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34 New Hampshire opinions name it 1 courts 1974–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Hampshire courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. St. Arnaultgreen2 sentences2015Arnault, 114 N.H. at 218 (stating that “a probable cause hearing is not an adversary proceeding”), and concluded that statutory protections for the accused at the probable cause hearing “envision an adversary process during which charges without sufficient supporting evidence will be eliminated.” Williams, 115 N.H. at 440 ; see also Gagne, 129 N.H. at 100 (“[acknowledging the true adversarial nature of the probable cause hearing in New Hampshire”). 2013Arnault, 114 N.H. 216, 217-18 (1974) (quotation omitted); see Smith v. O’Brien, 109 N.H. 317, 318 (1969) (the purpose of a probable cause hearing “is to determine whether probable cause exists for ... detention pending grand jury action”); State v. Chase, 109 N.H. 296, 297 (1969) (same). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2015It is also not provided to “afford[ ] the accused an opportunity for discovery.” Smith v. O’Brien, 109 N.H. 317, 318 (1969). *703 Nonetheless, a probable cause hearing is intended to be “something more than a routine proceeding leading inevitably to indictment and trial.” State v. Williams, 115 N.H. 437, 440 (1975). 2015Arnault, 114 N.H. at 218 (stating that “a probable cause hearing is not an adversary proceeding”), and concluded that statutory protections for the accused at the probable cause hearing “envision an adversary process during which charges without sufficient supporting evidence will be eliminated.” Williams, 115 N.H. at 440 ; see also Gagne, 129 N.H. at 100 (“[acknowledging the true adversarial nature of the probable cause hearing in New Hampshire”). | 3 | 3 |
Smith v. O'BRIENgreen2 sentences2015It is also not provided to “afford[ ] the accused an opportunity for discovery.” Smith v. O’Brien, 109 N.H. 317, 318 (1969). *703 Nonetheless, a probable cause hearing is intended to be “something more than a routine proceeding leading inevitably to indictment and trial.” State v. Williams, 115 N.H. 437, 440 (1975). 2013Arnault, 114 N.H. 216, 217-18 (1974) (quotation omitted); see Smith v. O’Brien, 109 N.H. 317, 318 (1969) (the purpose of a probable cause hearing “is to determine whether probable cause exists for ... detention pending grand jury action”); State v. Chase, 109 N.H. 296, 297 (1969) (same). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Chasegreen2 sentences2013Arnault, 114 N.H. 216, 217-18 (1974) (quotation omitted); see Smith v. O’Brien, 109 N.H. 317, 318 (1969) (the purpose of a probable cause hearing “is to determine whether probable cause exists for ... detention pending grand jury action”); State v. Chase, 109 N.H. 296, 297 (1969) (same). 1986In State v. Chase, 109 N.H. 296, 297 , 249 A.2d 677, 678 (1969), we held that “the preliminary hearing is not a judicial trial of the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused but rather is a judicial inquiry to determine whether probable cause exists for the accused to be bound over to a grand jury.” See also N.H. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Ballgreen2 sentences1991Rather, courts must approach the issue with a concern for the ‘factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent [persons], not legal technicians, act.’” State v. Stevens, 121 N.H. 287, 290 , 428 A.2d 1241, 1243 (1981) (quoting Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959) (citations omitted)). “[T]he expertise and experience of the law enforcement officer are relevant to the probable cause determination.” State v. Ball, supra at 236 , 471 A.2d at 353 . “[I]f facts sufficient to provide probable cause to believe an object is incriminating are immediately 1991Rather, courts must approach the issue with a concern for the ‘factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent [persons], not legal technicians, act.’” State v. Stevens, 121 N.H. 287, 290 , 428 A.2d 1241, 1243 (1981) (quoting Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959) (citations omitted)). “[T]he expertise and experience of the law enforcement officer are relevant to the probable cause determination.” State v. Ball, supra at 236 , 471 A.2d at 353 . “[I]f facts sufficient to provide probable cause to believe an object is incriminating are immediately | 1 | 3 |
United States v. Rehlandergreen1 sentence2024See United States v. Rehlander, 666 F.3d 45, 50 (1st Cir. 2012) (temporary hospitalization under Maine’s involuntary admission statute not a “commitment” under 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(4)). | 1 | 1 |
