probable cause hearing in Wisconsin

2026See Dodge Cnty. v. Ryan E.M., 2002 WI App 71, ¶¶5, 12 , 252 Wis. 2d 490 , 642 N.W.2d 592 (holding that the circuit court lost competency when a probable cause hearing did not occur within 72 hours after the individual was taken into custody pursuant to WIS.

2026See Dodge Cnty. v. Ryan E.M., 2002 WI App 71, ¶¶5, 12 , 252 Wis. 2d 490 , 642 N.W.2d 592 (holding that the circuit court lost competency when a probable cause hearing did not occur within 72 hours after the individual was taken into custody pursuant to WIS.

2013See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701, 712 (2001) (citing McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56-58 ) (noting that the 48-hour rule was based on the court of appeals' determination of the time required to complete a probable cause hearing).

2013See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701, 712 (2001) (citing McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56-58 ) (noting that the 48-hour rule was based on the court of appeals' determination of the time required to complete a probable cause hearing).

2025These dual mandates are meant to address “the central concern underlying the Fourth Amendment”—that the government should not have “unbridled discretion to rummage at will among a person’s private effects.” See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 345 (2009). ¶33 To satisfy the probable cause requirement, a warrant-issuing magistrate must be apprised of sufficient facts to support the belief that “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Ward, 231 Wis. 2d 723, ¶23 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). “[P]robable cause t

2010The probable cause standard is not a "technical, legalistic concept but a flexible, common-sense measure of the plausibility of particular conclusions about human behavior." State v. Petrone, 161 Wis.2d 530, 547-48 , 468 N.W.2d 676 (1991), overruled in part by State v. Greve, 2004 WI 69 , 272 Wis.2d 444 , 681 N.W.2d 479 (citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 743 , 103 S.Ct. 1535 , 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983)). ¶ 25 "We accord great deference to the warrant-issuing judge's determination of probable cause and that determination will stand unless the defendant establishes that the facts are clearly insu

2016Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Turner, 136 Wis. 2d at 343 ); see also Iverson, 365 Wis. 2d 302, ¶18 (characterizing applicable standard of review as "deferential" (quoting Robinson, 327 Wis. 2d 302, ¶22 )). ¶25 Weber contends that Deputy Dorshorst's verbal directive to Weber to stop as Weber neared his door is irrelevant to a probable cause analysis because Weber was already in the garage when it was issued.

2016Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Turner, 136 Wis. 2d at 343 ); see also Iverson, 365 Wis. 2d 302, ¶18 (characterizing applicable standard of review as "deferential" (quoting Robinson, 327 Wis. 2d 302, ¶22 )). ¶25 Weber contends that Deputy Dorshorst's verbal directive to Weber to stop as Weber neared his door is irrelevant to a probable cause analysis because Weber was already in the garage when it was issued.

2016Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Turner, 136 Wis. 2d at 343 ); see also Iverson, 365 Wis. 2d 302, ¶18 (characterizing applicable standard of review as "deferential" (quoting Robinson, 327 Wis. 2d 302, ¶22 )). ¶25 Weber contends that Deputy Dorshorst's verbal directive to Weber to stop as Weber neared his door is irrelevant to a probable cause analysis because Weber was already in the garage when it was issued.

2016Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Turner, 136 Wis. 2d at 343 ); see also Iverson, 365 Wis. 2d 302, ¶18 (characterizing applicable standard of review as "deferential" (quoting Robinson, 327 Wis. 2d 302, ¶22 )). ¶25 Weber contends that Deputy Dorshorst's verbal directive to Weber to stop as Weber neared his door is irrelevant to a probable cause analysis because Weber was already in the garage when it was issued.

1996Id. at 35-36 , 381 N.W.2d at 308 (emphasis added). 4 *620 If a probable cause determination made by a circuit court at a refusal hearing does not preclude the issue in the later criminal prosecution, we conclude that it must also be so as to a probable cause determination made at a DOT administrative review proceeding.

1996Id. at 35-36 , 381 N.W.2d at 308 (emphasis added). 4 *620 If a probable cause determination made by a circuit court at a refusal hearing does not preclude the issue in the later criminal prosecution, we conclude that it must also be so as to a probable cause determination made at a DOT administrative review proceeding.

