probable cause hearing in Ohio

2024Grim, 2023-Ohio-4474, at ¶ 16 ; see also In Re B.W., 7th -18- Case No. 8-22-44 Cir. Mahoning No. 17 MA 0071, 2017-Ohio-9220, ¶ 1, 41, 48 (explaining, “[w]e do not believe the juvenile court (at a probable cause hearing held prior to transferring a juvenile to the general division) was bound by confrontation clause standards for admissibility of evidence,” and deciding the juvenile court should have considered co-delinquent’s statements to a detective).

2022With regard to evidence permitted at a probable-cause hearing, this court has stated as follows: “‘[A] probable cause hearing held before a juvenile court’s transfer to adult court is a preliminary, non-adjudicatory proceeding[.]’ Matter of B.W., 2017-Ohio-9220 , 103 N.E.3d 266, ¶ 18 (7th Dist.), citing Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 , 95 S.Ct. 1779 , 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975), fn. 18, and State v. Carmichael, 35 Ohio St.2d 1, 7-8 , 298 N.E.2d 568 (1973).

2024“Ordinarily, ‘a probable cause inquiry must be confined to the four corners of the affidavit.’ ” State v. Humphrey, 2023-Ohio-1834 , 216 N.E.3d 1834 , ¶ 34 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Klosterman, 114 Ohio App.3d 327, 332-333 , 683 N.E.2d 100 (2d Dist.1996). {¶ 17} “In determining the sufficiency of probable cause in an affidavit submitted in support of a search warrant, ‘[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, * * * there is a fair probability that contraband or eviden

2024“Ordinarily, ‘a probable cause inquiry must be confined to the four corners of the affidavit.’ ” State v. Humphrey, 2023-Ohio-1834 , 216 N.E.3d 1834 , ¶ 34 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Klosterman, 114 Ohio App.3d 327, 332-333 , 683 N.E.2d 100 (2d Dist.1996). {¶ 17} “In determining the sufficiency of probable cause in an affidavit submitted in support of a search warrant, ‘[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, * * * there is a fair probability that contraband or eviden

2025I {¶19} Counsel for Appellant raises a potential argument the trial court violated Appellant’s due process rights by failing to conduct a probable cause hearing. {¶20} “Before a defendant's probation can be revoked, a two-part due process requirement must be met.” State v. Grove, 2016-Ohio-4818 , ¶ 12 (7th Dist.), citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973).

2022Id. {¶16} The final revocation hearing is less summary in nature than the probable cause hearing because the decision under consideration is the actual revocation rather than a mere determination of probable cause.

2020“The determination whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop must be based on the totality of circumstances ‘viewed through the eyes of the reasonable and prudent police officer on the scene who must react to events as they unfold.’” Id., quoting State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87-88 (1991).

2020The determination of whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate an investigative stop "must be based on the totality of circumstances 'viewed through the eyes of the reasonable and prudent police officer on the scene who must react to events as they unfold.'" Id., quoting State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87-88 (1991).

2024See Terry, 392 U.S. at 29 (“[E]vidence may not be introduced if it was discovered by means of a seizure and search which were not reasonably related in scope to the justification for their initiation.”); Jordan, 2021-Ohio-3922, at ¶ 18-23 (explaining the probable cause requirement for officers to effectuate an arrest); see also State v. Hairston, 2019-Ohio-1622, ¶ 21 (“Whether an investigative stop is converted into an arrest depends on . . . whether the degree of intrusion into the suspect’s personal security was reasonably related to the officers’ suspicions and the surrounding circumstances

2020See also Moore at ¶ 33, citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968). {¶ 18} While the concept of "reasonable and articulable suspicion" has not been precisely defined, "[t]he reasonable-suspicion standard is less demanding than the probable- cause standard when used analyzing an arrest." State v. Hairston, 156 Ohio St.3d 363 , 2019-Ohio-1622, ¶ 10 , citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 (1989).

2020See also Moore at ¶ 33, citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968). {¶ 18} While the concept of "reasonable and articulable suspicion" has not been precisely defined, "[t]he reasonable-suspicion standard is less demanding than the probable- cause standard when used analyzing an arrest." State v. Hairston, 156 Ohio St.3d 363 , 2019-Ohio-1622, ¶ 10 , citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 (1989).

2020See also Moore at ¶ 33, citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968). {¶ 18} While the concept of "reasonable and articulable suspicion" has not been precisely defined, "[t]he reasonable-suspicion standard is less demanding than the probable- cause standard when used analyzing an arrest." State v. Hairston, 156 Ohio St.3d 363 , 2019-Ohio-1622, ¶ 10 , citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 (1989).

