77 Idaho opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2026 23 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Idaho courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Kerleygreen2 sentences2026State v. Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 874 , 11 P.3d 489, 493 (Ct. App. 2000). 2026State v. Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 874 , 11 P.3d 489, 493 (Ct. App. 2000). | 18 | 19 |
State v. Gonzalesgreen2 sentences2021In Gonzales, we held “the smell of marijuana alone can satisfy the probable cause requirement for a warrantless search.” Gonzales, 117 Idaho at 519 , 789 P.2d at 207 . 2021In Gonzales, we held “the smell of marijuana alone can satisfy the probable cause requirement for a warrantless search.” Gonzales, 117 Idaho at 519 , 789 P.2d at 207 . | 4 | 5 |
Illinois v. Gatesgreen2 sentences2025See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983) (holding that the “totality-of-the-circumstances approach is far more consistent with our prior treatment of probable cause than is any rigid demand that specific ‘tests’ be satisfied” (footnote and internal citation omitted)). 2025Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983) (the “totality-of-the-circumstances approach is far more consistent with our prior treatment of probable cause than is any rigid demand that specific “tests” be satisfied). | 3 | 4 |
State v. Cappsgreen2 sentences1990Nor does he dispute the district court’s finding that the officer was trained to recognize by smell the presence of “raw marijuana.” “The smell of marijuana alone can satisfy the probable cause requirement for a warrantless search.” State v. Capps, 97 N.M. 453 , 641 P.2d 484, 487 (1982) (emphasis original); accord United States v. Bowman, supra. An officer may draw reasonable inferences to establish probable cause from related experience and law enforcement training. 1990Nor does he dispute the district court’s finding that the officer was trained to recognize by smell the presence of “raw marijuana.” “The smell of marijuana alone can satisfy the probable cause requirement for a warrantless search.” State v. Capps, 97 N.M. 453 , 641 P.2d 484, 487 (1982) (emphasis original); accord United States v. Bowman, supra. An officer may draw reasonable inferences to establish probable cause from related experience and law enforcement training. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Elisongreen2 sentences2022State v. Elison, 135 Idaho 546, 549 , 21 P.3d 483, 486 (2001). 2022State v. Elison, 135 Idaho 546, 549 , 21 P.3d 483, 486 (2001). | 2 | 2 |
Herrold v. Idaho State School for the Deaf & Blindgreen2 sentences2020Although the probable cause analysis generally focuses on what the defendant knew at the time of his actions, an “independent finding of probable cause by a magistrate preclude[s] as a matter of law a finding that there was no probable cause to arrest the plaintiff in a malicious prosecution action where there [has] been a full disclosure to the magistrate.” Herrold, 112 Idaho at 412 , 732 P.2d at 381 (alterations in original) (quotation omitted). 2020Although the probable cause analysis generally focuses on what the defendant knew at the time of his actions, an “independent finding of probable cause by a magistrate preclude[s] as a matter of law a finding that there was no probable cause to arrest the plaintiff in a malicious prosecution action where there [has] been a full disclosure to the magistrate.” Herrold, 112 Idaho at 412 , 732 P.2d at 381 (alterations in original) (quotation omitted). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Phelpsgreen2 sentences2014State v. Phelps, 131 Idaho 249, 251 , 953 P.2d 999, 1001 (Ct.App.1998). 2014State v. Phelps, 131 Idaho 249, 251 , 953 P.2d 999, 1001 (Ct.App.1998). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Stanley Mills Stanertgreen2 sentences1993To allow a magistrate to be misled in such a manner could denude the probable cause requirement of all real meaning.” United States v. Stanert, 762 F.2d 775, 781 (9th Cir.1985), amended, 769 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir.1985). 1990United States v. Stanert, 762 F.2d 775 at 781 (9th Cir.1985), amended, 769 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir.1985). | 2 | 2 |
Florida v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2026(Emphasis in original.) Thus, he contends the search was conducted in violation of the probable cause standard articulated by this Court in State v. Randall, 169 Idaho 358, 368 , 496 P.3d 844, 854 (2021), which requires a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” As explained below, Barritt’s contention relies on a rigid interpretation of evidentiary standards that were rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 244 (2013). 2023Furthermore, “a probable-cause hearing focusing on a dog’s alert should proceed much like any other,” with the trial court “allow[ing] the parties to make their best case, consistent with the usual rules of criminal procedure.” Id. | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Sokolowgreen2 sentences2012Gallegos, 120 Idaho at 896 , 821 P.2d at 951 (citing U.S. v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1, 10 (1989)). 