probable cause standard in Pennsylvania

2013In Hall , we noted, “ ‘To rule otherwise, would permit police in every case to exaggerate or expand on the facts given to the magistrate merely for the purpose of meeting the probable cause requirement, thus precluding a detached and objective determination.’ ” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. D’Angelo, 437 Pa. 331 , 263 A.2d 441, 444 (1970)).

2013In Hall , we noted, “ ‘To rule otherwise, would permit police in every case to exaggerate or expand on the facts given to the magistrate merely for the purpose of meeting the probable cause requirement, thus precluding a detached and objective determination.’ ” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. D’Angelo, 437 Pa. 331 , 263 A.2d 441, 444 (1970)).

2025Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Hall, 302 A.2d 342, 344 (Pa. 1973) (holding that a defendant at a suppression hearing may “test the truthfulness of the recitals in the warrant” and that, to “rule otherwise[] would permit police in every case to exaggerate or expand on the facts given to the magistrate merely for the purpose of meeting the probable cause requirement”).

2021"To rule otherwise, would permit police in every case to exaggerate or expand on the facts given to the magistrate merely for the purpose of meeting the probable cause requirement, thus precluding adetached and objective determination." Commonwealth v. Hall, 302 A.2d 342, 344 (Pa. 1973).

2016The standard to be applied in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence is whether reasonable grounds exist to believe that a person is severely mentally disabled and in need of immediate treatment, a standard that is "clearly less exacting than the probable cause standard." In re J.M., 556 Pa. 63, 78 , 726 A.2d 1041, 1049 (1999).

2016The standard to be applied in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence is whether reasonable grounds exist to believe that a person is severely mentally disabled and in need of immediate treatment, a standard that is "clearly less exacting than the probable cause standard." In re J.M., 556 Pa. 63, 78 , 726 A.2d 1041, 1049 (1999).

2024Over the years there have been “varying expressions of this Court” and, “[f]rom some of this Court’s formulations, one might [ ] infer that the prima facie burden attaches only to the facet of the Commonwealth’s obligation to prove that a crime has been committed, and that a separate probable cause standard pertains to demonstrating that the defendant was the perpetrator.” Ricker, 170 A.3d at 503 (Saylor, C.J., concurring), citing, e.g., Commonwealth v. Huggins, 836 A.2d 862, 866 (Pa. 2003) (“A prima facie case exists when the Commonwealth produces evidence of each of the material elements of

2024Over the years there have been “varying expressions of this Court” and, “[f]rom some of this Court’s formulations, one might [ ] infer that the prima facie burden attaches only to the facet of the Commonwealth’s obligation to prove that a crime has been committed, and that a separate probable cause standard pertains to demonstrating that the defendant was the perpetrator.” Ricker, 170 A.3d at 503 (Saylor, C.J., concurring), citing, e.g., Commonwealth v. Huggins, 836 A.2d 862, 866 (Pa. 2003) (“A prima facie case exists when the Commonwealth produces evidence of each of the material elements of

2024Over the years there have been “varying expressions of this Court” and, “[f]rom some of this Court’s formulations, one might [ ] infer that the prima facie burden attaches only to the facet of the Commonwealth’s obligation to prove that a crime has been committed, and that a separate probable cause standard pertains to demonstrating that the defendant was the perpetrator.” Ricker, 170 A.3d at 503 (Saylor, C.J., concurring), citing, e.g., Commonwealth v. Huggins, 836 A.2d 862, 866 (Pa. 2003) (“A prima facie case exists when the Commonwealth produces evidence of each of the material elements of

2024Over the years there have been “varying expressions of this Court” and, “[f]rom some of this Court’s formulations, one might [ ] infer that the prima facie burden attaches only to the facet of the Commonwealth’s obligation to prove that a crime has been committed, and that a separate probable cause standard pertains to demonstrating that the defendant was the perpetrator.” Ricker, 170 A.3d at 503 (Saylor, C.J., concurring), citing, e.g., Commonwealth v. Huggins, 836 A.2d 862, 866 (Pa. 2003) (“A prima facie case exists when the Commonwealth produces evidence of each of the material elements of

1990See also, Von Raab, supra 489 U.S. at ___, 109 S.Ct. at 1391 , 103 L.Ed.2d at 703 ("Our cases teach, however, that the probable-cause standard `is peculiarly related to criminal investigations.'").

