20 Vermont opinions name it 1 courts 1971–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Vermont courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Townegreen2 sentences2016See State v. Melchior , 172 Vt. 248 , 251, 775 A.2d 901 , 904 (2001) (stating that standard for finding probable cause that evidence of crime will be found in place to be searched "requires something less than the more-likely-than-not standard we rejected in State v. Towne , 158 Vt. 607 , 613-14, 615 A.2d 484 , 487-88 (1992)"); United States v. Gaviria , 805 F.2d 1108 , 1115 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that "the probable cause standard does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities" (quotation omitted)). ¶ 11. 2016See State v. Melchior , 172 Vt. 248 , 251, 775 A.2d 901 , 904 (2001) (stating that standard for finding probable cause that evidence of crime will be found in place to be searched "requires something less than the more-likely-than-not standard we rejected in State v. Towne , 158 Vt. 607 , 613-14, 615 A.2d 484 , 487-88 (1992)"); United States v. Gaviria , 805 F.2d 1108 , 1115 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that "the probable cause standard does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities" (quotation omitted)). ¶ 11. | 3 | 3 |
Terry v. Ohiogreen2 sentences2015In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27-29 (1968), the U.S. Supreme Court articulated an exception to the probable cause requirement for seizures that are limited in their scope and duration and do not rise to the level of full arrests. 2015In Terry v. Ohio, however, the United States Supreme Court developed a very circumscribed exception to the probable-cause requirement for seizures that are limited in their scope and duration and do not rise to the level of full arrests. 392 U.S. 1, 27-29 (1968). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Simoneaugreen2 sentences2015Such an intrusion must be justified by reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity and cannot be based on the officer’s “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’ ” Id. at 21, 27 ; see State v. Simoneau, 2003 VT 83, ¶ 14 , 176 Vt. 15 , 833 A.2d 1280 (same). ¶ 14. 2015Such an intrusion must be justified by reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity and cannot be based on the officer’s “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’ ” Id. at 21, 27 ; see State v. Simoneau, 2003 VT 83, ¶ 14 , 176 Vt. 15 , 833 A.2d 1280 (same). ¶ 14. | 2 | 2 |
Ball v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2009See Ball v. United States, 803 A.2d 971, 976 (D.C. 2002) (noting split among courts “on whether, under the plain feel doctrine, an officer may seize a container that is not in itself contraband and does not conform to the shape of contraband (such as a medicine bottle or matchbook), yet is known to be routinely used to package or contain drugs”); see also K. 2009See Ball v. United States, 803 A.2d 971, 976 (D.C.2002) (noting split among courts "on whether, under the plain feel doctrine, an officer may seize a container that is not in itself contraband and does not conform to the shape of contraband (such as a medicine bottle or matchbook), yet is known to be routinely used to package or contain drugs"); see also K. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Cunninghamgreen2 sentences2009See State v. Cunningham , 2008 VT 43 , ___ Vt. ___, 954 A.2d 1290 ; State v. Crandall , 162 Vt. 66 , 644 A.2d 320 (1994). 2009See State v. Cunningham , 2008 VT 43 , ___ Vt. ___, 954 A.2d 1290 ; State v. Crandall , 162 Vt. 66 , 644 A.2d 320 (1994). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Lambgreen2 sentences2000The reasonable suspicion standard is less demanding than the probable cause standard, see State v. Lamb, 168 Vt. 194, 196 , 720 A.2d 1101, 1102 (1998), and requires ‘“considerably less than a proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.’” See State v. Siergiey, 155 Vt. 78, 81 , 582 A.2d 119, 121 (1990) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). 2000The reasonable suspicion standard is less demanding than the probable cause standard, see State v. Lamb, 168 Vt. 194, 196 , 720 A.2d 1101, 1102 (1998), and requires ‘“considerably less than a proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.’” See State v. Siergiey, 155 Vt. 78, 81 , 582 A.2d 119, 121 (1990) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Siergieygreen2 sentences2000The reasonable suspicion standard is less demanding than the probable cause standard, see State v. Lamb, 168 Vt. 194, 196 , 720 A.2d 1101, 1102 (1998), and requires ‘“considerably less than a proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.’” See State v. Siergiey, 155 Vt. 78, 81 , 582 A.2d 119, 121 (1990) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). 2000The reasonable suspicion standard is less demanding than the probable cause standard, see State v. Lamb, 168 Vt. 194, 196 , 720 A.2d 1101, 1102 (1998), and requires ‘“considerably less than a proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.’” See State v. Siergiey, 155 Vt. 78, 81 , 582 A.2d 119, 121 (1990) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Jorge William Gaviria and Victor Contrerasgreen2 sentences2016See State v. Melchior , 172 Vt. 248 , 251, 775 A.2d 901 , 904 (2001) (stating that standard for finding probable cause that evidence of crime will be found in place to be searched "requires something less than the more-likely-than-not standard we rejected in State v. Towne , 158 Vt. 607 , 613-14, 615 A.2d 484 , 487-88 (1992)"); United States v. Gaviria , 805 F.2d 1108 , 1115 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that "the probable cause standard does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities" (quotation omitted)). ¶ 11. 