probable cause hearing in Washington

2024The Petersen court explicitly states: “A trial court’s legal conclusion of whether evidence meets the probable cause standard is reviewed de novo.” Id. at 799 (emphasis added).4 Therefore, our review of the trial court’s probable cause determination is de novo.

2009He has since obtained a temporary license in Washington and testified as an expert in In re Detention of Ambers, 160 Wn.2d 543 , 158 P.3d 1144 (2007). 145 Wn.2d 789, 817 , 42 P.3d 952 (2002) (Ireland, J., dissenting) (“[Former RCW 71.09.090(2)] does not require that all five [RCW 71.09.092] elements must be satisfied during a probable cause hearing.

2015The State must also show the failure or inability to provide for essential needs presents "a high probability of serious physical harm within the near future unless adequate treatment is afforded." LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at 204-05 . 4 RCW 71.05.240(3) states, in pertinent part: At the conclusion of the probable cause hearing, if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that such person, as the result of mental disorder, presents a likelihood of serious harm, or is gravely disabled, and, after considering less restrictive alternatives to involuntary detention and treatment, finds that no

2005Id. ¶19 In urging that LaBelle provides that a clear and convincing standard applies only in the case of indefinite commitment, the State overlooks the analysis in the case, including the importance attributed to the probable cause hearing under RCW 71.05.240 and its role in protecting the interests at stake, including the individual’s liberty interest, and in reducing the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the individual’s liberty interest. 11 In the case of commitment for mental health treatment and competency restoration under RCW 10.77.090(1)(d), there is no comparable hearing and no dete

2009He has since obtained a temporary license in Washington and testified as an expert in In re Detention of Ambers, 160 Wn.2d 543 , 158 P.3d 1144 (2007). 145 Wn.2d 789, 817 , 42 P.3d 952 (2002) (Ireland, J., dissenting) (“[Former RCW 71.09.090(2)] does not require that all five [RCW 71.09.092] elements must be satisfied during a probable cause hearing.

2009He has since obtained a temporary license in Washington and testified as an expert in In re Det. of Ambers, 160 Wash.2d 543 , 158 P.3d 1144 (2007). [5] 145 Wash.2d 789, 817 , 42 P.3d 952 (2002) (Ireland, J., dissenting) ("[Former RCW 71.09.090(2)] does not require that all five [RCW 71.09.092] elements must be satisfied during a probable cause hearing.

1984As stated by the Court in Illinois v. Gates, ___ U.S. ___, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 , 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2328 (1983) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 , 101 S.Ct. 690 (1981)): Perhaps the central teaching of our decisions bearing on the probable cause standard is that it is a "practical, nontechnical conception." ...

1984As stated by the Court in Illinois v. Gates, ___ U.S. ___, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 , 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2328 (1983) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 , 101 S.Ct. 690 (1981)): Perhaps the central teaching of our decisions bearing on the probable cause standard is that it is a "practical, nontechnical conception." ...

2010State v. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d 91, 108 , 59 P.3d 58 (2002). 2 “The probable cause requirement is a fact-based determination that represents a compromise between the competing interests of enforcing the law and protecting the individual’s right to privacy.” State v. Neth, 165 Wn.2d 177, 182 , 196 P.3d 658 (2008) (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 , 69 S. Ct. 1302 , 93 L.

2010State v. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d 91, 108 , 59 P.3d 58 (2002). 2 “The probable cause requirement is a fact-based determination that represents a compromise between the competing interests of enforcing the law and protecting the individual’s right to privacy.” State v. Neth, 165 Wn.2d 177, 182 , 196 P.3d 658 (2008) (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 , 69 S. Ct. 1302 , 93 L.

2009Lee, 147 Wash.App. at 921-22 , 199 P.3d 445 (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989)). [5] ¶ 26 The trial court's conclusion that the police observations confirming the informant's tip were "innocuous" was likewise unfounded.

2009Lee, 147 Wash.App. at 921-22 , 199 P.3d 445 (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989)). [5] ¶ 26 The trial court's conclusion that the police observations confirming the informant's tip were "innocuous" was likewise unfounded.

2009Because article I, section 7 jurisprudence is parallel to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the Terry stop context, other than with regard to the so-called "pretext stop," see State v. Ladson, 138 Wash.2d 343, 358 , 979 P.2d 833 (1999), this clarification is equally applicable here. [7] Again, this holding addressed the more stringent probable cause standard. [8] An appellate court reviewing a CrR 3.5 suppression order "must determine de novo whether the trial court `derived proper conclusions of law' from its findings of fact." State v. Solomon, 114 Wash.App. 781, 789 , 60 P.3d 1215 (2002) (q

1999These statutes establish that an officer must have probable cause to believe that an traffic infraction has been committed in order to make a stop. 12 See generally State v. Mendez, 137 Wn.2d 208, 211-12, 219, 220 , 970 P.2d 722 (1999) (referring to probable cause to stop a vehicle for a traffic infraction). 13 Because the relevant statutes encompass a probable cause standard, they codify a constitutionally valid standard for warrantless traffic stops.

2010Restraint of Young, 122 Wn.2d 1 , 857 P.2d 989 (1993) (upholding the recently enacted SVP law, which contained a provision identical to current RCW 71.09.040(4)); see also id. at 43 (describing how 72 hours of evaluation and treatment occurs under the involuntary commitment act, chapter 71.05 RCW, before the probable cause hearing).

