51 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1972–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Jacumingreen2 sentences2016Probable cause is “more than a mere suspicion,” State v. Lawrence, 154 S.W.3d 71, 76 (Tenn. 2005), but less than absolute certainty, see State v. Melson, 638 S.W.2d 342, 350 (Tenn. 1982). “[T]he strength of the evidence necessary to establish probable cause to arrest is significantly less than the strength of evidence necessary to find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Bishop, 431 S.W.3d 22, 41 (Tenn. 2014); see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148-49 (1972) (“Probable cause does not require the same type of specific evidence of each element of the offense as would b 2016Probable cause is “more than a mere suspicion,” State v. Lawrence, 154 S.W.3d 71, 76 (Tenn. 2005), but less than absolute certainty, see State v. Melson, 638 S.W.2d 342, 350 (Tenn. 1982). “[T]he strength of the evidence necessary to establish probable cause to arrest is significantly less than the strength of evidence necessary to find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Bishop, 431 S.W.3d 22, 41 (Tenn. 2014); see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148-49 , 92 S.Ct. 1921 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) (“Probable cause does not require the same type of specific evidence of each | 6 | 8 |
Brinegar v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2021“Probable cause is more than a mere suspicion but less than absolute certainty.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “[T]he strength of the evidence necessary to establish probable cause . . . is significantly less than the strength of evidence necessary to find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Bishop, 431 S.W.3d 22, 41 (Tenn. 2014); see also Brinegar v. U.S., 69 S. Ct. 1302 (1949) (discussing the differences between the probable cause standard and the standard for proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt). 2021“These [probabilities] are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” Brinegar, 69 S. Ct. 1302 ; see also Reynolds, 504 S.W.3d at 300 (recognizing that the probable cause standard is practical and nontechnical). | 6 | 8 |
State of Tennessee v. Corrin Kathleen Reynoldsgreen2 sentences2025The probable cause standard is “practical, nontechnical,” and “focuse[d] upon the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act[.]” Reynolds, 504 S.W.3d at 300 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “‘Determinations of probable cause are extremely fact-dependent.’” Tuttle, 515 S.W.3d at 300 (quoting Bell, 429 S.W.3d at 534-35 ). 2021“These [probabilities] are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” Brinegar, 69 S. Ct. 1302 ; see also Reynolds, 504 S.W.3d at 300 (recognizing that the probable cause standard is practical and nontechnical). | 6 | 6 |
State v. Melsongreen2 sentences2016Probable cause is “more than a mere suspicion,” State v. Lawrence, 154 S.W.3d 71, 76 (Tenn. 2005), but less than absolute certainty, see State v. Melson, 638 S.W.2d 342, 350 (Tenn. 1982). “[T]he strength of the evidence necessary to establish probable cause to arrest is significantly less than the strength of evidence necessary to find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Bishop, 431 S.W.3d 22, 41 (Tenn. 2014); see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148-49 (1972) (“Probable cause does not require the same type of specific evidence of each element of the offense as would b 2016Probable cause is “more than a mere suspicion,” State v. Lawrence, 154 S.W.3d 71, 76 (Tenn. 2005), but less than absolute certainty, see State v. Melson, 638 S.W.2d 342, 350 (Tenn. 1982). “[T]he strength of the evidence necessary to establish probable cause to arrest is significantly less than the strength of evidence necessary to find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Bishop, 431 S.W.3d 22, 41 (Tenn. 2014); see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148-49 (1972) (“Probable cause does not require the same type of specific evidence of each element of the offense as would b | 4 | 6 |