2001And certainly absolute certainty is not required for a warrant to issue. 2 See United States v. Gaviria, 805 F.2d 1108, 1115 (2d Cir. 1986) (“the probable cause standard ‘does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities.’ ”) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 231 ). | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Sokolowgreen2 sentences2000The reasonable suspicion standard is less demanding than the probable cause standard, see State v. Lamb, 168 Vt. 194, 196 , 720 A.2d 1101, 1102 (1998), and requires ‘“considerably less than a proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.’” See State v. Siergiey, 155 Vt. 78, 81 , 582 A.2d 119, 121 (1990) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). 2000The reasonable suspicion standard is less demanding than the probable cause standard, see State v. Lamb, 168 Vt. 194, 196 , 720 A.2d 1101, 1102 (1998), and requires "`considerably less than a proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.'" See State v. Siergiey, 155 Vt. 78, 81 , 582 A.2d 119, 121 (1990) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989)). *1243 The information supporting an NTO must be evaluated "in a common sense manner under the totality of the circumstances." State v. Towne, 158 Vt. 607, 618 , 615 A.2d 484, 490 (1992). | 1 | 2 |
Florida v. Royergreen1 sentence2020The U.S. Supreme Court held that police lacked probable cause to arrest a man based on the facts that he was nervous and paid cash for an airline ticket to New York, a “target city.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 507 (1983). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Melchiorgreen2 sentences2016See State v. Melchior , 172 Vt. 248 , 251, 775 A.2d 901 , 904 (2001) (stating that standard for finding probable cause that evidence of crime will be found in place to be searched "requires something less than the more-likely-than-not standard we rejected in State v. Towne , 158 Vt. 607 , 613-14, 615 A.2d 484 , 487-88 (1992)"); United States v. Gaviria , 805 F.2d 1108 , 1115 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that "the probable cause standard does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities" (quotation omitted)). ¶ 11. 2016See State v. Melchior , 172 Vt. 248 , 251, 775 A.2d 901 , 904 (2001) (stating that standard for finding probable cause that evidence of crime will be found in place to be searched "requires something less than the more-likely-than-not standard we rejected in State v. Towne , 158 Vt. 607 , 613-14, 615 A.2d 484 , 487-88 (1992)"); United States v. Gaviria , 805 F.2d 1108 , 1115 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that "the probable cause standard does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities" (quotation omitted)). ¶ 11. | 1 | 1 |
Alabama v. Whitegreen1 sentence2015Id.; see Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (stating that anonymous tip may serve as basis for vehicle stop because reasonable suspicion is less demanding standard than probable cause “not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Colegreen2 sentences2011State v. Duff, 151 Vt. 433, 439 , 563 A.2d 258, 262-63 (1989) (“The standard used to judge a motion to dismiss for lack of a prima facie case is stricter [than that required to show probable cause.]”); see also State v. Cole, 150 Vt. 453, 455 , 554 A.2d 253, 254 (1988) (“The burden is actually the same as that in response to a motion for judgment of acquittal . . . .”). 2011State v. Duff, 151 Vt. 433, 439 , 563 A.2d 258, 262-63 (1989) (“The standard used to judge a motion to dismiss for lack of a prima facie case is stricter [than that required to show probable cause.]”); see also State v. Cole, 150 Vt. 453, 455 , 554 A.2d 253, 254 (1988) (“The burden is actually the same as that in response to a motion for judgment of acquittal . . . .”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Duffgreen2 sentences2011State v. Duff, 151 Vt. 433, 439 , 563 A.2d 258, 262-63 (1989) (“The standard used to judge a motion to dismiss for lack of a prima facie case is stricter [than that required to show probable cause.]”); see also State v. Cole, 150 Vt. 453, 455 , 554 A.2d 253, 254 (1988) (“The burden is actually the same as that in response to a motion for judgment of acquittal . . . .”). 2011State v. Duff, 151 Vt. 433, 439 , 563 A.2d 258, 262-63 (1989) (“The standard used to judge a motion to dismiss for lack of a prima facie case is stricter [than that required to show probable cause.]”); see also State v. Cole, 150 Vt. 453, 455 , 554 A.2d 253, 254 (1988) (“The burden is actually the same as that in response to a motion for judgment of acquittal . . . .”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Roegreen1 sentence1971State v. Roe, 12 Vt. 93, 109 (1840). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Vermont. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Minnesota v. Dickerson
green
