24 Nevada opinions name it 2 courts 1968–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Nevada courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
McDonald v. Sheriff of Carson Citygreen2 sentences1978Even if we concede the merit of this claim and disregard such testimony, in our view the other recited evidence is sufficient to meet the probable cause standard delineated in NRS 172.155, and the presence, companionship and conduct criteria specified in Robertson v. Sheriff, 85 Nev. 681 , 462 P.2d 528 (1969). “[W]e are not now concerned with the prospect that the evidence presently in the record may, by itself, be insufficient to sustain a conviction.” McDonald v. Sheriff, 89 Nev. 326, 327 , 512 P.2d 774, 775 (1973). 1978Even if we concede the merit of this claim and disregard such testimony, in our view the other recited evidence is sufficient to meet the probable cause standard delineated in NRS 172.155, and the presence, companionship and conduct criteria specified in Robertson v. Sheriff, 85 Nev. 681 , 462 P.2d 528 (1969). “[W]e are not now concerned with the prospect that the evidence presently in the record may, by itself, be insufficient to sustain a conviction.” McDonald v. Sheriff, 89 Nev. 326, 327 , 512 P.2d 774, 775 (1973). | 3 | 3 |
Powell v. Stategreen2 sentences2022Cf. Powell v. State, 113 Nev. 41, 46 , 930 P.2d 1123, 1126 (1997) (noting that a confession may be excluded where given during a detention that was unlawful because the defendant was not afforded a probable-cause hearing within 48 hours of his warrantless arrest). 2022Cf. Powell v. State, 113 Nev. 41, 46 , 930 P.2d 1123, 1126 (1997) (noting that a confession may be excluded where given during a detention that was unlawful because the defendant was not afforded a probable-cause hearing within 48 hours of his warrantless arrest). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Melvin Skinnergreen2 sentences2016United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 777 (6th Cir. 2012). 2016United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 777 (6th Cir. 2012). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Quartavious Davisgreen2 sentences2016SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 10 (0) 1947A In United States v. Davis, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that a defendant "ha[s] no reasonable expectation of privacy in business records made, kept, and owned by [his or her cell phone provider]." 785 F.3d 498, 517 (11th Cir. 2015). 2016SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 10 (0) 1947A In United States v. Davis, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that a defendant "ha[s] no reasonable expectation of privacy in business records made, kept, and owned by [his or her cell phone provider]." 785 F.3d 498, 517 (11th Cir. 2015). | 2 | 2 |
Franks v. Delawaregreen2 sentences2015Id. at 168 . 2015Id. at 168. | 1 | 3 |
In re the United Statesgreen2 sentences2016In In re Application of United States for Historical Cell Site Data, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that cell phone users, by and large, do not have an expectation of privacy with regard to CSLI, as they are aware that their phones must emit CSLI to cell phone providers in order to receive cell phone service but continue to use their cell phones to place calls and, thus, voluntarily convey CSLI to cell phone providers. 724 F.3d at 612-13 . 2016In In re Application of United States for Historical Cell Site Data, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that cell phone users, by and large, do not have an expectation of privacy with regard to CSLI, as they are aware that their phones must emit CSLI to cell phone providers in order to receive cell phone service but continue to use their cell phones to place calls and, thus, voluntarily convey CSLI to cell phone providers. 724 F.3d at 612-13. | 1 | 2 |
Whitehead v. Nevada Commission on Judicial Disciplinegreen2 sentences1996Id. at 418-19 , 873 P.2d at 970-71 . 1996Id. at 418-19, 873 P.2d at 970-71 . | 1 | 2 |
Glispey v. Sheriff, Carson Citygreen2 sentences1979Cf. Glispy v. Sheriff, 89 Nev. 221 , 510 P.2d 623 (1973) where, in a similar institutional setting, we held that appellant’s access to a common area alleged crime scene was not exclusive and the evidence did not meet the probable cause test to warrant a trial on the basis of constructive possession. 1979Cf. Glispy v. Sheriff, 89 Nev. 221 , 510 P.2d 623 (1973) where, in a similar institutional setting, we held that appellant’s access to a common area alleged crime scene was not exclusive and the evidence did not meet the probable cause test to warrant a trial on the basis of constructive possession. | 1 | 2 |