Draper v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2016Probable cause is “more than a mere suspicion,” State v. Lawrence, 154 S.W.3d 71, 76 (Tenn. 2005), but less than absolute certainty, see State v. Melson, 638 S.W.2d 342, 350 (Tenn. 1982). “[T]he strength of the evidence necessary to establish probable cause to arrest is significantly less than the strength of evidence necessary to find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Bishop, 431 S.W.3d 22, 41 (Tenn. 2014); see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148-49 (1972) (“Probable cause does not require the same type of specific evidence of each element of the offense as would b 2016Probable cause is “more than a mere suspicion,” State v. Lawrence, 154 S.W.3d 71, 76 (Tenn. 2005), but less than absolute certainty, see State v. Melson, 638 S.W.2d 342, 350 (Tenn. 1982). “[T]he strength of the evidence necessary to establish probable cause to arrest is significantly less than the strength of evidence necessary to find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Bishop, 431 S.W.3d 22, 41 (Tenn. 2014); see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148-49 , 92 S.Ct. 1921 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) (“Probable cause does not require the same type of specific evidence of each | 3 | 5 |
State of Tennessee v. Courtney Bishopgreen2 sentences2021“Probable cause is more than a mere suspicion but less than absolute certainty.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “[T]he strength of the evidence necessary to establish probable cause . . . is significantly less than the strength of evidence necessary to find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Bishop, 431 S.W.3d 22, 41 (Tenn. 2014); see also Brinegar v. U.S., 69 S. Ct. 1302 (1949) (discussing the differences between the probable cause standard and the standard for proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt). 2017“Probable cause is more than a mere suspicion but less than absolute certainty.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “[T]he strength of the evidence necessary to establish probable cause ... is significantly less than the strength of evidence necessary to find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Bishop, 431 S.W.3d 22, 41 (Tenn. 2014); see also Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 , 69 S.Ct. 1302 , 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949) (discussing the differences between the probable cause standard and the standard for proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt). | 3 | 3 |
State of Tennessee v. William Whitlow Davis, Jr.green2 sentences2016As our supreme court recently reiterated, “Probable cause exists when „at the time of the arrest, the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the officers, and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the defendant had committed or was committing an offense.‟ It requires „more than a mere suspicion.‟ Instead, a probable cause inquiry focuses on probabilities rather than technicalities and is grounded in the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent people, not legal tec 2016Probable cause is “more than a mere suspicion,” State v. Lawrence, 154 S.W.3d 71, 76 (Tenn. 2005), but less than absolute certainty, see State v. Melson, 638 S.W.2d 342, 350 (Tenn. 1982). “[T]he strength of the evidence necessary to establish probable cause to arrest is significantly less than the strength of evidence necessary to find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Bishop, 431 S.W.3d 22, 41 (Tenn. 2014); see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148-49 (1972) (“Probable cause does not require the same type of specific evidence of each element of the offense as would b | 3 | 3 |
State of Tennessee v. Jerry Lewis Tuttlegreen2 sentences2025The probable cause standard is “practical, nontechnical,” and “focuse[d] upon the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act[.]” Reynolds, 504 S.W.3d at 300 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “‘Determinations of probable cause are extremely fact-dependent.’” Tuttle, 515 S.W.3d at 300 (quoting Bell, 429 S.W.3d at 534-35 ). 2020The probable cause standard is “practical, nontechnical” and “focuses upon the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act[.]” Reynolds, 504 S.W.3d at 300 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “‘Determinations of probable cause are extremely fact-dependent.’” Tuttle, 515 S.W.3d at 300 (quoting State v. Bell, 429 S.W.3d 524, 534-35 (Tenn. 2014)). 3 The Fourth Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, states: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and | 2 | 4 |