1990See also, Von Raab, supra 489 U.S. at ___, 109 S.Ct. at 1391 , 103 L.Ed.2d at 703 ("Our cases teach, however, that the probable-cause standard `is peculiarly related to criminal investigations.'").

2008See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 , 103 S.Ct. 1535 , 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983) (explaining probable cause requires less than a showing that the officer’s belief was “more likely true than false.”). ¶ 6 The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, Justice Castille continued, and there is nothing arbitrary or unreasonable under the totality of such circumstances about a targeted, minimally intrusive search to either confirm or dispel the reasonable belief that a suspect just dealt in illegal drugs.

2008See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 , 103 S.Ct. 1535 , 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983) (explaining probable cause requires less than a showing that the officer’s belief was “more likely true than false.”). ¶ 6 The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, Justice Castille continued, and there is nothing arbitrary or unreasonable under the totality of such circumstances about a targeted, minimally intrusive search to either confirm or dispel the reasonable belief that a suspect just dealt in illegal drugs.

2026The Court explained that this conclusion, based “on what some unknown people may or may not do under undefined circumstances … falls short of probable cause,” as the probable cause analysis “must be predicated upon individualized suspicion[.]” Id. at 1084 .

2025Contrary to the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in Camara, and contrary to many other states that have considered the issue, Pennsylvania’s Constitutional drafters designed the probable cause standard for obtaining a search warrant to be established only by a showing that “there is a fair probability that relevant evidence will be found in a particular place.” Jacoby, 170 A.3d at 1082 .

2016See Com. v. Whitmyer , 542 Pa. 545 , 668 A.2d 1113 , 1116 (1995), superseded by statute , Act of September 30, 2003, P.L. 120, as recognized in Com. v. Holmes , 609 Pa. 1 , 14 A.3d 89 (2011) (concluding that the "semantic difference" between the probable cause standard and the "articulable and reasonable grounds" are, when balancing the underlying interests, a "distinction without a difference").

2003We note, however, that the decision in Whitmyer to retain an elevated standard to support automobile stops for Vehicle Code violations derived from interpretation of an undefined term and reconciliation of the statute with prior rulings of the Court that the probable cause standard for these kinds of stops was constitutionally and/or judicially mandated, see Whitmyer, 542 Pa. at 548-51 , 668 A.2d at 1115 -16 (citing Commonwealth v. Murray, 460 Pa. 53 , 331 A.2d 414 (1975), and Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107 , 307 A.2d 875 (1973)), and not from the plain meaning of a statutorily defined t

2010In Gleason, the court reflected on the semantic difference between the language of the statute and a probable cause standard and reasoned that “when we balance the underlying interests of the individual and the government, the two standards amount to nothing more than a distinction without a difference.” Gleason, 785 A.2d at 988 .

2005However, in view of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s ruling in Commonwealth v. Gleason, 567 Pa. 111, 117-22 , 785 A.2d 983, 987-89 (2001), that the probable cause standard applies to traffic stops under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, regardless of whatever other statutory language authorizes such stops, it appears that probable cause continues to be the applicable standard and the court will apply that standard here.

2025In Pennsylvania, a person cannot drive a vehicle that has any material that does not permit a person to see inside the vehicle “through the windshield, side wing, or side window”: (1) No person shall drive any motor vehicle with any sun screening device or other material which does not permit a person to see or view the inside of the vehicle through the windshield, side wing or side window of the vehicle. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(e)(1). -4- J-A22028-24 As the parties agree that an officer must have probable cause to initiate a stop under this section, we will apply the probable cause standard.2 Com

2024In Commonwealth v. Prizzia, this Court found that prior cases of this Court applied a probable cause standard to determine whether the stop for a window tint violation was proper. 260 A.3d 263 , 268 (Pa.Super. 2021).

