knowing and intelligent waiver in Missouri

2009Since the record shows that Hardy was informed of and understood his Miranda rights, and thereafter made a voluntary statement, " 'it is absurd to say that such person has not made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to remain 6 State v. Walton, 899 S.W.2d 915, 920 (Mo.App.1995)(quoting State v. Schnick, 819 S.W.2d 330, 336 (Mo. banc 1991)).

2004If a defendant is informed of the right to remain silent under Miranda, understands that right, and thereafter makes voluntary statements, “it is absurd to say that such a person has not made a knowing and intelligent waiver of [the] right to remain silent.” Walton, 899 S.W.2d at 920 -21 (quoting State v. Schnick, 819 S.W.2d 330, 336 (Mo. banc 1991)).

2023In analyzing a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel, we look to the “particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Black, 223 S.W.3d at 154 .

2022State v. Black, 223 S.W.3d 149, 153 (Mo. banc 2007)(citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836 ). 3 A trial court has a duty to determine whether a knowing and intelligent waiver has been made.

2025“A knowing and intelligent waiver is ‘normally shown by having a police officer testify that he read the accused his rights, asked whether the rights were understood, and received an affirmative response.’” Watkins, 618 S.W.3d at 269 (quoting State v. Wise, 879 S.W.2d 494, 505 (Mo. banc 1994), overruled on other grounds by Joy v. Morrison, 254 S.W.3d 885 , 888 n.7 (Mo. banc 2008)).

2021A knowing and intelligent waiver is “normally shown by having a police officer testify that he read the accused his rights, asked whether the rights were understood, and received an affirmative response.” State v. Wise, 879 S.W.2d 494, 505 (Mo. banc 1994).

2016When, as in this case, “one is informed of his right to remain silent under Miranda, and understands his right to remain silent under Miranda, and thereafter makes voluntary statements, it is absurd to say that such person has not made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to remain silent.” Bucklew, 973 S.W.2d at 90 .

2009Appellant then verbally and in writing waived his Miranda rights for the second time and subjected himself to questioning once again. “ ‘If one is informed of his right to remain silent under Miranda, and understands his right to remain silent under Miranda ... it is absurd to say that such person has not made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to remain silent.’ ” State v. Cook, 67 S.W.3d 718, 723 (Mo.App.2002) (quoting State v. Bucklew, 973 S.W.2d 83, 90 (Mo. banc 1998)).

2022“Absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned unless he was represented by counsel at trial.” State v. Watson, 687 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Mo. App. E.D. 1985)(citing Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37 ).

2022Watson, 687 S.W.2d at 669 (citing Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-24 (1948); State v. Wilson, 816 S.W.2d 301, 305-6 (Mo. App. S.D. 1991). “‘The constitutional right of an accused to be represented by counsel invokes, of itself, the protection of a trial court, in which the accused-whose life or liberty is at stake-is without counsel.’” Watson, 687 S.W.2d at 669 (quoting Von Moltke, 332 U.S. at 423-24 )). “‘This protecting duty imposes the serious and weighty responsibility upon the trial judge of determining whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused.’” Id.

2003“If one is informed of his right to remain silent under Miranda, and understands his right to remain silent under Miranda, and thereafter makes voluntary statements, it is absurd to say that such person has not made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to remain silent.” Skillicorn, 944 S.W.2d at 890 ; State v. Schnick, 819 S.W.2d 330, 336 (Mo. *751 banc 1991) (citing Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 541-43 , 87 S.Ct. 639 , 17 L.Ed.2d 593 (1967)).

2002Likewise, Defendant’s unfamiliarity with the police is unpersuasive. “ ‘If one is informed of his right to remain silent under Miranda , and understands his right to remain silent under Miranda , and thereafter makes voluntary statements, it is absurd to say that such person has not made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to remain silent.’” Bucklew, 973 S.W.2d at 90 [5] (quoting State v. Skillicorn, 944 S.W.2d 877, 890 (Mo.banc 1997)).

2022“Absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned unless he was represented by counsel at trial.” State v. Watson, 687 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Mo. App. E.D. 1985)(citing Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37 ).