2012Gallegos, 120 Idaho at 896 , 821 P.2d at 951 (citing U.S. v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1, 10 (1989)). | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Phillip Lautergreen1 sentence2026Compare United States v. Vasquez-Algarin, 821 F.3d 467, 476 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that the “reason to believe” standard “amounts to a probable cause standard”) and United States v. Lauter, 57 F.3d 212, 215 (2d Cir. 6 1995) (holding that probable cause is “too stringent a test” for determining “reason to believe”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Randallgreen2 sentences2026(Emphasis in original.) Thus, he contends the search was conducted in violation of the probable cause standard articulated by this Court in State v. Randall, 169 Idaho 358, 368 , 496 P.3d 844, 854 (2021), which requires a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” As explained below, Barritt’s contention relies on a rigid interpretation of evidentiary standards that were rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 244 (2013). 2026(Emphasis in original.) Thus, he contends the search was conducted in violation of the probable cause standard articulated by this Court in State v. Randall, 169 Idaho 358, 368 , 496 P.3d 844, 854 (2021), which requires a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” As explained below, Barritt’s contention relies on a rigid interpretation of evidentiary standards that were rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 244 (2013). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Johnny Vasquez-Algaringreen1 sentence2026Compare United States v. Vasquez-Algarin, 821 F.3d 467, 476 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that the “reason to believe” standard “amounts to a probable cause standard”) and United States v. Lauter, 57 F.3d 212, 215 (2d Cir. 6 1995) (holding that probable cause is “too stringent a test” for determining “reason to believe”). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Wintersgreen1 sentence2025See, e.g., United States v. Holleman, 743 F.3d 1152, 1157-58 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding that the drug dog’s general alert established probable cause when viewed in light of the totality of the 13 circumstances available to the officer at the time of the stop); United States v. Winters, 600 F.3d 963, 968 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding a defendant’s furtive movements, body tremor, dilated pupils, and strong chemical odor, “when added to [the drug dog’s alerts], clearly support the district court’s ruling that the officers had probable cause to conduct the post-sniff search of [the defendant’s] person in | 1 | 1 |
People v. Baileygreen1 sentence2025See, e.g., United States v. Holleman, 743 F.3d 1152, 1157-58 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding that the drug dog’s general alert established probable cause when viewed in light of the totality of the 13 circumstances available to the officer at the time of the stop); United States v. Winters, 600 F.3d 963, 968 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding a defendant’s furtive movements, body tremor, dilated pupils, and strong chemical odor, “when added to [the drug dog’s alerts], clearly support the district court’s ruling that the officers had probable cause to conduct the post-sniff search of [the defendant’s] person in | 1 | 1 |
Connor Timothy Corrigan Phippen v. The State of Wyominggreen1 sentence2025See, e.g., United States v. Holleman, 743 F.3d 1152, 1157-58 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding that the drug dog’s general alert established probable cause when viewed in light of the totality of the 13 circumstances available to the officer at the time of the stop); United States v. Winters, 600 F.3d 963, 968 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding a defendant’s furtive movements, body tremor, dilated pupils, and strong chemical odor, “when added to [the drug dog’s alerts], clearly support the district court’s ruling that the officers had probable cause to conduct the post-sniff search of [the defendant’s] person in | 1 | 1 |
United States v. David Hollemangreen1 sentence2025See, e.g., United States v. Holleman, 743 F.3d 1152, 1157-58 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding that the drug dog’s general alert established probable cause when viewed in light of the totality of the 13 circumstances available to the officer at the time of the stop); United States v. Winters, 600 F.3d 963, 968 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding a defendant’s furtive movements, body tremor, dilated pupils, and strong chemical odor, “when added to [the drug dog’s alerts], clearly support the district court’s ruling that the officers had probable cause to conduct the post-sniff search of [the defendant’s] person in | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Forestegreen2 sentences2023In United States v. Foreste, the Second Circuit determined that the district court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s request for field-performance records on the basis that they “don’t tell you anything.” 780 F.3d 518, 529 (2d Cir. 2015) (alteration omitted). 2023The Foreste court explained that “Harris counsels caution, but it does not dictate an about-face from [the Second Circuit’s] long-standing position that a canine’s field performance is relevant to the probable cause inquiry.” Id. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Algergreen2 sentences2021Probable cause is defined as the possession of information that “would lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong suspicion that such person is guilty.” State v. Alger, 100 Idaho 675, 677 , 603 P.2d 1009, 1011 (1979) (citations omitted). 