57 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1970–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jamison v. State, Department of Social Services, Division of Family Servicesgreen2 sentences2009Servs., 218 S.W.3d 399, 411 (Mo. banc 2007). 2009Servs., 218 S.W.3d 399, 411 (Mo. banc 2007). | 3 | 3 |
Riche v. Director of Revenuegreen2 sentences2012“Whether [the arresting officer] had a reasonable suspicion for a lawful stop is irrelevant in a civil driver’s license revocation proceeding.” Jones v. Dir. of Revenue, 291 S.W.3d 340, 344 (Mo.App. 2009); see also Riche v. Dir. of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 331, 336 (Mo. banc 1999) (holding that the probable-cause requirement for the initial traffic stop and exclusionary rule do not apply to section 302.505 2 proceedings); Brown v. Dir. of Revenue, 85 S.W.3d 1 , 4 n. 4 (Mo. banc 2002) (equating probable-cause determinations in section 302.505 proceedings with reasonable-grounds determinations in sec 2009See Riche v. Dir. of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 331, 336 (Mo. banc 1999) (holding that the probable cause requirement for the initial stop and the exclusionary rule do not apply in section 302.505 5 proceedings); Brown v. Dir. of Revenue, 85 S.W.3d 1 , 4 n. 4 (Mo. banc 2002) (discussing probable cause determinations in section 302.505 proceedings synonymously with reasonable grounds determinations in section 577.041 proceedings); see also State v. Roark, 229 S.W.3d 216 , 220 n. 2 (Mo.App. | 2 | 4 |
Guhr v. Director of Revenuegreen2 sentences2011See Guhr v. Dir. of Revenue, 228 S.W.3d 581 , 585 n. 3 (Mo. banc 2007). 2008“The probable cause analysis requires consideration of all the information in the officer’s possession prior to arrest.” Guhr, 228 S.W.3d at 585 (emphasis added). | 2 | 3 |
In Re Dyergreen2 sentences2017As relevant here, “[t]he false information requirement and the probable cause requirement, when combined, ‘necessarily imply and mean that a petitioner .., has the burden to affirmatively demonstrate at a hearing, by a preponderance of the evidence ... his actual innocence of the offense for which he was arrested.’ ” In re Dyer, 163 S.W.3d 915, 919 (Mo. banc 2005) (quoting Martinez v. State, 24 S.W.3d 10, 20 (Mo. App. E.D. 2000)). 2016The Supreme Court of Missouri has held “[t]he false information requirement arid the probable cause requirement, when combined, ‘necessarily imply and mean that a petitioner... has the burden to affirmatively demonstrate at a hearing, by a preponderance of the evidence... his actual innocence of the offense for which he was arrested.’ ” In re Dyer, 163 S.W.3d 915, 919 (Mo. banc 2005) (quoting Martinez, 24 S.W.3d at 20 ) (emphasis added). *455 This Court in Martinez separately analyzed the probable cause and false information requirements under § 610.122 and held: Probable cause is a legal term | 2 | 2 |
Martinez v. Stategreen2 sentences2017As relevant here, “[t]he false information requirement and the probable cause requirement, when combined, ‘necessarily imply and mean that a petitioner .., has the burden to affirmatively demonstrate at a hearing, by a preponderance of the evidence ... his actual innocence of the offense for which he was arrested.’ ” In re Dyer, 163 S.W.3d 915, 919 (Mo. banc 2005) (quoting Martinez v. State, 24 S.W.3d 10, 20 (Mo. App. E.D. 2000)). 2016The Supreme Court of Missouri has held “[t]he false information requirement arid the probable cause requirement, when combined, ‘necessarily imply and mean that a petitioner... has the burden to affirmatively demonstrate at a hearing, by a preponderance of the evidence... his actual innocence of the offense for which he was arrested.’ ” In re Dyer, 163 S.W.3d 915, 919 (Mo. banc 2005) (quoting Martinez, 24 S.W.3d at 20 ) (emphasis added). *455 This Court in Martinez separately analyzed the probable cause and false information requirements under § 610.122 and held: Probable cause is a legal term | 1 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Perkinsgreen1 sentence2024As the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts noted when analyzing a similar issue in Commonwealth v. Perkins, 981 N.E.2d 630, 640 (Mass. 2013): The Commonwealth is not entitled to proceed at whatever pace it might choose, either in marshaling evidence to establish probable cause for the probable cause hearing or in presenting a case to the grand jury in order to secure an indictment. | 1 | 1 |
Hunt v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2019See Hunt v. Commonwealth, 326 S.W.3d 437 , 440 (Ky. 2010). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hawkinsgreen1 sentence2018See Hawkins , 328 S.W.3d at 808 . | 1 | 1 |
