Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
51 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2026 11 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Michigan v. Summersgreen2 sentences2022The parties instead dispute the applicability of an exception to the probable cause requirement—the exception recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), and later extended by this Court in Graves, for detentions incident to premises searches. 2022“In Summers, the United States Supreme Court established another limited exception to the probable cause requirement and ruled that a resident of the premises being searched [pursuant to a warrant] could be detained for the duration of the search.” Graves, 1994-NMCA-151 , ¶ 10; see Summers, 452 U.S. at 705 . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Tollardogreen2 sentences2021See id. ¶¶ 7, 16. of a controlled substance is sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for possession of a controlled substance), overruled on other grounds by State v. Tollardo, 2012-NMSC- 008, ¶ 37 n.6, 275 P.3d 110 . 2014In her memorandum in opposition Defendant 9 contends that the foregoing considerations should not be deemed sufficient to give rise 10 to probable cause to arrest, in light of her compliance with many of the officer’s 11 instructions as well as the existence of alternative explanations for certain aspects of 12 the behavioral evidence. [MIO 10-12] However, “[a]n appellate court does not 13 evaluate the evidence to determine whether some hypothesis could be designed which 14 is consistent with a finding of innocence.” State v. Sutphin, 1988-NMSC-031 , ¶ 21, 15 107 N.M. 126 , 753 P.2d 1314 ; see | 2 | 2 |
McCray v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences1974Whiteley v. Warden, supra; see McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 , 87 S.Ct. 1056 , 18 L. 1974Whiteley v. Warden, supra; see McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 , 87 S.Ct. 1056 , 18 L. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Granillo-Maciasgreen2 sentences2023Insofar as Defendant was arrested for DWI, the “probable cause inquiry is whether it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that Defendant had been driving while he was to the slightest degree impaired, that is unable to exercise the clear judgment and steady hand necessary to handle a vehicle in a safe manner.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {6} In this case the officer initiated the traffic stop as a consequence of Defendant’s near-collision with his vehicle, and the ensuing arrest was based on the officer’s observation of Defendant’s bloodshot watery eye 2014Such 3 1 observations are sufficient to satisfy the probable cause requirement. [DS 3-6] See, 2 e.g., Schuster v. State Dep’t of Taxation & Revenue, 2012-NMSC-025, ¶¶ 30-31 , 283 3 P.3d 288 (observing that probable cause to arrest for DWI existed based on the 4 defendant’s bloodshot watery eyes, odor of alcohol, admission to drinking, and poor 5 performance on field sobriety tests); State v. Granillo-Macias, 2008-NMCA-021 , ¶ 6 12, 143 N.M. 455 , 176 P.3d 1187 (holding that an officer had probable cause to arrest 7 for DWI where the defendant smelled of alcohol, was unsteady on his feet, and d | 1 | 4 |
State v. Cappsgreen2 sentences2025See NMSA 1978, § 26-2C-25(A)(1) (2021) (making it 16 “lawful for a person who is twenty-one years of age or older” to “possess[], us[e], 17 be[] under the influence of, display[], purchas[e], obtain[] or transport[] not more 18 cannabis than authorized by the Cannabis Regulation Act or the medical cannabis 19 program”). 1 {2} The narrow question presented here, as certified by the Court of Appeals, is 2 whether this Court’s criminalization-era caselaw holding that “[t]he smell of 3 marijuana alone can satisfy the probable cause requirement for a warrantless search 4 [of a vehicle],” State v. C 2025See NMSA 1978, § 26-2C-25(A)(1) (2021) (making it 16 “lawful for a person who is twenty-one years of age or older” to “possess[], us[e], 17 be[] under the influence of, display[], purchas[e], obtain[] or transport[] not more 18 cannabis than authorized by the Cannabis Regulation Act or the medical cannabis 19 program”). 1 {2} The narrow question presented here, as certified by the Court of Appeals, is 2 whether this Court’s criminalization-era caselaw holding that “[t]he smell of 3 marijuana alone can satisfy the probable cause requirement for a warrantless search 4 [of a vehicle],” State v. C | 1 | 3 |