Terry v. Ohiogreen1 sentence2016He argues, in essence, that his detention in his driveway was not a mere investigative stop, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-27 (1968), but that he was in custody — that is, the functional equivalent of arrest — requiring probable cause. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gagnegreen1 sentence2015Arnault, 114 N.H. at 218 (stating that “a probable cause hearing is not an adversary proceeding”), and concluded that statutory protections for the accused at the probable cause hearing “envision an adversary process during which charges without sufficient supporting evidence will be eliminated.” Williams, 115 N.H. at 440 ; see also Gagne, 129 N.H. at 100 (“[acknowledging the true adversarial nature of the probable cause hearing in New Hampshire”). | 1 | 1 |
State of New Hampshire v. Shawn Cartergreen1 sentence2015Cf. State v. Carter, 167 N.H. 161, 168 (2014) (observing that nothing in former Superior Court “Rule 98 prohibits the superior court from ordering discovery prior to” the time discovery is triggered under that rule). | 1 | 1 |
Hartgers v. Town of Plaistowgreen1 sentence2013By contrast, “[p]robable cause to arrest' exists when the arresting officer has knowledge and trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution and prudence in believing that the arrestee has committed an offense.” Hartgers, 141 N.H. at 255 (quotation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Smagulagreen1 sentence2011“It is a basic principle of statutory construction that a legislative enactment will be construed to avoid conflict with constitutional rights wherever reasonably possible.” State v. Smagula, 117 N.H. 663, 666 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
Keene Publishing Corp. v. Keene District Courtgreen2 sentences2005In Keene Publishing Corp. v. Keene District Court, 117 N.H. 959, 961-62 (1977), we held that the trial court could not order the closing of a probable cause hearing to protect the defendant from pre-trial publicity. 2005In doing so, we recognized that “[i]n this state the press has been held to have a right, though not unlimited, to gather news so as to effectuate the policy of our constitution that a free press is ‘essential to the security of freedom in a state.’ ” Id. at 961 (quoting N.H. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Wentworthgreen2 sentences1999In addition, a criminal defendant is protected by, inter alia, the law governing search and seizure, see State v. Pinkham, 141 N.H. 188, 189 , 679 A.2d 589, 590 (1996), the probable cause requirement for arrest, see State v. Christy, 138 N.H. 352, 356 , 639 A.2d 261, 264 (1994), the beyond a reasonable doubt standard for conviction, see State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 838 , 395 A.2d 858, 862 (1978), and post-conviction relief not afforded civil litigants, cf. State v. Daigle, 114 N.H. 679, 681 , 327 A.2d 711, 713 (1974). 1999In addition, a criminal defendant is protected by, inter alia, the law governing search and seizure, see State v. Pinkham, 141 N.H. 188, 189 , 679 A.2d 589, 590 (1996), the probable cause requirement for arrest, see State v. Christy, 138 N.H. 352, 356 , 639 A.2d 261, 264 (1994), the beyond a reasonable doubt standard for conviction, see State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 838 , 395 A.2d 858, 862 (1978), and post-conviction relief not afforded civil litigants, cf. State v. Daigle, 114 N.H. 679, 681 , 327 A.2d 711, 713 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
In re Lisa G.green2 sentences1999The defense attorney, however, is the ultimate guardian of these constitutional rights, cf. In re Lisa G., 127 N.H. 585, 590 , 504 A.2d 1, 4 (1986), who must defend the client against the immense resources of the State in its pursuit of a conviction. 1999The defense attorney, however, is the ultimate guardian of these constitutional rights, cf. In re Lisa G., 127 N.H. 585, 590 , 504 A.2d 1, 4 (1986), who must defend the client against the immense resources of the State in its pursuit of a conviction. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Christygreen2 sentences1999In addition, a criminal defendant is protected by, inter alia, the law governing search and seizure, see State v. Pinkham, 141 N.H. 188, 189 , 679 A.2d 589, 590 (1996), the probable cause requirement for arrest, see State v. Christy, 138 N.H. 352, 356 , 639 A.2d 261, 264 (1994), the beyond a reasonable doubt standard for conviction, see State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 838 , 395 A.2d 858, 862 (1978), and post-conviction relief not afforded civil litigants, cf. State v. Daigle, 114 N.H. 679, 681 , 327 A.2d 711, 713 (1974). 1999In addition, a criminal defendant is protected by, inter alia, the law governing search and seizure, see State v. Pinkham, 141 N.H. 188, 189 , 679 A.2d 589, 590 (1996), the probable cause requirement for arrest, see State v. Christy, 138 N.H. 352, 356 , 639 A.2d 261, 264 (1994), the beyond a reasonable doubt standard for conviction, see State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 838 , 395 A.2d 858, 862 (1978), and post-conviction relief not afforded civil litigants, cf. State v. Daigle, 114 N.H. 679, 681 , 327 A.2d 711, 713 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Pinkhamgreen2 sentences1999In addition, a criminal defendant is protected by, inter alia, the law governing search and seizure, see State v. Pinkham, 141 N.H. 188, 189 , 679 A.2d 589, 590 (1996), the probable cause requirement for arrest, see State v. Christy, 138 N.H. 352, 356 , 639 A.2d 261, 264 (1994), the beyond a reasonable doubt standard for conviction, see State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 838 , 395 A.2d 858, 862 (1978), and post-conviction relief not afforded civil litigants, cf. State v. Daigle, 114 N.H. 679, 681 , 327 A.2d 711, 713 (1974). 