State of Tennessee v. Travis Kinte Echolsgreen2 sentences2016Probable cause is “more than a mere suspicion,” State v. Lawrence, 154 S.W.3d 71, 76 (Tenn. 2005), but less than absolute certainty, see State v. Melson, 638 S.W.2d 342, 350 (Tenn. 1982). “[T]he strength of the evidence necessary to establish probable cause to arrest is significantly less than the strength of evidence necessary to find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Bishop, 431 S.W.3d 22, 41 (Tenn. 2014); see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148-49 (1972) (“Probable cause does not require the same type of specific evidence of each element of the offense as would b 2016Probable cause is “more than a mere suspicion,” State v. Lawrence, 154 S.W.3d 71, 76 (Tenn. 2005), but less than absolute certainty, see State v. Melson, 638 S.W.2d 342, 350 (Tenn. 1982). “[T]he strength of the evidence necessary to establish probable cause to arrest is significantly less than the strength of evidence necessary to find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Bishop, 431 S.W.3d 22, 41 (Tenn. 2014); see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148-49 , 92 S.Ct. 1921 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) (“Probable cause does not require the same type of specific evidence of each | 2 | 3 |
Felix Tamez v. City Of San Marcos, Texasgreen2 sentences2021Tamez v. City of San Marcos, 118 F.3d 1085, 1093 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing David Orlin, et al., Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 85 Geo. 2020Tamez v. City of San Marcos, 118 F.3d 1085, 1093 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing David Orlin, et al., Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 85 Geo. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Marsalagreen2 sentences2016Thus, these cases are distinguishable. 4 See Marsala, 579 A.2d at 59 (concluding that the Leon good-faith exception is incompatible with the Connecticut Constitution); Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 820 (Del. 2000) (finding that there can be no good-faith exception when the probable cause requirement in the Delaware Constitution is not met); Gary v. State, 422 S.E.2d 426, 429 (Ga. 1992) (holding that based on the unequivocal language of Georgia’s statutory exclusionary rule, “adopting the Leon good-faith exception would be tantamount to judicial legislation”); State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 67 2016Thus, these cases are distinguishable. .See Marsala, 579 A.2d at 59 (concluding that the Leon good-faith exception is incompatible with the Connecticut Constitution); Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 820 (Del. 2000) (finding that there can be no good-faith ex ception when the probable cause requirement in the Delaware Constitution is not met); Gary v. State, 262 Ga. 573 , 422 S.E.2d 426, 429 (1992) (holding that based on the unequivocal language of Georgia's statutory exclusionary rule, “adopting the Leon good-faith exception would be tantamount to judicial legislation”); State v. Guzman, 122 Id | 2 | 2 |
State v. Clinegreen2 sentences2016Thus, these cases are distinguishable. 4 See Marsala, 579 A.2d at 59 (concluding that the Leon good-faith exception is incompatible with the Connecticut Constitution); Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 820 (Del. 2000) (finding that there can be no good-faith exception when the probable cause requirement in the Delaware Constitution is not met); Gary v. State, 422 S.E.2d 426, 429 (Ga. 1992) (holding that based on the unequivocal language of Georgia’s statutory exclusionary rule, “adopting the Leon good-faith exception would be tantamount to judicial legislation”); State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 67 2016Thus, these cases are distinguishable. .See Marsala, 579 A.2d at 59 (concluding that the Leon good-faith exception is incompatible with the Connecticut Constitution); Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 820 (Del. 2000) (finding that there can be no good-faith ex ception when the probable cause requirement in the Delaware Constitution is not met); Gary v. State, 262 Ga. 573 , 422 S.E.2d 426, 429 (1992) (holding that based on the unequivocal language of Georgia's statutory exclusionary rule, “adopting the Leon good-faith exception would be tantamount to judicial legislation”); State v. Guzman, 122 Id | 2 | 2 |
State v. Canelogreen2 sentences2016Thus, these cases are distinguishable. 4 See Marsala, 579 A.2d at 59 (concluding that the Leon good-faith exception is incompatible with the Connecticut Constitution); Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 820 (Del. 2000) (finding that there can be no good-faith exception when the probable cause requirement in the Delaware Constitution is not met); Gary v. State, 422 S.E.2d 426, 429 (Ga. 1992) (holding that based on the unequivocal language of Georgia’s statutory exclusionary rule, “adopting the Leon good-faith exception would be tantamount to judicial legislation”); State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 67 2016Thus, these cases are distinguishable. .See Marsala, 579 A.2d at 59 (concluding that the Leon good-faith exception is incompatible with the Connecticut Constitution); Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 820 (Del. 2000) (finding that there can be no good-faith ex ception when the probable cause requirement in the Delaware Constitution is not met); Gary v. State, 262 Ga. 573 , 422 S.E.2d 426, 429 (1992) (holding that based on the unequivocal language of Georgia's statutory exclusionary rule, “adopting the Leon good-faith exception would be tantamount to judicial legislation”); State v. Guzman, 122 Id | 2 | 2 |
