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15 Rhode Island opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Rhode Island courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Fare v. Michael C.green2 sentences2022See - 44 - Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (“Only if the ‘totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation’ reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived.”) (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979)); see also State v. Amado, 424 A.2d 1057, 1062 (R.I. 1981) (“A review of all the ‘attendant circumstances’ is as important to a consideration of the voluntariness of a confession as it is to the determination of whether a knowing and intelligent waiver was made.”). 1981Compare Lynumn v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 528, 534-35 , 83 S.Ct. 917, 920-21 , 9 L.Ed.2d 922, 926 (1963) with Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. at 725 , 99 S.Ct. at 2572 , 61 L.Ed.2d at 212 . | 3 | 3 |
Faretta v. Californiagreen2 sentences2007The United States Supreme Court held that “absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense * * * unless he was represented by counsel * * Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662 , 122 S.Ct. 1764 , 152 L.Ed.2d 888 (2002) (quoting Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 , 92 S.Ct. 2006 , 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972)); see also State v. Bluitt, 850 A.2d 83, 88-89 (R.I.2004) (holding that trial judges must be satisfied that an accused is making a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of counsel, having been advised of “the dangers and disadvantages of self-representa 2007The United States Supreme Court held that “absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense * * * unless he was represented by counsel * * Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662 , 122 S.Ct. 1764 , 152 L.Ed.2d 888 (2002) (quoting Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 , 92 S.Ct. 2006 , 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972)); see also State v. Bluitt, 850 A.2d 83, 88-89 (R.I.2004) (holding that trial judges must be satisfied that an accused is making a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of counsel, having been advised of “the dangers and disadvantages of self-representa | 3 | 3 |
Lynumn v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences1981Compare Lynumn v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 528, 534-35 , 83 S.Ct. 917, 920-21 , 9 L.Ed.2d 922, 926 (1963) with Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. at 725 , 99 S.Ct. at 2572 , 61 L.Ed.2d at 212 . 1981Compare Lynumn v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 528, 534-35 , 83 S.Ct. 917, 920-21 , 9 L.Ed.2d 922, 926 (1963) with Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. at 725 , 99 S.Ct. at 2572 , 61 L.Ed.2d at 212 . | 2 | 2 |
Argersinger v. Hamlingreen2 sentences2007The United States Supreme Court held that “absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense * * * unless he was represented by counsel * * Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662 , 122 S.Ct. 1764 , 152 L.Ed.2d 888 (2002) (quoting Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 , 92 S.Ct. 2006 , 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972)); see also State v. Bluitt, 850 A.2d 83, 88-89 (R.I.2004) (holding that trial judges must be satisfied that an accused is making a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of counsel, having been advised of “the dangers and disadvantages of self-representa 2007The United States Supreme Court held that “absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense * * * unless he was represented by counsel * * Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662 , 122 S.Ct. 1764 , 152 L.Ed.2d 888 (2002) (quoting Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 , 92 S.Ct. 2006 , 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972)); see also State v. Bluitt, 850 A.2d 83, 88-89 (R.I.2004) (holding that trial judges must be satisfied that an accused is making a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of counsel, having been advised of “the dangers and disadvantages of self-representa | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Rojas Tapiagreen1 sentence2022The assessment of the totality of the circumstances may include consideration of “both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation[.]” United States v. Rojas-Tapia, 446 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Amadogreen1 sentence2022See - 44 - Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (“Only if the ‘totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation’ reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived.”) (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979)); see also State v. Amado, 424 A.2d 1057, 1062 (R.I. 1981) (“A review of all the ‘attendant circumstances’ is as important to a consideration of the voluntariness of a confession as it is to the determination of whether a knowing and intelligent waiver was made.”). | 1 | 1 |
Schneckloth v. Bustamontegreen1 sentence2022The assessment of the totality of the circumstances may include consideration of “both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation[.]” United States v. Rojas-Tapia, 446 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)). | 1 | 1 |