Maestas v. Stategreen1 sentence2014First, this court rejected a similar claim in Maestas v. State, 128 Nev. „ 275 P.3d 74, 86-87 (2012). | 1 | 1 |
Weeks v. United Statesred2 sentences1997In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 , 34 S.Ct. 341, 346 , 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914), the United States Supreme Court first reasoned that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be excluded in the federal courts. 1997In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 , 34 S.Ct. 341, 346 , 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914), the United States Supreme Court first reasoned that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be excluded in the federal courts. | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Shea v. Judicial Standards Commissiongreen2 sentences1995See State v. Judicial Standards Commission, 643 P.2d 210 (Mont. 1982). 1995See State v. Judicial Standards Commission, 643 P.2d 210 (Mont. 1982) (supreme court issued writ of prohibition barring judicial discipline proceedings based on complaint of misconduct that was not verified in compliance with statute and Commission's own rule). | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Chioverogreen1 sentence1995See Matter of Chiovero, 570 A.2d 57, 60 (Pa. 1990). [42] We note, parenthetically, that in only one case processed under the current ARJD where the Commission has imposed any form of discipline by consent of the respondent judge, whether in supposed conformity with Rule 31 or not, has there been a certified copy of a Commission order imposing discipline filed with this court as required by Rule 31. [43] We note that there is no provision in the ARJD that would prohibit a respondent judge from conceding probable cause to the charges of the sworn complaint at the probable cause hearing. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Murchison.green1 sentence1995Mr. Campbell was seemingly hired to investigate and prosecute Judge Whitehead and acted at all times in this role and not as the Commission's "own attorney." By deciding to help`out with the prosecution, Commissioner Lefebvre rather clearly forfeited his right to sit in judgment of Judge Whitehead. [19] It is very well established in this country that "a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process." In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). | 1 | 1 |
McKenney v. Commission on Judicial Conductgreen2 sentences1995See, e.g., McKenney v. Commission on Judicial Conduct, 388 N.E.2d 666 (Mass. 1979) (Commission on Judicial Conduct has no authority to investigate alleged judicial misconduct until a complaint has been filed with it); Richter v. State Com’n on Judicial Conduct, 445 N.Y.S.2d 307 (N.Y. 1995See, e.g., McKenney v. Commission on Judicial Conduct, 388 N.E.2d 666 (Mass. 1979) (Commission on Judicial Conduct has no authority to investigate alleged judicial misconduct until a complaint has been filed with it); Richter v. State Com'n on Judicial Conduct, 445 N.Y.S.2d 307 (N.Y. | 1 | 1 |
Wenger v. Commission on Judicial Performancegreen1 sentence1992See, e.g., Wenger v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 630 P.2d 954, 956 (Cal. 1981). 7 The commission eventually found it appropriate to resolve in a single final decision all the matters at issue. 8 At the formal hearing the commission deferred ruling on appellant’s objections to the admission of the transcript of the probable cause hearing and the exhibits that had been admitted at the prior hearing. | 1 | 1 |
Kennick v. Commission on Judicial Performancegreen1 sentence1992See also Kennick v. Com’n on Judicial Performance, 787 P.2d 591, 598 (Cal. 1990) (court refused to adopt commission determinations based upon findings outside scope of a notice of formal proceedings). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Von Brinckengreen2 sentences1976See State v. von Brincken, 86 Nev. 769 , 476 P.2d 733 (1970). 1976See State v. von Brincken, 86 Nev. 769 , 476 P.2d 733 (1970). | 1 | 1 |
