probable cause analysis in Georgia

1996Generally, “[w]hile establishment of the informant’s veracity and basis of knowledge is no longer an absolute requirement since Gates , veracity and basis of knowledge are still major considerations in the probable cause analysis, and this court continues to hold that an affidavit submitted in support of a search warrant must set forth sufficient facts from which the magistrate or judge can independently determine the reliability of both the information and the informant.” (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) State v. Bryant, 210 Ga. App. 319, 320 ( 436 SE2d 57 ) (1993);

1996Generally, “[w]hile establishment of the informant’s veracity and basis of knowledge is no longer an absolute requirement since Gates , veracity and basis of knowledge are still major considerations in the probable cause analysis, and this court continues to hold that an affidavit submitted in support of a search warrant must set forth sufficient facts from which the magistrate or judge can independently determine the reliability of both the information and the informant.” (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) State v. Bryant, 210 Ga. App. 319, 320 ( 436 SE2d 57 ) (1993);

1996Generally, “[w]hile establishment of the informant’s veracity and basis of knowledge is no longer an absolute requirement since Gates , veracity and basis of knowledge are still major considerations in the probable cause analysis, and this court continues to hold that an affidavit submitted in support of a search warrant must set forth sufficient facts from which the magistrate or judge can independently determine the reliability of both the information and the informant.” (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) State v. Bryant, 210 Ga. App. 319, 320 ( 436 SE2d 57 ) (1993);

1996Generally, “[w]hile establishment of the informant’s veracity and basis of knowledge is no longer an absolute requirement since Gates , veracity and basis of knowledge are still major considerations in the probable cause analysis, and this court continues to hold that an affidavit submitted in support of a search warrant must set forth sufficient facts from which the magistrate or judge can independently determine the reliability of both the information and the informant.” (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) State v. Bryant, 210 Ga. App. 319, 320 ( 436 SE2d 57 ) (1993);

2023And in analyzing probable cause, “a magistrate may draw ‘reasonable inferences from the material supplied to him by applicants for a warrant.’” Taylor v. State, 303 Ga. 57, 61 (2) (810 SE2d 113) (2018) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 240 (III) (103 SCt 2317, 76 LE2d 527) (1983) (punctuation omitted).

1999“While establishment of the informant’s veracity and basis of knowledge is no longer an absolute requirement since [Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213 (103 SC 2317, 76 LE2d 527) (1983)], veracity and basis of knowledge are still major considerations in the probable cause analysis, *70 and this court continues to hold that an affidavit submitted in support of a search warrant must set forth sufficient facts from which the magistrate or judge can independently determine the reliability of both the information and the informant.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id.; State v. Teague, 192 Ga. Ap

2025Citing United States v. Reichling, 781 F3d 883, 887 (7th Cir.) (2015), the Perez Court noted that “a judge is given license to draw reasonable inferences concerning where the evidence referred to in the affidavit is likely to be kept, taking into account the nature of the evidence and the offense” and “that the probable-cause inquiry must be grounded in both an understanding of criminal behavior and of modern technology.” Perez, 316 Ga. at 449 (3) (c).

2023See United States v. Reichling, 781 F3d 883, 887 (7th Cir. 2015) (explaining, in the context of analyzing whether a magistrate properly concluded that probable cause supported a warrant to search his residence for digital and non-digital storage devices, that “‘a judge is given license to draw reasonable inferences concerning where the evidence referred to in the affidavit is likely to be kept, taking into account the nature of the evidence and the offense,’” and that the probable-cause inquiry must be grounded in both an understanding of criminal behavior and of modern technology) (citation o

2023See also Copeland v. State, 314 Ga. 44, 49 (3) (875 SE2d 636) (2022) (“The probable cause test requires only a fair probability—less than a certainty but more than a mere suspicion of 8 possibility—which by no means is to be equated with proof by even so much as a preponderance of the evidence.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

2023See also Copeland v. State, 314 Ga. 44, 49 (3) (875 SE2d 636) (2022) (“The probable cause test requires only a fair probability—less than a certainty but more than a mere suspicion of 8 possibility—which by no means is to be equated with proof by even so much as a preponderance of the evidence.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

2016See Williams v. Russo, 322 Ga. App. 654 ( 745 SE2d 842 ) (2013).