Schuster v. New Mexico Dep't. of Taxation & Revenuegreen2 sentences2017See, e.g., Schuster v. N.M. 16 Dep’t of Taxation & Revenue, 2012-NMSC-025, ¶¶ 30-31 , 283 P.3d 288 (observing 17 that probable cause to arrest for DWI existed based on the defendant’s bloodshot, 18 watery eyes, odor of alcohol, admission to drinking, and poor performance on field 19 sobriety tests); State v. Granillo-Macias, 2008-NMCA-021, ¶ 12 , 143 N.M. 455 , 176 2 1 P.3d 1187 (holding that an officer had probable cause to arrest for DWI where the 2 defendant smelled of alcohol, was unsteady on his feet, and did not perform field 3 sobriety tests well); State v. Jones, 1998-NMCA-076, ¶ 10 , 2014Such 3 1 observations are sufficient to satisfy the probable cause requirement. [DS 3-6] See, 2 e.g., Schuster v. State Dep’t of Taxation & Revenue, 2012-NMSC-025, ¶¶ 30-31 , 283 3 P.3d 288 (observing that probable cause to arrest for DWI existed based on the 4 defendant’s bloodshot watery eyes, odor of alcohol, admission to drinking, and poor 5 performance on field sobriety tests); State v. Granillo-Macias, 2008-NMCA-021 , ¶ 6 12, 143 N.M. 455 , 176 P.3d 1187 (holding that an officer had probable cause to arrest 7 for DWI where the defendant smelled of alcohol, was unsteady on his feet, and d | 1 | 2 |
Whren v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2008See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 ; LaFave, Routine Traffic Stop, supra, at 1861. 2008See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 ; LaFave, Routine Traffic Stop, supra, at 1861. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Wintongreen1 sentence2025However, the Summers exception to the probable cause requirement is limited to residents and “cannot reasonably be extended to those merely present on the premises.” Graves, 1994-NMCA-151 , ¶ 12 (discussing the Summers exception). {9} In Graves, this Court adopted the “presence plus” approach, which prohibits the detention of nonresidents during residence searches unless there are articulable facts “that would render a detention reasonable under the circumstances.” Id. ¶ 14; see also Winton, 2010-NMCA-020, ¶ 13 (“[A] visitor’s mere presence [is] not sufficient to justify the detention or searc | 1 | 1 |
State v. Leongreen1 sentence2023See Leon, 2013-NMCA-011, ¶ 37 (stating that sufficient evidence to support a single probation violation supports affirmance of a district court's revocation of probation). {7} For the reasons set forth above, we affirm. {8} IT IS SO ORDERED. | 1 | 1 |
Durham v. Guestgreen2 sentences2020See, e.g., DeVaney, 1998-NMSC- 001, ¶ 44 (quoting comment j to Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 674 for the proposition that “[w]hether a withdrawal or an abandonment constitutes a final termination of the case in favor of the person against whom the proceedings are brought and whether the withdrawal is evidence of a lack of probable cause for their initiation, depends upon the circumstances under which the proceedings are withdrawn”); see also DeVaney, 1998-NMSC-001, ¶ 41 (relying on Restatement (Second) of Torts Sections 681B(1)(c) and 681B(2)(a) (1977) for the proposition that probable 2020Plaintiffs offer no reason why the Restatement’s framework should be rejected here. {39} Plaintiffs argue that our Supreme Court, in Durham, 2009-NMSC-007, ¶ 29 , “held that lack of probable cause is only a required element for an abuse of process claim that occurs at the initiation of a claim.” But this is incorrect; Durham simply held that a plaintiff alleging a procedural impropriety or wrongful use of proceedings (the second type of misuse of process) need not have initiated judicial proceedings. | 1 | 1 |
DeVaney v. Thriftway Marketing Corp.red1 sentence2020See, e.g., DeVaney, 1998-NMSC- 001, ¶ 44 (quoting comment j to Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 674 for the proposition that “[w]hether a withdrawal or an abandonment constitutes a final termination of the case in favor of the person against whom the proceedings are brought and whether the withdrawal is evidence of a lack of probable cause for their initiation, depends upon the circumstances under which the proceedings are withdrawn”); see also DeVaney, 1998-NMSC-001, ¶ 41 (relying on Restatement (Second) of Torts Sections 681B(1)(c) and 681B(2)(a) (1977) for the proposition that probable | 1 | 1 |
