probable cause hearing in California

2021(Parker, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1455 ; see id. at pp. 1461– 1462.) It determined from its statutory analysis that section 6602 affords defendants “a hearing at which [they] could be heard, not merely by counsel pointing out legal deficiencies on the face of the petition, but also by being able to effectively challenge the facts on which the petition was filed, i.e., the underlying attached experts’ evaluations.” (Parker, at p. 1468.) The court explained that the probable cause hearing consequently should allow for the admission of oral and written evidence.

2021(Parker, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1455 ; see id. at pp. 1461– 1462.) It determined from its statutory analysis that section 6602 affords defendants “a hearing at which [they] could be heard, not merely by counsel pointing out legal deficiencies on the face of the petition, but also by being able to effectively challenge the facts on which the petition was filed, i.e., the underlying attached experts’ evaluations.” (Parker, at p. 1468.) The court explained that the probable cause hearing consequently should allow for the admission of oral and written evidence.

2025(Ibid.) But the patient must establish with sufficient evidence how he “intended to comply with outpatient treatment and how such treatment would be safe and effective.” (People v. Rish (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1385 .) A trial court asked to determine whether reasonable cause exists that the patient can be safely and effectively treated on an outpatient basis, similar to a trial court in a criminal probable cause hearing, “ ‘ “may weigh the evidence, resolve conflicts, and give or withhold credence to particular witnesses.” ’ ” (Cooley v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 257 .) “In

2022If the judge determines that the petition, on its face, supports a finding of probable cause, the judge shall order that the person be detained in 27 a secure facility until a hearing can be completed pursuant to Section 6602.” (§ 6601.5.)10 A person alleged to be an SVP is entitled to a probable cause hearing. (§ 6602, subd. (a).) The probable cause hearing is somewhat “analogous to a preliminary hearing in a criminal case; both serve to ‘ “ ‘weed out groundless or unsupported charges . . . and to relieve the accused of the degradation and expense of a . . . trial.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Cooley,

2023First, it must describe the place to be searched or things to be seized with sufficient particularity, taking account of ‘the circumstances of the case and the types of items involved.’ [Citation.] Second, it must be no broader than the probable cause on which it is based. [Citation.] The particularity rule and the probable cause rule serve a common purpose: to protect privacy by prohibiting ‘a general, exploratory rummaging in a person[’s] belongings.’ [Citation.] Although the two rules serve the same ultimate purpose, they achieve the purpose in distinct ways.” (United States v. Weber (9th C

2021(Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at p. 238 .) The issuing magistrate need only make “a practical, common-sense decision . . . , given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information . . . .” (Ibid.) The probable cause standard is a “ ‘practical, nontechnical conception’ ” that focuses on probabilities that exist under a particular set of facts.

2013(Cf. People v. Hayes, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 47 [defendant failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by trial court’s failure to hold a probable cause hearing at the outset of the case] and People v. Butler (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 421, 435 [reversal not warranted where defendant failed to seek pretrial review of the trial court’s failure to provide a full probable cause hearing and failed to demonstrate prejudice thereby because “he was found to be an SVP after a trial at which he was able to cross-examine the prosecution’s witnesses and call his own witnesses”].) In sum, even assuming

2013(People v. Butler (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 421, 435 (Butler).) In Butler, the defendant challenged his sexually violent predator commitment on the ground the trial court did no more than conduct a facial review of the commitment petition at the probable cause hearing.

2023There was no longer a need for a new probable cause hearing in light of the California Supreme Court’s decision in Reilly v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 641 , where the Court overruled In re Ronje, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th 509 , and held that any issues from the faulty assessment protocols must result in a material error before a new probable cause hearing is required.

2023There was no longer a need for a new probable cause hearing in light of the California Supreme Court’s decision in Reilly v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 641 , where the Court overruled In re Ronje, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th 509 , and held that any issues from the faulty assessment protocols must result in a material error before a new probable cause hearing is required.

2013As such, the court “conducting the probable cause hearing must review all necessary elements of an SVP determination and conclude there is probable cause as to each element.” (People v. Hayes (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 34,43 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 747 ], italics omitted (Hayes); see Cooley, supra, at pp. 246-247 .) “Like a criminal preliminary hearing, the only purpose of the probable cause hearing is to test the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the SVPA petition.” (Cooley, at p. 247.) Here, the court found probable cause and ordered the matter to proceed to trial.