2021Probable cause is defined as the possession of information that “would lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong suspicion that such person is guilty.” State v. Alger, 100 Idaho 675, 677 , 603 P.2d 1009, 1011 (1979) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Wolf v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Zentnergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Draper v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Wilsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Edmonsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Braendlegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Schwarzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Wilsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Atwater v. City of Lago Vistagreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Rossgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Ruessgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gifford v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Matter of Nowojgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Coopergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Armbrustergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. DuValtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Inadigreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Kirk C. Reivichgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Vernon Willis Bowman, Jr.green | 1 | 1 |
| Vigil v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| United States v. Grotegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ferreira
green
2 sentences2023In contrast, “[a]n investigative detention is characterized as a seizure of limited duration which, when supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, falls within a judicially created exception to the probable cause requirement.” Id. 2023In contrast, “[a]n investigative detention is characterized as a seizure of limited duration which, when supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, falls within a judicially created exception to the probable cause requirement.” Id. | 4 | 2003–2023 |
State v. Gallegos
green
2 sentences2012Gallegos, 120 Idaho at 896 , 821 P.2d at 951 (citing U.S. v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1, 10 (1989)). 2012Gallegos, 120 Idaho at 896 , 821 P.2d at 951 (citing U.S. v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1, 10 (1989)). | 3 | 1998–2012 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2021In discussing the probable cause inquiry, we noted: 2 Nor does it appear that any person in Idaho, aside from Clark, has appealed a conviction under the felony enhancement of unlawful entry since it was added to Idaho Code section 18-7034 in 2017. 3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 8 When reviewing an officer’s actions the court must judge the facts against an objective standard. 2021In discussing the probable cause inquiry, we noted: 2 Nor does it appear that any person in Idaho, aside from Clark, has appealed a conviction under the felony enhancement of unlawful entry since it was added to Idaho Code section 18-7034 in 2017. 3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 8 When reviewing an officer’s actions the court must judge the facts against an objective standard. | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Maryland v. Pringle
green
2 sentences2014“The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances.” Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371 , 124 S.Ct. at 800 , 157 L.Ed.2d at 775 . 2014“The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances.” Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371 , 124 S.Ct. at 800 , 157 L.Ed.2d at 775 . | 2 | 2014–2017 |
Brinegar v. United States
green
2 sentences1978Long before Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 , 95 S.Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 , 85 S.Ct. 741 , 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 482 , 78 S.Ct. 1245 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1503 (1958); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 , 69 S.Ct. 1302 , 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949), and Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 , 68 S.Ct. 1978Long before Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 , 95 S.Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 , 85 S.Ct. 741 , 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 482 , 78 S.Ct. 1245 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1503 (1958); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 , 69 S.Ct. 1302 , 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949), and Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 , 68 S.Ct. | 2 | 1978–2014 |
United States v. State Of Oregon
green
2 sentences1993To allow a magistrate to be misled in such a manner could denude the probable cause requirement of all real meaning.” United States v. Stanert, 762 F.2d 775, 781 (9th Cir.1985), amended, 769 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir.1985). 1990United States v. Stanert, 762 F.2d 775 at 781 (9th Cir.1985), amended, 769 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir.1985). | 2 | 1990–1993 |
State v. Arregui
green
2 sentences1983In Struve v. Wilcox, 99 Idaho 205 , 579 P.2d 1188 (1978), a 4-1 Court noted that: “[T]his Court, in the same year that the Idaho legislature improved the Uniform Extradition Act by adding to Section 15 the safeguard of a probable cause hearing, handed down the landmark decision of State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43 , 254 P. 788 , 52 A.L.R. 463 (1927). 1983In Struve v. Wilcox, 99 Idaho 205 , 579 P.2d 1188 (1978), a 4-1 Court noted that: “[T]his Court, in the same year that the Idaho legislature improved the Uniform Extradition Act by adding to Section 15 the safeguard of a probable cause hearing, handed down the landmark decision of State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43 , 254 P. 788 , 52 A.L.R. 463 (1927). | 2 | 1978–1983 |
