probable cause standard in Utah

2019Nihells argues that the State failed to carry its burden of persuasion as concerns the possession­of­paraphernalia charge (continued…) 20180678-CA 7 2019 UT App 210 State v. Nihells ¶15 The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the probable cause standard applied at preliminary hearings is identical to the probable cause standard applied on review of arrest warrants, see, e.g., Jones, 2016 UT 4, ¶ 12 ; Schmidt, 2015 UT 65, ¶ 17 ; Ramirez, 2012 UT 59, ¶ 9 , and has specifically declined to distinguish one standard from the other, see State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, ¶ 16 , 20 P.3d 300 .

2019Nihells argues that the State failed to carry its burden of persuasion as concerns the possession­of­paraphernalia charge (continued…) 20180678-CA 7 2019 UT App 210 State v. Nihells ¶15 The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the probable cause standard applied at preliminary hearings is identical to the probable cause standard applied on review of arrest warrants, see, e.g., Jones, 2016 UT 4, ¶ 12 ; Schmidt, 2015 UT 65, ¶ 17 ; Ramirez, 2012 UT 59, ¶ 9 , and has specifically declined to distinguish one standard from the other, see State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, ¶ 16 , 20 P.3d 300 .

2022See Kastanis, 848 P.2d at 676 ; see also Scott, 548 P.2d at 236 (“Since the right to bail is a fundamental right, the State must sustain the burden of proving the accused is within one of the exceptions [to that right].”); UTAH CODE § 77-20- 1(7) (2020) (“After hearing evidence on a motion for pretrial detention, the court may detain the individual if: . . . the prosecution demonstrates substantial evidence to support the charge, and meets all additional evidentiary burdens required under Subsection (2) or Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 8.”). ¶74 And whereas the purpose of the probable

2020Indeed, when “[p]roperly construed and applied, the probable cause standard does not constitute a rubber stamp for the prosecution but, rather, provides a meaningful opportunity for magistrates to ferret out groundless and improvident prosecutions.” State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ¶ 19 , 137 P.3d 787 .

2006Just as the probable cause standard applicable to preliminary hearings in criminal cases serves the primary purpose of “ferreting out ... groundless and improvident prosecutions,” State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 783 (Utah 1980), so does the reason to believe standard serve to stem the flow of proposed changes in water use by arresting any proposal not supported by a reasonable belief that the change can be accomplished without impairing vested rights. ¶47 This standard is both workable and consistent with our prior eases that have analogized the reason to believe standard to the probable caus

2001The facts presented, however, do not have to establish a prima facie case against the defendant." Id. at 788 (emphasis added). 1 We have further held that the probable cause standard is also "less than would prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 788 n. 13.

2006This is especially true because “the probable cause standard already favors the prosecution.” State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29,¶ 33 (citing State v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 435, 437-38 (Utah 1998) (explaining that a magistrate must resolve all inferences in favor of the prosecution)).

2001As a result, despite our recent efforts to clarify the exact meaning of the probable cause standard, see Talbot, 972 P.2d at 437 , it remains somewhat confusing.

2026A magistrate “may disregard evidence as incredible only where it is so contradictory, inconsistent, or unbelievable that it is unreasonable to base belief of an element of the prosecutor’s claim on that evidence.” Schmidt, 2015 UT 65, ¶ 31 (quotation simplified). ¶19 Thus, in applying the probable cause standard, a magistrate may decline to bind a defendant over for trial “only where the facts presented by the prosecution provide no more than a basis for speculation—as opposed to providing a basis for a reasonable belief.” Id. ¶ 18 (quotation simplified).

2019Nihells argues that the State failed to carry its burden of persuasion as concerns the possession­of­paraphernalia charge (continued…) 20180678-CA 7 2019 UT App 210 State v. Nihells ¶15 The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the probable cause standard applied at preliminary hearings is identical to the probable cause standard applied on review of arrest warrants, see, e.g., Jones, 2016 UT 4, ¶ 12 ; Schmidt, 2015 UT 65, ¶ 17 ; Ramirez, 2012 UT 59, ¶ 9 , and has specifically declined to distinguish one standard from the other, see State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, ¶ 16 , 20 P.3d 300 .

2022IV. ¶18 In considering whether to authorize a search warrant, a magistrate “must rely on the representations of the investigating officer, who sets forth in the warrant affidavit the facts the officer contends are sufficient to meet the probable cause standard.” State v. Gonzalez, 2021 UT App 83, ¶ 22 , 494 P.3d 1066 ; see also Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 , 164-65 (1978).

2004To support its reasoning, the court of appeals relied on Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 , 98 S.Ct. 2674 , 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), as applied by this court in State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986). 2 Krukowski 2002 UT App 433 at ¶¶ 14-16 , 62 P.3d 452 . *1226 ¶ 14 In Franks , the United States Supreme Court recognized that the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirement rests on the premise “that there will be a truthful showing” of probable cause. 438 U.S. at 164-65 , 98 S.Ct. 2674 (internal quotations omitted).

