probable cause hearing in District of Columbia

2018The majority opinion resists the constraints of our precedent by attempting to show both that (1) the cases in which this court rejected warrantless entries based on the emergency aid exception, like Evans v. United States , 122 A.3d 876 (D.C. 2015) and Washington v. United States , 585 A.2d 167 (D.C. 1991), are distinguishable on their facts, and (2) cases in which we have upheld such warrantless entries, like Oliver , 656 A.2d 1159 , actually demand very little information when applying the probable cause standard.

2017Although neither the gun nor the bag containing the gun was in plain view in the bedroom, 12 the government’s emphasis on the presence of Mr. Proctor’s bank statement in the bag with the gun (to establish at least his knowledge of the gun) reflects our prior case law. 13 See Schools, supra, 84 A.3d at 510 (“We have often found that evidence was sufficient to establish a defendant’s constructive possession of contraband where the contraband was recovered in proximity to the defendant’s personal items such as mail or personal papers, photographs, and identification cards.”); see also Evans, supr

2017Although neither the gun nor the bag containing the gun was in plain view in the bedroom, 12 the government’s emphasis on the presence of Mr. Proctor’s bank statement in the bag with the gun (to establish at least his knowledge of the gun) reflects our prior case law. 13 See Schools, supra, 84 A.3d at 510 (“We have often found that evidence was sufficient to establish a defendant’s constructive possession of contraband where the contraband was recovered in proximity to the defendant’s personal items such as mail or personal papers, photographs, and identification cards.”); see also Evans, supr

2017Although neither the gun nor the bag containing the gun was in plain view in the bedroom, 12 the government’s emphasis on the presence of Mr. Proctor’s bank statement in the bag with the gun (to establish at least his knowledge of the gun) reflects our prior case law. 13 See Schools, supra, 84 A.3d at 510 (“We have often found that evidence was sufficient to establish a defendant’s constructive possession of contraband where the contraband was recovered in proximity to the defendant’s personal items such as mail or personal papers, photographs, and identification cards.”); see also Evans, supr

2017Although neither the gun nor the bag containing the gun was in plain view in the bedroom, 12 the government’s emphasis on the presence of Mr. Proctor’s bank statement in the bag with the gun (to establish at least his knowledge of the gun) reflects our prior case law. 13 See Schools, supra, 84 A.3d at 510 (“We have often found that evidence was sufficient to establish a defendant’s constructive possession of contraband where the contraband was recovered in proximity to the defendant’s personal items such as mail or personal papers, photographs, and identification cards.”); see also Evans, supr

2017Although neither the gun nor the bag containing the gun was in plain view in the bedroom, 12 the government’s emphasis on the presence of Mr. Proctor’s bank statement in the bag with the gun (to establish at least his knowledge of the gun) reflects our prior case law. 13 See Schools, supra, 84 A.3d at 510 (“We have often found that evidence was sufficient to establish a defendant’s constructive possession of contraband where the contraband was recovered in proximity to the defendant’s personal items such as mail or personal papers, photographs, and identification cards.”); see also Evans, supr

1996See In re T.T.C., 583 A.2d 986, 989 (D.C.1990) (“The Terry exception to the probable cause requirement is limited to circumstances “where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot.’”) (quoting Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at 30 , 88 S.Ct. at 1884 ) (emphasis omitted).

1996See In re T.T.C., 583 A.2d 986, 989 (D.C.1990) (“The Terry exception to the probable cause requirement is limited to circumstances “where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot.’”) (quoting Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at 30 , 88 S.Ct. at 1884 ) (emphasis omitted).

2014We recognize, as an initial matter, that the mother’s waiver of a probable cause hearing and her stipulation that the children were neglected had the curious effect of turning the trial court’s focus away from the children’s father—in some ways legitimately, as “the relevant focus for the court in neglect proceedings is the children’s condition, not parental culpability.” In re T.G., 684 A.2d 786 , 789 (D.C. 1996) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2014We recognize, as an initial matter, that the mother‟s waiver of a probable cause hearing and her stipulation that the children were neglected had the curious effect of turning the trial court‟s focus away from the children‟s father—in some ways legitimately, as “the relevant focus for the court in neglect proceedings is the children‟s condition, not parental culpability.” In re T.G., 684 A.2d 786 , 789 (D.C. 1996) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

