31 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2025 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Argersinger v. Hamlingreen2 sentences2021Such summary vindication of the court’s dignity and authority is necessary.”). ¶9 Mason asserts that subsequent Supreme Court case law acknowledging that “[c]riminal contempt is a crime in the ordinary sense” and that “criminal penalties may not be imposed on someone who has not been afforded the protections that the Constitution requires of such criminal proceedings,” International Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 826 (1994) (quotation simplified); see also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (“[A]bsent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be im 2005In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 , 92 S.Ct. 2006 , 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972), the United States Supreme Court first held that “absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.” Id. at 37 , 92 S.Ct. 2006 . | 3 | 7 |
State v. Pedockiegreen2 sentences2025See Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, ¶ 45 (stating that, even when the trial court does not conduct a sufficient colloquy, “a reviewing court should review the record de novo to determine whether the 20230322-CA 14 2025 UT App 157 State v. Horrocks defendant knowingly and intelligently waived [the] right to counsel”); Lucke, 2025 UT App 49, ¶ 32 (“Even without an adequate colloquy, we may still review the record de novo to determine whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived [the] right to counsel.” (cleaned up)). 2011Furthermore, he argues that the trial court prevented him from obtaining counsel by refusing to facilitate confidential communication with potential attorneys and that his mental health issues prevented him from making a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. 115 "[Tlhe Sixth Amendment implicitly guarantees criminal defendants the ability to waive their right to the assistance of counsel and proceed pro se." State v. Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, ¶ 26 , 187 P.83d 716 (citing Fareita v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818-32 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 LEd.2d 562 (1975)). | 2 | 4 |
Scott v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences1992This section implements the requirements of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which requires that, “[ajbsent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless that person was represented by counsel at trial.” See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 , 92 S.Ct. 2006, 2012 , 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972); see also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 , 99 S.Ct. 1158, 1162 , 59 L.Ed.2d 383 (1978). 1992This section implements the requirements of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which requires that, “[ajbsent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless that person was represented by counsel at trial.” See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 , 92 S.Ct. 2006, 2012 , 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972); see also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 , 99 S.Ct. 1158, 1162 , 59 L.Ed.2d 383 (1978). | 2 | 4 |
State v. Mooregreen2 sentences2019See State v. Moore , 697 P.2d 233 , 236 (Utah 1985) (holding that after showing that the accused initiated contact with law enforcement, "the prosecution must show, on the motion to suppress, a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel"); see also Martinez v. Cate , 903 F.3d 982 , 992-93 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that "[i]f the accused invoked his right to counsel, courts may admit his responses to further questioning only on finding that he (a) initiated further discussions with the police, and (b) knowingly and intelligently waived the right he had invoked" (cleaned up) ); Bush v 2019See State v. Moore , 697 P.2d 233 , 236 (Utah 1985) (holding that after showing that the accused initiated contact with law enforcement, "the prosecution must show, on the motion to suppress, a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel"); see also Martinez v. Cate , 903 F.3d 982 , 992-93 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that "[i]f the accused invoked his right to counsel, courts may admit his responses to further questioning only on finding that he (a) initiated further discussions with the police, and (b) knowingly and intelligently waived the right he had invoked" (cleaned up) ); Bush v | 2 | 3 |
