knowing and intelligent waiver in Arkansas

2012Philyaw v. State, 288 Ark. 237 , 704 S.W.2d 608 (1986), overruled on other grounds by Oliver, supra. The constitutional minimum for a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel requires that the accused be made sufficiently aware of his right to have counsel present and of the possible consequences of a decision to fore-go the aid of counsel.

2012Philyaw v. State, 288 Ark. 237 , 704 S.W.2d 608 (1986), overruled on other grounds by Oliver, supra. The constitutional minimum for a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel requires that the accused be made sufficiently aware of his right to have counsel present and of the possible consequences of a decision to fore-go the aid of counsel.

2025App. 314 , 416 S.W.3d 260 . 10 Pierce v. State, 362 Ark. 491 , 209 S.W.3d 364 (2005). 11 Id. 12 Gardner v. State, 2020 Ark. 147 , 598 S.W.3d 10 . 13 Id. 14 Talley, supra. 4 Here, in a pretrial hearing, Peal stated that he no longer wanted his defense counsel to represent him.

2025App. 314 , 416 S.W.3d 260 . 10 Pierce v. State, 362 Ark. 491 , 209 S.W.3d 364 (2005). 11 Id. 12 Gardner v. State, 2020 Ark. 147 , 598 S.W.3d 10 . 13 Id. 14 Talley, supra. 4 Here, in a pretrial hearing, Peal stated that he no longer wanted his defense counsel to represent him.

2023Ed. 2d 378 (1981)], and Oregon v. Bradshaw, supra, the stringent rule that an accused who has invoked his Fifth Amendment right to assistance of counsel cannot be subject to official custodial interrogation unless and until the accused (1) “initiates” further discussions relating to the investigation, and (2) makes a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel under the [waiver] standard of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), and its progeny.

2023Ed. 2d 378 (1981)], and Oregon v. Bradshaw, supra, the stringent rule that an accused who has invoked his Fifth Amendment right to assistance of counsel cannot be subject to official custodial interrogation unless and until the accused (1) “initiates” further discussions relating to the investigation, and (2) makes a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel under the [waiver] standard of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), and its progeny.

2007Bearden v. Arkansas Dep’t of Human Servs., 344 Ark. 317 , 42 S.W.3d 397 (2001).

2007Bearden v. Arkansas Dep’t of Human Servs., 344 Ark. 317 , 42 S.W.3d 397 (2001).

2025App. 550 , 533 S.W.3d 95 . 7 Id. 3 A circuit court must grant a defendant’s request to represent himself at trial when (1) the defendant’s request to waive his right to counsel and represent himself is unequivocal and timely asserted; (2) the defendant makes a knowing and intelligent waiver of his constitutional right to be represented by counsel; and (3) the defendant has not engaged in conduct that would prevent the fair and orderly exposition of his trial.8 Every reasonable presumption must be indulged against the waiver of the right to counsel.9 There is no infringement on the right to sel

2025App. 550 , 533 S.W.3d 95 . 7 Id. 3 A circuit court must grant a defendant’s request to represent himself at trial when (1) the defendant’s request to waive his right to counsel and represent himself is unequivocal and timely asserted; (2) the defendant makes a knowing and intelligent waiver of his constitutional right to be represented by counsel; and (3) the defendant has not engaged in conduct that would prevent the fair and orderly exposition of his trial.8 Every reasonable presumption must be indulged against the waiver of the right to counsel.9 There is no infringement on the right to sel

2020Id. 9 Every reasonable presumption must be indulged against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.

2001Collins v. State, 338 Ark. 1 , 991 S.W.2d 541 (1999); Mayo v. State, 336 Ark. 275 , 984 S.W.2d 801 (1999).

2013The meaning of “scrupulously honored” was discussed in James v. Arizona, 469 U.S. 990, 992-93 , 105 S.Ct. 398 , 83 L.Ed.2d 332 (1984): To ensure that officials scrupulously honor this right, we have established in Edwards v. Arizona, [ 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) ], and Oregon v. Bradshaw, [ 462 U.S. 1039 , 103 S.Ct. 2830 , 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983) ], the stringent rule that an accused who has invoked his Fifth Amendment right to assistance of counsel cannot be subject to official custodial interrogation unless and until the accused (1) “initiates” further discussions re

2013The meaning of “scrupulously honored” was discussed in James v. Arizona, 469 U.S. 990, 992-93 , 105 S.Ct. 398 , 83 L.Ed.2d 332 (1984): To ensure that officials scrupulously honor this right, we have established in Edwards v. Arizona, [ 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) ], and Oregon v. Bradshaw, [ 462 U.S. 1039 , 103 S.Ct. 2830 , 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983) ], the stringent rule that an accused who has invoked his Fifth Amendment right to assistance of counsel cannot be subject to official custodial interrogation unless and until the accused (1) “initiates” further discussions re