2016See Williams v. Russo, 322 Ga. App. 654 ( 745 SE2d 842 ) (2013).

2014Specifically, OCGA § 37-3-41 requires a peace officer to act pursuant to (1) a physician’s certificate stating that the physician “has personally examined [the] person within the preceding 48 hours and found that . . . the person appears to be a mentally ill person requiring involuntary treatment,” or (2) a court order based upon either the above-referenced physician’s certificate or “upon the affidavits of at least two persons who attest that, within the preceding 48 hours, they have seen the person to be taken into custody and . . . have reason to 11 See Fitzgerald v. Santoro, 707 F3d 725, 7

2014See Fitzgerald v. Santoro, 707 F3d 725, 732 (II) (B) (7th Cir. 2013) (“[S]eizures made to effectuate an involuntary mental health commitment are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause standard.”); Villanova v. Abrams, 972 F2d 792, 795 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.) (“Acivil commitment is a seizure, and may be made only upon probable cause----”); Gooden v. Howard County, Md., 954 F2d 960, 968 (4th Cir. 1992) (“We agree that the general right to he free from seizure unless probable cause exists was clearly established in the mental health seizure context”).

2003"Where the State seeks to establish probable cause through information provided by an unidentified informant, the informant's veracity and basis of knowledge are `major considerations in the probable cause analysis.'" (Footnote omitted.) Lyons v. State, 258 Ga.App. 9, 11 (1), 572 S.E.2d 632 (2002).

2003"Where the State seeks to establish probable cause through information provided by an unidentified informant, the informant's veracity and basis of knowledge are `major considerations in the probable cause analysis.'" (Footnote omitted.) Lyons v. State, 258 Ga.App. 9, 11 (1), 572 S.E.2d 632 (2002).

1999“While establishment of the informant’s veracity and basis of knowledge is no longer an absolute requirement since [Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213 (103 SC 2317, 76 LE2d 527) (1983)], veracity and basis of knowledge are still major considerations in the probable cause analysis, *70 and this court continues to hold that an affidavit submitted in support of a search warrant must set forth sufficient facts from which the magistrate or judge can independently determine the reliability of both the information and the informant.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id.; State v. Teague, 192 Ga. Ap

1999“While establishment of the informant’s veracity and basis of knowledge is no longer an absolute requirement since [Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213 (103 SC 2317, 76 LE2d 527) (1983)], veracity and basis of knowledge are still major considerations in the probable cause analysis, *70 and this court continues to hold that an affidavit submitted in support of a search warrant must set forth sufficient facts from which the magistrate or judge can independently determine the reliability of both the information and the informant.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id.; State v. Teague, 192 Ga. Ap

2019And in undertaking a probable cause analysis, a court must consider the facts and circumstances "altogether, for it is the totality of those facts and circumstances that matters, not any one fact or circumstance standing alone." Id.

2019And in undertaking a probable cause analysis, a court must consider the facts and circumstances “altogether, for it is the totality of those facts and circumstances that matters, not any one fact or circumstance standing alone.” Id.

2023The probable cause test requires only a fair probability — less than a certainty but more than a mere suspicion or possibility — which by no means is to be equated with proof by even so much as a preponderance of the evidence.30 29 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Crayton v. State, 298 Ga. 792, 797 (3) (b) ( 784 SE2d 343 ) (2016). 30 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Young v. State, 309 Ga. 529, 540-541 (4) ( 847 SE2d 347 ) (2020). 14 In the present matter, an anonymous informant contacted the officer applying for the warrant and stated that Mitchell had invited him or her to Mitchell’s

2023The probable cause test requires only a fair probability — less than a certainty but more than a mere suspicion or possibility — which by no means is to be equated with proof by even so much as a preponderance of the evidence.30 29 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Crayton v. State, 298 Ga. 792, 797 (3) (b) ( 784 SE2d 343 ) (2016). 30 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Young v. State, 309 Ga. 529, 540-541 (4) ( 847 SE2d 347 ) (2020). 14 In the present matter, an anonymous informant contacted the officer applying for the warrant and stated that Mitchell had invited him or her to Mitchell’s

1993In County of Riverside the U. S. Supreme Court held “that a jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement” of Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (95 SC 854, 43 LE2d 54) (1975) and the Fourth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution. 111 SC at 1670.