State v. Bakalovgreen2 sentences2025“Consideration of the defendant’s best interests is not relevant to the determination of whether or not a knowing and intelligent waiver has been made.” State v. Bakalov, 849 P.2d 629, 633 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 862 P.2d 1354 (Utah 1993) (per curiam). 2025“Consideration of the defendant’s best interests is not relevant to the determination of whether or not a knowing and intelligent waiver has been made.” State v. Bakalov, 849 P.2d 629, 633 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 862 P.2d 1354 (Utah 1993) (per curiam). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Hilfikergreen2 sentences2019See State v. Moore , 697 P.2d 233 , 236 (Utah 1985) (holding that after showing that the accused initiated contact with law enforcement, "the prosecution must show, on the motion to suppress, a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel"); see also Martinez v. Cate , 903 F.3d 982 , 992-93 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that "[i]f the accused invoked his right to counsel, courts may admit his responses to further questioning only on finding that he (a) initiated further discussions with the police, and (b) knowingly and intelligently waived the right he had invoked" (cleaned up) ); Bush v 2019See Hilfiker , 868 P.2d at 831 (cleaned up). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Framptongreen2 sentences2025While making such a finding may be the best course, see State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183 , 187 n.12 (Utah 1987), it is not required for a waiver of the right to counsel to be effective. “[W]hether a knowing and intelligent waiver has been made turns upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding each case.” Id. at 188 . 2025While making such a finding may be the best course, see State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183 , 187 n.12 (Utah 1987), it is not required for a waiver of the right to counsel to be effective. “[W]hether a knowing and intelligent waiver has been made turns upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding each case.” Id. at 188 . | 1 | 3 |
State v. Pattongreen2 sentences2025See, e.g., id. (holding that “the colloquy was inadequate” where it “addressed only two of Frampton’s recommended questions”); West, 2023 UT App 61, ¶¶ 36, 39 (holding that the defendant’s waiver of counsel was not knowing and intelligent even though the district court warned her that “she may have put herself at a disadvantage”); Patton, 2023 UT App 33, ¶¶ 17, 21 (same). ¶27 The question of “whether a knowing and intelligent waiver has been made turns upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding each case.” Frampton, 737 P.2d at 188 . 2025See, e.g., Pedockie, 2006 UT 28 , ¶¶ 50–52; State v. Lee, 2024 UT App 2 , ¶¶ 11–18, 542 P.3d 974 ; West, 2023 UT App 61 , ¶¶ 32–39; Patton, 2023 UT App 33, ¶ 31 ; State v. Houston, 2006 UT App 437, ¶ 11 , 147 P.3d 543 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Westgreen2 sentences2025See, e.g., id. (holding that “the colloquy was inadequate” where it “addressed only two of Frampton’s recommended questions”); West, 2023 UT App 61, ¶¶ 36, 39 (holding that the defendant’s waiver of counsel was not knowing and intelligent even though the district court warned her that “she may have put herself at a disadvantage”); Patton, 2023 UT App 33, ¶¶ 17, 21 (same). ¶27 The question of “whether a knowing and intelligent waiver has been made turns upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding each case.” Frampton, 737 P.2d at 188 . 2025See, e.g., Pedockie, 2006 UT 28 , ¶¶ 50–52; State v. Lee, 2024 UT App 2 , ¶¶ 11–18, 542 P.3d 974 ; West, 2023 UT App 61 , ¶¶ 32–39; Patton, 2023 UT App 33, ¶ 31 ; State v. Houston, 2006 UT App 437, ¶ 11 , 147 P.3d 543 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Leegreen2 sentences2025See, e.g., id. (holding that “the colloquy was inadequate” where it “addressed only two of Frampton’s recommended questions”); West, 2023 UT App 61, ¶¶ 36, 39 (holding that the defendant’s waiver of counsel was not knowing and intelligent even though the district court warned her that “she may have put herself at a disadvantage”); Patton, 2023 UT App 33, ¶¶ 17, 21 (same). ¶27 The question of “whether a knowing and intelligent waiver has been made turns upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding each case.” Frampton, 737 P.2d at 188 . 2025See, e.g., Pedockie, 2006 UT 28 , ¶¶ 50–52; State v. Lee, 2024 UT App 2 , ¶¶ 11–18, 542 P.3d 974 ; West, 2023 UT App 61 , ¶¶ 32–39; Patton, 2023 UT App 33, ¶ 31 ; State v. Houston, 2006 UT App 437, ¶ 11 , 147 P.3d 543 . | 1 | 2 |
Faretta v. Californiagreen2 sentences2011Furthermore, he argues that the trial court prevented him from obtaining counsel by refusing to facilitate confidential communication with potential attorneys and that his mental health issues prevented him from making a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. 115 "[Tlhe Sixth Amendment implicitly guarantees criminal defendants the ability to waive their right to the assistance of counsel and proceed pro se." State v. Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, ¶ 26 , 187 P.83d 716 (citing Fareita v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818-32 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 LEd.2d 562 (1975)). 2011Furthermore, he argues that the trial court prevented him from obtaining counsel by refusing to facilitate confidential communication with potential attorneys and that his mental health issues prevented him from making a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. 115 "[Tlhe Sixth Amendment implicitly guarantees criminal defendants the ability to waive their right to the assistance of counsel and proceed pro se." State v. Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, ¶ 26 , 187 P.83d 716 (citing Fareita v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818-32 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 LEd.2d 562 (1975)). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Luckegreen2 sentences2025See Lucke, 2025 UT App 49, ¶ 25 (stating that the Frampton colloquy “provides both the defendant and the court with the necessary information to determine that the defendant’s waiver of counsel was indeed knowing and intelligent”). ¶26 It is undisputed that the trial court in this case did not provide Horrocks with a complete Frampton colloquy. 2025See 2025 UT App 49, ¶ 30 . ¶28 The second possible path under which a court might find a knowing and intelligent waiver, even where no complete colloquy is present, involves an examination of the entire record. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Horrocksgreen2 sentences2025Compare Frampton, 737 P.2d at 188 (“Even absent such a colloquy, however, this [c]ourt will look at any evidence in the (continued…) 20230322-CA 15 2025 UT App 157 State v. Horrocks one of those presumably rare cases in which the record indicates that a defendant who was not provided a proper colloquy nevertheless made a knowing and intelligent waiver. ¶29 On a few occasions, Utah’s appellate courts have concluded that, despite the lack of a proper colloquy, the record contained enough evidence to show that the defendant nevertheless made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counse 2025More often, when the absence of a full colloquy compels an examination of the complete record, courts conclude that the record does not support the conclusion 20230322-CA 17 2025 UT App 157 State v. Horrocks that the defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel. | 1 | 1 |
International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwellgreen1 sentence2021Such summary vindication of the court’s dignity and authority is necessary.”). ¶9 Mason asserts that subsequent Supreme Court case law acknowledging that “[c]riminal contempt is a crime in the ordinary sense” and that “criminal penalties may not be imposed on someone who has not been afforded the protections that the Constitution requires of such criminal proceedings,” International Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 826 (1994) (quotation simplified); see also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (“[A]bsent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be im | 1 | 1 |
Daniel Martinez v. Matthew Categreen1 sentence2019See State v. Moore , 697 P.2d 233 , 236 (Utah 1985) (holding that after showing that the accused initiated contact with law enforcement, "the prosecution must show, on the motion to suppress, a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel"); see also Martinez v. Cate , 903 F.3d 982 , 992-93 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that "[i]f the accused invoked his right to counsel, courts may admit his responses to further questioning only on finding that he (a) initiated further discussions with the police, and (b) knowingly and intelligently waived the right he had invoked" (cleaned up) ); Bush v | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Duckworthgreen1 sentence2019See State v. Moore , 697 P.2d 233 , 236 (Utah 1985) (holding that after showing that the accused initiated contact with law enforcement, "the prosecution must show, on the motion to suppress, a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel"); see also Martinez v. Cate , 903 F.3d 982 , 992-93 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that "[i]f the accused invoked his right to counsel, courts may admit his responses to further questioning only on finding that he (a) initiated further discussions with the police, and (b) knowingly and intelligently waived the right he had invoked" (cleaned up) ); Bush v | 1 | 1 |
Oregon v. Bradshawgreen2 sentences2019See State v. Moore , 697 P.2d 233 , 236 (Utah 1985) (holding that after showing that the accused initiated contact with law enforcement, "the prosecution must show, on the motion to suppress, a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel"); see also Martinez v. Cate , 903 F.3d 982 , 992-93 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that "[i]f the accused invoked his right to counsel, courts may admit his responses to further questioning only on finding that he (a) initiated further discussions with the police, and (b) knowingly and intelligently waived the right he had invoked" (cleaned up) ); Bush v 2019See State v. Moore , 697 P.2d 233 , 236 (Utah 1985) (holding that after showing that the accused initiated contact with law enforcement, "the prosecution must show, on the motion to suppress, a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel"); see also Martinez v. Cate , 903 F.3d 982 , 992-93 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that "[i]f the accused invoked his right to counsel, courts may admit his responses to further questioning only on finding that he (a) initiated further discussions with the police, and (b) knowingly and intelligently waived the right he had invoked" (cleaned up) ); Bush v | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Roman G. Weningergreen1 sentence2006See United States v. Weninger, 624 F.2d 163, 167 (10th Cir.1980) ("We hold that [the defendant's] stubborn failure to hire an attorney constituted a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to assistance of counsel."). 18 The Utah Supreme Court has determined that an implied waiver must meet two requirements: it must be voluntary, and the defendant must have given it knowingly and intelligently. | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Cole, Reginald. Appeal of Reginald Colegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gideon v. Wainwrightgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Johnsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Miranda v. Arizonagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Viagreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. McNicolgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Bakalov