State v. Novembrinogreen2 sentences2016Thus, these cases are distinguishable. 4 See Marsala, 579 A.2d at 59 (concluding that the Leon good-faith exception is incompatible with the Connecticut Constitution); Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 820 (Del. 2000) (finding that there can be no good-faith exception when the probable cause requirement in the Delaware Constitution is not met); Gary v. State, 422 S.E.2d 426, 429 (Ga. 1992) (holding that based on the unequivocal language of Georgia’s statutory exclusionary rule, “adopting the Leon good-faith exception would be tantamount to judicial legislation”); State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 67 2016Thus, these cases are distinguishable. .See Marsala, 579 A.2d at 59 (concluding that the Leon good-faith exception is incompatible with the Connecticut Constitution); Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 820 (Del. 2000) (finding that there can be no good-faith ex ception when the probable cause requirement in the Delaware Constitution is not met); Gary v. State, 262 Ga. 573 , 422 S.E.2d 426, 429 (1992) (holding that based on the unequivocal language of Georgia's statutory exclusionary rule, “adopting the Leon good-faith exception would be tantamount to judicial legislation”); State v. Guzman, 122 Id | 2 | 2 |
State v. Afanagreen2 sentences2016Thus, these cases are distinguishable. 4 See Marsala, 579 A.2d at 59 (concluding that the Leon good-faith exception is incompatible with the Connecticut Constitution); Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 820 (Del. 2000) (finding that there can be no good-faith exception when the probable cause requirement in the Delaware Constitution is not met); Gary v. State, 422 S.E.2d 426, 429 (Ga. 1992) (holding that based on the unequivocal language of Georgia’s statutory exclusionary rule, “adopting the Leon good-faith exception would be tantamount to judicial legislation”); State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 67 2016Thus, these cases are distinguishable. .See Marsala, 579 A.2d at 59 (concluding that the Leon good-faith exception is incompatible with the Connecticut Constitution); Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 820 (Del. 2000) (finding that there can be no good-faith ex ception when the probable cause requirement in the Delaware Constitution is not met); Gary v. State, 262 Ga. 573 , 422 S.E.2d 426, 429 (1992) (holding that based on the unequivocal language of Georgia's statutory exclusionary rule, “adopting the Leon good-faith exception would be tantamount to judicial legislation”); State v. Guzman, 122 Id | 2 | 2 |
State v. Lawrencegreen2 sentences2016Probable cause is “more than a mere suspicion,” State v. Lawrence, 154 S.W.3d 71, 76 (Tenn. 2005), but less than absolute certainty, see State v. Melson, 638 S.W.2d 342, 350 (Tenn. 1982). “[T]he strength of the evidence necessary to establish probable cause to arrest is significantly less than the strength of evidence necessary to find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Bishop, 431 S.W.3d 22, 41 (Tenn. 2014); see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148-49 (1972) (“Probable cause does not require the same type of specific evidence of each element of the offense as would b 2016Probable cause is “more than a mere suspicion,” State v. Lawrence, 154 S.W.3d 71, 76 (Tenn. 2005), but less than absolute certainty, see State v. Melson, 638 S.W.2d 342, 350 (Tenn. 1982). “[T]he strength of the evidence necessary to establish probable cause to arrest is significantly less than the strength of evidence necessary to find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Bishop, 431 S.W.3d 22, 41 (Tenn. 2014); see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148-49 , 92 S.Ct. 1921 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) (“Probable cause does not require the same type of specific evidence of each | 2 | 2 |