1999In addition, a criminal defendant is protected by, inter alia, the law governing search and seizure, see State v. Pinkham, 141 N.H. 188, 189 , 679 A.2d 589, 590 (1996), the probable cause requirement for arrest, see State v. Christy, 138 N.H. 352, 356 , 639 A.2d 261, 264 (1994), the beyond a reasonable doubt standard for conviction, see State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 838 , 395 A.2d 858, 862 (1978), and post-conviction relief not afforded civil litigants, cf. State v. Daigle, 114 N.H. 679, 681 , 327 A.2d 711, 713 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Daiglegreen2 sentences1999In addition, a criminal defendant is protected by, inter alia, the law governing search and seizure, see State v. Pinkham, 141 N.H. 188, 189 , 679 A.2d 589, 590 (1996), the probable cause requirement for arrest, see State v. Christy, 138 N.H. 352, 356 , 639 A.2d 261, 264 (1994), the beyond a reasonable doubt standard for conviction, see State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 838 , 395 A.2d 858, 862 (1978), and post-conviction relief not afforded civil litigants, cf. State v. Daigle, 114 N.H. 679, 681 , 327 A.2d 711, 713 (1974). 1999In addition, a criminal defendant is protected by, inter alia, the law governing search and seizure, see State v. Pinkham, 141 N.H. 188, 189 , 679 A.2d 589, 590 (1996), the probable cause requirement for arrest, see State v. Christy, 138 N.H. 352, 356 , 639 A.2d 261, 264 (1994), the beyond a reasonable doubt standard for conviction, see State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 838 , 395 A.2d 858, 862 (1978), and post-conviction relief not afforded civil litigants, cf. State v. Daigle, 114 N.H. 679, 681 , 327 A.2d 711, 713 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
Valmonte v. Banegreen2 sentences1998While the “preponderance standard allows for the balancing of evidence from both sides,” Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 1004 (2d Cir. 1994) (quotation omitted), the probable cause standard only requires the trier of fact to look at the “totality of the circumstances,” 77,014.00 Dollars, 607 So. 2d at 582 (quotation omitted), to determine whether the “evidence goes beyond a mere suspicion.” Id. 1998Cf. Cavarretta, 660 N.E.2d at 258-59 ; Valmonte, 18 F.3d at 1003-04 (holding that use of preponderance standard only after denial of employment creates unacceptably high risk of error). | 1 | 1 |
Appeal of Dellgreen2 sentences1998Our certiorari review requires us to evaluate whether the agency “acted illegally with respect to jurisdiction, authority or observance of the law . . . [or] abused its discretion.” Appeal of Dell, 140 N.H. 484, 487-88 , 668 A.2d 1024, 1029 (1995) (quotation and brackets omitted). 1998Our certiorari review requires us to evaluate whether the agency “acted illegally with respect to jurisdiction, authority or observance of the law . . . [or] abused its discretion.” Appeal of Dell, 140 N.H. 484, 487-88 , 668 A.2d 1024, 1029 (1995) (quotation and brackets omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. 77,014.00 DOLLARSgreen | 1 | 1 |
MATTER OF LEE TT. v. Dowlinggreen1 sentence1998See id. | 1 | 1 |
Cavarretta v. Department of Children & Family Servicesgreen2 sentences1998Cf. Cavarretta, 660 N.E.2d at 258 (requiring use of preponderance standard rather than credible evidence because of high risk of error). 1998Cf. Cavarretta, 660 N.E.2d at 258-59 ; Valmonte, 18 F.3d at 1003-04 (holding that use of preponderance standard only after denial of employment creates unacceptably high risk of error). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Pelliccigreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Novembrinogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Marcottegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Draper v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Stevensgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Millwood v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Placegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Hastingsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Moore v. Illinoisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Farrowgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Thomson v. Cashgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Jamesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Kahangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Hampshire. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Canelo
green
2 sentences2003Canelo, 139 N.H. at 386-87 . 2000Id. at 386-87 , 653 A.2d at 1105 . | 2 | 2000–2003 |
In re Richard A.
green
1 sentence2021The statutory scheme “also incorporates safeguards to preserve the ability of the named individual to meaningfully contest the petition,” In re Richard A., 146 N.H. at 299 , such as the right to counsel, see RSA 135-C:22, and the right to notice about the right to counsel, see RSA 135-C:24. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State of New Hampshire v. Robert Letoile, Jr.
green
1 sentence2019He does not *941 "dispute that the affidavit established probable cause to search his phone for text messages that he and Sylvester exchanged after the victim's hospitalization." He contends, however, that the affidavit, which did not mention photographs, "failed to show that it was 'probable' that photographs constituted the fruit, instrumentalities, or evidence of any crime." "Probable cause exists if a person of ordinary caution would justifiably believe that what is sought will be found through the search and will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction." Letoile , 166 N.H. at 272 , | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Orde
green
2 sentences2011While we frequently conduct a probable cause analysis without the issue first being decided in the trial court, see, e.g., State v. Orde, 161 N.H. 260 , 13 A.3d 338 (2010), we believe that the trial court is best positioned to make the determination in this case. 2011While we frequently conduct a probable cause analysis without the issue first being decided in the trial court, see, e.g., State v. Orde, 161 N.H. 260 , 13 A.3d 338 (2010), we believe that the trial court is best positioned to make the determination in this case. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
In re Eduardo L.
green
1 sentence2011We discerned “no substantial risk in relying upon the district court’s ability to consider the trustworthiness of the evidence at issue.” Id. at 687 ; see also State v. Arnault, 114 N.H. 216, 219 (1974) (decided before adoption of the rules of evidence) (in a probable cause hearing the trial court, “within its discretion, may admit evidence which it finds relevant, not too remote, and given by a credible witness”). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
McCarthy v. Wheeler
green
1 sentence2009Id. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
New York v. P. J. Video, Inc.
green
1 sentence2004Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868 (1986), is the Supreme Court’s latest pronouncement concerning the probable cause requirement for the search and seizure of allegedly obscene materials. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
In re Tracy M.
green
2 sentences1998We hold that due process requires that the preponderance of the evidence standard apply in any hearing to determine whether an individual’s name should be added to the central registry, RSA 169-C:35, where that individual would be excluded from working in his or her profession due to that listing, RSA 170-E:7, IV “[I]n the absence of full briefing and argument by the parties,” In re Tracy M., 137 N.H. at 122-23 , 624 A.2d at 965 , we decline to address the State’s argument that the use of a probable cause standard was harmless error. 1998We hold that due process requires that the preponderance of the evidence standard apply in any hearing to determine whether an individual’s name should be added to the central registry, RSA 169-C:35, where that individual would be excluded from working in his or her profession due to that listing, RSA 170-E:7, IV “[I]n the absence of full briefing and argument by the parties,” In re Tracy M., 137 N.H. at 122-23 , 624 A.2d at 965 , we decline to address the State’s argument that the use of a probable cause standard was harmless error. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
State v. Seventy-Seven Thousand and Fourteen and No/100 ($77,014) Dollars
green
1 sentence1998Ct. App. 1992) (quotation omitted), writ denied, 612 So. 2d 61 (La. 1993). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| State v. Gagne green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. Russo green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| United States v. Conrad Whitehead, Ii, United States of America v. Hector Quesada green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Texas v. Brown green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| State v. Bell green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Feaster v. Kendall green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| State Ex Rel. Regan v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| United States v. Calandra green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.