green
2 sentences2025“Consideration of the defendant’s best interests is not relevant to the determination of whether or not a knowing and intelligent waiver has been made.” State v. Bakalov, 849 P.2d 629, 633 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 862 P.2d 1354 (Utah 1993) (per curiam). 2025“Consideration of the defendant’s best interests is not relevant to the determination of whether or not a knowing and intelligent waiver has been made.” State v. Bakalov, 849 P.2d 629, 633 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 862 P.2d 1354 (Utah 1993) (per curiam). | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Edwards v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1993Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 , 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884-85 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). 18 .Defendant also claims that the trial court erred by failing, in its findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning admissibility of the statements, to make a proper finding concerning the knowing and intelligent requirement of a valid waiver. 1993Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 , 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884-85 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). 18 .Defendant also claims that the trial court erred by failing, in its findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning admissibility of the statements, to make a proper finding concerning the knowing and intelligent requirement of a valid waiver. | 2 | 1993–1993 |
State v. Bozarth
green
2 sentences2025Under those unique circumstances, our supreme court held that “the record adequately support[ed] the conclusion that [the] defendant knowingly and intelligently waived the right to representation by counsel.” Id. ¶30 Similarly, in State v. Bozarth, this court concluded that, despite the lack of a proper colloquy, the record indicated that the defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. 2021 UT App 117 , ¶¶ 40–50, 501 P.3d 116 . 2025Under those unique circumstances, our supreme court held that “the record adequately support[ed] the conclusion that [the] defendant knowingly and intelligently waived the right to representation by counsel.” Id. ¶30 Similarly, in State v. Bozarth, this court concluded that, despite the lack of a proper colloquy, the record indicated that the defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. 2021 UT App 117 , ¶¶ 40–50, 501 P.3d 116 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Houston
neutral
2 sentences2025See, e.g., Pedockie, 2006 UT 28 , ¶¶ 50–52; State v. Lee, 2024 UT App 2 , ¶¶ 11–18, 542 P.3d 974 ; West, 2023 UT App 61 , ¶¶ 32–39; Patton, 2023 UT App 33, ¶ 31 ; State v. Houston, 2006 UT App 437, ¶ 11 , 147 P.3d 543 . 2025See, e.g., Pedockie, 2006 UT 28 , ¶¶ 50–52; State v. Lee, 2024 UT App 2 , ¶¶ 11–18, 542 P.3d 974 ; West, 2023 UT App 61 , ¶¶ 32–39; Patton, 2023 UT App 33, ¶ 31 ; State v. Houston, 2006 UT App 437, ¶ 11 , 147 P.3d 543 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Levering
neutral
2 sentences2025Here, the “record adequately 20221004-CA 16 2025 UT App 111 State v. Levering supports the conclusion that [Levering] knowingly and intelligently waived the right to representation by counsel.” Id. at 189 . ¶31 The court engaged with Levering in an extensive, if incomplete, colloquy about his request to waive his right to counsel that spanned five pages of the transcript. 2025Here, the “record adequately 20221004-CA 16 2025 UT App 111 State v. Levering supports the conclusion that [Levering] knowingly and intelligently waived the right to representation by counsel.” Id. at 189 . ¶31 The court engaged with Levering in an extensive, if incomplete, colloquy about his request to waive his right to counsel that spanned five pages of the transcript. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Barrett
green
2 sentences2019See State v. Moore , 697 P.2d 233 , 236 (Utah 1985) (holding that after showing that the accused initiated contact with law enforcement, "the prosecution must show, on the motion to suppress, a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel"); see also Martinez v. Cate , 903 F.3d 982 , 992-93 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that "[i]f the accused invoked his right to counsel, courts may admit his responses to further questioning only on finding that he (a) initiated further discussions with the police, and (b) knowingly and intelligently waived the right he had invoked" (cleaned up) ); Bush v 2019See State v. Moore , 697 P.2d 233 , 236 (Utah 1985) (holding that after showing that the accused initiated contact with law enforcement, "the prosecution must show, on the motion to suppress, a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel"); see also Martinez v. Cate , 903 F.3d 982 , 992-93 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that "[i]f the accused invoked his right to counsel, courts may admit his responses to further questioning only on finding that he (a) initiated further discussions with the police, and (b) knowingly and intelligently waived the right he had invoked" (cleaned up) ); Bush v | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Anthony Bone v. Marvin Polk
