probable cause hearing in Illinois

2019“In determining whether there has been ‘reasonable grounds’ under subsection (b)(2) of the statute, this court has utilized the probable cause analysis -6- deriving from the fourth amendment.” Id. at 560 .

2018“When determining whether reasonable grounds existed for an arrest, courts employ the probable cause analysis derived from the fourth amendment.” Id. ¶ 48. ¶ 17 “Probable cause is not guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. ¶ 50. “[P]robable cause deals with probabilities and involves ‘factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d 246, 275 (2009)). “[T]he existence of probable cause depends upon the totality of the circumstances at the time of the arrest.” People v. Wear, 229 I

2025The probable cause hearing is “ ‘intended to be preliminary in nature’ ” (Stanbridge, 2012 IL 112337, ¶ 59 ) and the committed person’s burden is “very low” (In re Commitment of Wilcoxen, 2016 IL App (3d) 140359, ¶ 30 ).

2024“At a probable cause hearing for conditional release, the respondent must present plausible evidence that it is not substantially probable that he will engage -9- in acts of sexual violence if he is on conditional release. [Citation.] This plausible evidence can be (1) a change in the respondent himself, (2) a change in professional knowledge or the methods used to evaluate a person’s mental disorder or risk of reoffending, or (3) a change in the applicable legal definitions.” In re Commitment of Canada, 2018 IL App (4th) 170511, ¶ 33 , 107 N.E.3d 898 (citing In re Detention of Stanbridge, 201

2024The probable cause standard involves probabilities and “are not technical; they are factual and practical considerations of everyday life in which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians act.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949); see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983); People v. Wright, 111 Ill.2d 128, 146 (1985). ¶ 21 Defendant presumes, without citation to authority, that modern electronic speedometers and GPS-based systems must be certified and continually recalibrated to be deemed accurate.

2017App. 3d 1, 17 (2002); see also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 806 (1982); United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 484 (1985). ¶ 45 “The probable-cause standard is incapable of [a] precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances.” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983), and Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)).

2002Under the probable cause standard, “ ‘[e]vidence that will sustain a conviction is not required, but more than mere suspicion is necessary. [Citation.]’ ” People v. Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d 1, 22 , 675 N.E.2d 910 (1996), quoting In re D.G., 144 Ill. 2d 404, 412-13 , 581 N.E.2d 648 (1991) (Miller, C.J., dissenting).

2002Under the probable cause standard, “ ‘[e]vidence that will sustain a conviction is not required, but more than mere suspicion is necessary. [Citation.]’ ” People v. Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d 1, 22 , 675 N.E.2d 910 (1996), quoting In re D.G., 144 Ill. 2d 404, 412-13 , 581 N.E.2d 648 (1991) (Miller, C.J., dissenting).

2010At a probable cause hearing, the trial court’s task is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, there is “ ‘a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’ ” People v. Hickey, 178 Ill. 2d 256, 285 (1997), quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 , 76 L.

2010In other words, the probable cause requirement is “rooted in principles of common sense.” Hickey, 178 Ill. 2d at 285 .

2020Kirst, 2015 IL App (2d) 140532, ¶ 49 . ¶ 21 The trial court’s role at the probable cause hearing is “to determine whether the movant has established a plausible account on each of the required elements to assure the court that there is a substantial basis for the petition.” (Emphasis in original and internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Detention of Stanbridge, 2012 IL 112337, ¶ 62 (quoting In re Detention of Hardin, 238 Ill. 2d 33, 48 (2010)).

2018In a probable-cause hearing on a petition for conditional release, a respondent must only “ ‘ “establish a plausible account on each of the required elements to assure the court that there is a substantial basis for the petition.” ’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 58 (quoting In re Detention of Hardin, 238 Ill. 2d 33, 48 (2010), quoting State v. Watson, 595 N.W.2d 403, 420 (Wis. 1999)).

2020Although “[r]easonableness under the fourth amendment generally requires a warrant supported by probable cause” (id.), the Supreme Court has recognized a limited exception to the probable cause requirement, allowing police officers, under appropriate circumstances, to briefly stop a person for temporary questioning where the officer reasonably believes that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime (Terry, 392 U.S. at 22 ). ¶ 18 Under the Terry exception, the police may conduct a brief investigatory stop “when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activ

2018Although “[r]easonableness under the fourth amendment generally requires a warrant supported by probable cause” (id.), the Supreme Court has recognized a limited exception to the probable cause requirement, allowing police officers, under appropriate circumstances, to briefly stop a person for temporary questioning where the officer reasonably believes that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime (Terry, 392 U.S. at 22 ). ¶ 18 Under the Terry exception, the police may conduct a brief investigatory stop “when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activ

2002Under the probable cause standard, “ ‘[e]vidence that will sustain a conviction is not required, but more than mere suspicion is necessary. [Citation.]’ ” People v. Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d 1, 22 , 675 N.E.2d 910 (1996), quoting In re D.G., 144 Ill. 2d 404, 412-13 , 581 N.E.2d 648 (1991) (Miller, C.J., dissenting).