Moran v. Burbinegreen1 sentence2022See - 44 - Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (“Only if the ‘totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation’ reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived.”) (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979)); see also State v. Amado, 424 A.2d 1057, 1062 (R.I. 1981) (“A review of all the ‘attendant circumstances’ is as important to a consideration of the voluntariness of a confession as it is to the determination of whether a knowing and intelligent waiver was made.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jimenezgreen2 sentences2020“We have further stated that ‘a knowing and intelligent waiver may be executed when a defendant is apprised of the Miranda warnings, comprehends such warnings, and thereafter makes a voluntary statement.’” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Jimenez, 33 A.3d 724, 735 (R.I. 2011)). 2020“Assessing whether or not a knowing and intelligent wavier took place requires ‘an analysis of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.’” Munir, 209 A.3d at 552 (quoting Jimenez, 33 A.3d at 734 ). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ana M. Cruzgreen1 sentence2017See Cruz, 109 A.3d at 393 (“[Although an explicit Chabot discussion would have been preferable, the absence of such a colloquy does not infect [a] defendant’s waiver of counsel with any constitutional defect.”). | 1 | 1 |
Azevedo v. Stategreen1 sentence2013See Azevedo v. State, 945 A.2d 335, 338 (R.I.2008) (where this Court considered “the testimony of trial counsel, the transcript of the plea proceeding, and [the] applicant’s own responses to questioning” to determine if a plea was a knowing and intelligent waiver). | 1 | 1 |
Berghuis v. Thompkinsgreen2 sentences2011Berghuis v. Thompkins, — U.S. -, -, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2262 , 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) (“Where the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused’s uneoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent.”). 2011Berghuis v. Thompkins, — U.S. -, -, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2262 , 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) (“Where the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused’s uneoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bluittgreen1 sentence2007The United States Supreme Court held that “absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense * * * unless he was represented by counsel * * Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662 , 122 S.Ct. 1764 , 152 L.Ed.2d 888 (2002) (quoting Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 , 92 S.Ct. 2006 , 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972)); see also State v. Bluitt, 850 A.2d 83, 88-89 (R.I.2004) (holding that trial judges must be satisfied that an accused is making a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of counsel, having been advised of “the dangers and disadvantages of self-representa | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Mark D. Goadgreen2 sentences2002See, e.g., United States v. Goad, 44 F.3d 580, 588-89 (7th Cir.1995); United States v. Fant, 890 F.2d 408, 409-10 (11th Cir.1989); State v. Harmon, 575 N.W.2d 635, 642 (N.D.1997). 2002See, e.g., United States v. Goad, 44 F.3d 580, 588-89 (7th Cir.1995); United States v. Fant, 890 F.2d 408, 409-10 (11th Cir.1989); State v. Harmon, 575 N.W.2d 635, 642 (N.D.1997). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Harmongreen2 sentences2002See, e.g., United States v. Goad, 44 F.3d 580, 588-89 (7th Cir.1995); United States v. Fant, 890 F.2d 408, 409-10 (11th Cir.1989); State v. Harmon, 575 N.W.2d 635, 642 (N.D.1997). 2002See, e.g., United States v. Goad, 44 F.3d 580, 588-89 (7th Cir.1995); United States v. Fant, 890 F.2d 408, 409-10 (11th Cir.1989); State v. Harmon, 575 N.W.2d 635, 642 (N.D.1997). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Arnold Norman Fantgreen2 sentences2002See, e.g., United States v. Goad, 44 F.3d 580, 588-89 (7th Cir.1995); United States v. Fant, 890 F.2d 408, 409-10 (11th Cir.1989); State v. Harmon, 575 N.W.2d 635, 642 (N.D.1997). 2002See, e.g., United States v. Goad, 44 F.3d 580, 588-89 (7th Cir.1995); United States v. Fant, 890 F.2d 408, 409-10 (11th Cir.1989); State v. Harmon, 575 N.W.2d 635, 642 (N.D.1997). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Spencergreen2 sentences2002See Spencer, 783 A.2d at 417 . 2002See Spencer, 783 A.2d at 417 . | 1 | 1 |
Claveau v. Starkgreen1 sentence1999In State v. Buxton , 643 A.2d 172 (Rd. 94) our court at page 175 cites to State v. Cook , 244 A.2d 822 at 835 (R.I. 1968) which determined that in order for a court to permit an accused to be subject to prosecution, three things must be found: first, that the defendant understands the nature of the charges brought against the defendant; second, that the defendant appreciates the purpose and object of the trial proceedings based thereon: and third, that the defendant has the mental capacity to assist reasonably and rationally his counsel in preparing and putting forth a defense to the criminal | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Burnsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wong Sun v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brown v. Illinoisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. LaRosagreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Espinosagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Rhode Island. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hasim Munir
green
1 sentence2020“Assessing whether or not a knowing and intelligent wavier took place requires ‘an analysis of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.’” Munir, 209 A.3d at 552 (quoting Jimenez, 33 A.3d at 734 ). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Gerrit Musterd
green
