probable cause standard in Rhode Island

2010Essentially, a magistrate is not required to assert with certainty that the search items will be found in that particular place, rather the magistrate “need only conclude that it would be reasonable to seek the evidence in the place indicated in the affidavit.” Id. at 639 (quoting United States v. Peacock, 761 F.2d 1313, 1315 (9th Cir.1985)); see also State v. Pratt, 641 A.2d 732, 736 (R.I.1994) (stating that although the probable-cause standard requires “more than a mere suspicion,” it demands “only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity”) (quoting State v. Baldo

1994The probable-cause standard requires “only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity.” State v. Baldoni, 609 A.2d 219, 220 (R.I.1992); State v. Doukales, 111 R.I. 443, 449 , 303 A.2d 769, 773 (1973).

2003See Guzman, 752 A.2d at 4-5 (holding that the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant because, among other things, the officer knew that a crime had been committed, the defendant’s appearance matched the police-radio broadcaster’s description, the arrest took place within twenty minutes after the commission of the crime, and the police encountered the suspect within ten to twelve blocks or so from the murder scene); Kryla, 742 A.2d at 1183 (holding that probable cause existed to support the arrest because sufficient evidence existed for the police to conclude that someone

1981This analysis emphasizes “considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men * * * act.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 , 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1310 , 93 L.Ed. 1879 , 1890 (1949); see State v. Belcourt, R.I., 425 A.2d 1224, 1226 (1981). “[A]n arrest with or without a warrant [, however,] must stand upon firmer ground than mere suspicion.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 , 83 S.Ct. 407, 413 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441, 450 (1963); see State v. Roach, 106 R.I. 280, 283-84 , 259 A.2d 119, 122 (1969).

1982The probable-cause standard to be applied “is the same as that for arrest.” (Footnote omitted.) Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120 , 95 S.Ct. 854, 866 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54, 69 (1975).

1982The probable-cause standard to be applied “is the same as that for arrest.” (Footnote omitted.) Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120 , 95 S.Ct. 854, 866 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54, 69 (1975).

1983However, when applying the probable-cause standard, “a search or seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause particularized with respect to that person.” Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 , 100 S.Ct. 338, 342 , 62 L.Ed.2d 238, 245 (1979).

1983However, when applying the probable-cause standard, “a search or seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause particularized with respect to that person.” Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 , 100 S.Ct. 338, 342 , 62 L.Ed.2d 238, 245 (1979).

2014“The probable-cause standard to be applied is the same as that for arrest.” Jenison, 442 A.2d at 875 (internal quotation marks omitted).

2010"Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the police officer's knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a reasonable person's belief that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested has committed the crime." Id. (citing State v. Jenison , 442 A.2d 866 , 873-74 (R.I. 1982)). *Page 4 It is well settled that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings.

2010Finally, we firmly acknowledge the postulate that “the resolution of doubtful or marginal [probable-cause] cases * * * [is] largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants” 8 Byrne, 972 A.2d at 639 (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 , 85 S.Ct. 741 , 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965)). 1 Facts Disclosed in the Affidavit At the outset, we note that defendant challenges individual portions of the affidavit, but fails to fully acknowledge that the probable cause, totality-of-the-cir *462 cumstances test looks to the entire mosaic of presented information.

2010Finally, we firmly acknowledge the postulate that “the resolution of doubtful or marginal [probable-cause] cases * * * [is] largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants” 8 Byrne, 972 A.2d at 639 (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 , 85 S.Ct. 741 , 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965)). 1 Facts Disclosed in the Affidavit At the outset, we note that defendant challenges individual portions of the affidavit, but fails to fully acknowledge that the probable cause, totality-of-the-cir *462 cumstances test looks to the entire mosaic of presented information.

2009The Rhode Island Supreme Court has held that "probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances . . . are sufficient to warrant a reasonable person's belief that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested has committed the crime." State v. Kryla , 742 A.2d 1178 , 1182 (R.I. 1999).