2002Under the probable cause standard, “ ‘[e]vidence that will sustain a conviction is not required, but more than mere suspicion is necessary. [Citation.]’ ” People v. Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d 1, 22 , 675 N.E.2d 910 (1996), quoting In re D.G., 144 Ill. 2d 404, 412-13 , 581 N.E.2d 648 (1991) (Miller, C.J., dissenting).

2006People v. Groves, 294 Ill.

2006People v. Groves, 294 Ill.

2021However, in its seminal ruling in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the United States Supreme Court created a limited exception to the probable cause requirement and held that a police officer “may conduct a brief, investigatory stop of a citizen [unsupported by probable cause] when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity and such suspicion amounts to more than a mere ‘hunch.’ ” McDonough, 239 Ill. 2d at 268 ; Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 .

2021However, in its seminal ruling in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the United States Supreme Court created a limited exception to the probable cause requirement and held that a police officer “may conduct a brief, investigatory stop of a citizen [unsupported by probable cause] when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity and such suspicion amounts to more than a mere ‘hunch.’ ” McDonough, 239 Ill. 2d at 268 ; Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 .

2020“The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances.” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003).

2017App. 3d 1, 17 (2002); see also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 806 (1982); United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 484 (1985). ¶ 45 “The probable-cause standard is incapable of [a] precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances.” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983), and Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)).

2019The Johnson court observed: "When the credibility of a [confidential informant] is at issue, our prior cases instruct us to consider several factors, such as the informant's personal observations, the degree of detail given, independent police corroboration of the * * * information, and whether the informant testified at the probable cause hearing. [Citations.] No single issue is dispositive; 'a deficiency in one factor may be compensated for by a strong showing in another or by some other indication of reliability.' [Citation.] We emphasize these factors as a means of examining the [informant

2019The Johnson court observed: “When the credibility of a [confidential informant] is at issue, our prior cases instruct us to consider several factors, such as the informant’s personal observations, the degree of detail given, independent police corroboration of the *** information, and whether the informant testified at the probable cause hearing. [Citations.] No single issue is dispositive; ‘a deficiency in one factor may be compensated for by a strong showing in another or by some other indication of reliability.’ [Citation.] We emphasize these factors as a means of examining the [informant’s

1991The probable cause requirement of the fourth amendment strikes a balance between the individual's right to privacy and the need for efficient law enforcement. ( People v. Moody (1983), 94 Ill.2d 1, 7 , 67 Ill.Dec. 795 , 445 N.E.2d 275 .) Probable cause exists when police "`have knowledge of facts which would lead a reasonable man to believe that a crime has occurred and that it has been committed by the defendant.'" ( Wright, 111 Ill.2d at 145 , 95 Ill.

1991The probable cause requirement of the fourth amendment strikes a balance between the individual's right to privacy and the need for efficient law enforcement. ( People v. Moody (1983), 94 Ill.2d 1, 7 , 67 Ill.Dec. 795 , 445 N.E.2d 275 .) Probable cause exists when police "`have knowledge of facts which would lead a reasonable man to believe that a crime has occurred and that it has been committed by the defendant.'" ( Wright, 111 Ill.2d at 145 , 95 Ill.

2020Defendant also notes that the probable cause inquiry is based on an objective analysis, as opposed to the subjective beliefs of the officer (see People v. Lee, 214 Ill. 2d 476, 484-85 (2005)), and that a mere hunch or suspicion is not enough (see People v. Drake, 288 Ill.

2020Defendant also notes that the probable cause inquiry is based on an objective analysis, as opposed to the subjective beliefs of the officer (see People v. Lee, 214 Ill. 2d 476, 484-85 (2005)), and that a mere hunch or suspicion is not enough (see People v. Drake, 288 Ill.

2010In re Austin D., 358 Ill.App.3d 794, 801 , 294 Ill.Dec. 881 , 831 N.E.2d 1206 (2005), citing In re L.M., 189 Ill.App.3d 392, 395 , 136 Ill.Dec. 795 , 545 N.E.2d 319 (1989) (referring to the temporary custody hearing as a "probable cause hearing").

2010In re Austin D., 358 Ill.App.3d 794, 801 , 294 Ill.Dec. 881 , 831 N.E.2d 1206 (2005), citing In re L.M., 189 Ill.App.3d 392, 395 , 136 Ill.Dec. 795 , 545 N.E.2d 319 (1989) (referring to the temporary custody hearing as a "probable cause hearing").