2024See Terry, 392 U.S. at 29 (“[E]vidence may not be introduced if it was discovered by means of a seizure and search which were not reasonably related in scope to the justification for their initiation.”); Jordan, 2021-Ohio-3922, at ¶ 18-23 (explaining the probable cause requirement for officers to effectuate an arrest); see also State v. Hairston, 2019-Ohio-1622, ¶ 21 (“Whether an investigative stop is converted into an arrest depends on . . . whether the degree of intrusion into the suspect’s personal security was reasonably related to the officers’ suspicions and the surrounding circumstances

2020See also Moore at ¶ 33, citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968). {¶ 18} While the concept of "reasonable and articulable suspicion" has not been precisely defined, "[t]he reasonable-suspicion standard is less demanding than the probable- cause standard when used analyzing an arrest." State v. Hairston, 156 Ohio St.3d 363 , 2019-Ohio-1622, ¶ 10 , citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 (1989).

2009Farmer, Presiding Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. {¶ 40} I respectfully dissent from the majority’s position that Officer Evans did not have probable cause to arrest Waters. {¶ 41} Under the probable-cause standard analyzed in Brinegar v. United States (1949), 338 U.S. 160, 172-176 , 69 S.Ct. 1302 , 93 L.Ed. 1879 , I would find the facts and beliefs stated by Officer Evans to qualify as a reasonable, prudent opinion of a law-enforcement person: {¶ 42} “That emphasis, we think, goes much too far in confusing and disregarding the difference between what is required to prove gui

2009Farmer, Presiding Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. {¶ 40} I respectfully dissent from the majority’s position that Officer Evans did not have probable cause to arrest Waters. {¶ 41} Under the probable-cause standard analyzed in Brinegar v. United States (1949), 338 U.S. 160, 172-176 , 69 S.Ct. 1302 , 93 L.Ed. 1879 , I would find the facts and beliefs stated by Officer Evans to qualify as a reasonable, prudent opinion of a law-enforcement person: {¶ 42} “That emphasis, we think, goes much too far in confusing and disregarding the difference between what is required to prove gui

2022Juv.R. 30(A) provides that a probable-cause hearing is a “preliminary hearing to determine if 34 January Term, 2022 there is probable cause to believe that the child committed the act alleged and that the act would be an offense if committed by an adult.” A Juv.R. 30(A) hearing is conducted “[i]n any proceeding where the court considers the transfer of a case for criminal prosecution.” To satisfy the probable-cause standard, “the state must produce evidence that raises more than a mere suspicion of guilt, but need not provide evidence proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis added.)

2022Juv.R. 30(A) provides that a probable-cause hearing is a “preliminary hearing to determine if 34 January Term, 2022 there is probable cause to believe that the child committed the act alleged and that the act would be an offense if committed by an adult.” A Juv.R. 30(A) hearing is conducted “[i]n any proceeding where the court considers the transfer of a case for criminal prosecution.” To satisfy the probable-cause standard, “the state must produce evidence that raises more than a mere suspicion of guilt, but need not provide evidence proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis added.)

2023However, the court’s questions and statements during the probable-cause hearing give some insight on how it reached that conclusion, and they suggest that the court 10 January Term, 2023 improperly expected the state “to disprove alternate theories of the case,” A.J.S., 120 Ohio St.3d 185 , 2008-Ohio-5307 , 897 N.E.2d 629, at ¶ 61 , and “marshal all of its evidence at the probable-cause phase,” Martin, 170 Ohio St.3d 181 , 2022-Ohio- 4175, 209 N.E.3d 688, at ¶ 30 .

2023However, the court’s questions and statements during the probable-cause hearing give some insight on how it reached that conclusion, and they suggest that the court 10 January Term, 2023 improperly expected the state “to disprove alternate theories of the case,” A.J.S., 120 Ohio St.3d 185 , 2008-Ohio-5307 , 897 N.E.2d 629, at ¶ 61 , and “marshal all of its evidence at the probable-cause phase,” Martin, 170 Ohio St.3d 181 , 2022-Ohio- 4175, 209 N.E.3d 688, at ¶ 30 .

2012See Delaware 3 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406 , 2008-Ohio-4539 , 894 N.E.2d 1204, ¶ 8 . {¶8} Here, the trial court concluded that Burnett had not committed any traffic violation when she changed lanes without signaling.