2013As such, the court “conducting the probable cause hearing must review all necessary elements of an SVP determination and conclude there is probable cause as to each element.” (People v. Hayes (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 34,43 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 747 ], italics omitted (Hayes); see Cooley, supra, at pp. 246-247 .) “Like a criminal preliminary hearing, the only purpose of the probable cause hearing is to test the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the SVPA petition.” (Cooley, at p. 247.) Here, the court found probable cause and ordered the matter to proceed to trial.

2016It found that probation had conducted a probable cause hearing consistent with Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 ( Morrissey ) standards on February 17 and denied appellant's dismissal request.

2016First, defendant asserts he was not given a probable cause hearing which complied with Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471 (Morrissey).

2015The SVPA serves an important public interest “protect[ing] tire public from sexual predators by detaining them and providing treatment until the mental condition causing their disorder has abated.” (People v. Martinez (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 465, 484 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 841 ].) While commitment as a sexually violent predator implicates significant liberty interests, as with the LPS, the SVPA contains procedural safeguards that mitigate the risk of erroneous resolution on appeal, including the beyond a reasonable doubt standard (Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138, 1153, fn. 20 [ 81 Ca

2015The SVPA serves an important public interest “protect[ing] tire public from sexual predators by detaining them and providing treatment until the mental condition causing their disorder has abated.” (People v. Martinez (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 465, 484 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 841 ].) While commitment as a sexually violent predator implicates significant liberty interests, as with the LPS, the SVPA contains procedural safeguards that mitigate the risk of erroneous resolution on appeal, including the beyond a reasonable doubt standard (Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138, 1153, fn. 20 [ 81 Ca

2021(Franks v. Delaware (1978) 438 U.S. 154 [ 57 L.Ed.2d 667 ]; People v. Kurland (1980) 28 Cal.3d 376, 384 .) “[A]n affidavit may be insufficient when it omits facts adverse to the warrant application.” (Kurland, at p. 384.) However, the affiant has a duty only to disclose facts that are material, meaning “only those omissions which significantly distort[] the probable cause analysis” will make an affidavit insufficient.

2021(Franks v. Delaware (1978) 438 U.S. 154 [ 57 L.Ed.2d 667 ]; People v. Kurland (1980) 28 Cal.3d 376, 384 .) “[A]n affidavit may be insufficient when it omits facts adverse to the warrant application.” (Kurland, at p. 384.) However, the affiant has a duty only to disclose facts that are material, meaning “only those omissions which significantly distort[] the probable cause analysis” will make an affidavit insufficient.

2017(See People v. Woodall (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1221 , 1238, 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 220 [given "well-established case authority" the court "construe[s] section 1203.2 to impliedly require a probable cause hearing if there is any significant delay between the probationer's arrest and a final revocation hearing"].) The Court of Appeal also looked to *798 Gerstein v. Pugh (1975) 420 U.S. 103 , 95 S.Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54 ( Gerstein ) to conclude that an ex parte, *657 nonadversarial determination of probable cause by a magistrate suffices to detain the parolee until the final revocation hearing.

2017(See People v. Woodall (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1221 , 1238, 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 220 [given "well-established case authority" the court "construe[s] section 1203.2 to impliedly require a probable cause hearing if there is any significant delay between the probationer's arrest and a final revocation hearing"].) The Court of Appeal also looked to *798 Gerstein v. Pugh (1975) 420 U.S. 103 , 95 S.Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54 ( Gerstein ) to conclude that an ex parte, *657 nonadversarial determination of probable cause by a magistrate suffices to detain the parolee until the final revocation hearing.

2016Under section 6600, subdivision (a)(1), “ ‘[sjexually violent predator’ means a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense against one or more victims and who has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.” As the SVPA makes clear, ‘“others” refers to members of the public, not prison staff or fellow inmates: the issue for both the judge to decide at the probable cause hearing and the fact finder to decide at trial is whether the person is l

2016Under section 6600, subdivision (a)(1), “ ‘[sjexually violent predator’ means a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense against one or more victims and who has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.” As the SVPA makes clear, ‘“others” refers to members of the public, not prison staff or fellow inmates: the issue for both the judge to decide at the probable cause hearing and the fact finder to decide at trial is whether the person is l

2013(See In re Parker, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1468.) “[I]rregularities in the preliminary examination procedures which are not jurisdictional in the fundamental sense shall be reviewed under the appropriate standard of prejudicial error and shall require a reversal only if defendant can show that he was deprived of a fair trial or otherwise suffered prejudice as a result of the error at the preliminary examination.” (People v. Pompa-Ortiz (1980) 27 Cal.3d 519, 529 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 851 , 612 P.2d 941 ] (Pompa-Ortiz).) Thus, irregularities in the probable cause hearing under the Act are subject

