probable cause hearing in North Carolina

2026The probable cause standard “depends on the totality of the circumstances.” Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371 (first citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 232 ; and then citing Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175 ); see also Harris, 568 U.S. at 244 .

2026The probable cause standard “consistently look[s] to the totality of the circumstances.” Id. (first citing Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371 ; then citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 232 ; and then citing Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176 ).

2022See State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 713 , 370 S.E.2d 553, 555 (1988) (“Even were the two provisions identical, we have the authority to construe our own constitution differently from the construction by the United States Supreme Court of the Federal Constitution, as long as our citizens are thereby accorded no lesser rights than they are guaranteed by the parallel federal provision.”), superseded in part by statute on other grounds, An Act to Provide for the Adoption of the Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule into State Law, S.L. 2011-6, § 2, 2011 Sess.

2022See State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 713 , 370 S.E.2d 553, 555 (1988) (“Even were the two provisions identical, we have the authority to construe our own constitution differently from the construction by the United States Supreme Court of the Federal Constitution, as long as our citizens are thereby accorded no lesser rights than they are guaranteed by the parallel federal provision.”), superseded in part by statute on other grounds, An Act to Provide for the Adoption of the Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule into State Law, S.L. 2011-6, § 2, 2011 Sess.

2022This probable cause standard is met where the totality of “the facts and circumstances within the officers’ knowledge and of which they had reasonable trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.” State v. Zuniga, 312 N.C. 251, 261 , 322 S.E.2d 140, 146 (1984) (brackets and quotation marks omitted) ¶ 18 “The standard of review in evaluating the denial of a motion to suppress is whether competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact and whether the findings of fact suppor

2022This probable cause standard is met where the totality of “the facts and circumstances within the officers’ knowledge and of which they had reasonable trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.” State v. Zuniga, 312 N.C. 251, 261 , 322 S.E.2d 140, 146 (1984) (brackets and quotation marks omitted) ¶ 18 “The standard of review in evaluating the denial of a motion to suppress is whether competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact and whether the findings of fact suppor

2010D.D., 146 N.C.App. at 318 , 554 S.E.2d at 352 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

2005In re D.D., 146 N.C.App. at 318, 554 S.E.2d at 352 (internal citation omitted).

1984G.S. 15A-606(a) provides in pertinent part that “The judge must schedule a probable cause hearing unless the defendant waives in writing his right to such hearing.” The identical issues raised by defendant’s first assignment were addressed in State v. Lester, 294 N.C. 220 , 240 S.E. 2d 391 (1978).

1984G.S. 15A-606(a) provides in pertinent part that “The judge must schedule a probable cause hearing unless the defendant waives in writing his right to such hearing.” The identical issues raised by defendant’s first assignment were addressed in State v. Lester, 294 N.C. 220 , 240 S.E. 2d 391 (1978).

2017See Styles , 362 N.C. at 415 , 665 S.E.2d at 440 . 3 Although Chanthasouxat itself took no position on whether the reasonable suspicion standard or the probable cause standard applied in this context, see 342 F.3d at 1275 & n.2, 1280, the language from Chanthasouxat that we have quoted comes from United States v. Cashman , which used a probable cause standard, see 216 F.3d at 587 .

2017See Styles , 362 N.C. at 415 , 665 S.E.2d at 440 . 3 Although Chanthasouxat itself took no position on whether the reasonable suspicion standard or the probable cause standard applied in this context, see 342 F.3d at 1275 & n.2, 1280, the language from Chanthasouxat that we have quoted comes from United States v. Cashman , which used a probable cause standard, see 216 F.3d at 587 .

2026See District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48 , 60–62 (2018).

2023See Wesby, 583 U.S. at 61 .

2022This probable cause standard is met where the totality of “the facts and circumstances within the officers’ knowledge and of which they had reasonable trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.” State v. Zuniga, 312 N.C. 251, 261 , 322 S.E.2d 140, 146 (1984) (brackets and quotation marks omitted) ¶ 18 “The standard of review in evaluating the denial of a motion to suppress is whether competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact and whether the findings of fact suppor

2022This probable cause standard is met where the totality of “the facts and circumstances within the officers’ knowledge and of which they had reasonable trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.” State v. Zuniga, 312 N.C. 251, 261 , 322 S.E.2d 140, 146 (1984) (brackets and quotation marks omitted) ¶ 18 “The standard of review in evaluating the denial of a motion to suppress is whether competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact and whether the findings of fact suppor

2022See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 , 86 S. Ct. 1245, 1247 , 16 L.

2022See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 , 86 S. Ct. 1245, 1247 , 16 L.

2020As the Carpenter Court explained, a court order issued under the SCA did not meet the probable cause standard required for warrants because it only required that the government “show ‘reasonable grounds’ for believing that the records were ‘relevant and material to an ongoing investigation.’ ” Id. at __, 201 L.

2020As the Carpenter Court explained, a court order issued under the SCA did not meet the probable cause standard required for warrants because it only required that the government “show ‘reasonable grounds’ for believing that the records were ‘relevant and material to an ongoing investigation.’ ” Id. at __, 201 L.

2020A probable cause hearing, State v. Cobb, 295 N.C. 1, 6 , 243 S.E.2d 759, 762 (1978), pre-trial motion to suppress hearing, Frederick, 222 N.C.

2020A probable cause hearing, State v. Cobb, 295 N.C. 1, 6 , 243 S.E.2d 759, 762 (1978), pre-trial motion to suppress hearing, Frederick, 222 N.C.

2011"A probable cause hearing is not conducted for the purposes of discovery; its purpose is to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that [the juvenile] committed it." In re Bass, 77 N.C.App. 110, 114 , 334 S.E.2d 779, 781 (1985).

2011“A probable cause hearing is not conducted for the purposes of discovery; its purpose is to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that [the juvenile] committed it.” In re Bass, 77 N.C.

2010D.D., 146 N.C.

2010D.D., 146 N.C.App. at 318 , 554 S.E.2d at 352 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

2026The probable cause standard “depends on the totality of the circumstances.” Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371 (first citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 232 ; and then citing Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175 ); see also Harris, 568 U.S. at 244 .

2026The probable cause standard “consistently look[s] to the totality of the circumstances.” Id. (first citing Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371 ; then citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 232 ; and then citing Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176 ).

2026The probable cause standard “depends on the totality of the circumstances.” Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371 (first citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 232 ; and then citing Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175 ); see also Harris, 568 U.S. at 244 .

2026The probable cause standard “consistently look[s] to the totality of the circumstances.” Id. (first citing Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371 ; then citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 232 ; and then citing Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176 ).

2008The exercise of that discretion is not subject to review in the absence of a showing of gross abuse." It is settled that "an abuse of discretion is established only upon a showing that a court's actions `are manifestly unsupported by reason,'" or "`so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.'" State v. T.D.R., 347 N.C. 489, 503 , 495 S.E.2d 700, 708 (1998) (quoting White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777 , 324 S.E.2d 829, 832 (1985)).

2008The exercise of that discretion is not subject to review in the absence of a showing of gross abuse." It is settled that "an abuse of discretion is established only upon a showing that a court's actions `are manifestly unsupported by reason,'" or "`so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.'" State v. T.D.R., 347 N.C. 489, 503 , 495 S.E.2d 700, 708 (1998) (quoting White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777 , 324 S.E.2d 829, 832 (1985)).

2008The exercise of that discretion is not subject to review in the absence of a showing of gross abuse." It is settled that "an abuse of discretion is established only upon a showing that a court's actions `are manifestly unsupported by reason,'" or "`so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.'" State v. T.D.R., 347 N.C. 489, 503 , 495 S.E.2d 700, 708 (1998) (quoting White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777 , 324 S.E.2d 829, 832 (1985)).

2008The exercise of that discretion is not subject to review in the absence of a showing of gross abuse." It is settled that "an abuse of discretion is established only upon a showing that a court's actions `are manifestly unsupported by reason,'" or "`so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.'" State v. T.D.R., 347 N.C. 489, 503 , 495 S.E.2d 700, 708 (1998) (quoting White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777 , 324 S.E.2d 829, 832 (1985)).

2008In State v. Green, 348 N.C. 588, 595 , 502 S.E.2d 819, 823 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1111 , 119 S.Ct. 883 , 142 L.Ed.2d 783 (1999), the Supreme Court held that "[t]he decision to transfer a juvenile's case to superior court lies solely within the sound discretion of the juvenile court judge and is not subject to review absent a showing of gross abuse of discretion." This Court held likewise in In re Bunn, 34 N.C.App. 614, 616 , 239 S.E.2d 483, 484 (1977): "[T]he decision on whether the case will be transferred to the Superior Court [lies] solely within the sound discretion of the District

2008In State v. Green, 348 N.C. 588, 595 , 502 S.E.2d 819, 823 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1111 , 119 S.Ct. 883 , 142 L.Ed.2d 783 (1999), the Supreme Court held that "[t]he decision to transfer a juvenile's case to superior court lies solely within the sound discretion of the juvenile court judge and is not subject to review absent a showing of gross abuse of discretion." This Court held likewise in In re Bunn, 34 N.C.App. 614, 616 , 239 S.E.2d 483, 484 (1977): "[T]he decision on whether the case will be transferred to the Superior Court [lies] solely within the sound discretion of the District

2008In State v. Green, 348 N.C. 588, 595 , 502 S.E.2d 819, 823 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1111 , 119 S.Ct. 883 , 142 L.Ed.2d 783 (1999), the Supreme Court held that "[t]he decision to transfer a juvenile's case to superior court lies solely within the sound discretion of the juvenile court judge and is not subject to review absent a showing of gross abuse of discretion." This Court held likewise in In re Bunn, 34 N.C.App. 614, 616 , 239 S.E.2d 483, 484 (1977): "[T]he decision on whether the case will be transferred to the Superior Court [lies] solely within the sound discretion of the District

2008In State v. Green, 348 N.C. 588, 595 , 502 S.E.2d 819, 823 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1111 , 119 S.Ct. 883 , 142 L.Ed.2d 783 (1999), the Supreme Court held that "[t]he decision to transfer a juvenile's case to superior court lies solely within the sound discretion of the juvenile court judge and is not subject to review absent a showing of gross abuse of discretion." This Court held likewise in In re Bunn, 34 N.C.App. 614, 616 , 239 S.E.2d 483, 484 (1977): "[T]he decision on whether the case will be transferred to the Superior Court [lies] solely within the sound discretion of the District

2007"The fact that appellant was in a neighborhood frequented by drug users, standing alone, is not a basis for concluding that appellant himself was engaged in criminal conduct." Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 , 99 S.Ct. 2637 , 61 L.Ed.2d 357, 362-63 (1979).

2007"The fact that appellant was in a neighborhood frequented by drug users, standing alone, is not a basis for concluding that appellant himself was engaged in criminal conduct." Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 , 99 S.Ct. 2637 , 61 L.Ed.2d 357, 362-63 (1979).