2013The meaning of “scrupulously honored” was discussed in James v. Arizona, 469 U.S. 990, 992-93 , 105 S.Ct. 398 , 83 L.Ed.2d 332 (1984): To ensure that officials scrupulously honor this right, we have established in Edwards v. Arizona, [ 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) ], and Oregon v. Bradshaw, [ 462 U.S. 1039 , 103 S.Ct. 2830 , 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983) ], the stringent rule that an accused who has invoked his Fifth Amendment right to assistance of counsel cannot be subject to official custodial interrogation unless and until the accused (1) “initiates” further discussions re

2013The meaning of “scrupulously honored” was discussed in James v. Arizona, 469 U.S. 990, 992-93 , 105 S.Ct. 398 , 83 L.Ed.2d 332 (1984): To ensure that officials scrupulously honor this right, we have established in Edwards v. Arizona, [ 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) ], and Oregon v. Bradshaw, [ 462 U.S. 1039 , 103 S.Ct. 2830 , 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983) ], the stringent rule that an accused who has invoked his Fifth Amendment right to assistance of counsel cannot be subject to official custodial interrogation unless and until the accused (1) “initiates” further discussions re

2013The meaning of “scrupulously honored” was discussed in James v. Arizona, 469 U.S. 990, 992-93 , 105 S.Ct. 398 , 83 L.Ed.2d 332 (1984): To ensure that officials scrupulously honor this right, we have established in Edwards v. Arizona, [ 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) ], and Oregon v. Bradshaw, [ 462 U.S. 1039 , 103 S.Ct. 2830 , 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983) ], the stringent rule that an accused who has invoked his Fifth Amendment right to assistance of counsel cannot be subject to official custodial interrogation unless and until the accused (1) “initiates” further discussions re

2010The meaning of “scrupulously honored” was |14discussed in James v. Arizona, 469 U.S. 990, 992-93 , 105 S.Ct. 398 , 83 L.Ed.2d 332 (1984): To ensure that officials scrupulously honor this right, we have established in Edwards v. Arizona, [ 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) ], and Oregon v. Bradshaw, [ 462 U.S. 1039 , 103 S.Ct. 2830 , 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983) ], the stringent rule that an accused who has invoked his Fifth Amendment right to assistance of counsel cannot be subject to official custodial interrogation unless and until the accused (1) “initiates” further discussions

1998Appellant moved to suppress his statement on the grounds that (1) it was taken after he had already exercised his right to remain silent under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and (2) it was not voluntarily given after a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights.

1977This appeal argues that when all circumstances relating to his confession are examined the conclusion must be reached that the State has failed in its burden of showing a knowing and intelligent waiver of Defendant's right to counsel and right to remain silent under the principles set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

1999Philyaw, 288 Ark. at 245 (citing Barnes, 258 Ark. 565 ).

1998Philyaw, 288 Ark. at 245 (citing Barnes, 258 Ark. 565 )).

1996In Gibson v. State, 298 Ark. 43 , 764 S.W.2d 617 , cert. denied 491 U.S. 910 [ 109 S.Ct. 3199 , *696 105 L.Ed.2d 707 ] (1989), we relied upon Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 [ 108 S.Ct. 2389 , 101 L.Ed.2d 261 ] (1988), to conclude that the constitutional minimum for a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel requires that the accused be made sufficiently aware of his right to have counsel present and of the possible consequences of a decision to forego the aid of counsel.

1996In Gibson v. State, 298 Ark. 43 , 764 S.W.2d 617 , cert. denied 491 U.S. 910 [ 109 S.Ct. 3199 , *696 105 L.Ed.2d 707 ] (1989), we relied upon Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 [ 108 S.Ct. 2389 , 101 L.Ed.2d 261 ] (1988), to conclude that the constitutional minimum for a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel requires that the accused be made sufficiently aware of his right to have counsel present and of the possible consequences of a decision to forego the aid of counsel.