2013(See In re Parker, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1468.) “[I]rregularities in the preliminary examination procedures which are not jurisdictional in the fundamental sense shall be reviewed under the appropriate standard of prejudicial error and shall require a reversal only if defendant can show that he was deprived of a fair trial or otherwise suffered prejudice as a result of the error at the preliminary examination.” (People v. Pompa-Ortiz (1980) 27 Cal.3d 519, 529 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 851 , 612 P.2d 941 ] (Pompa-Ortiz).) Thus, irregularities in the probable cause hearing under the Act are subject

2017The Williams court adopted a rule requiring "arraignment within 10 days of an arrest for a parole violation, a probable cause hearing within 15 days of the arrest, and a final hearing within 45 days of the arrest." ( Id . at p. 643, 178 Cal.Rptr.3d 685 .) Similarly, a class action lawsuit filed against the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation in federal district court in 1994 established that parolees were denied a preliminary revocation hearing, and were detained an average of 35 days before receiving a final revocation hearing. ( Valdivia v. Davis , supra , 206 F.Supp.2d at p. 1071 &

2016(See Williams, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 658 [Proposition 9 may not 2 Appellant claims that he was not advised that he had 24 to 48 business hours to prepare a response for the probable cause hearing or advised that he could request a continuance.

2021(Franks v. Delaware (1978) 438 U.S. 154 [ 57 L.Ed.2d 667 ]; People v. Kurland (1980) 28 Cal.3d 376, 384 .) “[A]n affidavit may be insufficient when it omits facts adverse to the warrant application.” (Kurland, at p. 384.) However, the affiant has a duty only to disclose facts that are material, meaning “only those omissions which significantly distort[] the probable cause analysis” will make an affidavit insufficient.

2014(Franks v. Delaware (1978) 438 U.S. 154 [ 57 L.Ed.2d 667 ]; People v. Luttenberger (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1, 11 ; People v. Kurland (1980) 28 Cal.3d 376, 384 (Kurland).) “[A]n affidavit may be insufficient when it omits facts adverse to the warrant application. [Citations.]” ( Kurland, supra, at p. 384 .) However, the affiant has a duty only to disclose facts that are material, meaning “only those omissions which significantly distort[] the probable cause analysis” will make an affidavit insufficient.

2016We concluded that “Morrissey requires only an informal hearing to determine whether reasonable grounds exist for the revocation of PRCS, conducted by ‘someone not directly involved in the case.’ [Citation.]” (Gutierrez, at p. 402; see People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867, 894-895 .) Those standards were satisfied because there was no evidence that the probation officer who conducted the appellant’s probable cause hearing was involved in his arrest.

2016We concluded that “Morrissey requires only an informal 4 hearing to determine whether reasonable grounds exist for the revocation of PRCS, conducted by ‘someone not directly involved in the case.’ [Citation.]” (Gutierrez, at p. 402; see People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867, 894-895 .) Those standards were satisfied because there was no evidence that the probation officer who conducted the appellant’s probable cause hearing was involved in his arrest.

2014(See § 6602; see also §§ 6601.5, 6604.) "After the petition is filed, rather than demonstrating the existence of the two evaluations, the People are required to show the more essential fact that the alleged SVP is a person likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior. [Citation.]" (Preciado, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 1130 ; see Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 247 ["the only purpose of the probable cause hearing is to test the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the SVPA petition"], 247-250 [probable cause determination encompasses four elements], 254-25

2013At the probable cause hearing the People are required to show “the more essential fact that the alleged SVP is a person likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior. [Citation.]” (People v. Superior Court (Preciado) (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1130 .) After that determination is made, the matter proceeds to trial where the prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual meets the criteria of the SVPA. (§§ 6603, 6604.) In the present case, the trial court found that there was probable cause to believe that appellant met the criteria of the

2023(See Tran, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 355 [risk of erroneous deprivation mitigated when defendant received a probable cause hearing and was reevaluated numerous times to assess whether he still met SVP criteria]; accord, Vasquez, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at pp. 81–82 [risk of erroneous deprivation from negative evaluation and the defendant entering a treatment program]; DeCasas, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 813 [risk of erroneous deprivation when two psychologists opined the defendant did not fulfill a requirement of being an SVP].) As to the government’s interest, “[t]here is no question that ‘t

2023(See Tran, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 355 [risk of erroneous deprivation mitigated when defendant received a probable cause hearing and was reevaluated numerous times to assess whether he still met SVP criteria]; accord, Vasquez, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at pp. 81–82 [risk of erroneous deprivation from negative evaluation and the defendant entering a treatment program]; DeCasas, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 813 [risk of erroneous deprivation when two psychologists opined the defendant did not fulfill a requirement of being an SVP].) As to the government’s interest, “[t]here is no question that ‘t