Care & Treatment of Tyson v. Stategreen2 sentences2018See Tyson , 249 S.W.3d at 852-53 ("The SVP Act contemplates that additional discovery will be accomplished after the probable cause hearing."). 2018Also, as with a criminal preliminary hearing, the purpose of the probable cause hearing is "merely to determine if the State's evidence raises a triable issue of fact." Tyson , 249 S.W.3d at 852-53 (citations omitted); cf. Turner , 353 S.W.2d at 604 ; see also 544.250. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2015Id. 2015See Jones, 432 F.3d at 41 (stating it was irrelevant that booking officer cited defendant for “intent to rob while armed”; arrest was valid if, on facts known to arresting officers, probable cause existed to believe defendant was committing another crime). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bizovigreen2 sentences2014See Id. at 433 (distinguishing the probable-cause standard). 2014See Id. at 433 (distinguishing the probable-cause standard). | 1 | 1 |
Peters v. Director of Revenuegreen1 sentence2012“Whether [the arresting officer] had a reasonable suspicion for a lawful stop is irrelevant in a civil driver’s license revocation proceeding.” Jones v. Dir. of Revenue, 291 S.W.3d 340, 344 (Mo.App. 2009); see also Riche v. Dir. of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 331, 336 (Mo. banc 1999) (holding that the probable-cause requirement for the initial traffic stop and exclusionary rule do not apply to section 302.505 2 proceedings); Brown v. Dir. of Revenue, 85 S.W.3d 1 , 4 n. 4 (Mo. banc 2002) (equating probable-cause determinations in section 302.505 proceedings with reasonable-grounds determinations in sec | 1 | 1 |
Gelsheimer v. Director of Revenuegreen1 sentence2012“Whether [the arresting officer] had a reasonable suspicion for a lawful stop is irrelevant in a civil driver’s license revocation proceeding.” Jones v. Dir. of Revenue, 291 S.W.3d 340, 344 (Mo.App. 2009); see also Riche v. Dir. of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 331, 336 (Mo. banc 1999) (holding that the probable-cause requirement for the initial traffic stop and exclusionary rule do not apply to section 302.505 2 proceedings); Brown v. Dir. of Revenue, 85 S.W.3d 1 , 4 n. 4 (Mo. banc 2002) (equating probable-cause determinations in section 302.505 proceedings with reasonable-grounds determinations in sec | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, STATEgreen1 sentence2012“Whether [the arresting officer] had a reasonable suspicion for a lawful stop is irrelevant in a civil driver’s license revocation proceeding.” Jones v. Dir. of Revenue, 291 S.W.3d 340, 344 (Mo.App. 2009); see also Riche v. Dir. of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 331, 336 (Mo. banc 1999) (holding that the probable-cause requirement for the initial traffic stop and exclusionary rule do not apply to section 302.505 2 proceedings); Brown v. Dir. of Revenue, 85 S.W.3d 1 , 4 n. 4 (Mo. banc 2002) (equating probable-cause determinations in section 302.505 proceedings with reasonable-grounds determinations in sec | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Roarkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Quinones v. Illinoisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sudduth v. City of Pittsburghgreen | 1 | 1 |
In Re the Care & Treatment of Matthewsgreen2 sentences2009See In Matter of Care and Treatment of Matthews, 345 S.C. 638 , 550 S.E.2d 311, 314-15 (2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1062 , 122 S.Ct. 1928 , 152 L.Ed.2d 834 (2002) (trial within 60 days of a probable cause hearing is mandatory but not jurisdictional; by not filing a motion to dismiss, detainee waived right to challenge the state’s noncompliance with the requisite time period). 2009See In Matter of Care and Treatment of Matthews, 345 S.C. 638 , 550 S.E.2d 311, 314-15 (2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1062 , 122 S.Ct. 1928 , 152 L.Ed.2d 834 (2002) (trial within 60 days of a probable cause hearing is mandatory but not jurisdictional; by not filing a motion to dismiss, detainee waived right to challenge the state’s noncompliance with the requisite time period). | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Marriage of Hendrixgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Martineau v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cavarretta v. Department of Children & Family Servicesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| James W. Sikes v. Teleline, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Flora v. Floragreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lynn v. Plumbgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Page v. Associated Couriers, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Holder v. Schenherrgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bradford v. Director of Revenuegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Routh Wrecker Service, Inc. v. Washingtongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kelley v. Kelly Residential Group, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Brancato v. Wholesale Tool Co., Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Smithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Willisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Hestergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Whitworth v. Director of Revenuegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Oughton v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, STATEgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Richards v. Wisconsingreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Lasleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rose v. State Board of Registration for the Healing Artsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Giffingreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Sidebottomgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hinnah v. Director of Revenue