2012See Delaware 3 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406 , 2008-Ohio-4539 , 894 N.E.2d 1204, ¶ 8 . {¶8} Here, the trial court concluded that Burnett had not committed any traffic violation when she changed lanes without signaling.

2024“Ordinarily, ‘a probable cause inquiry must be confined to the four corners of the affidavit.’ ” State v. Humphrey, 2023-Ohio-1834 , 216 N.E.3d 1834 , ¶ 34 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Klosterman, 114 Ohio App.3d 327, 332-333 , 683 N.E.2d 100 (2d Dist.1996). {¶ 17} “In determining the sufficiency of probable cause in an affidavit submitted in support of a search warrant, ‘[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, * * * there is a fair probability that contraband or eviden

2024“Ordinarily, ‘a probable cause inquiry must be confined to the four corners of the affidavit.’ ” State v. Humphrey, 2023-Ohio-1834 , 216 N.E.3d 1834 , ¶ 34 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Klosterman, 114 Ohio App.3d 327, 332-333 , 683 N.E.2d 100 (2d Dist.1996). {¶ 17} “In determining the sufficiency of probable cause in an affidavit submitted in support of a search warrant, ‘[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, * * * there is a fair probability that contraband or eviden

2021“The evidence presented at the probable cause hearing ‘does not have to be unassailable’ to qualify as credible.” Id. at ¶ 21, quoting A.J.S. at ¶ 46, citing Iacona at 93 . {¶ 20} The Ohio Supreme Court of Ohio has explained the role of the juvenile court in considering the evidence presented at a probable cause hearing: * * * “[I]n determining the existence of probable cause the juvenile court must evaluate the quality of the evidence presented by the state in support of probable cause as well as any evidence presented by the respondent that attacks probable cause.” (Emphasis added.) [ Iacona

2021“The evidence presented at the probable cause hearing ‘does not have to be unassailable’ to qualify as credible.” Id. at ¶ 21, quoting A.J.S. at ¶ 46, citing Iacona at 93 . {¶ 20} The Ohio Supreme Court of Ohio has explained the role of the juvenile court in considering the evidence presented at a probable cause hearing: * * * “[I]n determining the existence of probable cause the juvenile court must evaluate the quality of the evidence presented by the state in support of probable cause as well as any evidence presented by the respondent that attacks probable cause.” (Emphasis added.) [ Iacona

2026A defendant facing the possible revocation of community-control supervision is entitled to an initial or probable-cause hearing, but that hearing serves a limited purpose: “to prevent the incarceration of a probationer without probable cause and to allow independent review of the charges against him while information is fresh and sources are available.” State v. Delaney, 11 Ohio St.3d 231, 233 (1984).

2008In addition, "a preliminary probable cause hearing should be held before an independent decision maker, `as promptly as convenient after arrest while information is fresh and sources are available.'" State v. Delaney (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 231 , 233 , citing Morrissey . {¶ 15} Here, Elkins' arrest occurred on September 15, 2006, and the court scheduled his revocation hearing for November 15, 2006.

2019See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 , 417-418, 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981) ; Ybarra v. Illinois , 444 U.S. 85 , 94, 100 S.Ct. 338 , 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979) ("The 'narrow scope' of the Terry exception [to the probable-cause requirement] does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked * * *").

2019See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 , 417-418, 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981) ; Ybarra v. Illinois , 444 U.S. 85 , 94, 100 S.Ct. 338 , 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979) ("The 'narrow scope' of the Terry exception [to the probable-cause requirement] does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked * * *").

2019See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 , 417-418, 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981) ; Ybarra v. Illinois , 444 U.S. 85 , 94, 100 S.Ct. 338 , 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979) ("The 'narrow scope' of the Terry exception [to the probable-cause requirement] does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked * * *").

2019See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 , 417-418, 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981) ; Ybarra v. Illinois , 444 U.S. 85 , 94, 100 S.Ct. 338 , 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979) ("The 'narrow scope' of the Terry exception [to the probable-cause requirement] does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked * * *").

2025“The juvenile court presiding over a probable-cause hearing does not sit as the ultimate trier of fact.” State v. Martin, 2022-Ohio-4175, ¶ 31 .

2024See, e.g., State v. Martin, 2022-Ohio-4175, ¶ 23, 26 (concluding that because appellate courts cannot weigh the credibility of the evidence in a probable cause hearing and must defer to the factfinder, those determinations are not subject to manifest-weight challenges); see also State v. Knuff, 2024-Ohio-902, ¶ 207-214 (reviewing the weight of the evidence without mentioning, discussing, or applying any deference to the trier of fact’s credibility determinations); State v. Nicholson, 2024-Ohio-604, ¶ 69-79 (same); State v. Garrett, 2022-Ohio-4218, ¶ 136-142 (same).

