probable cause standard in Maine

2004In that case, the Law Court held that the probable cause requirement in the statute which authorizes the Secretary of State to suspend an operator’s license concerns not whether there is probable cause to believe that a motor vehicle statute has been violated, but whether or not to believe “that the person was operating a motor vehicle with an excessive blood-alcohol level.” Id.

2001The court also notes Powell v. Secretary of State, 614 A.2d 1303 (Me. 1992) where the Court discusses the probable cause standard to be used by a hearing examiner in the suspension process saying that determination applies only to whether the operator had excessive alcohol in his blood and thus whether the officer had sufficient reason to justify administration of the blood alcohol test.

1984State v. Curlew, 459 A.2d at 165 ; State v. Snow, 438 A.2d at 487 ; State v. Ames, 388 A.2d 94, 96 (Me.1978); State v. Atkinson, 325 A.2d 44 , 45 n. 1 (Me.1974).

1983State v. Ames, 388 A.2d 94, 96 (Me.1978); State v. Atkinson, 325 A.2d 44 , 45 n. 1 (Me.1974). 9 We examine the evidence in this case with reference to the rule in Maine that we have described.

1970Admitting that the probable cause hearing is not ordinarily a critical stage in criminal proceedings, Holbrook v. State of Maine, 1965, 161 Me. 102, 105 , 208 A.2d 313 , the defendant argues that the District Court’s denial of his motion to continue the probable cause hearing to secure the services of a court reporter had an “appreciable effect” in depriving trial counsel of probable cross-examination leverage due to the absence of a record concerning pretrial disclosure of the prosecutrix’s evidence.

1970Admitting that the probable cause hearing is not ordinarily a critical stage in criminal proceedings, Holbrook v. State of Maine, 1965, 161 Me. 102, 105 , 208 A.2d 313 , the defendant argues that the District Court’s denial of his motion to continue the probable cause hearing to secure the services of a court reporter had an “appreciable effect” in depriving trial counsel of probable cross-examination leverage due to the absence of a record concerning pretrial disclosure of the prosecutrix’s evidence.

2020State v. Cormier [¶22] In a 2007 decision, State v. Cormier, we upheld the constitutionality of a warrantless blood draw taken pursuant to section 2522, notwithstanding the absence of probable cause at the time of the search and despite an acknowledgment that none of the traditional exceptions to the warrant requirement applied. 2007 ME 112, ¶ 18 , 928 A.2d 753 . [¶23] As to the probable cause requirement, we opined that the statute allowed for a determination of previously existing probable cause after the search, rather than before, when “but for the exigencies at the scene of the collision,

2020State v. Cormier [¶22] In a 2007 decision, State v. Cormier, we upheld the constitutionality of a warrantless blood draw taken pursuant to section 2522, notwithstanding the absence of probable cause at the time of the search and despite an acknowledgment that none of the traditional exceptions to the warrant requirement applied. 2007 ME 112, ¶ 18 , 928 A.2d 753 . [¶23] As to the probable cause requirement, we opined that the statute allowed for a determination of previously existing probable cause after the search, rather than before, when “but for the exigencies at the scene of the collision,

2018Relying on Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602 (1989), which upheld regulations requiring blood tests of railroad employees after certain major train accidents under a "special needs" exception to the probable cause requirement, the Law Court held that ... the statute [29 M.R.S. § 1312] contemplates that probable cause is implicat~d only when admiss ion of the test result is sought at the trial.

2018Specifically, the corpus delicti standard is akin to the probable cause standard and can be satisfied by "less than a preponderance of the evidence." Poulin, 2016 ME 40 ,r 12; Fundalewicz, 2012 ME 107 ,r 9; State v. Snow, 438 A.2d 485, 487 (Me. 1981) ( quotations omitted).

2016Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304 , 313 (3d Cir.2010). [¶ 28] Here, because the State sought a warrant based on a probable cause standard, it assumed a greater burden than was required pursuant to the SCA and in doing so, the State — by inadvertence or otherwise — triggered a process that likely gave Simmons a greater level of protection than might have been available to him had the State sought a court order pursuant to section 2703(d) of the SCA. [¶ 29] The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct and prevent the State from benefitting from th

2016State v. Bailey, 2012 ME 55, ¶ 16 , 41 A.3d 535 .

2016State v. Bailey, 2012 ME 55, ¶ 16 , 41 A.3d 535 .

2016“In order to meet the probable cause standard, the affidavit must set forth some nexus between the evidence to be seized and the locations to be searched.” Simmons, 2016 ME 103, ¶ 11 , 143 A.3d 819 (quotation marks omitted). [¶20] We apply the “totality of the circumstances approach” to probable cause, as set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).

2016“In order to meet the probable cause standard, the affidavit must set forth some nexus between the evidence to be seized and the locations to be searched.” Simmons, 2016 ME 103, ¶ 11 , 143 A.3d 819 (quotation marks omitted). [¶20] We apply the “totality of the circumstances approach” to probable cause, as set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).

2016Rabon, 2007 ME 113, ¶ 22 , 930 A.2d 268 .

2016Rabon, 2007 ME 113, ¶ 22 , 930 A.2d 268 .

2016Graham, 824 F.3d at 427-29 , 2016 U.S.App.

2016In order to meet the probable cause standard, the affidavit “must set forth some-nexus between the evidence to be seized and the locations to be searched.” State v. Gurney, 2012 ME 14, ¶ 33 , 36 A.3d 893 (quotation marks omitted).

2016In order to meet the probable cause standard, the affidavit “must set forth some-nexus between the evidence to be seized and the locations to be searched.” State v. Gurney, 2012 ME 14, ¶ 33 , 36 A.3d 893 (quotation marks omitted).

2015The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances. 540 U.S. 366, 370-71 , 124 S.Ct. 795 , 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003) (alterations, citations, and quotation marks omitted). [¶ 10] We recently discussed the probable cause standard as well, noting that it “is flexible and based on common sense.

2015The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances. 540 U.S. 366, 370-71 , 124 S.Ct. 795 , 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003) (alterations, citations, and quotation marks omitted). [¶ 10] We recently discussed the probable cause standard as well, noting that it “is flexible and based on common sense.

2011State v. Forsyth, 2002 ME 75, ¶ 10 , 795 A.2d 66, 69-70 (quotation marks omitted); Cilley, 1998 ME 34, ¶ 11 , 707 A.2d at 83 . [¶ 12] The probable cause standard is flexible and based on common sense.

2011State v. Forsyth, 2002 ME 75, ¶ 10 , 795 A.2d 66, 69-70 (quotation marks omitted); Cilley, 1998 ME 34, ¶ 11 , 707 A.2d at 83 . [¶ 12] The probable cause standard is flexible and based on common sense.