81 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Browngreen2 sentences2025State v. Medinger, 235 Or App 88, 94 , 230 P3d 76 (2010) (citing State v. Gressel, 276 Or 333, 339 , 554 P2d 1014 (1976)); see also State v. Brown, 110 Or App 604, 610-11 , 825 P2d 282 (1992). 2025State v. Medinger, 235 Or App 88, 94 , 230 P3d 76 (2010) (citing State v. Gressel, 276 Or 333, 339 , 554 P2d 1014 (1976)); see also State v. Brown, 110 Or App 604, 610-11 , 825 P2d 282 (1992). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Clomangreen2 sentences2019See State v. Cloman, 254 Or 1, 6 , 456 P2d 67 (1969) (police can stop a car to determine identity of vehicle and its occupants based on reasonable suspicion, and reason- able suspicion is “of less quantum” than probable cause to arrest). 2019See State v. Cloman, 254 Or 1, 6 , 456 P2d 67 (1969) (police can stop a car to determine identity of vehicle and its occupants based on reasonable suspicion, and reason- able suspicion is “of less quantum” than probable cause to arrest). | 2 | 2 |
State ex rel. Juvenile Department v. Duboisgreen2 sentences2009The inquiry, it said, is whether the search was reasonable under all of the circumstances.” DuBois, 110 Or App at 317. 2009Dept. v. DuBois, 110 Or App 314, 317 , 821 P2d 1124 (1991), the Supreme Court held that “the school setting was not conducive to application of the warrant requirement because of the need for prompt and informal discipline and the need to maintain safety in the schools” and that “the state’s substantial interest in maintaining discipline and security in the school environment, which depends on informal and flexible disciplinary procedures, weighed against application of the probable cause standard and justified a more flexible ‘reasonableness’ standard.” The majority eschews this approach unde | 2 | 2 |
State v. Hendersongreen2 sentences2021“While adhering to the probable cause requirement, we resolve doubtful or marginal cases in favor of the preference for war- rants.” Henderson, 341 Or at 225 . 2019Finally, in adhering to the probable cause requirement, “we resolve doubtful or marginal cases in favor of the preference for warrants.” State v. Henderson, 341 Or 219, 225 , 142 P3d 58 (2006). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Fostergreen2 sentences2020See State v. Foster, 233 Or App 135, 143 , 225 P3d 830 (2010), aff’d, 350 Or 161 , 252 P3d 292 (2011) (concluding that an informant’s tip should be given little weight in the probable cause analysis where the tip was a “nonspecific” tip that the defendant was selling small quantities of methamphetamine, no “purchaser was identi- fied, no location was specified, * * * no basis for the infor- mant’s knowledge was demonstrated,” and, “by the time of the search[,] * * * the tip was six months old”). 2020See State v. Foster, 233 Or App 135, 143 , 225 P3d 830 (2010), aff’d, 350 Or 161 , 252 P3d 292 (2011) (concluding that an informant’s tip should be given little weight in the probable cause analysis where the tip was a “nonspecific” tip that the defendant was selling small quantities of methamphetamine, no “purchaser was identi- fied, no location was specified, * * * no basis for the infor- mant’s knowledge was demonstrated,” and, “by the time of the search[,] * * * the tip was six months old”). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Gresselgreen2 sentences2025State v. Medinger, 235 Or App 88, 94 , 230 P3d 76 (2010) (citing State v. Gressel, 276 Or 333, 339 , 554 P2d 1014 (1976)); see also State v. Brown, 110 Or App 604, 610-11 , 825 P2d 282 (1992). 2025State v. Medinger, 235 Or App 88, 94 , 230 P3d 76 (2010) (citing State v. Gressel, 276 Or 333, 339 , 554 P2d 1014 (1976)); see also State v. Brown, 110 Or App 604, 610-11 , 825 P2d 282 (1992). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Browngreen2 sentences2011State v. Brown, 301 Or 268, 274-76 , 721 P2d 1357 (1986). 3 The probable cause analysis for a warrantless search is the same as for a warranted one. 2011State v. Brown, 301 Or 268, 274-76 , 721 P2d 1357 (1986). 3 The probable cause analysis for a warrantless search is the same as for a warranted one. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Kreisgreen1 sentence2022See Kreis, 365 Or at 665 (reasonable suspicion “requires less than prob- able cause but more than mere speculation”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Fostergreen2 sentences2020See State v. Foster, 233 Or App 135, 143 , 225 P3d 830 (2010), aff’d, 350 Or 161 , 252 P3d 292 (2011) (concluding that an informant’s tip should be given little weight in the probable cause analysis where the tip was a “nonspecific” tip that the defendant was selling small quantities of methamphetamine, no “purchaser was identi- fied, no location was specified, * * * no basis for the infor- mant’s knowledge was demonstrated,” and, “by the time of the search[,] * * * the tip was six months old”). 2020See State v. Foster, 233 Or App 135, 143 , 225 P3d 830 (2010), aff’d, 350 Or 161 , 252 P3d 292 (2011) (concluding that an informant’s tip should be given little weight in the probable cause analysis where the tip was a “nonspecific” tip that the defendant was selling small quantities of methamphetamine, no “purchaser was identi- fied, no location was specified, * * * no basis for the infor- mant’s knowledge was demonstrated,” and, “by the time of the search[,] * * * the tip was six months old”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sundermangreen2 sentences2020State v. Schmitz, 299 Or App 170 , 178, 448 P3d 699 (2019); see also State v. Sunderman, 304 Or App 329, 346-48 , 467 P3d 52 (2020) (stating same in the context of a probable cause analysis). 2020State v. Schmitz, 299 Or App 170 , 178, 448 P3d 699 (2019); see also State v. Sunderman, 304 Or App 329, 346-48 , 467 P3d 52 (2020) (stating same in the context of a probable cause analysis). | 1 | 1 |
Summerfield v. Or. Liquor Control Comm'ngreen1 sentence2019State v. Grover, 193 Or App 165, 173 , 90 P3d 8 (2004) (italics omitted); see also, e.g., State v. Castillo, 295 Or App 121, 132 , 433 P3d 467 (2018), rev den, 364 Or 749 (2019) (remanding for trial court to determine whether certain statements made by the defendant were voluntary, where that issue had been raised but not resolved in the trial court, was presented on appeal as an alternative basis to affirm, but required factual findings to resolve). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Castillogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Danielsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Webbergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Taylorgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Clemonsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mark A. Criss v. The City of Kent Rick Haury, Officer, Kent City Police Departmentgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Morgangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Maryland v. Pringlegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Lanegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Villagrangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hannah v. Larchegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Franciscogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Anspach
green
2 sentences2004"The probable cause requirement means that the facts upon which the warrant is premised must lead a reasonable person to believe that seizable things will probably be found in the location to be searched." State v. Anspach, 298 Or. 375, 380-81 , 692 P.2d 602 (1984). 2004"The probable cause requirement means that the facts upon which the warrant is premised must lead a reasonable person to believe that seizable things will probably be found in the location to be searched." State v. Anspach, 298 Or. 375, 380-81 , 692 P.2d 602 (1984). | 8 | 1986–2004 |
State v. Miller
green
2 sentences2008Turning to subjective probable cause, the Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Miller, 345 Or 176, 188-89 , 191 P3d 651 (2008), issued after this case was submitted to this court, clarified what is sufficient to satisfy the subjective component of the probable cause inquiry. 2008Turning to subjective probable cause, the Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Miller, 345 Or 176, 188-89 , 191 P3d 651 (2008), issued after this case was submitted to this court, clarified what is sufficient to satisfy the subjective component of the probable cause inquiry. | 6 | 2008–2009 |
State v. Owens
green
2 sentences2013In State v. Owens, 302 Or 196, 202-03 , 729 P2d 524 (1986), the Supreme Court stated, in the context of a search incident to arrest, that “[w]hen an officer has probable cause to believe that an object he has lawfully discovered is contraband and, therefore, that a crime is being committed in his presence, he has the right to seize it.” See also Texas v. Brown, 460 US 730, 740-42 , 103 S Ct 1535 , 75 L Ed 2d 502 (1983) (stating that, in the Fourth Amendment plain-view context, “immediately apparent” is equivalent to the probable cause standard). 2013In State v. Owens, 302 Or 196, 202-03 , 729 P2d 524 (1986), the Supreme Court stated, in the context of a search incident to arrest, that “[w]hen an officer has probable cause to believe that an object he has lawfully discovered is contraband and, therefore, that a crime is being committed in his presence, he has the right to seize it.” See also Texas v. Brown, 460 US 730, 740-42 , 103 S Ct 1535 , 75 L Ed 2d 502 (1983) (stating that, in the Fourth Amendment plain-view context, “immediately apparent” is equivalent to the probable cause standard). | 5 | 2000–2013 |
State v. Vasquez-Villagomez
green
2 sentences2015“The subjective component of the probable cause inquiry is satisfied if an officer believes that he or she has lawful authority to restrain the individual’s liberty.” 5 State v. Vasquez-Villagomez, 346 Or 12, 23 , 203 P3d 193 (2009). 2015“The subjective component of the probable cause inquiry is satisfied if an officer believes that he or she has lawful authority to restrain the individual’s liberty.” 5 State v. Vasquez-Villagomez, 346 Or 12, 23 , 203 P3d 193 (2009). | 3 | 2011–2015 |
State v. Tacker
green
2 sentences1993State v. Tacker, 241 Or 597, 601 , 407 P2d 851 (1965), quoting from United States v. Ventresca, 380 US 102, 108 , 85 S Ct 741 [746], 13 L Ed 2d 684 (1965)." In State v. Anspach, 298 Or. 375, 380-82 , 692 P.2d 602 (1984), concerning probable cause, the court explained: "The probable cause requirement means that the facts upon which the warrant is premised must lead a reasonable person to believe that seizable things will probably be found in the location to be searched. "* * * * * "Here, the affidavit stated that the officers observed marijuana while flying over the premises. 1993State v. Tacker, 241 Or 597, 601 , 407 P2d 851 (1965), quoting from United States v. Ventresca, 380 US 102, 108 , 85 S Ct 741 [746], 13 L Ed 2d 684 (1965)." In State v. Anspach, 298 Or. 375, 380-82 , 692 P.2d 602 (1984), concerning probable cause, the court explained: "The probable cause requirement means that the facts upon which the warrant is premised must lead a reasonable person to believe that seizable things will probably be found in the location to be searched. "* * * * * "Here, the affidavit stated that the officers observed marijuana while flying over the premises. | 3 | 1993–2007 |
State v. Stookey
green
2 sentences2026“The objective component of the probable-cause inquiry asks whether the facts, as perceived by the officer, constitute a violation of a statute.” State v. Stookey, 255 Or App 489, 496 , 297 P3d 548 (2013). 2026“The objective component of the probable-cause inquiry asks whether the facts, as perceived by the officer, constitute a violation of a statute.” State v. Stookey, 255 Or App 489, 496 , 297 P3d 548 (2013). | 2 | 2015–2026 |
State v. Soldahl
green
2 sentences2014The doctrine merely views law enforcement agencies as a unit.” Id. at 428 . 2014The doctrine merely views law enforcement agencies as a unit.” Id. at 428 . | 2 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Coffey
green
2 sentences2011As we held in Coffey, 309 Or at 348 , “[i]nformation to be considered in issuing a warrant need not be admissible under the rules applicable to trial evidence[.]” And, as we have already observed, the probable cause standard for testing a warrantless search is the same as that for testing an affidavit in support of a warrant. 2004"When addressing probable cause issues in cases where a warrant was issued, we confine our analysis to a `common-sense view of the affidavit' filed by the police officer." State v. Moylett, 313 Or. 540, 552 , 836 P.2d 1329 (1992) (quoting State v. Coffey, 309 Or. 342, 346 , 788 P.2d 424 (1990)). | 2 | 2004–2011 |
State Ex Rel. Juv. Dept. v. DuBois
green
2 sentences2009Dept. v. DuBois, 110 Or.App. 3514 , 317, 821 P.2d 1124 (1991), the Supreme Court held that "the school setting was not conducive to application of the warrant requirement because of the need for prompt and informal discipline and the need to maintain safety in the schools" and that "the state's substantial interest in maintaining discipline and security in the school environment, which depends on informal and flexible disciplinary procedures, weighed against application of the probable cause standard and justified a more flexible `reasonableness' standard." The majority eschews this approach u 2009Dept. v. DuBois, 110 Or App 314, 317 , 821 P2d 1124 (1991), the Supreme Court held that “the school setting was not conducive to application of the warrant requirement because of the need for prompt and informal discipline and the need to maintain safety in the schools” and that “the state’s substantial interest in maintaining discipline and security in the school environment, which depends on informal and flexible disciplinary procedures, weighed against application of the probable cause standard and justified a more flexible ‘reasonableness’ standard.” The majority eschews this approach unde | 2 | 2009–2009 |
City of Portland v. James
green
2 sentences1976In City of Portland v. James, 251 Or 8 , 444 P2d 554 (1968), the Oregon Supreme Court indicated that the vagueness doctrine could also rest on the probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment because a vague statute does not provide sufficiently ascertainable standards from which a reasonably prudent man could form a belief in the guilt of the accused. 1976In City of Portland v. James, 251 Or 8 , 444 P2d 554 (1968), the Oregon Supreme Court indicated that the vagueness doctrine could also rest on the probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment because a vague statute does not provide sufficiently ascertainable standards from which a reasonably prudent man could form a belief in the guilt of the accused. | 2 | 1976–1976 |
State v. Hughes
neutral
2 sentences2026However, “probable cause may be based on a mistake of fact or on a mistake as to which law the Cite as 348 Or App 381 (2026) 383 defendant violated.” State v. Hughes, 311 Or App 123, 132 , 488 P3d 795 (2021) (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). 2026However, “probable cause may be based on a mistake of fact or on a mistake as to which law the Cite as 348 Or App 381 (2026) 383 defendant violated.” State v. Hughes, 311 Or App 123, 132 , 488 P3d 795 (2021) (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
cluster 10839334
neutral
1 sentence2026However, “probable cause may be based on a mistake of fact or on a mistake as to which law the Cite as 348 Or App 381 (2026) 383 defendant violated.” State v. Hughes, 311 Or App 123, 132 , 488 P3d 795 (2021) (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. MEDINGER
green
2 sentences2025State v. Medinger, 235 Or App 88, 94 , 230 P3d 76 (2010) (citing State v. Gressel, 276 Or 333, 339 , 554 P2d 1014 (1976)); see also State v. Brown, 110 Or App 604, 610-11 , 825 P2d 282 (1992). 2025State v. Medinger, 235 Or App 88, 94 , 230 P3d 76 (2010) (citing State v. Gressel, 276 Or 333, 339 , 554 P2d 1014 (1976)); see also State v. Brown, 110 Or App 604, 610-11 , 825 P2d 282 (1992). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Querbach v. Dept. of Human Services
green
2 sentences2022In its decision on the appeal and cross-appeal, the Court of Appeals first addressed its own role on review, noting that the issue before it was the same issue that was before the circuit court, i.e., “whether substantial evidence in the record created before the circuit court supports the founded dispositions that DHS made in the final order on review. * * * ‘Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.’ ” Querbach v. Dept. of Human Services, 308 Or App 131, 134-35 , 480 P3d 1030 (2020) (quo 2022In its decision on the appeal and cross-appeal, the Court of Appeals first addressed its own role on review, noting that the issue before it was the same issue that was before the circuit court, i.e., “whether substantial evidence in the record created before the circuit court supports the founded dispositions that DHS made in the final order on review. * * * ‘Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.’ ” Querbach v. Dept. of Human Services, 308 Or App 131, 134-35 , 480 P3d 1030 (2020) (quo | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Cox
green
1 sentence2021Id. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Yaeger
neutral
1 sentence2021The state concedes that, if the July 29 search of defendant’s room was unlawful, then the warrant authoriz- ing further examination of defendant’s personal paperwork Cite as 311 Or App 626 (2021) 649 found in the room is invalid. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Hollins
neutral
1 sentence2021Id. at 687-89 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Muir v. NOOTH green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Derby green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Cannon
green
1 sentence2019The facts of the affidavit must therefore establish a nexus between three things: (1) that a crime has been, or Cite as 299 Or App 616 (2019) 627 is currently being, committed, and that (2) evidence of that crime (3) will be found in the place to be searched. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Lovaina-Burmudez
green
2 sentences2019Thus, the probable-cause analysis Cite as 301 Or App 134 (2019) 141 When a party argues an alternative basis to affirm that was raised but not resolved in the trial court, and fac- tual findings are necessary to decide the legal question, we “will ordinarily remand to the trial court to determine potentially dispositive questions of fact in the first instance.” State v. Lovaina-Burmudez, 257 Or App 1, 14 , 303 P3d 988 (2013).3 Thus, where “the need for a finding on a certain crit- ical fact was obviated by the trial court’s erroneous legal conclusions,” and the existing record contains “potent 2019Thus, the probable-cause analysis Cite as 301 Or App 134 (2019) 141 When a party argues an alternative basis to affirm that was raised but not resolved in the trial court, and fac- tual findings are necessary to decide the legal question, we “will ordinarily remand to the trial court to determine potentially dispositive questions of fact in the first instance.” State v. Lovaina-Burmudez, 257 Or App 1, 14 , 303 P3d 988 (2013).3 Thus, where “the need for a finding on a certain crit- ical fact was obviated by the trial court’s erroneous legal conclusions,” and the existing record contains “potent | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Grover green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Scarborough green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Massey neutral | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Matsen green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Berry green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Texas v. Brown green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Caraher green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Hart green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Tiffin green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Stearns green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Chase green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| State v. Chambless green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| State v. Tanner green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State Ex Rel. Juv. Dept. v. MAD green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Castilleja green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Moylett green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| State v. Bourget-Goddard green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Erlandson v. Pullen green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| State v. Pelster/Boyer green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.