1979These events, all (unlike his flight at the sight of the police officers) occurring before the officers felt through the plastic bag, meet the traditional test for the probable cause exception justifying warrantless arrests and searches incident to arrest: "[T]he facts and circumstances within their [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that" an offense has been or is being committed. [ Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 , 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311 , 93 L.Ed.2

1979These events, all (unlike his flight at the sight of the police officers) occurring before the officers felt through the plastic bag, meet the traditional test for the probable cause exception justifying warrantless arrests and searches incident to arrest: "[T]he facts and circumstances within their [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that" an offense has been or is being committed. [ Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 , 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311 , 93 L.Ed.2

2018Doe , supra , 796 F.3d at 104 (observing that *202 federal circuits are split among those that only require reasonable suspicion of past abuse to justify a warrantless seizure, those that require reasonable suspicion of imminent abuse, and the Eleventh Circuit which requires probable cause).

2018Doe , supra , 796 F.3d at 104 (observing that *202 federal circuits are split among those that only require reasonable suspicion of past abuse to justify a warrantless seizure, those that require reasonable suspicion of imminent abuse, and the Eleventh Circuit which requires probable cause).

2017Although neither the gun nor the bag containing the gun was in plain view in the bedroom,11 the government’s emphasis on the presence of Mr. Proctor’s bank statement in the bag with the gun (to establish at least his knowledge of the gun) reflects our prior case law.12 See Schools, supra, 84 A.3d at 510 (“We have often found that evidence was sufficient to establish a defendant’s constructive possession of contraband where the contraband was recovered in proximity to the 11 In contrast, in Evans, supra, one gun was in plain view in a bedroom closet leaning against the wall, and we said that a

2017Although neither the gun nor the bag containing the gun was in plain view in the bedroom,11 the government’s emphasis on the presence of Mr. Proctor’s bank statement in the bag with the gun (to establish at least his knowledge of the gun) reflects our prior case law.12 See Schools, supra, 84 A.3d at 510 (“We have often found that evidence was sufficient to establish a defendant’s constructive possession of contraband where the contraband was recovered in proximity to the 11 In contrast, in Evans, supra, one gun was in plain view in a bedroom closet leaning against the wall, and we said that a

2014See Smith, supra, 77 A.3d at 997 (stating that appellant has not proven some element of her claim “confuses the probable cause standard at the threshold of a proceeding with the higher standard of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that applies at a full-fledged administrative adjudication of the charge of discrimination”) (citing Sparrow v. District of Columbia Office of Hu *836 man Rights, 74 A.3d 698, 706 (D.C.2013)). “[Applying the probable cause standard requires consideration of whether [the complainant’s] version of events was reasonable, not whether [he or she] failed to disprove

2013This latter formulation is misplaced as it confuses the probable cause standard at the threshold of a proceeding, see Sparrow v. District of Columbia Office of Human Rights, 74 A.3d 698, 706-07 (D.C.2013), with the higher standard of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that applies at a full-fledged administrative adjudication of the charge of discrimination.

2011New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 , 105 S.Ct. 733 , 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Blackmun, J. concurring); see also United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 322-23 , 92 S.Ct. 2125 , 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972) (acknowledging that a domestic security surveillance warrant may be granted based on reasonable standards balancing "the legitimate need of Government for intelligence information and the protected rights of our citizens"); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-38 , 87 S.Ct. 1727 , 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967) (permitting home inspections conducted in compliance with "reaso

2011New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 , 105 S.Ct. 733 , 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Blackmun, J. concurring); see also United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 322-23 , 92 S.Ct. 2125 , 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972) (acknowledging that a domestic security surveillance warrant may be granted based on reasonable standards balancing "the legitimate need of Government for intelligence information and the protected rights of our citizens"); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-38 , 87 S.Ct. 1727 , 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967) (permitting home inspections conducted in compliance with "reaso

2006In doing so, "[o]ur standard of review for a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress tangible evidence requires `that the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom must be viewed in favor of sustaining the trial court's ruling.'" United States v. Watson, 697 A.2d 36, 38 (D.C.1997) (quoting Holt v. United States, 675 A.2d 474, 478 (D.C. 1996)).