Struve v. Wilcox
green
2 sentences1983In Struve v. Wilcox, 99 Idaho 205 , 579 P.2d 1188 (1978), a 4-1 Court noted that: “[T]his Court, in the same year that the Idaho legislature improved the Uniform Extradition Act by adding to Section 15 the safeguard of a probable cause hearing, handed down the landmark decision of State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43 , 254 P. 788 , 52 A.L.R. 463 (1927). 1983In Struve v. Wilcox, 99 Idaho 205 , 579 P.2d 1188 (1978), a 4-1 Court noted that: “[T]his Court, in the same year that the Idaho legislature improved the Uniform Extradition Act by adding to Section 15 the safeguard of a probable cause hearing, handed down the landmark decision of State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43 , 254 P. 788 , 52 A.L.R. 463 (1927). | 2 | 1982–1983 |
Gerstein v. Pugh
green
2 sentences1978Long before Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 , 95 S.Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 , 85 S.Ct. 741 , 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 482 , 78 S.Ct. 1245 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1503 (1958); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 , 69 S.Ct. 1302 , 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949), and Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 , 68 S.Ct. 1978Long before Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 , 95 S.Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 , 85 S.Ct. 741 , 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 482 , 78 S.Ct. 1245 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1503 (1958); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 , 69 S.Ct. 1302 , 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949), and Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 , 68 S.Ct. | 2 | 1978–1978 |
State v. Northover
green
2 sentences2026The Idaho appellate courts have not directly adopted a standard; however, this Court applied a less than probable cause analysis in State v. Northover, 133 Idaho 655 , 991 P.2d 380 (Ct. App. 1999). 2026The Idaho appellate courts have not directly adopted a standard; however, this Court applied a less than probable cause analysis in State v. Northover, 133 Idaho 655 , 991 P.2d 380 (Ct. App. 1999). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Bishop
green
2 sentences2022Specifically, the State argues the district court improperly discounted the presumed reliability of the CI’s tips as required by State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804 , 203 P.3d 1203 (2009) and incorrectly applied the probable cause standard instead of the reasonable suspicion standard. 2022Specifically, the State argues the district court improperly discounted the presumed reliability of the CI’s tips as required by State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804 , 203 P.3d 1203 (2009) and incorrectly applied the probable cause standard instead of the reasonable suspicion standard. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| United States v. Alvarez green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Arizona v. Gant green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Knowles v. Iowa green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| United States v. Floyd David Johnson green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| United States v. Tyronski Johnson green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Deen v. State green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| cluster 333168 green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Maryland v. Buie green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| White v. Illinois green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| State v. Zapp green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| United States v. Martinez-Fuerte green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| New York v. P. J. Video, Inc. green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Donaldson green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| People v. Aston green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| State v. Lockett green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| United States v. Roy L. Williams, Thomas F. O'malley, Andrew G. Massa, Joseph Lombardo green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| People v. Winden green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Coleman v. Alabama green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Gagnon v. Scarpelli red | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Morrissey v. Brewer green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Michigan v. Doran green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Wilcox v. Struve green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Wayland v. Essex County Bank & Trust Co. green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Vornado, Inc. v. Degnan green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Giordenello v. United States green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Johnson v. United States green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Walton v. State green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| United States Ex Rel. Anthony Vitiello v. Walter J. Flood, Warden of the Nassau County Jail green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Breed v. Jones green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.