2025Dec. 22, 2000), citing State v. Willoughby, 81 Ohio App.3d 562, 569 (6th Dist. 1992).

2004State v. Strothers (Dec. 22, 2000), Montgomery App. No. 18322, citing State v. Willoughby (1992), 81 Ohio App.3d 562 , 569 , 611 N.E.2d 937 .

2022With regard to evidence permitted at a probable-cause hearing, this court has stated as follows: “‘[A] probable cause hearing held before a juvenile court’s transfer to adult court is a preliminary, non-adjudicatory proceeding[.]’ Matter of B.W., 2017-Ohio-9220 , 103 N.E.3d 266, ¶ 18 (7th Dist.), citing Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 , 95 S.Ct. 1779 , 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975), fn. 18, and State v. Carmichael, 35 Ohio St.2d 1, 7-8 , 298 N.E.2d 568 (1973).

2022With regard to evidence permitted at a probable-cause hearing, this court has stated as follows: “‘[A] probable cause hearing held before a juvenile court’s transfer to adult court is a preliminary, non-adjudicatory proceeding[.]’ Matter of B.W., 2017-Ohio-9220 , 103 N.E.3d 266, ¶ 18 (7th Dist.), citing Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 , 95 S.Ct. 1779 , 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975), fn. 18, and State v. Carmichael, 35 Ohio St.2d 1, 7-8 , 298 N.E.2d 568 (1973).

2021State v. Whisenant, 127 Ohio App.3d 75, 85 , 711 N.E.2d 1016 (11th Dist. 1998); Burns at ¶ 77 (“defense counsel’s motion to suppress was not properly before the juvenile court at the time of the probable cause hearing”); Starling at ¶ 32 (“we find that filing a motion to suppress for the purposes of Starling’s probable cause hearing would have been premature and improper”). {¶24} The issue of whether the state presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed the act charged is a question of law; an appellate court applies a de novo review.

2021State v. Whisenant, 127 Ohio App.3d 75, 85 , 711 N.E.2d 1016 (11th Dist. 1998); Burns at ¶ 77 (“defense counsel’s motion to suppress was not properly before the juvenile court at the time of the probable cause hearing”); Starling at ¶ 32 (“we find that filing a motion to suppress for the purposes of Starling’s probable cause hearing would have been premature and improper”). {¶24} The issue of whether the state presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed the act charged is a question of law; an appellate court applies a de novo review.

2016See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990), Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-233 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); also see State v. Jones, 143 Ohio St.3d 266 , 2015-Ohio-483 , 37 N.E.3d 123, at ¶13 . {¶ 18} After our review of this matter, we readily conclude, as did the trial court, that Detective Bollinger’s affidavit satisfies the probable cause standard.

2016See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990), Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-233 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); also see State v. Jones, 143 Ohio St.3d 266 , 2015-Ohio-483 , 37 N.E.3d 123, at ¶13 . {¶ 18} After our review of this matter, we readily conclude, as did the trial court, that Detective Bollinger’s affidavit satisfies the probable cause standard.

2016Montgomery No. 25124, 2013-Ohio-1371, ¶ 31 (A probable cause inquiry is generally confined to the four corners of the affidavit.).

2016Montgomery No. 25124, 2013-Ohio-1371, ¶ 31 , quoting State v. Klosterman, 114 Ohio App.3d 327, 333 , 683 N.E.2d 100 (2d Dist.1996).

2007Instead, the juvenile court acts as a gatekeeper, charged with evaluating whether sufficient credible evidence exists to warrant going forward with a prosecution on a charge that the legislature has determined triggers a mandatory transfer of jurisdiction to adult court. {¶ 23} In this way, the determination made at the probable-cause hearing is akin to a determination as to the existence of probable cause to search or stop in a suppression hearing, which the United States Supreme Court has described as follows: The first part of the analysis involves only a determination of historical facts,

2007Instead, the juvenile court acts as a gatekeeper, charged with evaluating whether sufficient credible evidence exists to warrant going forward with a prosecution on a charge that the legislature has determined triggers a mandatory transfer of jurisdiction to adult court. {¶ 23} In this way, the determination made at the probable-cause hearing is akin to a determination as to the existence of probable cause to search or stop in a suppression hearing, which the United States Supreme Court has described as follows: The first part of the analysis involves only a determination of historical facts,