green
1 sentence2019See State v. Moore , 697 P.2d 233 , 236 (Utah 1985) (holding that after showing that the accused initiated contact with law enforcement, "the prosecution must show, on the motion to suppress, a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel"); see also Martinez v. Cate , 903 F.3d 982 , 992-93 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that "[i]f the accused invoked his right to counsel, courts may admit his responses to further questioning only on finding that he (a) initiated further discussions with the police, and (b) knowingly and intelligently waived the right he had invoked" (cleaned up) ); Bush v | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Bush v. Warden, Southern Ohio Correctional Facility
green
1 sentence2019See State v. Moore , 697 P.2d 233 , 236 (Utah 1985) (holding that after showing that the accused initiated contact with law enforcement, "the prosecution must show, on the motion to suppress, a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel"); see also Martinez v. Cate , 903 F.3d 982 , 992-93 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that "[i]f the accused invoked his right to counsel, courts may admit his responses to further questioning only on finding that he (a) initiated further discussions with the police, and (b) knowingly and intelligently waived the right he had invoked" (cleaned up) ); Bush v | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Von Ferguson
green
2 sentences2015Ferguson, 2007 UT 1, ¶ 41 , 169 P.3d 423 . 2015Ferguson, 2007 UT 1, ¶ 41 , 169 P.3d 423 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Dunn
green
1 sentence2013To prove plain error, an appellant must show that "(i) [aln error exists; (i) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and Gif) the error is harmful. . .." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
van Frank v. Salt Lake City Corporation
neutral
2 sentences2013However, we review the legal standards applied by the [trial] court in denying [a] motion [for a new trial] for correctness." Van Frank v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2012 UT App 188, ¶ 7 , 283 P.3d 535 (alterations and first omission in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 10 Finally, Hall contends that the trial court plainly erred by denying his pro se motion for a new trial without first obtaining a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. 2013However, we review the legal standards applied by the [trial] court in denying [a] motion [for a new trial] for correctness." Van Frank v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2012 UT App 188, ¶ 7 , 283 P.3d 535 (alterations and first omission in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 10 Finally, Hall contends that the trial court plainly erred by denying his pro se motion for a new trial without first obtaining a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Oregon v. Elstad
green
2 sentences2006Id. (holding that suspect who responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning that resulted in inculpatory admission was not disabled from waiving rights and making confession after being given Miranda warnings. 3 T8 Like the United States Supreme Court, Utah courts have also held that absent any coercion during the first unwarned admission, a defendant's subsequent statements are admissible if they were voluntarily made after a knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights. 2006In short, Defendant's pre-Miranda statements were not "[ Jaccompanied by any actual coercion or other cireumstances calculated to undermine [his] ability to exercise his free will." Wistad, 470 U.S. at 809 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 . 111 Because we have determined that Defendant's pre-Miranda statements were not coerced, we must now examine whether his post-Miranda statements were voluntarily made after a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| State v. James green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| State v. Beckstead green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| State v. Rawlings green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| United States v. David Lawson green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Schneckloth v. Bustamonte green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| State v. Drobel green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| United States v. Robert Martinez green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Newton green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Alires v. Turner green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| State v. Tippetts neutral | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Glasser v. United States green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| United States v. Anna Erna Lawriw green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Commonwealth v. Westbrook green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.