State v. Gutierrezgreen2 sentences2016Thus, these cases are distinguishable. 4 See Marsala, 579 A.2d at 59 (concluding that the Leon good-faith exception is incompatible with the Connecticut Constitution); Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 820 (Del. 2000) (finding that there can be no good-faith exception when the probable cause requirement in the Delaware Constitution is not met); Gary v. State, 422 S.E.2d 426, 429 (Ga. 1992) (holding that based on the unequivocal language of Georgia’s statutory exclusionary rule, “adopting the Leon good-faith exception would be tantamount to judicial legislation”); State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 67 2016Thus, these cases are distinguishable. .See Marsala, 579 A.2d at 59 (concluding that the Leon good-faith exception is incompatible with the Connecticut Constitution); Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 820 (Del. 2000) (finding that there can be no good-faith ex ception when the probable cause requirement in the Delaware Constitution is not met); Gary v. State, 262 Ga. 573 , 422 S.E.2d 426, 429 (1992) (holding that based on the unequivocal language of Georgia's statutory exclusionary rule, “adopting the Leon good-faith exception would be tantamount to judicial legislation”); State v. Guzman, 122 Id | 2 | 2 |
State v. Guzmangreen2 sentences2016Thus, these cases are distinguishable. 4 See Marsala, 579 A.2d at 59 (concluding that the Leon good-faith exception is incompatible with the Connecticut Constitution); Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 820 (Del. 2000) (finding that there can be no good-faith exception when the probable cause requirement in the Delaware Constitution is not met); Gary v. State, 422 S.E.2d 426, 429 (Ga. 1992) (holding that based on the unequivocal language of Georgia’s statutory exclusionary rule, “adopting the Leon good-faith exception would be tantamount to judicial legislation”); State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 67 2016Thus, these cases are distinguishable. .See Marsala, 579 A.2d at 59 (concluding that the Leon good-faith exception is incompatible with the Connecticut Constitution); Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 820 (Del. 2000) (finding that there can be no good-faith ex ception when the probable cause requirement in the Delaware Constitution is not met); Gary v. State, 262 Ga. 573 , 422 S.E.2d 426, 429 (1992) (holding that based on the unequivocal language of Georgia's statutory exclusionary rule, “adopting the Leon good-faith exception would be tantamount to judicial legislation”); State v. Guzman, 122 Id | 2 | 2 |
Wright v. City Of Philadelphiagreen2 sentences2016Probable cause is “more than a mere suspicion,” State v. Lawrence, 154 S.W.3d 71, 76 (Tenn. 2005), but less than absolute certainty, see State v. Melson, 638 S.W.2d 342, 350 (Tenn. 1982). “[T]he strength of the evidence necessary to establish probable cause to arrest is significantly less than the strength of evidence necessary to find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Bishop, 431 S.W.3d 22, 41 (Tenn. 2014); see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148-49 (1972) (“Probable cause does not require the same type of specific evidence of each element of the offense as would b 2016Probable cause is “more than a mere suspicion,” State v. Lawrence, 154 S.W.3d 71, 76 (Tenn. 2005), but less than absolute certainty, see State v. Melson, 638 S.W.2d 342, 350 (Tenn. 1982). “[T]he strength of the evidence necessary to establish probable cause to arrest is significantly less than the strength of evidence necessary to find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Bishop, 431 S.W.3d 22, 41 (Tenn. 2014); see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148-49 , 92 S.Ct. 1921 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) (“Probable cause does not require the same type of specific evidence of each | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Edmundsgreen2 sentences2016Thus, these cases are distinguishable. 4 See Marsala, 579 A.2d at 59 (concluding that the Leon good-faith exception is incompatible with the Connecticut Constitution); Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 820 (Del. 2000) (finding that there can be no good-faith exception when the probable cause requirement in the Delaware Constitution is not met); Gary v. State, 422 S.E.2d 426, 429 (Ga. 1992) (holding that based on the unequivocal language of Georgia’s statutory exclusionary rule, “adopting the Leon good-faith exception would be tantamount to judicial legislation”); State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 67 2016Thus, these cases are distinguishable. .See Marsala, 579 A.2d at 59 (concluding that the Leon good-faith exception is incompatible with the Connecticut Constitution); Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 820 (Del. 2000) (finding that there can be no good-faith ex ception when the probable cause requirement in the Delaware Constitution is not met); Gary v. State, 262 Ga. 573 , 422 S.E.2d 426, 429 (1992) (holding that based on the unequivocal language of Georgia's statutory exclusionary rule, “adopting the Leon good-faith exception would be tantamount to judicial legislation”); State v. Guzman, 122 Id | 2 | 2 |