green
2 sentences2010Id. 2010Guhr v. Director of Revenue, 228 S.W.3d 581 , 585 n. 3 (Mo. banc 2007), overruled on other grounds by White, 321 S.W.3d at 301-03 ; Hinnah, 77 S.W.3d at 621 . | 3 | 2007–2010 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
2 sentences1987Additionally, the state contends that the proper resolution of this case rests not upon a probable cause analysis but upon the stop and frisk doctrine established in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 1987Additionally, the state contends that the proper resolution of this case rests not upon a probable cause analysis but upon the stop and frisk doctrine established in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). | 3 | 1987–2009 |
White v. Director of Revenue
green
2 sentences2018Ornelas , 517 U.S. at 696 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , White , 321 S.W.3d at 310 . 2010Guhr v. Director of Revenue, 228 S.W.3d 581 , 585 n. 3 (Mo. banc 2007), overruled on other grounds by White, 321 S.W.3d at 301-03 ; Hinnah, 77 S.W.3d at 621 . | 2 | 2010–2018 |
Brown v. Director of Revenue
green
2 sentences2012“Whether [the arresting officer] had a reasonable suspicion for a lawful stop is irrelevant in a civil driver’s license revocation proceeding.” Jones v. Dir. of Revenue, 291 S.W.3d 340, 344 (Mo.App. 2009); see also Riche v. Dir. of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 331, 336 (Mo. banc 1999) (holding that the probable-cause requirement for the initial traffic stop and exclusionary rule do not apply to section 302.505 2 proceedings); Brown v. Dir. of Revenue, 85 S.W.3d 1 , 4 n. 4 (Mo. banc 2002) (equating probable-cause determinations in section 302.505 proceedings with reasonable-grounds determinations in sec 2009See Riche v. Dir. of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 331, 336 (Mo. banc 1999) (holding that the probable cause requirement for the initial stop and the exclusionary rule do not apply in section 302.505 5 proceedings); Brown v. Dir. of Revenue, 85 S.W.3d 1 , 4 n. 4 (Mo. banc 2002) (discussing probable cause determinations in section 302.505 proceedings synonymously with reasonable grounds determinations in section 577.041 proceedings); see also State v. Roark, 229 S.W.3d 216 , 220 n. 2 (Mo.App. | 2 | 2009–2012 |
State v. Rushing
green
2 sentences2003When Officer Wray removed the item, Officer Manlove related that he observed it was a plastic baggie containing “what we believed to be crack cocaine .... ” “The [United States] Supreme Court has equated the requirement that an item in plain view or feel be ‘immediately apparent’ as contraband or other evidence of a crime with the probable cause standard.” Rushing, 935 S.W.2d at 33 . 2003The United States Supreme Court “has equated the requirement that an item in plain view or feel be ‘immediately apparent’ as contraband or other evidence of a crime with the probable cause standard.” Rushing, 935 S.W.2d at 33 . | 2 | 2003–2003 |
State v. Clark
green
2 sentences1989Clark, 552 S.W.2d at 261 .” State v. Luleff, 729 S.W.2d 530 , 534 (Mo.App.1987). 1987Clark, 552 S.W.2d at 261 . | 2 | 1987–1989 |
Morrissey v. Brewer
green
2 sentences2019The probable cause hearing The Morrissey Court conceptualized the revocation probable cause hearing to be one of "minimal inquiry," Morrissey , 408 U.S. at 485 , 487 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 . 2019The probable cause hearing The Morrissey Court conceptualized the revocation probable cause hearing to be one of "minimal inquiry," Morrissey , 408 U.S. at 485 , 487 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Mathews v. Eldridge
green
2 sentences2019Because the conclusion that a supervision violation has occurred is one where "a wide variety of information may be deemed relevant, and issues of witness credibility and veracity are often critical to the decisionmaking process," reviewing the administrative record is only minimally reliable and a "wholly unsatisfactory basis for [a revocation] decision." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 343-44, 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). 2019Because the conclusion that a supervision violation has occurred is one where "a wide variety of information may be deemed relevant, and issues of witness credibility and veracity are often critical to the decisionmaking process," reviewing the administrative record is only minimally reliable and a "wholly unsatisfactory basis for [a revocation] decision." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 343-44, 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Ornelas v. United States
green
