36 Kentucky opinions name it 2 courts 1968–2026 19 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Illinois v. Gatesgreen2 sentences2026Perhaps the central teaching of our decisions bearing on the probable cause standard is that it is a “practical, nontechnical conception.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 230–31. 2026Perhaps the central teaching of our decisions bearing on the probable cause standard is that it is a “practical, nontechnical conception.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 230–31. | 2 | 7 |
Moore v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2026See also Moore v. Commonwealth, 159 S.W.3d 325, 329 (Ky. 2005) (“Courts should review the sufficiency of an affidavit underlying a search warrant in a commonsense, rather than hypertechnical, manner.”). 2026See also Moore v. Commonwealth, 159 S.W.3d 325, 329 (Ky. 2005) (“Courts should review the sufficiency of an affidavit underlying a search warrant in a commonsense, rather than hypertechnical, manner.”). | 2 | 2 |
Williams v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2022However, the probable cause standard is a “‘practical, nontechnical conception’ that deals with ‘the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.’” Williams v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky. 2004) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 , 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2328 , 76 L. 2022The probable cause standard, however, is incapable of strict definition, and “is a flexible, common-sense standard.” Williams v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky. 2004). | 2 | 2 |
Bauder v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2021Although not readily susceptible to a precise, universal definition, “reasonable suspicion is more than an unparticularized suspicion or hunch[,]” Bauder v. Commonwealth, 299 S.W.3d 588, 591 (Ky. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), but “is a significantly lower standard than the probable-cause standard.” Boyle v. Commonwealth, 245 S.W.3d 219, 220 (Ky.App. 2007). 2021“A reasonable suspicion is more than an unparticularized suspicion or hunch[,]” Bauder v. Commonwealth, 299 S.W.3d 588, 591 (Ky. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), but it “is a significantly lower standard than the probable-cause standard.” Boyle v. Commonwealth, 245 S.W.3d 219, 220 (Ky. -8- App. 2007). | 2 | 2 |
Boyle v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2021Although not readily susceptible to a precise, universal definition, “reasonable suspicion is more than an unparticularized suspicion or hunch[,]” Bauder v. Commonwealth, 299 S.W.3d 588, 591 (Ky. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), but “is a significantly lower standard than the probable-cause standard.” Boyle v. Commonwealth, 245 S.W.3d 219, 220 (Ky.App. 2007). 2021“A reasonable suspicion is more than an unparticularized suspicion or hunch[,]” Bauder v. Commonwealth, 299 S.W.3d 588, 591 (Ky. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), but it “is a significantly lower standard than the probable-cause standard.” Boyle v. Commonwealth, 245 S.W.3d 219, 220 (Ky. -8- App. 2007). | 2 | 2 |
Jones v. Baileygreen2 sentences2026Id. at 133 . 2026Id. at 144 . | 1 | 2 |
Brinegar v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2004On many occasions, we have reiterated that the probable-cause standard is a "`practical, nontechnical conception'" that deals with "`the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.'" Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (quoting Brinegar, supra, at 175-176 , 69 S.Ct. 1302 ); see, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7-8 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). "[P]robable cause is a flui 2004On many occasions, we have reiterated that the probable-cause standard is a “ ‘practical, nontechnical conception’ ” that deals with “ ‘the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.’ ” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (quoting Brinegar, supra, at 175-176 , 69 S.Ct. 1302 ); see, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 . (1996); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7-8 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). “[Pjrobable cause is | 1 | 2 |
Maryland v. Pringlegreen2 sentences2022Furthermore, probable cause “deals with the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370-71 (2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 2004Id. | 1 | 2 |
Baker v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2007Baker v. Commonwealth, 5 S.W.3d 142, 146 (Ky.1999). 2007Baker v. Commonwealth, 5 S.W.3d 142, 146 (Ky.1999). | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Demetrius Pruittgreen1 sentence2025Id. at 342 (citing United States v. Pruitt, 458 F.3d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 2006)). | 1 | 1 |
Spinelli v. United Statesred1 sentence2024“While an effort to fix some general, numerically precise degree of certainty corresponding to ‘probable cause’ may not be helpful, it is clear that ‘only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause.’” Gates¸ 462 U.S. at 235 (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969)). “[P]robable cause is a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” Id. at 232. | 1 | 1 |
Barrett v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2024Id. at 342 (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Hanson v. DANE COUNTY, WIS.green1 sentence2023Wisconsin, 608 F.3d 335, 338 (7th Cir. 2010)). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Albert Whitegreen1 sentence2023Appellant KM argues “the probable cause standard in an affidavit must minimally show a sufficient nexus between the illegal activity and the place to be searched” citing United States v. White, 874 F.3d 490, 496-97 (6th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Risby v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2023See Risby v. Commonwealth, 284 S.W.2d 686, 687 (Ky. 1955). | 1 | 1 |
Parrish v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2023See Parrish v. Commonwealth, 472 S.W.2d 69, 71 (Ky. 1971) (“Under our rules of criminal procedure, arraignment is not a critical stage of the trial unless, of course, the accused enters a plea of guilty without benefit of counsel.”); Walton v. Commonwealth, No. 2018-CA-000380-MR, 2020 WL 969583 , at *7 (Ky. App. Feb. 28, 2020) (Holding that a probable cause hearing is not a critical stage of a criminal proceeding if its purpose “remains limited with little risk of substantial harm to the accused”).3 As to the information, the record demonstrates it clearly contains the handwritten signatures o | 1 | 1 |