2024See Feczko, 10 A.3d at 1291 ; Draine, 2023 WL 7181200 , at *4-5; cf. Commonwealth v. Enick, 70 A.3d 843 , 846 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2013) (noting the probable cause standard requires an officer to articulate specific facts to believe that there was a violation of a provision of the Vehicle Code).

2024See id. (holding that a stop for failing to drive in a single lane requires probable cause); accord Commonwealth v. Draine, 82 EDA 2022, 2023 WL 7181200 , at *4-5 (Pa. Super. 2023) (unpublished memorandum) (using a probable cause standard when determining that an officer lawfully stopped a pedestrian who failed to use a sidewalk in violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3544).6 If an officer has sufficient cause to stop a person, an inquiry into the officer’s subjective or pretextual motives becomes unnecessary.

2015See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003) (observing that the probable cause standard is a “nontechnical conception that deals with the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.”).

2014See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 , 124 S.Ct. 795 , 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003) (observing that the probable cause standard is a “nontechnical conception that deals with the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.”).

2024Accordingly, we vacate the order granting suppression and remand the matter for the trial court to (1) make a factual finding as to whether Appellee was aware of the police when he ran and, (2) reconsider whether, based upon the totality of the circumstances present before Investigator Morris commanded Appellee to stop, the officer possessed reasonable suspicion that criminal - 11 - J-A11002-24 activity was afoot.3 See Commonwealth v. Landis, 89 A.3d 694, 703 (Pa.Super. 2014) (vacating suppression order and remanding for “reconsideration of the evidence in light of the probable cause standard

2016Therefore, we ”vacate[d] the order denying Appellant's motion to suppress for reconsideration of the evidence in light of the probable cause standard and the filing of a statement of its findings of fact and conclusions of law.” Id., 89 A.3d at 703 .

2015To rule otherwise would permit police in every case to exaggerate or to expand on the facts given to the issuing authority merely for the purpose of meeting the probable cause requirement, thus precluding an objective determination of whether probable cause for the warrant existed. [Commonwealth v.] (William) Ryan, [ 407 A.2d 1345, 1348 (Pa. Super. 1979)] (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

1982To rule otherwise would permit police in every case to exaggerate or to expand on the facts given to the issuing authority merely for the purpose of meeting the probable cause requirement, thus precluding an objective determination of whether probable cause for the warrant existed. 268 Pa.Super. at 264-265 , 407 A.2d at 1348 .

2018We have explained the probable cause requirement as follows: [T]he question of whether probable cause exists for the issuance of a search warrant must be answered according to the totality of the circumstances test articulated in Commonwealth v. Gray, 503 A.2d 921 (Pa. 1985), and its Pennsylvania progeny, which incorporates the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)....

2014Pa.R.Crim.P. 203. -4- J-S49013-14 We have explained the probable cause requirement for issuance of a search warrant as follows: [T]he question of whether probable cause exists for the issuance of a search warrant must be answered according to the totality of the circumstances test articulated in Commonwealth v. Gray, 503 A.2d 921 (Pa. 1985), and its Pennsylvania progeny, which incorporates the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). . . .

2025Facts On December 22, 2021, the City filed a Disciplinary Action Report against Grievant alleging violations of the following City Bureau of Police (PBP) Rules and Regulations: -12-06 Use of Force 3.0 De-Escalation -12-06 Use of Force 8.1 Use of Non-Deadly Force -12-06 Use of Force 8.2 Use of Non-Deadly Force -12-09 Pepper Aerosol Resistant Spray 4.0 OC Usage Criteria -16-01 Standards of Conduct 3.13 Neglect of Duty -45-02 Warrantless Searches and Seizures 5.0 Procedure for Conducting Pat-Down Searches (Terry Stop)4 4 In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the United States Supreme Court approve

2018Setting aside the fact that Appellant has, with this argument, conflated the reasonable suspicion standard applicable to investigatory detentions with the probable cause standard applicable to arrests,3 we find that the record belies Appellant’s underlying assertion that the officers relied solely on an anonymous tip to arrest him. ____________________________________________ 2 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 3We have acknowledged the following approach to police/citizen encounters under both the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 8: This Court has noted