Dorsey v. Stategreen2 sentences2016Thus, these cases are distinguishable. 4 See Marsala, 579 A.2d at 59 (concluding that the Leon good-faith exception is incompatible with the Connecticut Constitution); Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 820 (Del. 2000) (finding that there can be no good-faith exception when the probable cause requirement in the Delaware Constitution is not met); Gary v. State, 422 S.E.2d 426, 429 (Ga. 1992) (holding that based on the unequivocal language of Georgia’s statutory exclusionary rule, “adopting the Leon good-faith exception would be tantamount to judicial legislation”); State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 67 2016Thus, these cases are distinguishable. .See Marsala, 579 A.2d at 59 (concluding that the Leon good-faith exception is incompatible with the Connecticut Constitution); Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 820 (Del. 2000) (finding that there can be no good-faith ex ception when the probable cause requirement in the Delaware Constitution is not met); Gary v. State, 262 Ga. 573 , 422 S.E.2d 426, 429 (1992) (holding that based on the unequivocal language of Georgia's statutory exclusionary rule, “adopting the Leon good-faith exception would be tantamount to judicial legislation”); State v. Guzman, 122 Id | 2 | 2 |
State v. Cartergreen2 sentences2016Thus, these cases are distinguishable. 4 See Marsala, 579 A.2d at 59 (concluding that the Leon good-faith exception is incompatible with the Connecticut Constitution); Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 820 (Del. 2000) (finding that there can be no good-faith exception when the probable cause requirement in the Delaware Constitution is not met); Gary v. State, 422 S.E.2d 426, 429 (Ga. 1992) (holding that based on the unequivocal language of Georgia’s statutory exclusionary rule, “adopting the Leon good-faith exception would be tantamount to judicial legislation”); State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 67 2016Thus, these cases are distinguishable. .See Marsala, 579 A.2d at 59 (concluding that the Leon good-faith exception is incompatible with the Connecticut Constitution); Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 820 (Del. 2000) (finding that there can be no good-faith ex ception when the probable cause requirement in the Delaware Constitution is not met); Gary v. State, 262 Ga. 573 , 422 S.E.2d 426, 429 (1992) (holding that based on the unequivocal language of Georgia's statutory exclusionary rule, “adopting the Leon good-faith exception would be tantamount to judicial legislation”); State v. Guzman, 122 Id | 2 | 2 |
Gary v. Stategreen2 sentences2016Thus, these cases are distinguishable. 4 See Marsala, 579 A.2d at 59 (concluding that the Leon good-faith exception is incompatible with the Connecticut Constitution); Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 820 (Del. 2000) (finding that there can be no good-faith exception when the probable cause requirement in the Delaware Constitution is not met); Gary v. State, 422 S.E.2d 426, 429 (Ga. 1992) (holding that based on the unequivocal language of Georgia’s statutory exclusionary rule, “adopting the Leon good-faith exception would be tantamount to judicial legislation”); State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 67 2016Thus, these cases are distinguishable. .See Marsala, 579 A.2d at 59 (concluding that the Leon good-faith exception is incompatible with the Connecticut Constitution); Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 820 (Del. 2000) (finding that there can be no good-faith ex ception when the probable cause requirement in the Delaware Constitution is not met); Gary v. State, 262 Ga. 573 , 422 S.E.2d 426, 429 (1992) (holding that based on the unequivocal language of Georgia's statutory exclusionary rule, “adopting the Leon good-faith exception would be tantamount to judicial legislation”); State v. Guzman, 122 Id | 2 | 2 |
State v. TYWAYNE H.green2 sentences2008App.1988) (holding that the “school official exception” to the probable cause requirement does not apply when search is carried out at direction of police); State v. Tywayne H., 123 N.M. 42 , 933 P.2d 251, 254 (Ct.App.1997) (holding that probable cause was required when a search was conducted completely at the discretion of the police officers); In re Thomas B.D., 326 S.C. 614 , 486 S.E.2d 498, 499-500 (Ct.App.1997) (holding that probable cause was required when police conducted a search in furtherance of law enforcement objective, rather than on behalf of school). 2008App.1988) (holding that the “school official exception” to the probable cause requirement does not apply when search is carried out at direction of police); State v. Tywayne H., 123 N.M. 42 , 933 P.2d 251, 254 (Ct.App.1997) (holding that probable cause was required when a search was conducted completely at the discretion of the police officers); In re Thomas B.D., 326 S.C. 614 , 486 S.E.2d 498, 499-500 (Ct.App.1997) (holding that probable cause was required when police conducted a search in furtherance of law enforcement objective, rather than on behalf of school). | 2 | 2 |
