probable cause standard in Kansas

2016Hence, the statute as written with a probable cause standard adds [a] requirement and is meaningful.” Ultreras, 296 Kan. at 843-44 .

2016Our Supreme Court rejected this, finding instead that the State had the burden to negate the defendant s claim under a probable cause standard and that the district court had erred by “imposing a higher standard of proof than probable cause.” 296 Kan. at 845 .

2022But the probable- cause standard is a practical, commonsense, nontechnical, and fluid concept that deals with "the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act." Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370-71 , 124 S. Ct. 795 , 157 L.

2022But the probable- cause standard is a practical, commonsense, nontechnical, and fluid concept that deals with "the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act." Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370-71 , 124 S. Ct. 795 , 157 L.

2022"The probable cause analysis reviews the totality of the circumstances to determine the probability that the vehicle contains contraband or evidence." 309 Kan. at 143 .

2022"The probable cause analysis reviews the totality of the circumstances to determine the probability that the vehicle contains contraband or evidence." 309 Kan. at 143 .

2022Brown, 26 Kan.

2004The trial may be continued upon the request of either party and a showing of good cause, or by the court on its own motion in the due administration of justice, and when the respondent will not be substantially prejudiced.” In In re Care & Treatment of Brown, 26 Kan.

2004As the United States Supreme Court has recently stated: "`[P]robable cause is a fluid concept — turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts — not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.' [Citation omitted.] "The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances." Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 370 -71 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 , 76 L.

2004As the United States Supreme Court has recently stated: "`[P]robable cause is a fluid concept — turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts — not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.' [Citation omitted.] "The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances." Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 370 -71 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 , 76 L.

2024On appeal, Vega-Ruiz appears to claim that the district court applied a lower standard in its determination that probable cause supported the arrest and argues that through some of its recent decisions, the Kansas Supreme Court "is implicitly reminding prosecutors, officers and courts alike that the Fourth Amendment applies equally to DUI cases and that no special rules or lower standards will be tolerated." See City of Wichita v. Molitor, 301 Kan. 251, 268-69 , 341 P.3d 1275 (2015) (finding preliminary breath test results inadmissible after field sobriety testing indicated a lack of impairmen

2024On appeal, Vega-Ruiz appears to claim that the district court applied a lower standard in its determination that probable cause supported the arrest and argues that through some of its recent decisions, the Kansas Supreme Court "is implicitly reminding prosecutors, officers and courts alike that the Fourth Amendment applies equally to DUI cases and that no special rules or lower standards will be tolerated." See City of Wichita v. Molitor, 301 Kan. 251, 268-69 , 341 P.3d 1275 (2015) (finding preliminary breath test results inadmissible after field sobriety testing indicated a lack of impairmen

2023Sebek had the burden at the probable cause hearing to establish that the facts, viewed in the light favoring him, were "sufficient to cause a person of ordinary prudence and action to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief that [his] mental abnormality or personality disorder had so changed that he was safe to be placed in transitional release." 296 Kan. at 226 .

2020The appointment of an examiner is discretionary." Quary asks this court to apply the probable cause standard from K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 59-29a08(d) and In re Care and Treatment of Burch, 296 Kan. 215, 225 , 291 P.3d 78 (2012), and rule that the district court made an error of law when it failed to apply this standard.

2000Hershberger argues the State failed to hold a probable cause hearing within 48 hours as required by County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 47 , 114 L.

2000Hershberger argues the State failed to hold a probable cause hearing within 48 hours as required by County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 47 , 114 L.

2019Whether the officer had probable cause depends on "'the facts and circumstances within the arresting officers' knowledge.'" Ramirez, 278 Kan. at 406 .

2018When analyzing the totality of the circumstances to determine whether probable cause exists, we consider " 'all of the information in the officer's possession, fair inferences therefrom, and any other relevant facts, even if they may not be admissible on the issue of guilt.' " State v. Ramirez , 278 Kan. 402 , 406, 100 P.3d 94 (2004).

2011“The general rule is that an unlawful detention, absent a showing of specific prejudice to the defendant’s right to a fair trial, is not sufficient to justify the dismissal of criminal charges.” State v. Cuchy, 270 Kan. 763 , Syl. ¶ 3, 19 P.3d 152 (2001).

2011“The general rule is that an unlawful detention, absent a showing of specific prejudice to the defendant’s right to a fair trial, is not sufficient to justify the dismissal of criminal charges.” State v. Cuchy, 270 Kan. 763 , Syl. ¶ 3, 19 P.3d 152 (2001).

2011CONCLUSION In In re D.E.R., the Kansas Supreme Court mandated that in proceedings under the KJJC, a juvenile respondent possesses the constitutional right to have a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to an extended restraint of liberty. 290 Kan. 306 , Syl. ¶ 2, 225 P.3d 1187 .