2003See, e.g., U.S. v. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d 8, 10 (1st Cir.1993) ("The probable cause doctrine does not require that the contraband to be seized must presently be located at the premises to be searched, only that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been (or is being) committed and that evidence of it can likely be found at the described locus at the time of the search.”); United States v. Aguirre, 839 F.2d 854, 857-58 (1st Cir.1988) probable cause exists where warrant "demonstrates in some trustworthy fashion the likelihood that an offense has been committed and that there is sou

2003See, e.g., U.S. v. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d 8, 10 (1st Cir.1993) ("The probable cause doctrine does not require that the contraband to be seized must presently be located at the premises to be searched, only that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been (or is being) committed and that evidence of it can likely be found at the described locus at the time of the search.”); United States v. Aguirre, 839 F.2d 854, 857-58 (1st Cir.1988) probable cause exists where warrant "demonstrates in some trustworthy fashion the likelihood that an offense has been committed and that there is sou

2020Our Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted that standard in Commonwealth v. Gray, 503 A.2d 921, 926 (Pa. 1985), finding that the probable cause test articulated by the Gates Court was a practical standard, and that the Gates “totality of the circumstances” test was consonant with Art.

2018We have explained the probable cause requirement as follows: [T]he question of whether probable cause exists for the issuance of a search warrant must be answered according to the totality of the circumstances test articulated in Commonwealth v. Gray, 503 A.2d 921 (Pa. 1985), and its Pennsylvania progeny, which incorporates the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)....

2020Id. at 935 .

2016Under these circumstances, the Thompson Court concluded that “a police officer’s experience is a relevant factor in the probable cause inquiry[,] as long as it has specific application to the circumstances at hand.” Id. (emphasis added). [A] court cannot simply conclude that probable cause existed based upon nothing more than the number of years an officer has spent on the force.

2016See Com. v. Whitmyer , 542 Pa. 545 , 668 A.2d 1113 , 1116 (1995), superseded by statute , Act of September 30, 2003, P.L. 120, as recognized in Com. v. Holmes , 609 Pa. 1 , 14 A.3d 89 (2011) (concluding that the "semantic difference" between the probable cause standard and the "articulable and reasonable grounds" are, when balancing the underlying interests, a "distinction without a difference").

2003We note, however, that the decision in Whitmyer to retain an elevated standard to support automobile stops for Vehicle Code violations derived from interpretation of an undefined term and reconciliation of the statute with prior rulings of the Court that the probable cause standard for these kinds of stops was constitutionally and/or judicially mandated, see Whitmyer, 542 Pa. at 548-51 , 668 A.2d at 1115 -16 (citing Commonwealth v. Murray, 460 Pa. 53 , 331 A.2d 414 (1975), and Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107 , 307 A.2d 875 (1973)), and not from the plain meaning of a statutorily defined t

2016Id.

2014See Banner, 737 A.2d at 1207 ; Marone, 990 A.2d at 1190 ; Vinansky v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 665 A.2d 860, 862 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995).

2018See Vasquez-Algarin , 821 F.3d at 477-78 (citing Berger v. New York , 388 U.S. 41 , 59, 87 S.Ct. 1873 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) ("The purpose of the probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment [is] to keep the state out of constitutionally protected areas until it has reason to believe that a specific crime has been or is being committed.") (emphasis added) (alteration in original); Gerstein v. Pugh , 420 U.S. 103 , 114-15, 95 S.Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975) (noting the common-law function of a justice of the peace "to determine whether there was reason to believe the prisoner had commi

2018See Vasquez-Algarin , 821 F.3d at 477-78 (citing Berger v. New York , 388 U.S. 41 , 59, 87 S.Ct. 1873 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) ("The purpose of the probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment [is] to keep the state out of constitutionally protected areas until it has reason to believe that a specific crime has been or is being committed.") (emphasis added) (alteration in original); Gerstein v. Pugh , 420 U.S. 103 , 114-15, 95 S.Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975) (noting the common-law function of a justice of the peace "to determine whether there was reason to believe the prisoner had commi