2016We agree. 128 To bind a defendant over for trial, the State must at a preliminary hearing "present sufficient evidence to establish that the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed it." State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), 'And "the quantum of sary to support a bindover is less than that necessary to survive a directed verdict motion" and is the same as the probable cause standard necessary to support an arrest warrant.

2001In Pledger we held that the probable cause standard at a preliminary hearing is "lower, even, than a preponderance of the evidence standard applicable to civil cases." 896 P.2d at 1229 .

1988The Utah Supreme Court has “reject[ed] the position that the probable cause requirement for arrest warrants is jurisdictional.” State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 272 (Utah 1985).

1988The Utah Supreme Court has "reject[ed] the position that the probable cause requirement for arrest warrants is jurisdictional." State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 272 (Utah 1985).

1993Under federal law, the odor of marijuana “has a distinct smell” and can alone “satisfy the probable cause requirement to search a vehicle or baggage.” United States v. Morin, 949 F.2d 297, 300 (10th Cir.1991) (citing United States v. Merryman, 630 F.2d 780, 785 (10th Cir. 1080) (once agent smelled marijuana, he was justified in the search of the vehicle); United States v. Sperow, 551 F.2d 808, 811 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 930 , 97 S.Ct. 2634 , 53 L.Ed.2d 245 (1977) (once a vehicle is stopped and marijuana sniffed and identified, probable cause exists for search); United States v. Bo

1992The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently noted this general rule: “This court has long recognized that marijuana has a distinct smell and^hat the odor of marijuana alone can satisfy the probable cause requirement to search a vehicle or baggage.” United States v. Morin, 949 F.2d 297, 300 (10th Cir.1991) (citing United States v. Merryman, 630 F.2d 780, 785 (10th Cir.1980)). 5 The constitutional basis for this rule is that “[a] strong, emanating odor of marijuana comes within the ‘plain view’ doctrine and need not be ignored by officers.” United States v. Manbeck, 744 F.2

1993Under federal law, the odor of marijuana “has a distinct smell” and can alone “satisfy the probable cause requirement to search a vehicle or baggage.” United States v. Morin, 949 F.2d 297, 300 (10th Cir.1991) (citing United States v. Merryman, 630 F.2d 780, 785 (10th Cir. 1080) (once agent smelled marijuana, he was justified in the search of the vehicle); United States v. Sperow, 551 F.2d 808, 811 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 930 , 97 S.Ct. 2634 , 53 L.Ed.2d 245 (1977) (once a vehicle is stopped and marijuana sniffed and identified, probable cause exists for search); United States v. Bo

1992The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently noted this general rule: “This court has long recognized that marijuana has a distinct smell and^hat the odor of marijuana alone can satisfy the probable cause requirement to search a vehicle or baggage.” United States v. Morin, 949 F.2d 297, 300 (10th Cir.1991) (citing United States v. Merryman, 630 F.2d 780, 785 (10th Cir.1980)). 5 The constitutional basis for this rule is that “[a] strong, emanating odor of marijuana comes within the ‘plain view’ doctrine and need not be ignored by officers.” United States v. Manbeck, 744 F.2

2018Indeed, the probable cause standard "requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity." Gates , 462 U.S. at 243 n.13, 103 S.Ct. 2317 ; see also State v. Bartley , 784 P.2d 1231 , 1235 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (stating that "[t]he quantum of evidence needed for probable cause is significantly less than that needed to prove guilt"). ¶9 "Where a search warrant supported by an affidavit is challenged as having been issued without an adequate showing of probable cause, our review focuses on the magistrate's probable cause determination." Sta

2018Indeed, the probable cause standard "requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity." Gates , 462 U.S. at 243 n.13, 103 S.Ct. 2317 ; see also State v. Bartley , 784 P.2d 1231 , 1235 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (stating that "[t]he quantum of evidence needed for probable cause is significantly less than that needed to prove guilt"). ¶9 "Where a search warrant supported by an affidavit is challenged as having been issued without an adequate showing of probable cause, our review focuses on the magistrate's probable cause determination." Sta

2020See 2001 UT 9 , ¶ 11 n.1 (stating that, “[t]hough phrased differently, there is little, if any, difference” between the “reasonable belief” standard for obtaining an arrest warrant and the “fair probability” standard for obtaining a search warrant); see also State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, ¶ 59 , 993 P.2d 837 (stating that a search warrant is proper where there is a “fair probability that evidence of the crime will be found in the place or places named in the warrant” (quotation simplified)), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Thornton, 2017 UT 9 , 391 P.3d 1061 . ¶21 While the State bears t

2019Nihells argues that the State failed to carry its burden of persuasion as concerns the possession­of­paraphernalia charge (continued…) 20180678-CA 7 2019 UT App 210 State v. Nihells ¶15 The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the probable cause standard applied at preliminary hearings is identical to the probable cause standard applied on review of arrest warrants, see, e.g., Jones, 2016 UT 4, ¶ 12 ; Schmidt, 2015 UT 65, ¶ 17 ; Ramirez, 2012 UT 59, ¶ 9 , and has specifically declined to distinguish one standard from the other, see State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, ¶ 16 , 20 P.3d 300 .