Ray MARSHALL, Secretary of Labor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HORN SEED COMPANY, INC., Respondent-Appelleegreen1 sentence2019While “[a]n administrative warrant application based upon specific evidence is more analogous to an application for a criminal search warrant than to an application for a search warrant under a regulatory scheme[,]” Marshall v. Horn Seed Co., 647 F.2d 96, 101 (10th Cir. 1981), the probable cause standard in administrative cases differs from the standard in criminal cases. | 1 | 1 |
Harjo v. City of Albuquerquegreen1 sentence2018See Harjo v. City of Albuquerque, 307 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1210 (D.N.M. 2018), modified on reconsideration by 326 F. Supp. 3d 1145 (D.N.M. 2018). 8 nuances of the circumstances presented, critically, the seriousness of the crime. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Skippingsgreen1 sentence2017Defendant told the officer that there was marijuana inside a blue backpack 16 in the trunk of the car. [RP 76] The officer requested and received consent from 17 Defendant to search the vehicle. [RP 62, 82] The officer asked for the passenger’s 18 license and instructed Defendant and the passenger to stand on the shoulder of the 19 road about thirty yards away. [RP 76] Moments later three officers arrived to assist 20 with security and the search. [Id.] The blue backpack was found and contained 5 1 marijuana, and a small amount of cocaine, a pipe, and more marijuana was discovered 2 on the rea | 1 | 1 |
State v. Marquezgreen2 sentences2014In her memorandum in opposition Defendant 9 contends that the foregoing considerations should not be deemed sufficient to give rise 10 to probable cause to arrest, in light of her compliance with many of the officer’s 11 instructions as well as the existence of alternative explanations for certain aspects of 12 the behavioral evidence. [MIO 10-12] However, “[a]n appellate court does not 13 evaluate the evidence to determine whether some hypothesis could be designed which 14 is consistent with a finding of innocence.” State v. Sutphin, 1988-NMSC-031 , ¶ 21, 15 107 N.M. 126 , 753 P.2d 1314 ; see 2014In her memorandum in opposition Defendant 9 contends that the foregoing considerations should not be deemed sufficient to give rise 10 to probable cause to arrest, in light of her compliance with many of the officer’s 11 instructions as well as the existence of alternative explanations for certain aspects of 12 the behavioral evidence. [MIO 10-12] However, “[a]n appellate court does not 13 evaluate the evidence to determine whether some hypothesis could be designed which 14 is consistent with a finding of innocence.” State v. Sutphin, 1988-NMSC-031 , ¶ 21, 15 107 N.M. 126 , 753 P.2d 1314 ; see | 1 | 1 |
| Meiboom v. Watsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Gutierrezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Minnesota v. Murphygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Lucerogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Garciagreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Gravesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Coyazogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Willisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. TYWAYNE H.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Andersongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Gallowaygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Warrengreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Bowersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Younggreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Rossgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cason v. Cookgreen | 1 | 1 |
| FP v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Michigan v. Dorangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Picha v. Wielgosgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Corlett v. Smithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Martens Ex Rel. Martens v. District No. 220, Board of Educationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mariposa Development Co. v. Stoddardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Edmundsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Charles N. Matthewsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| People v. Dilworthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Polur v. Grievance Committee for the Southern District of New Yorkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Nyce
green
2 sentences2009The Court noted that "the probable cause inquiry should be `particularly exacting' when the conduct observed by an officer is consistent with lawful activity, and this is so `regardless of an officer's qualifications and experience.'" Id. ¶ 10 (quoting State v. Nyce, 2006-NMSC-026, ¶ 14 , 139 N.M. 647 , 137 P.3d 587 ). 2009The Court noted that "the probable cause inquiry should be `particularly exacting' when the conduct observed by an officer is consistent with lawful activity, and this is so `regardless of an officer's qualifications and experience.'" Id. ¶ 10 (quoting State v. Nyce, 2006-NMSC-026, ¶ 14 , 139 N.M. 647 , 137 P.3d 587 ). | 3 | 2008–2009 |
State v. Nyce
green
2 sentences2009The Court noted that “the probable cause inquiry should be ‘particularly exacting’ when the conduct observed by an officer is consistent with lawful activity, and this is so ‘regardless of an officer’s qualifications and experience.’ ” Id. ¶ 10 (quoting State v. Nyce, 2006-NMSC-026, ¶ 14 , 139 N.M. 647 , 137 P.3d 587 ). 2009The Court noted that "the probable cause inquiry should be `particularly exacting' when the conduct observed by an officer is consistent with lawful activity, and this is so `regardless of an officer's qualifications and experience.'" Id. ¶ 10 (quoting State v. Nyce, 2006-NMSC-026, ¶ 14 , 139 N.M. 647 , 137 P.3d 587 ). | 3 | 2008–2009 |
State v. Neal
green
2 sentences2023We have 8 previously explained that “reasonable suspicion can arise from wholly lawful 9 conduct.” State v. Neal, 2007-NMSC-043, ¶ 28 , 142 N.M. 176 , 164 P.3d 57 (internal 10 quotation marks and citation omitted). 2023We have 8 previously explained that “reasonable suspicion can arise from wholly lawful 9 conduct.” State v. Neal, 2007-NMSC-043, ¶ 28 , 142 N.M. 176 , 164 P.3d 57 (internal 10 quotation marks and citation omitted). | 2 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Sanchez
green
2 sentences2021State v. Sanchez, 2015-NMCA-084, ¶ 14 , 355 P.3d 795 . {5} Here, Officer Jeffrey Zamorano testified that he was dispatched to a single-car accident, where he made contact with Defendant. [MIO 2] Defendant stated that he was the driver and had consumed alcohol prior to the crash. [MIO 2] Officer Zamorano also observed that Defendant had blood-shot watery eyes and smelled of alcohol. [MIO 2] Officer Zamorano testified that he administered standard field sobriety tests (FST’s), and indicated that Defendant had difficulty in complying. [MIO 2] Defendant was then placed under arrest. [DS 2] {6} Our 2017Cf. 12 State v. Sanchez, 2015-NMCA-084, ¶ 13-14 , 355 P.3d 795 (discussing plain-view 13 exception and probable cause). 14 {6} In the motion to amend, Defendant does not make the same argument that he 15 made below, that the description of the items was not sufficiently specific to alert 16 officers executing the search warrant as to which property was subject to seizure. [RP 17 74] That argument therefore appears to have been abandoned; but to the extent 18 Defendant may be intending to raise that argument, we believe, as did the district 19 court [RP 138], that the reference to items stolen | 2 | 2017–2021 |
State v. Ogden
green
2 sentences2004As a result, a probable cause standard applies at the pretrial determination, and “the State will defeat the motion if it proves that there is probable cause to believe an aggravating circumstance is present.” Id. at 240 , 880 P.2d at 851 . 2004As a result, a probable cause standard applies at the pretrial determination, and “the State will defeat the motion if it proves that there is probable cause to believe an aggravating circumstance is present.” Id. at 240 , 880 P.2d at 851 . | 2 | 2004–2006 |
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista
green
2 sentences2006The Court preferred to remain with what it considered the traditional probable cause standard for constitutional reasonableness, rather than to “mint a new rule of constitutional law on the understanding that when historical practice fails to speak conclusively to a claim grounded on the Fourth Amendment, courts are left to strike a current balance between individual and societal interests by subjecting particular contemporary circumstances to traditional standards of reasonableness.” Id. at 345^16, 121 S.Ct. 1536 . 2006The Court preferred to remain with what it considered the traditional probable cause standard for constitutional reasonableness, rather than to “mint a new rule of constitutional law on the understanding that when historical practice fails to speak conclusively to a claim grounded on the Fourth Amendment, courts are left to strike a current balance between individual and societal interests by subjecting particular contemporary circumstances to traditional standards of reasonableness.” Id. at 345^16, 121 S.Ct. 1536 . | 2 | 2005–2006 |
New Jersey v. T. L. O.
green
2 sentences2000Further, .strict adherence to a probable cause requirement could not be justified in light of “the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools.” Id. at 341 , 105 S.Ct. 733 . 2000Further, .strict adherence to a probable cause requirement could not be justified in light of “the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools.” Id. at 341 , 105 S.Ct. 733 . | 2 | 1998–2000 |
State v. Ochoa
green
2 sentences2026II, § 10 and State v. Ochoa, 2004-NMSC-023, ¶ 9 , 135 N.M. 781 , 93 P.3d 1286 (explaining that under the probable cause requirement for a lawful arrest, a law enforcement officer must establish “facts and circumstances [that] warrant a belief that the accused had committed an offense, or is committing an offense”), with N.M. 2026II, § 10 and State v. Ochoa, 2004-NMSC-023, ¶ 9 , 135 N.M. 781 , 93 P.3d 1286 (explaining that under the probable cause requirement for a lawful arrest, a law enforcement officer must establish “facts and circumstances [that] warrant a belief that the accused had committed an offense, or is committing an offense”), with N.M. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Martinez
green
2 sentences2025However, the Summers exception to the probable cause requirement is limited to residents and “cannot reasonably be extended to those merely present on the premises.” Graves, 1994-NMCA-151 , ¶ 12 (discussing the Summers exception). {9} In Graves, this Court adopted the “presence plus” approach, which prohibits the detention of nonresidents during residence searches unless there are articulable facts “that would render a detention reasonable under the circumstances.” Id. ¶ 14; see also Winton, 2010-NMCA-020, ¶ 13 (“[A] visitor’s mere presence [is] not sufficient to justify the detention or searc 2025However, the Summers exception to the probable cause requirement is limited to residents and “cannot reasonably be extended to those merely present on the premises.” Graves, 1994-NMCA-151 , ¶ 12 (discussing the Summers exception). {9} In Graves, this Court adopted the “presence plus” approach, which prohibits the detention of nonresidents during residence searches unless there are articulable facts “that would render a detention reasonable under the circumstances.” Id. ¶ 14; see also Winton, 2010-NMCA-020, ¶ 13 (“[A] visitor’s mere presence [is] not sufficient to justify the detention or searc | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Cassola
green
2 sentences2025However, the Summers exception to the probable cause requirement is limited to residents and “cannot reasonably be extended to those merely present on the premises.” Graves, 1994-NMCA-151 , ¶ 12 (discussing the Summers exception). {9} In Graves, this Court adopted the “presence plus” approach, which prohibits the detention of nonresidents during residence searches unless there are articulable facts “that would render a detention reasonable under the circumstances.” Id. ¶ 14; see also Winton, 2010-NMCA-020, ¶ 13 (“[A] visitor’s mere presence [is] not sufficient to justify the detention or searc 2025However, the Summers exception to the probable cause requirement is limited to residents and “cannot reasonably be extended to those merely present on the premises.” Graves, 1994-NMCA-151 , ¶ 12 (discussing the Summers exception). {9} In Graves, this Court adopted the “presence plus” approach, which prohibits the detention of nonresidents during residence searches unless there are articulable facts “that would render a detention reasonable under the circumstances.” Id. ¶ 14; see also Winton, 2010-NMCA-020, ¶ 13 (“[A] visitor’s mere presence [is] not sufficient to justify the detention or searc | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Jason L.
green
2 sentences2024Reviewing the totality of the circumstances and considering the Deputy’s testimony about his experience and specialized training in interdiction and narcotics recognition, each of the facts available to Deputy Salazar before he questioned Defendant about his travel were sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. {11} We agree with the Court of Appeals and Defendant’s contention that, at the suppression hearing, Deputy Salazar should not have relied on facts discovered after the expansion of the stop to “justify expanding the scope of the detention to ask the questions i 2024Reviewing the totality of the circumstances and considering the Deputy’s testimony about his experience and specialized training in interdiction and narcotics recognition, each of the facts available to Deputy Salazar before he questioned Defendant about his travel were sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. {11} We agree with the Court of Appeals and Defendant’s contention that, at the suppression hearing, Deputy Salazar should not have relied on facts discovered after the expansion of the stop to “justify expanding the scope of the detention to ask the questions i | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Berger v. Sonneland
green
1 sentence2017See, e.g., Schuster v. N.M. 16 Dep’t of Taxation & Revenue, 2012-NMSC-025, ¶¶ 30-31 , 283 P.3d 288 (observing 17 that probable cause to arrest for DWI existed based on the defendant’s bloodshot, 18 watery eyes, odor of alcohol, admission to drinking, and poor performance on field 19 sobriety tests); State v. Granillo-Macias, 2008-NMCA-021, ¶ 12 , 143 N.M. 455 , 176 2 1 P.3d 1187 (holding that an officer had probable cause to arrest for DWI where the 2 defendant smelled of alcohol, was unsteady on his feet, and did not perform field 3 sobriety tests well); State v. Jones, 1998-NMCA-076, ¶ 10 , | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Jones
green
2 sentences2017See, e.g., Schuster v. N.M. 16 Dep’t of Taxation & Revenue, 2012-NMSC-025, ¶¶ 30-31 , 283 P.3d 288 (observing 17 that probable cause to arrest for DWI existed based on the defendant’s bloodshot, 18 watery eyes, odor of alcohol, admission to drinking, and poor performance on field 19 sobriety tests); State v. Granillo-Macias, 2008-NMCA-021, ¶ 12 , 143 N.M. 455 , 176 2 1 P.3d 1187 (holding that an officer had probable cause to arrest for DWI where the 2 defendant smelled of alcohol, was unsteady on his feet, and did not perform field 3 sobriety tests well); State v. Jones, 1998-NMCA-076, ¶ 10 , 2017See, e.g., Schuster v. N.M. 16 Dep’t of Taxation & Revenue, 2012-NMSC-025, ¶¶ 30-31 , 283 P.3d 288 (observing 17 that probable cause to arrest for DWI existed based on the defendant’s bloodshot, 18 watery eyes, odor of alcohol, admission to drinking, and poor performance on field 19 sobriety tests); State v. Granillo-Macias, 2008-NMCA-021, ¶ 12 , 143 N.M. 455 , 176 2 1 P.3d 1187 (holding that an officer had probable cause to arrest for DWI where the 2 defendant smelled of alcohol, was unsteady on his feet, and did not perform field 3 sobriety tests well); State v. Jones, 1998-NMCA-076, ¶ 10 , | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Weststar Mortgage Corp. v. Jackson
green
2 sentences2015Weststar Mortg. 10 Corp. v. Jackson, 2003-NMSC-002, ¶ 16 , 133 N.M. 114 , 61 P.3d 823 (“Probable 11 cause . . . is to be judged by facts as they appeared at the time, not by later-discovered 12 facts.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 2015Weststar Mortg. 10 Corp. v. Jackson, 2003-NMSC-002, ¶ 16 , 133 N.M. 114 , 61 P.3d 823 (“Probable 11 cause . . . is to be judged by facts as they appeared at the time, not by later-discovered 12 facts.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Sutphin
green
2 sentences2014In her memorandum in opposition Defendant 9 contends that the foregoing considerations should not be deemed sufficient to give rise 10 to probable cause to arrest, in light of her compliance with many of the officer’s 11 instructions as well as the existence of alternative explanations for certain aspects of 12 the behavioral evidence. [MIO 10-12] However, “[a]n appellate court does not 13 evaluate the evidence to determine whether some hypothesis could be designed which 14 is consistent with a finding of innocence.” State v. Sutphin, 1988-NMSC-031 , ¶ 21, 15 107 N.M. 126 , 753 P.2d 1314 ; see 2014In her memorandum in opposition Defendant 9 contends that the foregoing considerations should not be deemed sufficient to give rise 10 to probable cause to arrest, in light of her compliance with many of the officer’s 11 instructions as well as the existence of alternative explanations for certain aspects of 12 the behavioral evidence. [MIO 10-12] However, “[a]n appellate court does not 13 evaluate the evidence to determine whether some hypothesis could be designed which 14 is consistent with a finding of innocence.” State v. Sutphin, 1988-NMSC-031 , ¶ 21, 15 107 N.M. 126 , 753 P.2d 1314 ; see | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Dunaway v. New York green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Richards v. Wisconsin green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| United States v. Knights green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| State v. Bunnell green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| State v. Cordova green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| cluster 377082 green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Terry v. Ohio green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Gerstein v. Pugh green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Morrissey v. Brewer green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| State v. Carrasco green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| United States v. Place green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| People v. David green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Greyeyes green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Harrison green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Ybarra v. Illinois green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| United States v. Vernon Willis Bowman, Jr. green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| United States v. John Rumpf, Joanne Hanson, Gloria Masters, and Gary James Griffin green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Ochoa v. Estelle green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Woodward v. Southern Ry. Co. green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.