probable cause standard in Texas

2025And although Rotter argued that he did not think that when Detective Potts used the word “homicide” he believed he had probable cause for homicide, the probable-cause standard “does not demand certainty; it is met so long as there is a ‘fair probability’ that evidence of criminal activity will be found.” Thacker v. State, No. 07-23-00368-CR, 2024 WL 3405900 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo July 12, 2024, 11 no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 , 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983)).

2025And although Rotter argued that he did not think that when Detective Potts used the word “homicide” he believed he had probable cause for homicide, the probable-cause standard “does not demand certainty; it is met so long as there is a ‘fair probability’ that evidence of criminal activity will be found.” Thacker v. State, No. 07-23-00368-CR, 2024 WL 3405900 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo July 12, 2024, 11 no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 , 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983)).

2015See id. at 596 .

2010The well-established probable cause standard that applies to a warrantless entry or search of a specific location is that probable cause exists ―when reasonably trustworthy facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the officer on the scene would lead a man of reasonable prudence to believe that the instrumentality of a crime or evidence of a crime will be found.‖ Parker, 206 S.W.3d at 597 .

2024“The probable-cause standard ‘requires more than mere suspicion but less evidence than needed to support a conviction or support a finding by a preponderance of the evidence.’” Id. (quoting Matter of C.M.M., 503 S.W.3d at 702 ); see Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex. Crim.

2019The probable-cause standard “requires more than mere suspicion but less evidence than 19 needed to support a conviction or support a finding by a preponderance of the evidence.” In re C.M.M., 503 S.W.3d 692, 702 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (citing Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex. Crim.

2005See New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112 , 106 S.Ct. 960 , 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (“A citizen does not surrender all the protections of the Fourth Amendment by entering an automobile.”).

2005See New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112 , 106 S.Ct. 960 , 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (“A citizen does not surrender all the protections of the Fourth Amendment by entering an automobile.”).

1996In re D.W.L., 828 S.W.2d 520, 524 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ) (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 , 95 S.Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975)); Mayfield v. State, 800 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1990, no pet.).

1996In re D.W.L., 828 S.W.2d 520, 524 (Tex.App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ) (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 , 95 S.Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975)); Mayfield v. State, 800 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1990, no pet.).

2019App. 2011) (observing that the reasonable suspicion standard is much lower than the probable cause standard because a “brief investigatory detention constitutes a significantly lesser intrusion upon the privacy and integrity of the person” compared to an arrest); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968).

2014App. 2009) (“[T]he officer’s conduct of reaching into appellant’s pocket— even under a valid investigative detention—was an illegal search unless there existed some exception to the usual probable cause requirement.”). 13 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 15 Granting almost total deference to findings by the trial court does not mean the trial court’s findings or implied findings of historical fact are granted absolute deference.

2022“The probable cause inquiry asks only whether the complainant reasonably believed that the elements of a crime had been committed based on the information available to the complainant before criminal proceedings began.” Id. at 519 .

2021Lack of probable cause “The probable cause inquiry asks only whether the complainant reasonably believed that the elements of a crime had been committed based on the information 13 available to the complainant before criminal proceedings began.” Richey, 952 S.W.2d at 519 . “[T]here is an initial presumption in malicious prosecution actions that the defendant acted reasonably and in good faith and had probable cause to initiate the proceedings.” Id at 517.

2024“The probable-cause standard ‘requires more than mere suspicion but less evidence than needed to support a conviction or support a finding by a preponderance of the evidence.’” Id. (quoting Matter of C.M.M., 503 S.W.3d at 702 ); see Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex. Crim.

2024“The probable cause standard embraces a practical, common sense approach rather than the more technical standards applied when assessing whether proof rises to standards such as beyond a reasonable doubt.” In re C.M.M., 503 S.W.3d at 702 .

2003Here, the probable cause analysis is controlled by the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision in McNairy , which the plurality does not see fit to analyze in any significant detail. 835 S.W.2d at 106 .

2003Here, the probable cause analysis is controlled by the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision in McNairy , which the plurality does not see fit to analyze in any significant detail. 835 S.W.2d at 106 .

2025The probable cause standard is “flexible and non-demanding,” and our review is “highly deferential because of the constitutional preference for searches to be conducted pursuant to a warrant as opposed to a warrantless search.” McLain, 337 S.W.3d at 271, 272 .

2014Because the affidavit used the word “witnesses” and did not connote they were “informant[s] ‘from the criminal milieu,’” Duarte, existed, see McLain, 337 S.W.3d at 271 , and what type of search warrant the probable cause mandates is collateral to the probable-cause inquiry.

2023Law Despite Isaac’s argument that industrial hemp is now legal 3 and indistinguishable from marijuana without a lab test, marijuana remains illegal, 4 and the probable cause standard for police to detect it remains the same: “Probable cause ‘exists when reasonably trustworthy facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the officer on the scene would lead a man of reasonable prudence to believe that the instrumentality of a crime or evidence pertaining to a crime will be found.’” Hyland v. State, 574 S.W.3d 904, 910 (Tex. Crim.

2023Notwithstanding the fact that industrial hemp is now legal and may be indistinguishable from marijuana without a lab test, marijuana remains illegal, and the probable cause standard for police to detect it remains the same: “Probable cause ‘exists when reasonably trustworthy facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the officer on the scene would lead a man of reasonable prudence to believe that the instrumentality of a crime or evidence pertaining to a crime will be found.’” Hyland v. State, 574 S.W.3d 904, 910 (Tex. Crim.