2006In doing so, “[o]ur standard of review for a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress tangible evidence requires ‘that the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom must be viewed in favor of sustaining the trial court’s ruling.’ ” United States v. Watson, 697 A.2d 36, 38 (D.C.1997) (quoting Holt v. United States, 675 A.2d 474, 478 (D.C.1996)).

2006In doing so, "[o]ur standard of review for a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress tangible evidence requires `that the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom must be viewed in favor of sustaining the trial court's ruling.'" United States v. Watson, 697 A.2d 36, 38 (D.C.1997) (quoting Holt v. United States, 675 A.2d 474, 478 (D.C. 1996)).

2006In doing so, “[o]ur standard of review for a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress tangible evidence requires ‘that the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom must be viewed in favor of sustaining the trial court’s ruling.’ ” United States v. Watson, 697 A.2d 36, 38 (D.C.1997) (quoting Holt v. United States, 675 A.2d 474, 478 (D.C.1996)).

1992Holmes v. United States, 460 U.S. 1087 , 103 S.Ct. 1781 , 76 L.Ed.2d 351 (1983), overruled by Lynch, supra, 557 A.2d 580 , which concerned pretrial detention based on findings of both “risk of flight” and “danger,” we held that the “ ‘reason to believe’ clause of § 23-1325(a) is the equivalent of a probable cause standard.” Id. at 1316 (citing United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1339 (D.C.) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 872 , 101 S.Ct. 211 , 66 L.Ed.2d 92 (1981)).

1989"The sum of an evidentiary presentation may well be greater than its constituent parts." Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 180 , 107 S.Ct. 2775, 2781 , 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987). (2) In making a finding as to commission of the offense, the trial court must continue to employ the probable cause standard of Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 , 95 S.Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975); see United States v. Salerno, supra (noting separate requirements under federal pretrial detention statute of proof of offense by probable cause and proof of dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence). [5] (3) The

1989"The sum of an evidentiary presentation may well be greater than its constituent parts." Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 180 , 107 S.Ct. 2775, 2781 , 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987). (2) In making a finding as to commission of the offense, the trial court must continue to employ the probable cause standard of Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 , 95 S.Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975); see United States v. Salerno, supra (noting separate requirements under federal pretrial detention statute of proof of offense by probable cause and proof of dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence). [5] (3) The

1989"The sum of an evidentiary presentation may well be greater than its constituent parts." Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 180 , 107 S.Ct. 2775, 2781 , 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987). (2) In making a finding as to commission of the offense, the trial court must continue to employ the probable cause standard of Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 , 95 S.Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975); see United States v. Salerno, supra (noting separate requirements under federal pretrial detention statute of proof of offense by probable cause and proof of dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence). [5] (3) The

2007The Supreme Court has instructed that “the probable-cause standard is a ‘practical, non-technical conception’ that deals with ‘the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.’ ” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 , 124 S.Ct. 795 , 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), and Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 , 69 S.Ct. 1302 , 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)).

2007The Supreme Court has instructed that “the probable-cause standard is a ‘practical, non-technical conception’ that deals with ‘the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.’ ” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 , 124 S.Ct. 795 , 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), and Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 , 69 S.Ct. 1302 , 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)).

2010McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 312-313 , 87 S.Ct. 1056 , 18 L.Ed.2d 62 (1967); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 679 , 100 S.Ct. *1027 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980) (“[a]t a suppression hearing, the court may rely on hearsay and other evidence, even though that evidence would not be admissible at trial”).

2010McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 312-313 , 87 S.Ct. 1056 , 18 L.Ed.2d 62 (1967); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 679 , 100 S.Ct. *1027 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980) (“[a]t a suppression hearing, the court may rely on hearsay and other evidence, even though that evidence would not be admissible at trial”).

1993Only an alleged failure to comply with subsection (b) is at issue. [8] This point is not conceded by the government, which argues that the trial court had no occasion to develop the full facts. [9] See also In re Rosell, 547 A.2d 180 (D.C.1988); In re Morris, 482 A.2d 369 (D.C.1984). [10] Appellant has not challenged as such the sufficiency of the evidence at the probable cause hearing. [11] In this regard, we note that where Congress intended to prescribe the release of a person, it knew how to do so explicitly.

1991See note 11 infra. [10] The government reads Rosell, supra, 547 A.2d at 182 , to hold that the trial court's ex parte order under § 524 constitutes a cure, regardless of a § 525 probable cause hearing.