2006The committed person has a right to have an attorney represent him or her at the probable cause hearing, but the person is not entitled to be present at the probable cause hearing. [14] Wis. Stat. § 980.09 (2)(a). [15] Id. [16] Id. [17] Id. [18] State v. Paulick, 213 Wis. 2d 432, 438-39 , 570 N.W.2d 626 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding that probable cause hearing under Wis. Stat. § 980.09 (2) was not intended to be an evidentiary hearing but rather a review of the paper record with argument allowed by counsel). [19] Thayer, 241 Wis. 2d 417, ¶¶ 8-9 (holding, inter alia, that Wis. Stat. § 980.07 (1) all

2006The committed person has a right to have an attorney represent him or her at the probable cause hearing, but the person is not entitled to be present at the probable cause hearing. [14] Wis. Stat. § 980.09 (2)(a). [15] Id. [16] Id. [17] Id. [18] State v. Paulick, 213 Wis. 2d 432, 438-39 , 570 N.W.2d 626 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding that probable cause hearing under Wis. Stat. § 980.09 (2) was not intended to be an evidentiary hearing but rather a review of the paper record with argument allowed by counsel). [19] Thayer, 241 Wis. 2d 417, ¶¶ 8-9 (holding, inter alia, that Wis. Stat. § 980.07 (1) all

2005See State v. Kiekhefer, 212 Wis. 2d 460, 484 , 569 N.W.2d 316 (Ct. App. 1997) ("The probable cause standard is an objective one; the officer's subjective state of mind is irrelevant.") Forrest's lie about Amber provided objective grounds for arrest, and therefore rendered his arrest lawful.

2005See State v. Kiekhefer, 212 Wis. 2d 460, 484 , 569 N.W.2d 316 (Ct. App. 1997) ("The probable cause standard is an objective one; the officer's subjective state of mind is irrelevant.") Forrest's lie about Amber provided objective grounds for arrest, and therefore rendered his arrest lawful.

2026STAT. § 51.20(7)(a), results in circuit court’s loss of competency); Louise M., 205 Wis. 2d at 172 (circuit court loses competency if a final hearing does not occur within 14 days of the individual’s detention under WIS.

2002See Milwaukee County v. Louise M., 205 Wis. 2d 162, 171-72 , 555 N.W.2d 807 (1996); see also State ex rel.

2025Walworth County v. M.R.M., 2023 WI 59, ¶¶17-18 , 408 Wis. 2d 316 , 992 N.W.2d 809 .

2025See § 51.20(7)(c), (8)(a), (8)(bg), (10)(a)-(e), (13) (referring to the disposition hearing held after the initial probable cause hearing as the “final” or “full” hearing); Walworth County v. M.R.M., 2023 WI 59, ¶¶1, 18, 21, 24 , 408 Wis. 2d 316 , 992 N.W.2d 809 (referring to the disposition hearing as the “final” hearing or “final commitment” hearing).

2025These dual mandates are meant to address “the central concern underlying the Fourth Amendment”—that the government should not have “unbridled discretion to rummage at will among a person’s private effects.” See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 345 (2009). ¶33 To satisfy the probable cause requirement, a warrant-issuing magistrate must be apprised of sufficient facts to support the belief that “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Ward, 231 Wis. 2d 723, ¶23 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). “[P]robable cause t

2024Ward, 231 Wis. 2d 723, ¶34 . ¶21 Logan also argued that the facts gleaned from the surveillance of Logan entering and leaving the house with other people, traveling to other locations, carrying bags with unknown contents, or parking near other vehicles do not establish criminal activities, but instead were innocent behavior. 6 However, an innocent explanation of conduct does not defeat a probable cause analysis.

2014Id. at 876 ; see also Knights, 534 U.S. at 121 ("Although the Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires the degree of probability embodied in the term 'probable cause,' a lesser degree satisfies the Constitution when the balance of governmental and private interests makes such a standard reasonable."). ¶27 Purtell does not challenge the search of his residence (a group home) or the seizure of his computers.