2025App. 550 , 533 S.W.3d 95 . 7 Id. 3 A circuit court must grant a defendant’s request to represent himself at trial when (1) the defendant’s request to waive his right to counsel and represent himself is unequivocal and timely asserted; (2) the defendant makes a knowing and intelligent waiver of his constitutional right to be represented by counsel; and (3) the defendant has not engaged in conduct that would prevent the fair and orderly exposition of his trial.8 Every reasonable presumption must be indulged against the waiver of the right to counsel.9 There is no infringement on the right to sel

2025App. 314 , 416 S.W.3d 260 . 10 Pierce v. State, 362 Ark. 491 , 209 S.W.3d 364 (2005). 11 Id. 12 Gardner v. State, 2020 Ark. 147 , 598 S.W.3d 10 . 13 Id. 14 Talley, supra. 4 Here, in a pretrial hearing, Peal stated that he no longer wanted his defense counsel to represent him.

2025App. 550 , 533 S.W.3d 95 . 7 Id. 3 A circuit court must grant a defendant’s request to represent himself at trial when (1) the defendant’s request to waive his right to counsel and represent himself is unequivocal and timely asserted; (2) the defendant makes a knowing and intelligent waiver of his constitutional right to be represented by counsel; and (3) the defendant has not engaged in conduct that would prevent the fair and orderly exposition of his trial.8 Every reasonable presumption must be indulged against the waiver of the right to counsel.9 There is no infringement on the right to sel

2025App. 550 , 533 S.W.3d 95 . 7 Id. 3 A circuit court must grant a defendant’s request to represent himself at trial when (1) the defendant’s request to waive his right to counsel and represent himself is unequivocal and timely asserted; (2) the defendant makes a knowing and intelligent waiver of his constitutional right to be represented by counsel; and (3) the defendant has not engaged in conduct that would prevent the fair and orderly exposition of his trial.8 Every reasonable presumption must be indulged against the waiver of the right to counsel.9 There is no infringement on the right to sel

2021Daniels v. State, 322 Ark. 367 , 908 S.W.2d 638 (1995).

2021Daniels v. State, 322 Ark. 367 , 908 S.W.2d 638 (1995).

2016The circuit court stated that Roberts would take the stand to answer questions about the May 10, 2013 letter and to indicate to the court “what his wishes [were] and how he wishe[d] to proceed.” After the circuit court and counsel had the opportunity to ask Roberts questions about his letter to Judge Kopf, the circuit court ruled that, per our directive in Roberts, 2013 Ark. 57 , 426 S.W.3d 372 , Roberts must undergo a current evaluation for the circuit court to make a determination of whether he had made a knowing and intelligent waiver of Rule 37 proceedings.

2016The circuit court stated that Roberts would take the stand to answer questions about the May 10, 2013 letter and to indicate to the court “what- his wishes [were] and how he wishe[d] to proceed.” After the circuit court and counsel had the opportunity, to ask Roberts questions about his letter to Judge Kopf, the circuit court ruled- that, per our directive in Roberts, 2018 Ark. 57 , 426 S.W.3d 372 , Roberts must undergo a current evaluation for the circuit court to make a determination- of whether he had made a knowing and intelligent waiver .of Rule 37 proceedings.

2016Specifically, the circuit court issued a two-page 12 Cite as 2016 Ark. 118 order in which it recounted the facts of the case, the evidence that included the specific testimony of the two expert witnesses, and ruled, After considering all relevant testimony and evidence and after applying the test of competency mandated by the Arkansas Supreme Court, the court finds that the Defendant, Karl Roberts, is competent to knowingly and intelligently waive all rights to postconviction relief and has the capacity to choose between life and death (i.e., to elect execution) and to forego representation.

2016Specifically, the circuit court issued a two-page 12 Cite as 2016 Ark. 118 order in which it recounted the facts of the case, the evidence that included the specific testimony of the two expert witnesses, and ruled, After considering all relevant testimony and evidence and after applying the test of competency mandated by the Arkansas Supreme Court, the court finds that the Defendant, Karl Roberts, is competent to knowingly and intelligently waive all rights to postconviction relief and has the capacity to choose between life and death (i.e., to elect execution) and to forego representation.

2007App. 68 , 82 S.W.3d 178 (2002), where we said, [o]ur supreme court has found that a waiver of the fundamental right to the assistance of counsel is valid only when 1) the request to waive the right of counsel is unequivocal and timely asserted; 2) there has been a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel; and 3) the defendant has not engaged in conduct that would prevent the fair and orderly exposition of the issues.

2007But every reasonable presumption must be indulged against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights." This court set forth the factors used to evaluate whether a parent has made a valid waiver of the right to counsel in Battishill v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 78 Ark.App. 68 , 82 S.W.3d 178 (2002), where we said: Our supreme court has found that a waiver of the fundamental right to the assistance of counsel is valid only when 1) the request to waive the right of counsel is unequivocal and timely asserted; 2) there has been a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to coun