| FP v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
| In Re Interest of Thomas B.D.green | 2 | 2 |
| United States v. Robert R. Carragreen | 2 | 2 |
| United States v. Douglas Ellis Johnsongreen | 2 | 2 |
State of Tennessee v. David Dwayne Bellgreen2 sentences2025The probable cause standard is “practical, nontechnical,” and “focuse[d] upon the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act[.]” Reynolds, 504 S.W.3d at 300 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “‘Determinations of probable cause are extremely fact-dependent.’” Tuttle, 515 S.W.3d at 300 (quoting Bell, 429 S.W.3d at 534-35 ). 2020The probable cause standard is “practical, nontechnical” and “focuses upon the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act[.]” Reynolds, 504 S.W.3d at 300 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “‘Determinations of probable cause are extremely fact-dependent.’” Tuttle, 515 S.W.3d at 300 (quoting State v. Bell, 429 S.W.3d 524, 534-35 (Tenn. 2014)). 3 The Fourth Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, states: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and | 1 | 3 |
Ornelas v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2021“Probable cause is more than a mere suspicion but less than absolute certainty.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “[T]he strength of the evidence necessary to establish probable cause . . . is significantly less than the strength of evidence necessary to find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Bishop, 431 S.W.3d 22, 41 (Tenn. 2014); see also Brinegar v. U.S., 69 S. Ct. 1302 (1949) (discussing the differences between the probable cause standard and the standard for proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt). 2017“Probable cause is more than a mere suspicion but less than absolute certainty.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “[T]he strength of the evidence necessary to establish probable cause ... is significantly less than the strength of evidence necessary to find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Bishop, 431 S.W.3d 22, 41 (Tenn. 2014); see also Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 , 69 S.Ct. 1302 , 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949) (discussing the differences between the probable cause standard and the standard for proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt). | 1 | 3 |
People v. Zunigagreen2 sentences2025Although the defendant argues a trained officer cannot tell the difference between the smell of legal hemp and illegal marijuana, the possibility of an officer altering to hemp as opposed to marijuana would “merely affect a fact’s weight and persuasiveness [in the probable cause analysis], not its inclusion in the analysis [altogether].” Colorado v. Zuniga, 372 P.3d 1052, 1058 (Colo. 2016). 2024Extending the rationale from Harris to the facts of this case, the possibility of a dog alerting to hemp rather than an illegal substance “merely affects a fact’s weight and persuasiveness [in the probable cause analysis], not its inclusion in the analysis [altogether].” Zuniga, 372 P.3d at 1058 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Oakesgreen2 sentences2016Thus, these cases are distinguishable. 4 See Marsala, 579 A.2d at 59 (concluding that the Leon good-faith exception is incompatible with the Connecticut Constitution); Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 820 (Del. 2000) (finding that there can be no good-faith exception when the probable cause requirement in the Delaware Constitution is not met); Gary v. State, 422 S.E.2d 426, 429 (Ga. 1992) (holding that based on the unequivocal language of Georgia’s statutory exclusionary rule, “adopting the Leon good-faith exception would be tantamount to judicial legislation”); State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 67 2016Thus, these cases are distinguishable. .See Marsala, 579 A.2d at 59 (concluding that the Leon good-faith exception is incompatible with the Connecticut Constitution); Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 820 (Del. 2000) (finding that there can be no good-faith ex ception when the probable cause requirement in the Delaware Constitution is not met); Gary v. State, 262 Ga. 573 , 422 S.E.2d 426, 429 (1992) (holding that based on the unequivocal language of Georgia's statutory exclusionary rule, “adopting the Leon good-faith exception would be tantamount to judicial legislation”); State v. Guzman, 122 Id | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Sainegreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Ricky Browngreen | 1 | 1 |