2022Even a dismissal in the superior court following an order setting aside an information or indictment is no bar to a future prosecution for the same offense. [Citation.]” (People v. Uhlemann (1973) 9 Cal.3d 662, 666 (Uhlemann).) The question is one of probable cause, and “ ‘the probable cause test is not identical with the test which controls a jury . . . .’ ” (Id. at p. 667.) When the court accepts the prosecution’s evidence at a preliminary hearing but determines there is insufficient evidentiary support, that is a legal conclusion.

2000(People v. Laiwa (1983) 34 Cal.3d 711, 718 [ 195 Cal.Rptr. 503 , 669 P.2d 1278 ].) As the California Supreme Court has summarized the issue: “In a related context, we observed that a magistrate’s authority in determining whether to dismiss criminal charges is ‘limited to determining whether sufficient or probable cause exists to hold the defendant for trial.’ [Citation.] In Uhlemann [People v. Uhlemann (1973) 9 Cal.3d 662 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 657 , 511 P.2d 609 ]], we distinguished the probable cause test from the test used by a jury in determining guilt or innocence, namely, the ‘beyond a reasonab

2023Gass subsequently filed a motion for new evaluators in June 2010, pursuant to In re Ronje (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 509 , claiming he was entitled to new evaluations conducted under a valid protocol.3 At a July 2010 hearing, the trial court granted the motion, finding Hubbs was entitled to new evaluations and a new probable cause hearing.

2023On June 9, 2010, Rosenthal informed the trial court he wanted to consider whether to file a motion for a new probable cause hearing in light of In re Ronje (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 509 , which held that assessment protocols used to evaluate SVP’s were based on an invalid regulation, and that an SVP defendant is not required to show prejudice from the use of the invalid assessment protocols.

2016Brown was not entitled to counsel at the probable cause hearing because it was a summary proceeding, not a formal proceeding. ( Vickers, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 4 461-462.) Under Vickers, a probationer is entitled to counsel for “formal proceedings for the revocation of probation,” although Vickers also states that counsel is required “at all revocation proceedings other than at summary proceedings had while probationer remains at liberty after absconding.” (Id. at p. 461.) In Vickers, all proceedings were court proceedings following the initiation of a petition to revoke probation in contrast

2016Neutral Hearing Officer The Criminal Justice Realignment Act of 2011 requires that PRCS revocations "incorporate the procedural due process protections held to apply to probation revocation procedures under Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471 , and People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451 , and their progeny." (Vol. 6 West's Cal. Legislative Service (Stats. 2012, ch. 43, § 2(b), p. 1969.) Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. 471 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 484 ], delineates basic due process requirements for the revocation of parole, which includes the right to a probable cause hearing before a neutral hearing office

2026Appellant wanted Maserang to file a motion pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Ghilotti) (2002) 27 Cal.4th 888 1 In Ronje, the Court of Appeal concluded SVPs who had been evaluated under a protocol which had been invalidated were entitled to new evaluations and a new probable cause hearing based upon those new evaluations.

2015(Ibid.) In People v. Superior Court (Ghilotti) (2002) 27 Cal.4th 888 [ 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 44 P.3d 949 ] (Ghilotti), the Supreme Court held that, although not expressly authorized by statute, the superior court may review an evaluator’s report before the probable cause hearing to determine whether, “on its face,” it contains “material legal error.” (Id. at pp. 894-895, 909-915.) The court emphasized, however, that the scope of this review is quite limited-“the superior court’s review of evaluators’ reports to determine the validity of an SVPA commitment or recommitment petition is limited to *

2015A police officer may conduct a pat down search during an investigation “where [the officer] has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous 7 individual . . . . [T]he issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.” (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 27 (Terry).) A Terry frisk, a limited exception to the probable cause requirement (Ybarra v. Illinois (1979) 444 U.S. 85, 93-94 ), “is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse

2004That ruling was overturned by the Maryland Court of Appeals, that state's highest tribunal, which invalidated the search because the officers lacked probable cause to search the basement. ( Id. at p. 329, 110 S.Ct. 1093 .) That decision, in turn, was vacated by the United States Supreme Court, which concluded that the probable cause standard did not apply to a "protective sweep." ( Id. at pp. 327, 337, 110 S.Ct. 1093 .) The court explained that as incident to an arrest "the officers could, as a precautionary matter and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other s