2022As the United States Supreme Court observed in United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95 (2006), “[b]ecause the probable cause requirement looks to whether evidence will be found when the search is conducted, all warrants are, in a sense, ‘anticipatory.’” That such anticipatory probable cause is contingent upon a triggering fact is 1 In relevant part, Article 18.01(b) provides that “[n]o search warrant shall issue for any purpose in this state unless sufficient facts are first presented to satisfy the issuing magistrate that probable cause does in fact exist for its issuance.” TEX.

2020See United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95 (2006) (stating that “the probable-cause requirement looks to whether the evidence will be found when the search is conducted”) (emphasis in original).

2022Akin, 661 S.W.2d at 920 (holding that “only” existing events matter in determining probable cause); Digby v. Tex. Bank, 943 S.W.2d 914, 921 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1997, writ denied) (“Texas courts have consistently held that probable cause should be evaluated from the perspective of the person or entity who made the report to law enforcement authorities, at the time that the report was made.”).

2016Digby, 943 S.W.2d at 920-21 .

2013See, e.g., Gates, 462 U.S. at 238 , 103 S. Ct. at 2332 (“The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” (emphasis supplied)); Crider v. State, 352 S.W.3d at 707 (“The probable-cause standard means that the affidavit must set out sufficient facts for the magistrate to conclude that the item to be seized will be on the described premises at the time the warrant issues and

2013See, e.g., Gates, 462 U.S. at 238 , 103 S.Ct. at 2332 (“The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him ... there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” (emphasis supplied)); Crider v. State, 352 S.W.3d at 707 (“The probable-cause standard means that the affidavit must set out sufficient facts for the magistrate to conclude that the item to be seized will be on the described premises at the time the warrant issues and the

2004Lippert v. State, 664 S.W.2d 712, 721-22 (Tex.Crim.App.1984).

2004Lippert v. State , 664 S.W.2d 712 , 721 B 22 (Tex. Crim.

2025Bonds v. State, 403 S.W.3d 867, 875 (Tex. Crim.

2015Proc. art. 18.04(2). 12 Bonds, 403 S.W.3d at 875 . 7 particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another.”13 Moreover, “[i]n addition to the prevention of general searches, the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement ‘assures the individual whose property is searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of his powers to search.’”14 “When investigators fail to limit themselves to the particulars in the warrant, both the pa

1996In re D.W.L., 828 S.W.2d 520, 524 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ) (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 , 95 S.Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975)); Mayfield v. State, 800 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1990, no pet.).

1996In re D.W.L., 828 S.W.2d 520, 524 (Tex.App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ) (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 , 95 S.Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975)); Mayfield v. State, 800 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1990, no pet.).

2021P’ship v. Suberu, 216 S.W.3d 788, 794 (Tex. 2006) (“To rebut the probable cause presumption, Suberu had to produce evidence that the motives, grounds, beliefs, or other information upon which Kroger acted demonstrate that it did not reasonably believe Suberu was guilty of shoplifting. [citations omitted] While Suberu’s evidence supports the jury’s determination—consistent with her acquittal—that she did not steal groceries, it does not establish the absence of probable cause.”). 15 1.

2015Torts > ... > Elements > Lack of Probable Cause > Evidence Page 2 of 10 216 S.W.3d 788, *788 ; 2006 Tex. LEXIS 441 , **1 HN5 In a malicious prosecution action, the civil law presumes a defendant’s good faith and requires a plaintiff to rebut this presumption, because it is more important that a private citizen report an apparent subversion of our laws than for the wrongly accused to attain monetary redress from the accuser.

2018Dixon v. State, 206 S.W.3d 613, 616 (Tex. Crim.

2017Dixon v. State , 206 S.W.3d 613 , 616 (Tex. Crim.

2025In fact, the Supreme Court has explained that the “central teaching” of its decisions bearing on “the probable cause standard” is that “it is a ‘practical, nontechnical conception.’” Id. at 231 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)) (emphasis added).

2002Although Stout concerned an automobile search, that fact did not affect the probable cause analysis, but only the issue of whether a warrant was required. [4] State v. Steelman, 93 S.W.3d 102 , 108 (Tex. Crim.App.2002). [5] Id. at 109 . [1] Black's Law Dictionary, 7th Ed. 1218 (West 1999). [2] Id. [3] 338 U.S. 160, 175 , 69 S.Ct. 1302 , 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949). [4] Id. at 175 , 69 S.Ct. 1302 (internal quotation marks omitted). [5] Id. at 175-76 , 69 S.Ct. 1302 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). [6] Id. at 176 , 69 S.Ct. 1302 . [7] Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 243 n. 13, 103 S.

2011Swearingen v. State, 143 S.W.3d 808, 810-11 (Tex.Crim.App.2004); Nichols v. State, 877 S.W.2d 494, 497 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1994, pet. ref d).

2011Swearingen v. State , 143 S.W.3d 808 , 810–11 (Tex. Crim.

1996In re D.W.L., 828 S.W.2d 520, 524 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ) (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 , 95 S.Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975)); Mayfield v. State, 800 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1990, no pet.).

1996In re D.W.L., 828 S.W.2d 520, 524 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ) (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 , 95 S.Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975)); Mayfield v. State, 800 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1990, no pet.).