| State of Tennessee v. John B. Albertsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Cartergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Maryland v. Pringlegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Adams v. Williamsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Norrisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Longstreetgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Illinois v. Gates
green
2 sentences1993The probable cause standard set out in Jacumin is based on Article I, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution and, as it turns out, is narrower than the federal standard announced in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). 1993The probable cause standard set out in Jacumin is based on Article I, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution and, as it turns out, is narrower than the federal standard announced in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). | 3 | 1993–2020 |
State v. Turner
green
2 sentences2016Thus, these cases are distinguishable. 4 See Marsala, 579 A.2d at 59 (concluding that the Leon good-faith exception is incompatible with the Connecticut Constitution); Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 820 (Del. 2000) (finding that there can be no good-faith exception when the probable cause requirement in the Delaware Constitution is not met); Gary v. State, 422 S.E.2d 426, 429 (Ga. 1992) (holding that based on the unequivocal language of Georgia’s statutory exclusionary rule, “adopting the Leon good-faith exception would be tantamount to judicial legislation”); State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 67 2016Thus, these cases are distinguishable. .See Marsala, 579 A.2d at 59 (concluding that the Leon good-faith exception is incompatible with the Connecticut Constitution); Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 820 (Del. 2000) (finding that there can be no good-faith ex ception when the probable cause requirement in the Delaware Constitution is not met); Gary v. State, 262 Ga. 573 , 422 S.E.2d 426, 429 (1992) (holding that based on the unequivocal language of Georgia's statutory exclusionary rule, “adopting the Leon good-faith exception would be tantamount to judicial legislation”); State v. Guzman, 122 Id | 2 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Huddleston green | 2 | 2002–2005 |
| United States v. Cortez green | 2 | 1985–1989 |
| State v. Henning green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Kentucky v. King green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Ker v. California green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Terry Norris v. Jerry Lester green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Afana green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Beck v. Ohio green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Florida v. JL green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| United States v. Leon green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Baker v. McCollan green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| State v. Tays green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Hughes v. State green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Whren v. United States green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| State v. Willoughby green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Moore v. Illinois green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Bacon v. State green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Moore v. State green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Morrissey v. Brewer green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Giordenello v. United States green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Rugendorf v. United States green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Aguilar v. Texas red | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Jones v. United States red | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| United States v. Ventresca green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Spinelli v. United States red | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Greer v. State green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Jones v. State green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.