neb. 329, 631 N.W.2d 879 (2001), we determined that the defendant had made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel in that the trial court found him *886 to be competent.

2006In State v. Dunster, 262 Neb. 329, 631 N.W.2d 879 (2001), we determined that the defendant had made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel in that the trial court found him *886 to be competent.

2005U.S. v. Egwaoje, supra. Rather, the court’s ultimate inquiry is whether the record supports a knowing and intelligent waiver, regardless of the consideration of the four factors.

2005Id.

2002Id.

2000Faretta, supra; State v. Dodson, 250 Neb. 584 , 550 N.W.2d 347 (1996), overruled on other grounds, State v. Paul, 256 Neb. 669 , 592 N.W.2d 148 (1999); State v. Green, 238 Neb. 328 , 470 N.W.2d 736 (1991); State v. Jost, 219 Neb. 162 , 361 N.W.2d 526 (1985).

2000Faretta, supra; State v. Dodson, 250 Neb. 584 , 550 N.W.2d 347 (1996), overruled on other grounds, State v. Paul, 256 Neb. 669 , 592 N.W.2d 148 (1999); State v. Green, 238 Neb. 328 , 470 N.W.2d 736 (1991); State v. Jost, 219 Neb. 162 , 361 N.W.2d 526 (1985).

1997Id.