2011Conclusion In In re D.E.R., the Kansas Supreme Court mandated that in proceedings under the KJJC, a juvenile respondent possesses the constitutional right to have a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to an extended restraint of liberty. 290 Kan. 306 , Syl. ¶ 2.

2024On appeal, Vega-Ruiz appears to claim that the district court applied a lower standard in its determination that probable cause supported the arrest and argues that through some of its recent decisions, the Kansas Supreme Court "is implicitly reminding prosecutors, officers and courts alike that the Fourth Amendment applies equally to DUI cases and that no special rules or lower standards will be tolerated." See City of Wichita v. Molitor, 301 Kan. 251, 268-69 , 341 P.3d 1275 (2015) (finding preliminary breath test results inadmissible after field sobriety testing indicated a lack of impairmen

2024On appeal, Vega-Ruiz appears to claim that the district court applied a lower standard in its determination that probable cause supported the arrest and argues that through some of its recent decisions, the Kansas Supreme Court "is implicitly reminding prosecutors, officers and courts alike that the Fourth Amendment applies equally to DUI cases and that no special rules or lower standards will be tolerated." See City of Wichita v. Molitor, 301 Kan. 251, 268-69 , 341 P.3d 1275 (2015) (finding preliminary breath test results inadmissible after field sobriety testing indicated a lack of impairmen

2022"Officers do not need ironclad proof of 'a likely serious, life-threatening' injury to invoke the emergency aid exception." Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 , 130 S. Ct. 546 , 175 L.

2022"Officers do not need ironclad proof of 'a likely serious, life-threatening' injury to invoke the emergency aid exception." Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 , 130 S. Ct. 546 , 175 L.

2022The landmark United States Supreme Court case for the automobile exception is United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 , 102 S. Ct. 2157 , 72 L.

2022The landmark United States Supreme Court case for the automobile exception is United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 , 102 S. Ct. 2157 , 72 L.

2022"Reasonable belief does not require absolute certainty; the standard is more lenient than the probable cause standard." Porter, 594 F.3d at 1258 .

2021Our appellate courts generally find an in terrorem clause "valid and enforceable against a beneficiary who attacks the validity of the will, or provisions therein, unless the beneficiary had probable cause to challenge the will or its 11 provisions." Hamel v. Hamel, 296 Kan. 1060, 1075 , 299 P.3d 278 (2013).

2021Our appellate courts generally find an in terrorem clause "valid and enforceable against a beneficiary who attacks the validity of the will, or provisions therein, unless the beneficiary had probable cause to challenge the will or its 11 provisions." Hamel v. Hamel, 296 Kan. 1060, 1075 , 299 P.3d 278 (2013).

2021Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." "The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'" Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 , 96 S. Ct. 893 , 47 L.

2021Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." "The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'" Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 , 96 S. Ct. 893 , 47 L.

2021Thompson, 284 Kan. at 805 .

2020The only significant difference was that in Palmer, the defendant "waived his right to a probable cause hearing," which we found to be an agreement or stipulation that "there was sufficient evidence to bind him over for trial." 46 Kan.

2020Casper, 309 Kan. at 1215 (citing Johnson, 297 Kan. at 222 ).

2020As an example, a motion to dismiss on res judicata grounds was made after the probable-cause finding had been made in In re Care & Treatment of Sporn, 289 Kan. 681, 682 , 215 P.3d 615 (2009).

2020As an example, a motion to dismiss on res judicata grounds was made after the probable-cause finding had been made in In re Care & Treatment of Sporn, 289 Kan. 681, 682 , 215 P.3d 615 (2009).

2019The probable cause analysis reviews the totality of the circumstances to determine the probability that the vehicle contains contraband or evidence. 294 Kan. at 55 , 272 P.3d 34 .

2019The probable cause analysis reviews the totality of the circumstances to determine the probability that the vehicle contains contraband or evidence. 294 Kan. at 55 , 272 P.3d 34 .

2018Cf. United States v. Downs , 151 F.3d 1301 , 1303 (10th Cir. 1998) ("In a case involving raw marijuana, this court has held that 'the odor of marijuana alone can satisfy the probable cause requirement to search a vehicle or baggage.' "); State v. Cuong Phu Le , 463 S.W.3d 872 , 878 (Tex. Crim.

2018"Discrepancies in travel plans or histories have been used as objective reasonable suspicion factors in other cases, depending on the nature of the discrepancy. 'As with unusual travel plans, inconsistencies in information provided to the officer during the traffic stop may give rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.' " DeMarco , 263 Kan. at 739 , 952 P.2d 1276 .

2018"Discrepancies in travel plans or histories have been used as objective reasonable suspicion factors in other cases, depending on the nature of the discrepancy. 'As with unusual travel plans, inconsistencies in information provided to the officer during the traffic stop may give rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.' " DeMarco , 263 Kan. at 739 , 952 P.2d 1276 .