Franklin v. Stategreen2 sentences1974See concurring opinion by Zenoff, J., in Franklin v. State, 89 Nev. 382 , 513 P.2d 1252 (1973). “[W]e are not now concerned with the prospect that the evidence presently in the record may, by itself, .be insufficient to sustain a conviction.” McDonald v. Sheriff, 89 Nev. 326 , 512 P.2d 774 (1973). 1974See concurring opinion by Zenoff, J., in Franklin v. State, 89 Nev. 382 , 513 P.2d 1252 (1973). “[W]e are not now concerned with the prospect that the evidence presently in the record may, by itself, .be insufficient to sustain a conviction.” McDonald v. Sheriff, 89 Nev. 326 , 512 P.2d 774 (1973). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Nevada. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker
green
2 sentences1995The majority endorses for adoption in Nevada the probable cause rule announced in Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, 765 P.2d 498 (Cal. 1989). 1995The majority endorses for adoption in Nevada the probable cause rule announced in Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, 47 Cal.3d 863 , 254 Cal.Rptr. 336 , 765 P.2d 498 (Cal. 1989). | 2 | 1992–1995 |
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin
green
1 sentence1998County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Gerstein v. Pugh
green
2 sentences1997Id. at 119 , 95 S.Ct. at 865-66 . 1997Id. at 119 , 95 S.Ct. at 865-66 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Richter v. State Commission on Judicial Conduct
neutral
2 sentences1995See, e.g., McKenney v. Commission on Judicial Conduct, 388 N.E.2d 666 (Mass. 1979) (Commission on Judicial Conduct has no authority to investigate alleged judicial misconduct until a complaint has been filed with it); Richter v. State Com’n on Judicial Conduct, 445 N.Y.S.2d 307 (N.Y. 1995See, e.g., McKenney v. Commission on Judicial Conduct, 388 N.E.2d 666 (Mass. 1979) (Commission on Judicial Conduct has no authority to investigate alleged judicial misconduct until a complaint has been filed with it); Richter v. State Com'n on Judicial Conduct, 445 N.Y.S.2d 307 (N.Y. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Goldman v. Bryan
green
2 sentences1995In the Goldman case, the Commission, under the old rules, hired independent counsel to prepare for the probable cause hearing. 104 Nev. 644 , 764 P.2d 1296 . 1995In the Goldman case, the Commission, under the old rules, hired independent counsel to prepare for the probable cause hearing. 104 Nev. 644 , 764 P.2d 1296 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Whitehead v. Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline
green
2 sentences1995THE COMMISSION MAY NOT PROCEED TO A PROBABLE CAUSE HEARINGM ON THE BASIS OF THE CAMPBELL INVESTIGATION AND COMPLAINT BECAUSE CAMPBELL WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY DISQUALIFIED FROM ACTING As we held in Whitehead III, the Attorney General and her deputies are constitutionally disqualified from acting in the capacities in which they have served the Commission in the proceedings involving Judge Whitehead. 110 Nev. 874 , 878 P.2d 913 (1994). 1995THE COMMISSION MAY NOT PROCEED TO A PROBABLE CAUSE HEARINGM ON THE BASIS OF THE CAMPBELL INVESTIGATION AND COMPLAINT BECAUSE CAMPBELL WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY DISQUALIFIED FROM ACTING As we held in Whitehead III, the Attorney General and her deputies are constitutionally disqualified from acting in the capacities in which they have served the Commission in the proceedings involving Judge Whitehead. 110 Nev. 874 , 878 P.2d 913 (1994). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Goldman Ex Rel. Goldman-Wilson v. Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline
green
2 sentences1994The Petition/Motion informs us that the Commission is at a loss to understand how its special counsel has been transformed in the Whitehead I Opinion into a so-called "special prosecutor." Our reason, of course, was that Mr. Campbell apparently has been performing functions analogous to those which ARJD 16 contemplates are to be performed by a "prosecuting attorney" or "prosecutor," although, arguably, prematurely. [11] This is consistent with the nomenclature employed in Goldman v. Nevada Comm'n on Judicial Discipline, 108 Nev. 251 , 830 P.2d 107 (1992), except that, under ARJD 16, it appears 1994The Petition/Motion informs us that the Commission is at a loss to understand how its special counsel has been transformed in the Whitehead I Opinion into a so-called "special prosecutor." Our reason, of course, was that Mr. Campbell apparently has been performing functions analogous to those which ARJD 16 contemplates are to be performed by a "prosecuting attorney" or "prosecutor," although, arguably, prematurely. [11] This is consistent with the nomenclature employed in Goldman v. Nevada Comm'n on Judicial Discipline, 108 Nev. 251 , 830 P.2d 107 (1992), except that, under ARJD 16, it appears | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia
green
2 sentences1994Emphasizing again the primary importance of confidentiality to a respondent judge, it *959 has been noted that confidentiality also " protects judges from the injury which might result from publication of unexamined and unwarranted complaints. " [15] See Landmark Communication, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 , 98 S.Ct. 1535 , 56 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (emphasis added). 1994Emphasizing again the primary importance of confidentiality to a respondent judge, it *959 has been noted that confidentiality also " protects judges from the injury which might result from publication of unexamined and unwarranted complaints. " [15] See Landmark Communication, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 , 98 S.Ct. 1535 , 56 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Robertson v. Sheriff, Clark County
green
2 sentences1978Even if we concede the merit of this claim and disregard such testimony, in our view the other recited evidence is sufficient to meet the probable cause standard delineated in NRS 172.155, and the presence, companionship and conduct criteria specified in Robertson v. Sheriff, 85 Nev. 681 , 462 P.2d 528 (1969). “[W]e are not now concerned with the prospect that the evidence presently in the record may, by itself, be insufficient to sustain a conviction.” McDonald v. Sheriff, 89 Nev. 326, 327 , 512 P.2d 774, 775 (1973). 1978Even if we concede the merit of this claim and disregard such testimony, in our view the other recited evidence is sufficient to meet the probable cause standard delineated in NRS 172.155, and the presence, companionship and conduct criteria specified in Robertson v. Sheriff, 85 Nev. 681 , 462 P.2d 528 (1969). “[W]e are not now concerned with the prospect that the evidence presently in the record may, by itself, be insufficient to sustain a conviction.” McDonald v. Sheriff, 89 Nev. 326, 327 , 512 P.2d 774, 775 (1973). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Kinsey v. Sheriff, Washoe County
green
2 sentences1977Kinsey v. Sheriff, 87 Nev. 361 , 487 P.2d 340 (1971). “[W]e are not now concerned with the prospect that the evidence presently in the record may, by itself, be insufficient to sustain a conviction.” McDonald v. Sheriff, 89 Nev. 326, 327 , 512 P.2d 774, 775 (1973). 1977Kinsey v. Sheriff, 87 Nev. 361 , 487 P.2d 340 (1971). “[W]e are not now concerned with the prospect that the evidence presently in the record may, by itself, be insufficient to sustain a conviction.” McDonald v. Sheriff, 89 Nev. 326, 327 , 512 P.2d 774, 775 (1973). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Hooker v. Sheriff, Clark County
neutral
2 sentences1975Cf. Hooker v. Sheriff, 89 Nev. 89 , 506 P.2d 1262 (1973). 1975Cf. Hooker v. Sheriff, 89 Nev. 89 , 506 P.2d 1262 (1973). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Lawrence E. Wilson, Warden v. William Eugene Porter
green
2 sentences1968In Wilson, supra, the court wrote: “Granting that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures makes no distinction between informal detention without cause and formal arrest without cause, there is a difference between that ‘cause’ which will justify informal detention short of arrest and the probable cause standard required to justify that kind of custody traditionally denominated an arrest. * * * We take it as settled that there is nothing ipso facto unconstitutional in the brief detention of citizens under circumstances not justifying an arrest, for purposes of 1968In Wilson, supra, the court wrote: "Granting that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures makes no distinction between informal detention without cause and formal arrest without cause, there is a difference between that `cause' which will justify informal detention short of arrest and the probable cause standard required to justify that kind of custody traditionally denominated an arrest. * * * We take it as settled that there is nothing ipso facto unconstitutional in the brief detention of citizens under circumstances not justifying an arrest, for purposes of | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.