probable cause standard in Michigan

2025“This probable cause standard is a practical, nontechnical conception judged from the totality of the circumstances before the arresting officers.” People v Cohen, 294 Mich App 70, 75 ; 816 NW2d 474 (2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). -2- Here, the district court correctly concluded that Deputy Jenski had probable cause to arrest defendant for OWI under MCL 257.625(1), which provides: (1) A person, whether licensed or not, shall not operate a vehicle on a highway or other place open to the general public or generally accessible to motor vehicles, including an area designated for the

2025“This probable cause standard is a practical, nontechnical conception judged from the totality of the circumstances before the arresting officers.” People v Cohen, 294 Mich App 70, 75 ; 816 NW2d 474 (2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). -2- Here, the district court correctly concluded that Deputy Jenski had probable cause to arrest defendant for OWI under MCL 257.625(1), which provides: (1) A person, whether licensed or not, shall not operate a vehicle on a highway or other place open to the general public or generally accessible to motor vehicles, including an area designated for the

2022Yet in granting reconsideration the trial court articulated an incorrect standard, indicating that it was “reviewing this evidence, from, at least, a probable cause standard.” But as the Champion Court held, 452 Mich at 98 , “[r]easonable suspicion entails something more than an inchoate or unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but less than the level of suspicion required for probable cause.” Thus, as far as we can discern from the trial courts on the record ruling, it applied an incorrect—and higher—burden when evaluating the evidence on reconsideration.

2022Yet in granting reconsideration the trial court articulated an incorrect standard, indicating that it was “reviewing this evidence, from, at least, a probable cause standard.” But as the Champion Court held, 452 Mich at 98 , “[r]easonable suspicion entails something more than an inchoate or unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but less than the level of suspicion required for probable cause.” Thus, as far as we can discern from the trial courts on the record ruling, it applied an incorrect—and higher—burden when evaluating the evidence on reconsideration.

2017Id. at 756 “This probable cause standard ‘is a practical, nontechnical conception’ judged from the totality of the circumstances before the arresting officers.” Cohen, 294 Mich App at 75 , quoting Maryland v Pringle, 540 US 366, 370 ; 124 S Ct 795 ; 157 L Ed 2d 769 (2003).

2017Id. at 756 “This probable cause standard ‘is a practical, nontechnical conception’ judged from the totality of the circumstances before the arresting officers.” Cohen, 294 Mich App at 75 , quoting Maryland v Pringle, 540 US 366, 370 ; 124 S Ct 795 ; 157 L Ed 2d 769 (2003).

2015This “good-faith exception” to the probable cause requirement is meant to curb the effects of the exclusionary rule, because the rule is “designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates.” Id. at 916 . -2- MCL 780.653 codifies the requirements that must be fulfilled before a warrant based on tips from informants will be issued.

1995Although the judicial branch is governed by the Fourth Amendment, which establishes the probable cause standard for issuance of a warrant, judicial error is the basis for the good-faith exception established in United States v Leon, supra, and Massachusetts v Sheppard, 468 US 981 ; 104 S Ct 3424 ; 82 L Ed 2d 737 (1984).

2019If the evidence conflicts or raises a reasonable doubt, the defendant should be bound over for trial, where the questions can be resolved by the trier of fact. [People v Henderson, 282 Mich App 307, 312 ; 765 NW2d 619 (2009) (citations omitted).] “The probable-cause standard of proof is, of course, less rigorous than the guilt-beyond-a- reasonable-doubt standard of proof.” People v Yost, 468 Mich 122, 126 ; 659 NW2d 604 (2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2018If the evidence conflicts or raises a reasonable doubt, the defendant should be bound over for trial, where the questions can be resolved by the trier of fact. [People v Henderson, 282 Mich App 307, 312 ; 765 NW2d 619 (2009) (citations omitted).] “The probable-cause standard of proof is, of course, less rigorous than the guilt-beyond-a- reasonable-doubt standard of proof.” People v Yost, 468 Mich 122, 126 ; 659 NW2d 604 (2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2022Over the Thanksgiving holiday, a 7-day delay is possible.” McLaughlin, 500 US at 47 .

2015In People v Whitehead, 238 Mich App 1, 2 ; 604 NW2d 737 (1999) (quotation marks and brackets omitted), this Court explained: In Riverside Co v McLaughlin, 500 US 44, 56 ; 111 S Ct 1661 ; 114 L Ed 2d 49 (1991), the United States Supreme Court held that, following an arrest without a warrant, a jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, be found to comply with the promptness requirement of the federal constitution’s Fourth Amendment.