1984See also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (95 SC 854, 43 LE2d 54); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519 (72 SC 509, 96 LE 541); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U. S. 436 (7 SC 225, 30 LE 421); Stynchcombe v. Hardy, 228 Ga. 130 ( 184 SE2d 356 ). 8.

2026Although Appellant argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a probable cause challenge to the warrant in a supplemental brief in support of his motion for new trial, “[a] brief normally does not amend a motion for new trial to add new grounds.” Cowart v. State, 294 Ga. 333, 338 (2013).

2026And the fact that “the trial court did not address [this] ineffective assistance claim in ruling on his motion for new trial[ ] indicat[es] that the court did not treat his supplemental brief as an amendment to the motion.” Id. at 338 .

2025Citing United States v. Reichling, 781 F3d 883, 887 (7th Cir.) (2015), the Perez Court noted that “a judge is given license to draw reasonable inferences concerning where the evidence referred to in the affidavit is likely to be kept, taking into account the nature of the evidence and the offense” and “that the probable-cause inquiry must be grounded in both an understanding of criminal behavior and of modern technology.” Perez, 316 Ga. at 449 (3) (c).

2025See Tatum v. State, 319 Ga. 187, 191 (2024) (“[T]he United States Supreme Court created the exclusionary rule, a deterrent sanction that bars the prosecution from introducing evidence obtained by way of a Fourth Amendment violation.” (citation and punctuation omitted)); Pugh v. State, 318 Ga. 706, 713 (2024) (the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that search warrants be predicated on probable cause “to believe both that a crime is being committed or has been committed and that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” (citation and punctu

2025And as noted above, the probable cause standard is a “commonsense standard” that allows a magistrate to “draw reasonable inferences from the information in the warrant affidavit,” to “consider the factual and practical considerations of everyday life,” and to “depend on common-sense conclusions about human behavior.” Jones, 321 Ga. at 142 (quotation marks omitted).

2025See Tatum v. State, 319 Ga. 187, 191 (2024) (“[T]he United States Supreme Court created the exclusionary rule, a deterrent sanction that bars the prosecution from introducing evidence obtained by way of a Fourth Amendment violation.” (citation and punctuation omitted)); Pugh v. State, 318 Ga. 706, 713 (2024) (the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that search warrants be predicated on probable cause “to believe both that a crime is being committed or has been committed and that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” (citation and punctu

2024See, e.g., Williams v. State, 301 Ga. 60, 62 ( 799 SE2d 779 ) (2017) (vacating this Court’s decision reversing grant of motion to suppress and remanding to the trial court “for further clarification on the specific findings that form the basis for its legal conclusions” including whether it credited the officer’s testimony).

2024See, e.g., Williams v. State, 301 Ga. 60, 62 ( 799 SE2d 779 ) (2017) (vacating this Court’s decision reversing grant of motion to suppress and remanding to the trial court “for further clarification on the specific findings that form the basis for its legal conclusions” including whether it credited the officer’s testimony).

2024See generally State v. Gilstrap, 230 Ga. App. 281, 282 (495 SE2d 885) (1998) (noting, in the context of a criminal defendant who posted bond without receiving a preliminary hearing, that “the remedy for failing to hold a probable cause hearing within the statutory period is a release from custody, and not a dismissal of the charges”).

2024See generally State v. Gilstrap, 230 Ga. App. 281, 282 (495 SE2d 885) (1998) (noting, in the context of a criminal defendant who posted bond without receiving a preliminary hearing, that “the remedy for failing to hold a probable cause hearing within the statutory period is a release from custody, and not a dismissal of the charges”).

2023And in analyzing probable cause, “a magistrate may draw ‘reasonable inferences from the material supplied to him by applicants for a warrant.’” Taylor v. State, 303 Ga. 57, 61 (2) (810 SE2d 113) (2018) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 240 (III) (103 SCt 2317, 76 LE2d 527) (1983) (punctuation omitted).

2023And in analyzing probable cause, “a magistrate may draw ‘reasonable inferences . . . from the material supplied to him by applicants for a warrant.’” Taylor v. State, 303 Ga. 57, 61 (2) ( 810 SE2d 113 ) (2018) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 240 (III) ( 103 SCt 2317 , 76 LE2d 527) (1983).