2006Our Supreme Court has held that "probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the police officer's knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a reasonable person's belief that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested has committed the crime." State v. Kryla, 742 A.2d 1178 , 1182 (R.I. 1999).

2026See Gates, 462 U.S. at 230.

2010Essentially, a magistrate is not required to assert with certainty that the search items will be found in that particular place, rather the magistrate “need only conclude that it would be reasonable to seek the evidence in the place indicated in the affidavit.” Id. at 639 (quoting United States v. Peacock, 761 F.2d 1313, 1315 (9th Cir.1985)); see also State v. Pratt, 641 A.2d 732, 736 (R.I.1994) (stating that although the probable-cause standard requires “more than a mere suspicion,” it demands “only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity”) (quoting State v. Baldo

1981In State v. Duffy, 112 R.I. 276 , 308 A.2d 796 (1973), we held that the probable-cause inquiry may focus on the collective knowledge of the police department and is not limited to what the arresting officer knew.

1981In State v. Duffy, 112 R.I. 276 , 308 A.2d 796 (1973), we held that the probable-cause inquiry may focus on the collective knowledge of the police department and is not limited to what the arresting officer knew.

2021In Brunette, the First Circuit engrafted the Dost factors onto a search warrant’s probable cause requirement when the suspected images of child pornography are not available for the issuing magistrate to evaluate and the affiant fails to set forth a description of the images based on a series of detailed, factual components, “to allow a magistrate judge to make a considered judgment.” Brunette, 256 F.3d at 18, 19, 20 .

2016In -any event, we note that, in State v. Pitts, 960 A.2d 240, 246 (R.I.2008), this Court considered the offenses of which the defendant was convicted in assessing whether his conduct amounted to a failure to keep the peace and remain of good behavior. 11 .Under the Compact, a probable-cause hearing is not required where the offender is convicted' of a crime.

2014Under that standard, “[p]robable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within the police officer’s knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a reasonable person’s belief that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested has committed the crime.” Baillargeron, 58 A.3d at 197-98 (internal quotation marks omitted).

2010Essentially, a magistrate is not required to assert with certainty that the search items will be found in that particular place, rather the magistrate “need only conclude that it would be reasonable to seek the evidence in the place indicated in the affidavit.” Id. at 639 (quoting United States v. Peacock, 761 F.2d 1313, 1315 (9th Cir.1985)); see also State v. Pratt, 641 A.2d 732, 736 (R.I.1994) (stating that although the probable-cause standard requires “more than a mere suspicion,” it demands “only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity”) (quoting State v. Baldo

2010Essentially, a magistrate is not required to assert with certainty that the search items will be found in that particular place, rather the magistrate “need only conclude that it would be reasonable to seek the evidence in the place indicated in the affidavit.” Id. at 639 (quoting United States v. Peacock, 761 F.2d 1313, 1315 (9th Cir.1985)); see also State v. Pratt, 641 A.2d 732, 736 (R.I.1994) (stating that although the probable-cause standard requires “more than a mere suspicion,” it demands “only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity”) (quoting State v. Baldo

2006See In re Armand, 454 A.2d at 1219 .

2005State v. Rios, 702 A.2d 889, 890 (R.I.1997) (“We have often stated that probable cause need not reach the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt or even proof that might establish a prima facie case sufficient to be submitted to a jury.”). 8 As the United States Supreme Court said in Ventresca : “[T]his Court has long held that ‘the term “probable cause” * * * means less than evidence which would justify condemnation’ * * 380 U.S. at 107 , 85 S.Ct. 741 (quoting Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 348 , 3 L.Ed. 364 (1813)). 9 In applying the foregoing principles, the.

2003See Guzman, 752 A.2d at 4-5 (holding that the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant because, among other things, the officer knew that a crime had been committed, the defendant’s appearance matched the police-radio broadcaster’s description, the arrest took place within twenty minutes after the commission of the crime, and the police encountered the suspect within ten to twelve blocks or so from the murder scene); Kryla, 742 A.2d at 1183 (holding that probable cause existed to support the arrest because sufficient evidence existed for the police to conclude that someone