2012As fully amplified, these provisions guarantee that, “absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.” Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 , 92 S.Ct. 2006 , 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972).

2000Bittick, 806 S.W.2d at 658 .

1991Defendant argues that these findings are insufficient to demonstrate that defendant’s waiver of his rights was a knowing and intelligent waiver, relying on State v. Bittick, 806 S.W.2d 652, 658 (Mo. banc 1991).

2025“The knowing and intelligent requirement does not mean that a defendant must know and understand all the possible consequences of the waiver.” Id. (quoting State v. Powell, 798 S.W.2d 709, 713 (Mo. banc 1990)).

2021“The knowing and intelligent requirement does not mean that a defendant must know and understand all the possible consequences of the waiver.” State v. Powell, 798 S.W.2d 709, 713 (Mo. banc 1990) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422 (1986)).

2023State v. Wilson, 816 S.W.2d 301, 305-06 (Mo. App. S.D. 1991).

2022Watson, 687 S.W.2d at 669 (citing Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-24 (1948); State v. Wilson, 816 S.W.2d 301, 305-6 (Mo. App. S.D. 1991). “‘The constitutional right of an accused to be represented by counsel invokes, of itself, the protection of a trial court, in which the accused-whose life or liberty is at stake-is without counsel.’” Watson, 687 S.W.2d at 669 (quoting Von Moltke, 332 U.S. at 423-24 )). “‘This protecting duty imposes the serious and weighty responsibility upon the trial judge of determining whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused.’” Id.

2009Since the record shows that Hardy was informed of and understood his Miranda rights, and thereafter made a voluntary statement, " 'it is absurd to say that such person has not made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to remain 6 State v. Walton, 899 S.W.2d 915, 920 (Mo.App.1995)(quoting State v. Schnick, 819 S.W.2d 330, 336 (Mo. banc 1991)).

2004If a defendant is informed of the right to remain silent under Miranda, understands that right, and thereafter makes voluntary statements, “it is absurd to say that such a person has not made a knowing and intelligent waiver of [the] right to remain silent.” Walton, 899 S.W.2d at 920 -21 (quoting State v. Schnick, 819 S.W.2d 330, 336 (Mo. banc 1991)).

1990He relies upon Hunt v. Moreland, 697 S.W.2d 326, 328 (Mo.App.1985), in which this court ruled that in a proceeding for civil contempt to compel compliance with the court order to pay child support, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution confer upon the alleged contemnor the right to be represented by counsel. 1 We held that in such a proceeding an order of incarceration could not be upheld “in the absence of representation by counsel, or a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel.” Id.

1990He relies upon Hunt v. Moreland, 697 S.W.2d 326, 328 (Mo.App.1985), in which this court ruled that in a proceeding for civil contempt to compel compliance with the court order to pay child support, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution confer upon the alleged contemnor the right to be represented by counsel. 1 We held that in such a proceeding an order of incarceration could not be upheld “in the absence of representation by counsel, or a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel.” Id.

1994Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 , 146 A.L.R. 357 (1938); Gilmore, 697 S.W.2d at 174 [4].

1987In State v. Gilmore, 697 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Mo. banc 1985), the Missouri Supreme Court stated, “[i]t is the duty of the trial judge initially to determine whether a knowing and intelligent waiver has been made, and the judge must investigate ‘as long and as thoroughly as the circumstances of the case before him demand.’ ” The only evidence on the question of waiver is as follows: The Court: ‘You have concluded in your own mind to proceed without an attorney, is that correct’?

2025See State v. Mendez-Ulloa, 525 S.W.3d 585, 591-92 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017). 11 The trial court appears to have believed Officer Pyle’s testimony about what occurred at the scene and at the hospital.

2024See Mendez-Ulloa, 525 S.W.3d at 592 (citing Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 382-83).

2024“To ensure a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel, this Court has stated that trial courts must engage in a colloquy with the defendant to make certain the defendant understands exactly what rights and privileges he is waiving, as well as the dangers associated with waiving constitutional rights.” Davis, 318 S.W.3d at 630-31 (internal quotation omitted). 1 All statutory references are to RSMo 2016. 2 A request for self-representation is equivocal when the defendant states he or she would prefer different counsel, but will proceed pro se if another attorney is not provided.