2 sentences2018Ornelas , 517 U.S. at 696 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , White , 321 S.W.3d at 310 . 2018Ornelas , 517 U.S. at 696 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , White , 321 S.W.3d at 310 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Campbell v. Citizens Bank of Edina
green
1 sentence2018Walker v. Mo. State Bd. of Registration for Healing Arts , 926 S.W.2d 148 , 151 (Mo. App. E.D. 1996) (noting in writ proceeding seeking to prevent board from holding probable cause hearing on physician's competency to practice medicine that "the full panoply of due process is not required" "at the probable cause stage of the proceeding"). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Turner
green
1 sentence2018Also, as with a criminal preliminary hearing, the purpose of the probable cause hearing is "merely to determine if the State's evidence raises a triable issue of fact." Tyson , 249 S.W.3d at 852-53 (citations omitted); cf. Turner , 353 S.W.2d at 604 ; see also 544.250. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Aaron
green
1 sentence2018Similar to a criminal preliminary hearing, the right to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses at the probable cause hearing in an SVP case have been granted by the general assembly but are not rights required under the constitution. 16 § 632.489.3; cf. Aaron , 218 S.W.3d at 509 ; see also State ex rel. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton
green
2 sentences2017In other words, Judge Beam reasoned, the school reduced the extent to which it was acting under its "custodial and tutelary responsibilities” and, instead, brought its actions much closer to "the investigatory role for which the probable-cause standard is intended.” Id. (quoting Earls, 536 U.S. at 830 , 122 S.Ct. 2559 , which was quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656 , 115 S.Ct. 2386 ). . 2017In other words, Judge Beam reasoned, the school reduced the extent to which it was acting under its "custodial and tutelary responsibilities” and, instead, brought its actions much closer to "the investigatory role for which the probable-cause standard is intended.” Id. (quoting Earls, 536 U.S. at 830 , 122 S.Ct. 2559 , which was quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656 , 115 S.Ct. 2386 ). . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls
green
2 sentences2017In other words, Judge Beam reasoned, the school reduced the extent to which it was acting under its "custodial and tutelary responsibilities” and, instead, brought its actions much closer to "the investigatory role for which the probable-cause standard is intended.” Id. (quoting Earls, 536 U.S. at 830 , 122 S.Ct. 2559 , which was quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656 , 115 S.Ct. 2386 ). . 2017In other words, Judge Beam reasoned, the school reduced the extent to which it was acting under its "custodial and tutelary responsibilities” and, instead, brought its actions much closer to "the investigatory role for which the probable-cause standard is intended.” Id. (quoting Earls, 536 U.S. at 830 , 122 S.Ct. 2559 , which was quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656 , 115 S.Ct. 2386 ). . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
In Re the Care & Treatment of Foster
green
1 sentence2017In this case, the Judge determined that there was.” Id. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Martin v. Director of Revenue green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Artman v. State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Santosky v. Kramer green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| In re Preisendorfer green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Care and Treatment of Schottel v. State green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Gant neutral | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Lane green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| In re the Detention of Petersen green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Care and Treatment of Schottel v. State green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Ellis v. Farmers Insurance Group green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Detention of Petersen v. State green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. Manley green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Johnson v. State green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Maryland v. Buie green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Minnesota v. Dickerson green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Arizona v. Hicks green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Texas v. Brown green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Missouri v. Presley green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Luleff green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| State v. Toney green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| United States v. Leon green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Gerstein v. Pugh green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.