Goben v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2023It rests on a probable cause standard which, in a different context, we have explained means “a good reason to act, . . . it does not mean certainty, or even more likely than not . . . .” Goben v. Commonwealth, 503 S.W.3d 890, 913 (Ky. 2016) (quoting Hanson v. Dane Cnty. | 1 | 1 |
Hunt v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2019See Hunt v. Commonwealth, 326 S.W.3d 437, 440 (Ky. 2010). | 1 | 1 |
Mathews v. Eldridgegreen1 sentence2019Because the conclusion that a supervision violation has occurred is one where “a wide variety of information may be deemed relevant, and issues of witness credibility and veracity are often critical to the decisionmaking process,” reviewing the administrative record is only minimally reliable and a “wholly unsatisfactory basis for [a revocation] decision.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343-44 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
Bender v. Eatongreen1 sentence2015Under our writ jurisprudence, there is no adequate remedy by appeal where the trial court’s erroneous action will result in a “substantial miscarriage of justice,” and “correction of the error is necessary and appropriate in the interest of orderly judicial administration.” Bender v. Eaton, 343 S.W.2d 799, 801 (Ky. 1961). | 1 | 1 |
| Kotila v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Matheney v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Greene v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Baltimore v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ornelas v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| See v. City of Seattlegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Terry v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2025Though the common law definition cited by Fuller continues to be applicable when determining whether a seizure has occurred, the Supreme Court in Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31 , 88 S. Ct. at 1885 , carved out an exception to the probable cause requirement. 2025Though the common law definition cited by Fuller continues to be applicable when determining whether a seizure has occurred, the Supreme Court in Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31 , 88 S. Ct. at 1885 , carved out an exception to the probable cause requirement. | 4 | 1991–2025 |
Rodgers v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2018Id. at 754-55 . *271 However, the trial court failed to apply the correct probable cause standard to the facts of this case. 2015If such cause does' not exist, immunity must be granted and, conversely, if it does exist, the matter must proceed. 285 S.W.3d at 754-55 , citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). | 2 | 2015–2018 |
Payton v. New York
green
1 sentence2025Id. at 342 (citing United States v. Pruitt, 458 F.3d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 2006)). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
McCloud v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2024Although the circuit court used the more stringent probable cause standard applicable to the general automobile exception to assess the constitutionality of the search, its order denying the motion to suppress need not be reversed because we “may affirm a lower court for any reason supported by the record.” McCloud v. Commonwealth, 286 S.W.3d 780 , 786 n.19 (Ky. 2009) (citation omitted). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2023Regarding the third and final claim of the ineffective assistance of counsel, Merriweather fails to demonstrate he is entitled to relief as set forth under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 , 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2068 , 80 L. 2023Regarding the third and final claim of the ineffective assistance of counsel, Merriweather fails to demonstrate he is entitled to relief as set forth under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 , 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2068 , 80 L. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Crawford v. Washington
green
1 sentence2022While the former testimony hearsay exception’s “opportunity” for cross- examination is also properly analyzed under the constitutional standard of an 12 “adequate opportunity” for cross-examination, see Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 , Shields, without citing authority, states that the “similar motive to develop testimony” test is required by both KRE 804(b)(1) and the Confrontation Clauses of the United States and Kentucky Constitutions.7 Neither this Court, nor our Court of Appeals, has directly addressed the “similar motive” requirement in the context of a preliminary or probable cause hearing, e | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Ohio v. Roberts
red
1 sentence2022Although Shields’s defense counsel may have been caught off guard and she may not have had complete discovery,13 her experience of never having seen an eyewitness appear to testify at a probable cause hearing would seem to raise a red flag and either lead to asking the trial court for relief or at least asking credibility-challenging questions “comporting with the principal purpose of cross-examination.” Roberts, 448 U.S. at 71 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Helton v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2022Id. at 564 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Yopp v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2021All that is required for reasonable suspicion is that “in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Yopp, 562 S.W.3d at 294 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 , 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 , 20 L. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Gagnon v. Scarpelli
red
1 sentence2019Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 785-86 . 24 While no one suggests that the ALJ improperly conducted the probable cause hearing in this case, the Board is the body charged with determining the ultimate findings of fact. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Wilson v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| United States v. Sokolow green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Commonwealth v. Halsell green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Delaware v. Prouse green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Morrissey v. Brewer green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Giordenello v. United States green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Ybarra v. Illinois green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| United States v. Cortez green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Barber v. Page green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.