2015Similarly, in the context of a defendant providing a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel, this Court stated that the trial court must “engage in a colloquy with the defendant to make certain the defendant understands ‘exactly what rights and privileges he [or she] is waiving, as well as the dangers associated with waiving constitutional rights.’ ” State v. Davis, 318 S.W.3d 618, 630-31 (Mo. banc 2010).

2024Nevertheless, we note that “a deficient mental condition . . . does not by itself render a statement unintelligent.” State v. Bucklew, 973 S.W.2d 83, 89-90 (Mo. banc 1998) (rejecting the defendant’s claim that medication affected his mental state and holding a Miranda waiver was knowing and intelligent); see also State v. Scott, 841 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Mo. App. E.D. 1992) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that mental illness made him incompetent and holding a Miranda waiver was knowing and intelligent). 7 evidence the defendant “lacked [] mental capacity,” in part because “[n]o direct evidence

1994See State v. Scott, 841 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Mo.App.1992). 3 .

2018See Hodak, 125 S.W.3d at 894 .

2011In criminal cases, a knowing and intelligent waiver requires that a defendant be “timely inform[ed] as to the nature of the charges against him, potential sentences if convicted of the offenses, potential defenses he can offer, the nature of the trial proceedings ... and the dangers of proceeding pro se.” State v. Black, 223 S.W.3d 149, 154 (Mo. banc 2007) (quoting City of St Peters v. Hodak, 125 S.W.3d 892, 894 (Mo.App.2004)).

2003State v. Schnelle, 924 S.W.2d 292, 296 (Mo.App. 1996).

2003State v. Schnelle, 924 S.W.2d 292, 296 (Mo.App.1996).

2022State v. Black, 223 S.W.3d 149, 153 (Mo. banc 2007)(citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836 ). 3 A trial court has a duty to determine whether a knowing and intelligent waiver has been made.

2021A knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to be represented by counsel does not require technical knowledge or mastery of trial process or legal principles The United States Supreme Court recognized the constitutional right to self- represent, and described the standard for determining whether a criminal defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived the right to be represented by counsel in Faretta, 422 U.S. 806 .

1985It is the duty of the trial judge initially to determine whether a knowing and intelligent waiver has been made, and the judge must investigate “as long and as thoroughly as the circumstances of the case before him demand.” Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-24 , 68 S.Ct. 316, 323-24 , 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948).

1985It is the duty of the trial judge initially to determine whether a knowing and intelligent waiver has been made, and the judge must investigate “as long and as thoroughly as the circumstances of the case before him demand.” Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-24 , 68 S.Ct. 316, 323-24 , 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948).

1995He argues that the court did not make a specific finding that his confession was a product of a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights. “[Wjaivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter which depends in each case ‘upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience and conduct of the accused.’ ” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 , 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1883-84 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst,

1995He argues that the court did not make a specific finding that his confession was a product of a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights. “[Wjaivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter which depends in each case ‘upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience and conduct of the accused.’ ” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 , 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1883-84 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst,

2008“Criminal defendants are guaranteed the right to counsel, and absent a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel, no defendant may be imprisoned unless represented by counsel at trial.” State v. Kilburn, 941 S.W.2d 737, 739 (Mo.App. 1997).

1997Id.

2003Id. at 329-30 ; Bewig v. Bewig, 784 S.W.2d 823, 825 (Mo.App.

2003Mother relies on Bewig v. Bewig, 784 S.W.2d 823 (Mo.App.

2024See Branch v. State, 531 S.W.3d 621, 623-24 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017); see also Environmental Utilities, LLC v. Public Service Com’n, 219 S.W.3d 256, 265 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007) (“[c]ourts may take judicial notice of other proceedings when the cases are interwoven or interdependent”). 4 Defendant appears to argue on appeal only that his mental state as assessed at Parkland prevented a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights, not that he had a general ongoing or underlying mental condition that prevented him from understanding his Miranda rights.