2014Id. at 876 ; see also Knights, 534 U.S. at 121 ("Although the Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires the degree of probability embodied in the term 'probable cause,' a lesser degree satisfies the Constitution when the balance of governmental and private interests makes such a standard reasonable."). ¶27 Purtell does not challenge the search of his residence (a group home) or the seizure of his computers.

2025The probable cause test “is not a high bar.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48 , 57 (2018) (citation omitted).

2023The probable cause test is “not a high bar,” and “requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018) (citation omitted).

2010The probable cause standard is not a "technical, legalistic concept but a flexible, common-sense measure of the plausibility of particular conclusions about human behavior." State v. Petrone, 161 Wis.2d 530, 547-48 , 468 N.W.2d 676 (1991), overruled in part by State v. Greve, 2004 WI 69 , 272 Wis.2d 444 , 681 N.W.2d 479 (citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 743 , 103 S.Ct. 1535 , 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983)). ¶ 25 "We accord great deference to the warrant-issuing judge's determination of probable cause and that determination will stand unless the defendant establishes that the facts are clearly insu

2010The probable cause standard is not a "technical, legalistic concept but a flexible, common-sense measure of the plausibility of particular conclusions about human behavior." State v. Petrone, 161 Wis.2d 530, 547-48 , 468 N.W.2d 676 (1991), overruled in part by State v. Greve, 2004 WI 69 , 272 Wis.2d 444 , 681 N.W.2d 479 (citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 743 , 103 S.Ct. 1535 , 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983)). ¶ 25 "We accord great deference to the warrant-issuing judge's determination of probable cause and that determination will stand unless the defendant establishes that the facts are clearly insu

2025STAT. § 29.921(5) to arrest Phelan at the time that the warden asked Phelan to get out of the pickup because probable cause objectively existed at that point that Phelan possessed marijuana in the presence of the warden based on information available to the warden through his senses.11 ¶57 The undisputed facts here easily satisfy the probable cause standard under the reasoning in State v. Secrist, 224 Wis. 2d 201 , 589 N.W.2d 387 (1999), reaffirmed in Moore, 408 Wis. 2d 16 .

2025STAT. § 29.921(5) to arrest Phelan at the time that the warden asked Phelan to get out of the pickup because probable cause objectively existed at that point that Phelan possessed marijuana in the presence of the warden based on information available to the warden through his senses.11 ¶57 The undisputed facts here easily satisfy the probable cause standard under the reasoning in State v. Secrist, 224 Wis. 2d 201 , 589 N.W.2d 387 (1999), reaffirmed in Moore, 408 Wis. 2d 16 .

2022Lange, 317 Wis. 2d 383, ¶20 .

2022See State v. Lange, 2009 WI 49, ¶33 , 317 Wis. 2d 383 , 766 N.W.2d 551 .

2019Section 55.135(5) provides, in relevant part: "Upon finding probable cause under sub. (4), the court may order temporary protective placement up to 30 days pending the hearing for a permanent protective placement[.]" In N.N. , this court held that the statute requires the final hearing to be held within thirty days of the probable cause hearing and the circuit court, whether in the exercise of its own discretion or on stipulation of the parties, lacks authority to enlarge that time limit or extend the temporary placement beyond it. 3 N.N. , 140 Wis. 2d at 69 .

2002See N.N., 140 Wis. 2d at 69, 409 N.W.2d at 390-391. ¶ 19.

2015The probable cause requirement "deals with probabilities" and must be sufficient "to lead a reasonable officer to believe that guilt is more than a possibility." Borzyskowski, 123 Wis. 2d at 189 ; accord State v. Drogsvold, 104 Wis. 2d 247, 254 , 311 N.W.2d 243 (Ct. App. 1981).

2015The probable cause requirement "deals with probabilities" and must be sufficient "to lead a reasonable officer to believe that guilt is more than a possibility." Borzyskowski, 123 Wis. 2d at 189 ; accord State v. Drogsvold, 104 Wis. 2d 247, 254 , 311 N.W.2d 243 (Ct. App. 1981).