2018Gagnon, 411 US at 782 , held that a defendant has a due process right to a preliminary probable cause hearing regarding an alleged probation violation and a final hearing before the revocation of probation, which is distinct from the extension of probation.

2018Gagnon, 411 US at 782 , held that a defendant has a due process right to a preliminary probable cause hearing regarding an alleged probation violation and a final hearing before the revocation of probation, which is distinct from the extension of probation.

2018“This probable cause standard is not a very demanding threshold,” Harlan, 258 Mich App at 145 , and the quantum of evidence required to bind a defendant over for trial is “much lower” than that necessary to establish that a defendant committed the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, People v Greene, 255 Mich App 426, 443-444 ; 661 NW2d 616 (2003).

2018“This probable cause standard is not a very demanding threshold,” Harlan, 258 Mich App at 145 , and the quantum of evidence required to bind a defendant over for trial is “much lower” than that necessary to establish that a defendant committed the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, People v Greene, 255 Mich App 426, 443-444 ; 661 NW2d 616 (2003).

2017Id. at 756 “This probable cause standard ‘is a practical, nontechnical conception’ judged from the totality of the circumstances before the arresting officers.” Cohen, 294 Mich App at 75 , quoting Maryland v Pringle, 540 US 366, 370 ; 124 S Ct 795 ; 157 L Ed 2d 769 (2003).

2017Id. at 756 “This probable cause standard ‘is a practical, nontechnical conception’ judged from the totality of the circumstances before the arresting officers.” Cohen, 294 Mich App at 75 , quoting Maryland v Pringle, 540 US 366, 370 ; 124 S Ct 795 ; 157 L Ed 2d 769 (2003).

2025Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 30-31 ; 88 S Ct 1868 ; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968), carved out an exception to the probable cause requirement that permits the police to stop and briefly detain a person for investigation based on reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot.

2025Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 30-31 ; 88 S Ct 1868 ; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968), carved out an exception to the probable cause requirement that permits the police to stop and briefly detain a person for investigation based on reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot.

2025People v Borchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich 278, 294 ; 597 NW2d 1 (1999). 3 We note that defendant argues the PBT results must be suppressed because officers did not obtain a search warrant before administering the PBT.

2025People v Borchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich 278, 294 ; 597 NW2d 1 (1999). 3 We note that defendant argues the PBT results must be suppressed because officers did not obtain a search warrant before administering the PBT.

2025“We review constitutional questions de novo.” People v Sadows, 283 Mich App 65, 67 ; 768 NW2d 93 (2009). 2 In addition to the original charge of possession of methamphetamine, the prosecution also asked the district court at the probable-cause hearing to bind defendant over on a separate charge of resisting or obstructing a police officer, MCL 750.81d(1). 3 Arizona v Johnson, 555 US 323 ; 129 S Ct 781 ; 172 L Ed 2d 694 (2009). -2- “The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and its counterpart in the Michigan Constitution guarantee the right of persons to be secure against unreason

2025“We review constitutional questions de novo.” People v Sadows, 283 Mich App 65, 67 ; 768 NW2d 93 (2009). 2 In addition to the original charge of possession of methamphetamine, the prosecution also asked the district court at the probable-cause hearing to bind defendant over on a separate charge of resisting or obstructing a police officer, MCL 750.81d(1). 3 Arizona v Johnson, 555 US 323 ; 129 S Ct 781 ; 172 L Ed 2d 694 (2009). -2- “The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and its counterpart in the Michigan Constitution guarantee the right of persons to be secure against unreason

2019If the evidence conflicts or raises a reasonable doubt, the defendant should be bound over for trial, where the questions can be resolved by the trier of fact. [People v Henderson, 282 Mich App 307, 312 ; 765 NW2d 619 (2009) (citations omitted).] “The probable-cause standard of proof is, of course, less rigorous than the guilt-beyond-a- reasonable-doubt standard of proof.” People v Yost, 468 Mich 122, 126 ; 659 NW2d 604 (2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2018If the evidence conflicts or raises a reasonable doubt, the defendant should be bound over for trial, where the questions can be resolved by the trier of fact. [People v Henderson, 282 Mich App 307, 312 ; 765 NW2d 619 (2009) (citations omitted).] “The probable-cause standard of proof is, of course, less rigorous than the guilt-beyond-a- reasonable-doubt standard of proof.” People v Yost, 468 Mich 122, 126 ; 659 NW2d 604 (2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2019He need present only enough evidence” to satisfy the probable cause standard, i.e., sufficient evidence “on each element of the charged offense to lead a person of ordinary 2 Defendant has not raised any issue on appeal with respect to his charges for resisting or obstructing arrest or driving with license suspended. -3- prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief of the defendant’s guilt.” Id. (quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted).