1 sentence2020“We have further stated that ‘a knowing and intelligent waiver may be executed when a defendant is apprised of the Miranda warnings, comprehends such warnings, and thereafter makes a voluntary statement.’” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Jimenez, 33 A.3d 724, 735 (R.I. 2011)). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Illinois v. Allen
green
2 sentences2015Moreover, we echo one of the Supreme Court’s fundamental teachings on the right of self-representation that, “although [defendant] may conduct h[er] own defense ultimately to h[er] own detriment, h[er] choice must be honored out of ‘that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.’ ” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51 , 90 S.Ct. 1057 , 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)). 2015Moreover, we echo one of the Supreme Court’s fundamental teachings on the right of self-representation that, “although [defendant] may conduct h[er] own defense ultimately to h[er] own detriment, h[er] choice must be honored out of ‘that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.’ ” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51 , 90 S.Ct. 1057 , 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Sampson
green
1 sentence2015See, e.g., Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 ; Sampson, 24 A.3d at 1143 ; Costa, 604 A.2d at 330 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Costa
green
1 sentence2015See, e.g., Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 ; Sampson, 24 A.3d at 1143 ; Costa, 604 A.2d at 330 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Frazar
green
1 sentence2013This Court repeatedly has held that it “shall not vacate a plea unless the record viewed in its totality discloses no facts that could have satisfied the trial justice that a factual basis existed for a defendant’s plea.” Frazar, 822 A.2d at 935 -36 (quoting Feng, 421 A.2d at 1269 ). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Feng
green
1 sentence2013This Court repeatedly has held that it “shall not vacate a plea unless the record viewed in its totality discloses no facts that could have satisfied the trial justice that a factual basis existed for a defendant’s plea.” Frazar, 822 A.2d at 935 -36 (quoting Feng, 421 A.2d at 1269 ). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Alabama v. Shelton
green
2 sentences2007The United States Supreme Court held that “absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense * * * unless he was represented by counsel * * Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662 , 122 S.Ct. 1764 , 152 L.Ed.2d 888 (2002) (quoting Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 , 92 S.Ct. 2006 , 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972)); see also State v. Bluitt, 850 A.2d 83, 88-89 (R.I.2004) (holding that trial judges must be satisfied that an accused is making a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of counsel, having been advised of “the dangers and disadvantages of self-representa 2007The United States Supreme Court held that “absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense * * * unless he was represented by counsel * * Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662 , 122 S.Ct. 1764 , 152 L.Ed.2d 888 (2002) (quoting Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 , 92 S.Ct. 2006 , 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972)); see also State v. Bluitt, 850 A.2d 83, 88-89 (R.I.2004) (holding that trial judges must be satisfied that an accused is making a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of counsel, having been advised of “the dangers and disadvantages of self-representa | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Shatney v. State
green
1 sentence2002The applicant also argues that the PCR hearing justice did not comply with the dictates of Shatney v. State, 755 A.2d 130 (R.I.2000) (per curiam) when the court considered his PCR application. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Buxton
green
1 sentence1999In State v. Buxton , 643 A.2d 172 (Rd. 94) our court at page 175 cites to State v. Cook , 244 A.2d 822 at 835 (R.I. 1968) which determined that in order for a court to permit an accused to be subject to prosecution, three things must be found: first, that the defendant understands the nature of the charges brought against the defendant; second, that the defendant appreciates the purpose and object of the trial proceedings based thereon: and third, that the defendant has the mental capacity to assist reasonably and rationally his counsel in preparing and putting forth a defense to the criminal | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Edwards v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1991The case of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), holds that after a suspect who is under interrogation requests an attorney, that interrogation must cease and interrogation may not be reinitiated by the police unless the suspect initiates the conversation and in the course thereof makes a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. 1991The case of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), holds that after a suspect who is under interrogation requests an attorney, that interrogation must cease and interrogation may not be reinitiated by the police unless the suspect initiates the conversation and in the course thereof makes a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Oregon v. Bradshaw
green
2 sentences1991Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 , 103 S.Ct. 2830 , 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983). 1991Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 , 103 S.Ct. 2830 , 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.