2018In a probable-cause hearing on a petition for conditional release, a respondent must only “ ‘ “establish a plausible account on each of the required elements to assure the court that there is a substantial basis for the petition.” ’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 58 (quoting In re Detention of Hardin, 238 Ill. 2d 33, 48 (2010), quoting State v. Watson, 595 N.W.2d 403, 420 (Wis. 1999)).

2017In a probable-cause hearing on a petition for conditional release, a respondent must only " ' "establish a plausible account on each of the required elements to assure the court that there is a substantial basis for the petition." ' " (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 58 (quoting In re Detention of Hardin , 238 Ill.2d 33 , 48, 342 Ill.Dec. 555 , 932 N.E.2d 1016 (2010), quoting State v. Watson , 227 Wis.2d 167 , 595 N.W.2d 403 , 420 (1999) ).

2024The probable cause standard involves probabilities and “are not technical; they are factual and practical considerations of everyday life in which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians act.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949); see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983); People v. Wright, 111 Ill.2d 128, 146 (1985). ¶ 21 Defendant presumes, without citation to authority, that modern electronic speedometers and GPS-based systems must be certified and continually recalibrated to be deemed accurate.

1996In People v. Wright, 111 Ill. 2d 128, 146 (1985), this court noted: "[D]ecisions analyzing the probable cause standard reveal that it is a 'practical, nontechnical conception.’ [Citation.] 'In dealing with probable cause, *** we deal with probabilities.

2020If the committed individual does not affirmatively waive that right, like respondent in this case, the trial court must set a probable cause hearing “to determine whether facts exist to believe that since the most recent periodic reexamination ***, the condition of the committed person has so changed that he or she is no longer a sexually violent person.” See id.

2011See Botruff, 212 Ill.2d at 179-80 , 288 Ill.Dec. 105 , 817 N.E.2d 463 (finding risk of erroneous deprivation was slight in considering whether due process required a respondent to have the right to be present at the probable cause hearing at the time of a periodic reexamination under the Act). ¶ 51 In their petition for rehearing, respondents point to the fact that Hatter was not "screened out" despite Dr. Tsofilias' recommendation that Hatter remain in a DHS Department of Mental Health facility because he lacked the capacity to participate in sex offender treatment.

2000The probable cause standard requires only facts sufficient to “ ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief [citation] that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false.” Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 , 75 L.

2000The probable cause standard requires only facts sufficient to “ ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief [citation] that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false.” Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 , 75 L.

2025On February 20, 2024, the defendant appeared for a probable cause hearing pursuant to Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), before the Honorable Linzey D.

2025On February 11, 2025, defendant appeared for a probable cause hearing pursuant to Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).

2005Therefore, since the State has failed to establish that an emergency or extraordinary circumstance occurred that delayed Wead’s presentment before a neutral magistrate for a probable cause hearing, Wead’s statement must be suppressed because it is unpurged of the primary taint created by the State’s violation of Gerstein and McLaughlin McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 , 114 L.

2005Therefore, since the State has failed to establish that an emergency or extraordinary circumstance occurred that delayed Wead’s presentment before a neutral magistrate for a probable cause hearing, Wead’s statement must be suppressed because it is unpurged of the primary taint created by the State’s violation of Gerstein and McLaughlin McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 , 114 L.

2011See Lippert, 89 Ill.2d at 179 , 59 Ill.Dec. 819 , 432 N.E.2d 605 (quoting Professor LaFave's treatise that suggests the probable cause test may be more stringent when the question confronting the officer is whether a crime had occurred). "`[T]he probable cause test is a "compromise" for accommodating the "often opposing interests" of privacy and law enforcement.

2011See Lippert, 89 Ill.2d at 179 , 59 Ill.Dec. 819 , 432 N.E.2d 605 (quoting Professor LaFave's treatise that suggests the probable cause test may be more stringent when the question confronting the officer is whether a crime had occurred). "`[T]he probable cause test is a "compromise" for accommodating the "often opposing interests" of privacy and law enforcement.

2024In interpreting the probable cause standard of proof, our supreme court found the State had to prove “facts providing reasonable grounds for the belief that there exist[ed] a nexus between the property and illegal drug activity, supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion.” People v. A Parcel of Property Commonly Known as 1945 North 31st Street, Decatur, 217 Ill. 2d 481, 505 (2005).

2019See People v. Parcel of Property Commonly Known as 1945 North 31st Street, Decatur, Macon County, Illinois, 217 Ill. 2d 481, 505 (2005) (discussing the probable cause requirement that prior to July 2018 was contained in section 9 of the Forfeiture Act).