2023See also Bass, 785 F3d at 1049-1050 (holding that a warrant authorizing a search of the appellant’s cell 38 phone for “any records of communication, indicia of use, ownership, or possession, including electronic calendars, address books, e-mails, and chat logs” was sufficiently particular, because the warrant sought evidence of fraudulent conduct related to the charges of wire fraud, credit fraud, and identity theft; the affidavit set forth a substantial basis to believe such evidence existed on the cell phone; and officers could not have known where such evidence was located on the phone or i

2023See also Bass, 785 F3d at 1049 -1050 38 (holding that a warrant authorizing a search of the appellant’s cell phone for “any records of communication, indicia of use, ownership, or possession, including electronic calendars, address books, e-mails, and chat logs” was sufficiently particular, because the warrant sought evidence of fraudulent conduct related to the charges of wire fraud, credit fraud, and identity theft; the affidavit set forth a substantial basis to believe such evidence existed on the cell phone; and officers could not have known where such evidence was located on the phone or

2023The probable cause test requires only a fair probability — less than a certainty but more than a mere suspicion or possibility — which by no means is to be equated with proof by even so much as a preponderance of the evidence.30 29 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Crayton v. State, 298 Ga. 792, 797 (3) (b) ( 784 SE2d 343 ) (2016). 30 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Young v. State, 309 Ga. 529, 540-541 (4) ( 847 SE2d 347 ) (2020). 14 In the present matter, an anonymous informant contacted the officer applying for the warrant and stated that Mitchell had invited him or her to Mitchell’s

2023The probable cause test requires only a fair probability — less than a certainty but more than a mere suspicion or possibility — which by no means is to be equated with proof by even so much as a preponderance of the evidence.30 29 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Crayton v. State, 298 Ga. 792, 797 (3) (b) ( 784 SE2d 343 ) (2016). 30 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Young v. State, 309 Ga. 529, 540-541 (4) ( 847 SE2d 347 ) (2020). 14 In the present matter, an anonymous informant contacted the officer applying for the warrant and stated that Mitchell had invited him or her to Mitchell’s

2023See also Brannon v. State, 298 Ga. 601, 612 (7) ( 783 SE2d 642 ) (2016) (“In describing the items to be seized pursuant to a search warrant, the degree of specificity required is flexible and will vary with the circumstances involved.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 10 Black made the overbreadth argument in his motion to suppress below, and he invokes this Court’s “right for any reason” doctrine.

2023See also Brannon v. State, 298 Ga. 601, 612 (7) ( 783 SE2d 642 ) (2016) (“In describing the items to be seized pursuant to a search warrant, the degree of specificity required is flexible and will vary with the circumstances involved.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 10 Black made the overbreadth argument in his motion to suppress below, and he invokes this Court’s “right for any reason” doctrine.

2020“The probable cause test requires only a fair probability — less than a certainty but more than a mere suspicion or possibility — which by no means is to be equated with proof by even so much as a preponderance of the evidence.” Jackson v. State, 306 Ga. 706, 714 ( 832 SE2d 809 ) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2019See also Henderson v. City of Simi Valley , 305 F.3d 1052 , 1057-1058 (1) (A) (9th Cir. 2002) (reviewing under the purview of 42 USC § 1983 a search by officers assisting a petitioner in retrieving her property as authorized by a domestic protective order and finding the search authorized by the special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment because the police were not engaged in a law enforcement function and merely effectuated the search in support of the petitioner). 23 Compare with State v. Nelson , 283 Mont. 231 , 235-236, 244 (3), 941 P.2d 441 (1997) (allowing an investigative subpoena

2019See also Henderson v. City of Simi Valley , 305 F.3d 1052 , 1057-1058 (1) (A) (9th Cir. 2002) (reviewing under the purview of 42 USC § 1983 a search by officers assisting a petitioner in retrieving her property as authorized by a domestic protective order and finding the search authorized by the special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment because the police were not engaged in a law enforcement function and merely effectuated the search in support of the petitioner). 23 Compare with State v. Nelson , 283 Mont. 231 , 235-236, 244 (3), 941 P.2d 441 (1997) (allowing an investigative subpoena