2016He need present only enough evidence” to satisfy the probable cause standard, i.e., sufficient evidence “on each element of the charged offense to lead a person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief of the defendant’s guilt.” Id. (quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted).

2017Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213 , 246, 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).

2017Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213 , 246, 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).

2015In People v Whitehead, 238 Mich App 1, 2 ; 604 NW2d 737 (1999) (quotation marks and brackets omitted), this Court explained: In Riverside Co v McLaughlin, 500 US 44, 56 ; 111 S Ct 1661 ; 114 L Ed 2d 49 (1991), the United States Supreme Court held that, following an arrest without a warrant, a jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, be found to comply with the promptness requirement of the federal constitution’s Fourth Amendment.

2015In People v Whitehead, 238 Mich App 1, 2 ; 604 NW2d 737 (1999) (quotation marks and brackets omitted), this Court explained: In Riverside Co v McLaughlin, 500 US 44, 56 ; 111 S Ct 1661 ; 114 L Ed 2d 49 (1991), the United States Supreme Court held that, following an arrest without a warrant, a jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, be found to comply with the promptness requirement of the federal constitution’s Fourth Amendment.

2015In People v Whitehead, 238 Mich App 1, 2 ; 604 NW2d 737 (1999) (quotation marks and brackets omitted), this Court explained: In Riverside Co v McLaughlin, 500 US 44, 56 ; 111 S Ct 1661 ; 114 L Ed 2d 49 (1991), the United States Supreme Court held that, following an arrest without a warrant, a jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, be found to comply with the promptness requirement of the federal constitution’s Fourth Amendment.

2015In People v Whitehead, 238 Mich App 1, 2 ; 604 NW2d 737 (1999) (quotation marks and brackets omitted), this Court explained: In Riverside Co v McLaughlin, 500 US 44, 56 ; 111 S Ct 1661 ; 114 L Ed 2d 49 (1991), the United States Supreme Court held that, following an arrest without a warrant, a jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, be found to comply with the promptness requirement of the federal constitution’s Fourth Amendment.

1995Such compelling reasons were succinctly set forth in David, supra, pp 297-298 , and they are repeated here: Such a holding [that the exclusionary rule need not be applied where the police act unconstitutionally but in good faith] would, in effect, remove the probable cause requirement from the Fourth Amendment.

1995Such compelling reasons were succinctly set forth in David, supra, pp 297-298 , and they are repeated here: Such a holding [that the exclusionary rule need not be applied where the police act unconstitutionally but in good faith] would, in effect, remove the probable cause requirement from the Fourth Amendment.

1988"Probable cause exists where 'the facts and circumstances within their [the officers’] knowledge, and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information, [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has been or is being committed [by the person to be arrested].” Brinegar v United States, 338 US 160, 175-176 ; 69 S Ct 1302 ; 93 L Ed 1879 (1949), quoting Carroll v United States, 267 US 132, 162 ; 45 S Ct 280 ; 69 L Ed 543 ; 39 ALR 790 (1925).

1988"Probable cause exists where 'the facts and circumstances within their [the officers’] knowledge, and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information, [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has been or is being committed [by the person to be arrested].” Brinegar v United States, 338 US 160, 175-176 ; 69 S Ct 1302 ; 93 L Ed 1879 (1949), quoting Carroll v United States, 267 US 132, 162 ; 45 S Ct 280 ; 69 L Ed 543 ; 39 ALR 790 (1925).

2026CONCLUSION Because the prosecution presented evidence satisfying the elements of resisting or obstructing under the probable-cause standard with respect to defendant’s failure to exit the vehicle and his failure to identify himself, we affirm the district court’s bindover decision. /s/ Brock A. Swartzle /s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado /s/ Matthew S. Ackerman 2 We assume, without deciding, that defendant’s failure to verbally provide identification and his provision of a false name and date of birth constitute obstruction, which requires “some physical refusal to comply with a command, as opposed

2026Therefore, the prosecution only needs to provide enough evidence to satisfy the probable-cause standard, i.e., provide sufficient evidence for each element of the charged offense “to lead a person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief of the defendant’s guilt.” People v Bass, 317 Mich App 241, 280 ; 893 NW2d 140 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2026Therefore, the prosecution only needs to provide enough evidence to satisfy the probable-cause standard, i.e., provide sufficient evidence for each element of the charged offense “to lead a person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief of the defendant’s guilt.” People v Bass, 317 Mich App 241, 280 ; 893 NW2d 140 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted).