probable cause requirement in Oregon

2004“The probable cause requirement means that the facts upon which the warrant is premised must lead a reasonable person to believe that seizable things will probably be found in the location to be searched.” State v. Anspach, 298 Or 375, 380-81 , 692 P2d 602 (1984).

2004“The probable cause requirement means that the facts upon which the warrant is premised must lead a reasonable person to believe that seizable things will probably be found in the location to be searched.” State v. Anspach, 298 Or 375, 380-81 , 692 P2d 602 (1984).

2024In State v. Miller, 345 Or 176, 186 , 191 P3d 651 (2008), the Supreme Court stated, “For the purposes of the subjective component of the probable cause inquiry, it is sufficient if the trial court finds (and there is evidence to support its findings) that the officer reasonably believed that he had lawful authority to act, even if the officer’s subjective basis for acting turns out to be incorrect.

2024In State v. Miller, 345 Or 176, 186 , 191 P3d 651 (2008), the Supreme Court stated, “For the purposes of the subjective component of the probable cause inquiry, it is sufficient if the trial court finds (and there is evidence to support its findings) that the officer reasonably believed that he had lawful authority to act, even if the officer’s subjective basis for acting turns out to be incorrect.

2013In State v. Owens, 302 Or 196, 202-03 , 729 P2d 524 (1986), the Supreme Court stated, in the context of a search incident to arrest, that “[w]hen an officer has probable cause to believe that an object he has lawfully discovered is contraband and, therefore, that a crime is being committed in his presence, he has the right to seize it.” See also Texas v. Brown, 460 US 730, 740-42 , 103 S Ct 1535 , 75 L Ed 2d 502 (1983) (stating that, in the Fourth Amendment plain-view context, “immediately apparent” is equivalent to the probable cause standard).

2013In State v. Owens, 302 Or 196, 202-03 , 729 P2d 524 (1986), the Supreme Court stated, in the context of a search incident to arrest, that “[w]hen an officer has probable cause to believe that an object he has lawfully discovered is contraband and, therefore, that a crime is being committed in his presence, he has the right to seize it.” See also Texas v. Brown, 460 US 730, 740-42 , 103 S Ct 1535 , 75 L Ed 2d 502 (1983) (stating that, in the Fourth Amendment plain-view context, “immediately apparent” is equivalent to the probable cause standard).

2020See State v. Foster, 233 Or App 135, 143 , 225 P3d 830 (2010), aff’d, 350 Or 161 , 252 P3d 292 (2011) (concluding that an informant’s tip should be given little weight in the probable cause analysis where the tip was a “nonspecific” tip that the defendant was selling small quantities of methamphetamine, no “purchaser was identified, no location was specified, * * * no basis for the informant’s knowledge was demonstrated,” and, “by the time of the search[,] * * * the tip was six months old”).

2020See State v. Foster, 233 Or App 135, 143 , 225 P3d 830 (2010), aff’d, 350 Or 161 , 252 P3d 292 (2011) (concluding that an informant’s tip should be given little weight in the probable cause analysis where the tip was a “nonspecific” tip that the defendant was selling small quantities of methamphetamine, no “purchaser was identified, no location was specified, * * * no basis for the informant’s knowledge was demonstrated,” and, “by the time of the search[,] * * * the tip was six months old”).

2015“The subjective component of the probable cause inquiry is satisfied if an officer believes that he or she has lawful authority to restrain the individual’s liberty.” 5 State v. Vasquez-Villagomez, 346 Or 12, 23 , 203 P3d 193 (2009).

2015“The subjective component of the probable cause inquiry is satisfied if an officer believes that he or she has lawful authority to restrain the individual’s liberty.” 5 State v. Vasquez-Villagomez, 346 Or 12, 23 , 203 P3d 193 (2009).

1993State v. Tacker, 241 Or 597, 601 , 407 P2d 851 (1965), quoting from United States v. Ventresca, 380 US 102, 108 , 85 S Ct 741 , 13 L Ed 2d 684 (1965).” In State v. Anspach, 298 Or 375, 380-82 , 692 P2d 602 (1984), concerning probable cause, the court explained: “The probable cause requirement means that the facts upon which the warrant is premised must lead a reasonable person to believe that seizable things will probably be found in the location to be searched.

1993State v. Tacker, 241 Or 597, 601 , 407 P2d 851 (1965), quoting from United States v. Ventresca, 380 US 102, 108 , 85 S Ct 741 , 13 L Ed 2d 684 (1965).” In State v. Anspach, 298 Or 375, 380-82 , 692 P2d 602 (1984), concerning probable cause, the court explained: “The probable cause requirement means that the facts upon which the warrant is premised must lead a reasonable person to believe that seizable things will probably be found in the location to be searched.

2026“The objective component of the probable-cause inquiry asks whether the facts, as perceived by the officer, constitute a violation of a statute.” State v. Stookey, 255 Or App 489, 496 , 297 P3d 548 (2013).

2026“The objective component of the probable-cause inquiry asks whether the facts, as perceived by the officer, constitute a violation of a statute.” State v. Stookey, 255 Or App 489, 496 , 297 P3d 548 (2013).

2014The doctrine merely views law enforcement agencies as a unit.” Id. at 428 .

2014The doctrine merely views law enforcement agencies as a unit.” Id. at 428 .

2011As we held in Coffey, 309 Or at 348 , “[i]nformation to be considered in issuing a warrant need not be admissible under the rules applicable to trial evidence[.]” And, as we have already observed, the probable cause standard for testing a warrantless search is the same as that for testing an affidavit in support of a warrant.

2004“When addressing probable cause issues in cases where a warrant was issued, we confine our analysis to a ‘common-sense view of the affidavit’ filed by the police officer.” State v. Moylett, 313 Or 540, 552 , 836 P2d 1329 (1992) (quoting State v. Coffey, 309 Or 342, 346 , 788 P2d 424 (1990)).

1976In City of Portland v. James, 251 Or. 8 , 444 P.2d 554 (1968), the Oregon Supreme Court indicated that the vagueness doctrine could also rest on the probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment because a vague statute does not provide sufficiently ascertainable standards from which a reasonably prudent man could form a belief in the guilt of the accused.

1976In City of Portland v. James, 251 Or. 8 , 444 P.2d 554 (1968), the Oregon Supreme Court indicated that the vagueness doctrine could also rest on the probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment because a vague statute does not provide sufficiently ascertainable standards from which a reasonably prudent man could form a belief in the guilt of the accused.

2026However, “probable cause may be based on a mistake of fact or on a mistake as to which law the *383 defendant violated.” State v. Hughes, 311 Or App 123, 132 , 488 P3d 795 (2021) (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted).

2026However, “probable cause may be based on a mistake of fact or on a mistake as to which law the *383 defendant violated.” State v. Hughes, 311 Or App 123, 132 , 488 P3d 795 (2021) (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted).

2026Nonprecedential Memo Op: 352 Or App 358 (2026) 363 registration, while in a stolen vehicle, was a factor that an officer could rely on to conclude, more likely than not, that the defendant knew the vehicle was stolen. 268 Or App at 433 .

2026Nonprecedential Memo Op: 352 Or App 358 (2026) 363 registration, while in a stolen vehicle, was a factor that an officer could rely on to conclude, more likely than not, that the defendant knew the vehicle was stolen. 268 Or App at 433 .

2025State v. Medinger, 235 Or App 88, 94 , 230 P3d 76 (2010) (citing State v. Gressel, 276 Or 333, 339 , 554 P2d 1014 (1976)); see also State v. Brown, 110 Or App 604, 610-11 , 825 P2d 282 (1992).

2025State v. Medinger, 235 Or App 88, 94 , 230 P3d 76 (2010) (citing State v. Gressel, 276 Or 333, 339 , 554 P2d 1014 (1976)); see also State v. Brown, 110 Or App 604, 610-11 , 825 P2d 282 (1992).

2022In its decision on the appeal and cross-appeal, the Court of Appeals first addressed its own role on review, noting that the issue before it was the same issue that was before the circuit court, i.e., “whether substantial evidence in the record created before the circuit court supports the founded dispositions that DHS made in the final order on review. * * * ‘Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.’ ” Querbach v. Dept. of Human Services, 308 Or App 131, 134-35 , 480 P3d 1030 (2020) (quo

2022In its decision on the appeal and cross-appeal, the Court of Appeals first addressed its own role on review, noting that the issue before it was the same issue that was before the circuit court, i.e., “whether substantial evidence in the record created before the circuit court supports the founded dispositions that DHS made in the final order on review. * * * ‘Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.’ ” Querbach v. Dept. of Human Services, 308 Or App 131, 134-35 , 480 P3d 1030 (2020) (quo

2021Id. at 687-89 .

2021Id.

2020Klingler, 284 Or App at 540 ; see also State v. Henderson, 341 Or 219, 225 , 142 P3d 58 (2006) (“While adhering to the probable cause requirement, we resolve doubtful or marginal cases in favor of the preference for warrants.”). *233 There is no question that Miller’s affidavit permitted a magistrate to conclude that evidence of Blalack’s drug dealing would probably be found in the shipping container in the backyard of the Jefferson property.