2 sentences2009Despite the Supreme Court’s avowed desire to foreclose any invasion of privacy beyond that necessary to assure the investigating officer’s safety, id. at 373 , and its stated belief that the probable cause requirement would ensure against excessively speculative seizures, id. at 373-76 , many federal and state courts have applied the “plain-feel” exception to allow warrantless searches in situations where the identity of the object felt was not “immediately apparent” except in the sense that it was the type of container commonly used to carry drugs (in addition to many other items). 2009Despite the Supreme Court’s avowed desire to foreclose any invasion of privacy beyond that necessary to assure the investigating officer’s safety, id. at 373 , and its stated belief that the probable cause requirement would ensure against excessively speculative seizures, id. at 373-76 , many federal and state courts have applied the “plain-feel” exception to allow warrantless searches in situations where the identity of the object felt was not “immediately apparent” except in the sense that it was the type of container commonly used to carry drugs (in addition to many other items). | 2 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Ballou
green
2 sentences2009Cf. State v. Ballou , 148 Vt. 427 , 435 n.3, 535 A.2d 1280 , 1284 n.3 (1987) (fact that informant’s statement to affiant was against informant’s penal interest had bearing on judge’s assessment of informant’s reliability). [4] We note finally that several of the cases cited by the State on this point are reasonable-suspicion cases, and thus have little application to this case, which concerns the higher probable-cause standard. 2009Cf. State v. Ballou , 148 Vt. 427 , 435 n.3, 535 A.2d 1280 , 1284 n.3 (1987) (fact that informant’s statement to affiant was against informant’s penal interest had bearing on judge’s assessment of informant’s reliability). [4] We note finally that several of the cases cited by the State on this point are reasonable-suspicion cases, and thus have little application to this case, which concerns the higher probable-cause standard. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Crandall
green
2 sentences2009See State v. Cunningham , 2008 VT 43 , ___ Vt. ___, 954 A.2d 1290 ; State v. Crandall , 162 Vt. 66 , 644 A.2d 320 (1994). 2009See State v. Cunningham , 2008 VT 43 , ___ Vt. ___, 954 A.2d 1290 ; State v. Crandall , 162 Vt. 66 , 644 A.2d 320 (1994). | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Spinelli v. United States
red
1 sentence2006Our probable cause standard relies on a two-pronged test established in two United States Supreme Court decisions, Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Aguilar v. Texas
red
1 sentence2006Our probable cause standard relies on a two-pronged test established in two United States Supreme Court decisions, Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Illinois v. Gates
green
2 sentences2001And certainly absolute certainty is not required for a warrant to issue. [2] See United States v. Gaviria, 805 F.2d 1108, 1115 (2d Cir. 1986) ("the probable cause standard `does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities.'") (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 231 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 ). 2001And certainly absolute certainty is not required for a warrant to issue. 2 See United States v. Gaviria, 805 F.2d 1108, 1115 (2d Cir. 1986) (“the probable cause standard ‘does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities.’ ”) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 231 ). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Griffin v. Wisconsin
green
2 sentences1993In such situations, the search need not satisfy the higher probable cause standard. [4] Id. at 873 , 107 S.Ct. at 3168 . 1993In such situations, the search need not satisfy the higher probable cause standard. [4] Id. at 873 , 107 S.Ct. at 3168 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
State v. Brown
green
2 sentences1992Defendant does not challenge the use of a nontestimonial order, but instead insists that the order was invalid because it was not supported by the probable cause standard of Brown, 151 Vt. at 535 n.2, 562 A.2d at 1058 -59 n.2. 1992Defendant does not challenge the use of a nontestimonial order, but instead insists that the order was invalid because it was not supported by the probable cause standard of Brown, 151 Vt. at 535 n.2, 562 A.2d at 1058 -59 n.2. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
State v. Ahart
green
1 sentence1990The court, however, stated that the evidence would be admissible and the probable cause requirement satisfied where “an undercover agent uses deception to obtain an invitation to a home to consummate an illegal transaction.” Id. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
State v. Hood
green
2 sentences1981Citing State v. Hood, 69 Ariz. 294 , 213 P.2d 368 (1950), Arizona claims that a defendant’s waiver of his right to a preliminary hearing is the legal equivalent of a judicial finding of probable cause and thus, is a substitute for the affidavit of facts. 1981Citing State v. Hood, 69 Ariz. 294 , 213 P.2d 368 (1950), Arizona claims that a defendant’s waiver of his right to a preliminary hearing is the legal equivalent of a judicial finding of probable cause and thus, is a substitute for the affidavit of facts. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Gerstein v. Pugh
green
2 sentences1975The trial court dismissed his petition, correctly pointing out that the cited statute had been repealed, holding the bail not excessive, and not ruling on the Fourth Amendment question raised by petitioner and subsequently decided in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 , 95 S.Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). 1975The trial court dismissed his petition, correctly pointing out that the cited statute had been repealed, holding the bail not excessive, and not ruling on the Fourth Amendment question raised by petitioner and subsequently decided in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 , 95 S.Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.