2010Restraint of Young, 122 Wn.2d 1 , 857 P.2d 989 (1993) (upholding the recently enacted SVP law, which contained a provision identical to current RCW 71.09.040(4)); see also id. at 43 (describing how 72 hours of evaluation and treatment occurs under the involuntary commitment act, chapter 71.05 RCW, before the probable cause hearing).

2023“While the probable cause standard is not a stringent one, it allows the court to perform a critical gate-keeping function.” The court “must assume the truth of the evidence presented” but at the same time “must determine whether the asserted evidence, if believed, is sufficient to establish the proposition its proponent intends to prove.” McCuistion, 174 Wn.2d at 382 . -4- No. 82912-2-I/5 II.

2023The Supreme Court has expressly stated that at a probable cause hearing, the trial court “is entitled to consider all of the evidence, including evidence submitted by the State.” McCuistion [ 174 Wn.2d at 382 ].

2019See State v. Neth, 165 Wn.2d 177, 185-86 , 196 P.3d 658 (2008) (holding that a prior criminal history of similar crimes is not enough on its own, but with other evidence may meet the higher probable cause standard).

2010State v. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d 91, 108 , 59 P.3d 58 (2002). 2 “The probable cause requirement is a fact-based determination that represents a compromise between the competing interests of enforcing the law and protecting the individual’s right to privacy.” State v. Neth, 165 Wn.2d 177, 182 , 196 P.3d 658 (2008) (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 , 69 S. Ct. 1302 , 93 L.

2019See State v. Neth, 165 Wn.2d 177, 185-86 , 196 P.3d 658 (2008) (holding that a prior criminal history of similar crimes is not enough on its own, but with other evidence may meet the higher probable cause standard).

2010State v. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d 91, 108 , 59 P.3d 58 (2002). 2 “The probable cause requirement is a fact-based determination that represents a compromise between the competing interests of enforcing the law and protecting the individual’s right to privacy.” State v. Neth, 165 Wn.2d 177, 182 , 196 P.3d 658 (2008) (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 , 69 S. Ct. 1302 , 93 L.

2018But this comparison ignores the fundamental difference that the former is being appealed following a trial on its merits and the other is a threshold determination whether a trial is warranted. 4 No. 76851-4-1/5 limitations on her liberties.14 But a successful petition for final release necessarily results in termination of any court jurisdiction over the person, leaving nothing else for the court to do.15 The State relies heavily on In re Detention of Petersen to argue against Coleman's right to appeal, but Petersen is inapposite because it addresses interlocutory circumstances akin to a peti

2009Indeed, we have previously rejected an overarching right to counsel, stating that “[i]f RCW 71.09.050(1) truly represents the overarching statutory grant of the right to counsel at all stages of all proceedings under the entire chapter, the grant of the right to counsel in [RCW 71.09.090(2)] is surplusage.” In re Det. of Petersen, 138 Wn.2d 70, 92 , 980 P.2d 1204 (1999).

2018But this comparison ignores the fundamental difference that the former is being appealed following a trial on its merits and the other is a threshold determination whether a trial is warranted. 4 No. 76851-4-1/5 limitations on her liberties.14 But a successful petition for final release necessarily results in termination of any court jurisdiction over the person, leaving nothing else for the court to do.15 The State relies heavily on In re Detention of Petersen to argue against Coleman's right to appeal, but Petersen is inapposite because it addresses interlocutory circumstances akin to a peti

2009Indeed, we have previously rejected an overarching right to counsel, stating that “[i]f RCW 71.09.050(1) truly represents the overarching statutory grant of the right to counsel at all stages of all proceedings under the entire chapter, the grant of the right to counsel in [RCW 71.09.090(2)] is surplusage.” In re Det. of Petersen, 138 Wn.2d 70, 92 , 980 P.2d 1204 (1999).

2009He has since obtained a temporary license in Washington and testified as an expert in In re Detention of Ambers, 160 Wn.2d 543 , 158 P.3d 1144 (2007). 145 Wn.2d 789, 817 , 42 P.3d 952 (2002) (Ireland, J., dissenting) (“[Former RCW 71.09.090(2)] does not require that all five [RCW 71.09.092] elements must be satisfied during a probable cause hearing.

2009He has since obtained a temporary license in Washington and testified as an expert in In re Det. of Ambers, 160 Wash.2d 543 , 158 P.3d 1144 (2007). [5] 145 Wash.2d 789, 817 , 42 P.3d 952 (2002) (Ireland, J., dissenting) ("[Former RCW 71.09.090(2)] does not require that all five [RCW 71.09.092] elements must be satisfied during a probable cause hearing.

2008App. at 202 . ¶20 “[W]hile an occupant may be detained during the execution of a residential search warrant, this limited exception to the probable cause requirement does not extend to those merely present on the premises.” State v. Broadnax, 98 Wn.2d 289, 304 , 654 P.2d 96 (1982), overruled on other grounds by Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 , 113 S. Ct. 2130 , 124 L.

2008App. at 202 . ¶20 “[W]hile an occupant may be detained during the execution of a residential search warrant, this limited exception to the probable cause requirement does not extend to those merely present on the premises.” State v. Broadnax, 98 Wn.2d 289, 304 , 654 P.2d 96 (1982), overruled on other grounds by Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 , 113 S. Ct. 2130 , 124 L.