2019Nihells argues that the State failed to carry its burden of persuasion as concerns the possession­of­paraphernalia charge (continued…) 20180678-CA 7 2019 UT App 210 State v. Nihells ¶15 The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the probable cause standard applied at preliminary hearings is identical to the probable cause standard applied on review of arrest warrants, see, e.g., Jones, 2016 UT 4, ¶ 12 ; Schmidt, 2015 UT 65, ¶ 17 ; Ramirez, 2012 UT 59, ¶ 9 , and has specifically declined to distinguish one standard from the other, see State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, ¶ 16 , 20 P.3d 300 .

2017This “relatively low” threshold is the same evidentiary standard used by officers when they determine whether they may legally arrest someone: there must be “a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it.” Id. ¶¶ 17, 22 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Jones, 2016 UT 4, ¶ 22 , 365 P.3d 1212 (stating that, “[u]nder the probable cause standard” applicable at the preliminary hearing stage, “we are required to take the perspective of the reasonable arresting officer”). ¶ 9 In evaluating the evidence presented at a prel

2022See Kastanis, 848 P.2d at 676 ; see also Scott, 548 P.2d at 236 (“Since the right to bail is a fundamental right, the State must sustain the burden of proving the accused is within one of the exceptions [to that right].”); UTAH CODE § 77-20- 1(7) (2020) (“After hearing evidence on a motion for pretrial detention, the court may detain the individual if: . . . the prosecution demonstrates substantial evidence to support the charge, and meets all additional evidentiary burdens required under Subsection (2) or Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 8.”). ¶74 And whereas the purpose of the probable

2022See Kastanis, 848 P.2d at 676 ; see also Scott, 548 P.2d at 236 (“Since the right to bail is a fundamental right, the State must sustain the burden of proving the accused is within one of the exceptions [to that right].”); UTAH CODE § 77-20- 1(7) (2020) (“After hearing evidence on a motion for pretrial detention, the court may detain the individual if: . . . the prosecution demonstrates substantial evidence to support the charge, and meets all additional evidentiary burdens required under Subsection (2) or Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 8.”). ¶74 And whereas the purpose of the probable

2021See State v. Moreno, 2009 UT 15, ¶ 37 , 203 P.3d 1000 ; see also Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) (describing probable cause as a fluid concept).

2021See State v. Moreno, 2009 UT 15, ¶ 37 , 203 P.3d 1000 ; see also Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) (describing probable cause as a fluid concept).

2021See State v. Moreno, 2009 UT 15, ¶ 37 , 203 P.3d 1000 ; see also Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) (describing probable cause as a fluid concept).

2020See 2001 UT 9 , ¶ 11 n.1 (stating that, “[t]hough phrased differently, there is little, if any, difference” between the “reasonable belief” standard for obtaining an arrest warrant and the “fair probability” standard for obtaining a search warrant); see also State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, ¶ 59 , 993 P.2d 837 (stating that a search warrant is proper where there is a “fair probability that evidence of the crime will be found in the place or places named in the warrant” (quotation simplified)), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Thornton, 2017 UT 9 , 391 P.3d 1061 . ¶21 While the State bears t

2020See 2001 UT 9 , ¶ 11 n.1 (stating that, “[t]hough phrased differently, there is little, if any, difference” between the “reasonable belief” standard for obtaining an arrest warrant and the “fair probability” standard for obtaining a search warrant); see also State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, ¶ 59 , 993 P.2d 837 (stating that a search warrant is proper where there is a “fair probability that evidence of the crime will be found in the place or places named in the warrant” (quotation simplified)), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Thornton, 2017 UT 9 , 391 P.3d 1061 . ¶21 While the State bears t

2020See 2001 UT 9 , ¶ 11 n.1 (stating that, “[t]hough phrased differently, there is little, if any, difference” between the “reasonable belief” standard for obtaining an arrest warrant and the “fair probability” standard for obtaining a search warrant); see also State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, ¶ 59 , 993 P.2d 837 (stating that a search warrant is proper where there is a “fair probability that evidence of the crime will be found in the place or places named in the warrant” (quotation simplified)), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Thornton, 2017 UT 9 , 391 P.3d 1061 . ¶21 While the State bears t

2020See 2001 UT 9 , ¶ 11 n.1 (stating that, “[t]hough phrased differently, there is little, if any, difference” between the “reasonable belief” standard for obtaining an arrest warrant and the “fair probability” standard for obtaining a search warrant); see also State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, ¶ 59 , 993 P.2d 837 (stating that a search warrant is proper where there is a “fair probability that evidence of the crime will be found in the place or places named in the warrant” (quotation simplified)), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Thornton, 2017 UT 9 , 391 P.3d 1061 . ¶21 While the State bears t

2020For instance, “when the evidence, considered under the totality of the circumstances, is wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable inference to prove some issue which supports the prosecution’s claim, the magistrate is not required to bind a criminal defendant over for trial.” Graham, 2013 UT App 109, ¶ 9 (quotation simplified).