26 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1904–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Swindle v. Big River Broadcasting Corp.green2 sentences2001Corp., 905 S.W.2d 565, 567 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). 2001Corp., 905 S.W.2d 565, 567 (Tenn. Ct.App.1995). | 2 | 2 |
Ferrell v. Elrodgreen2 sentences2001Cf. Ferrell v. Elrod, 63 Tenn.App. 129 , 469 S.W.2d 678, 690 (1971) (permitting, among other things, loss rent from a breach of a lease). 2001Cf. Ferrell v. Elrod, 63 Tenn.App. 129 , 469 S.W.2d 678, 690 (1971) (permitting, among other things, loss rent from a breach of a lease). | 2 | 2 |
Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance v. Mooregreen1 sentence2013Allstate Insurance Co. v. Watts, 811 S.W.2d 883, 886 (Tenn. 1991) (citing Travelers Insurance Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 491 S.W.2d at 367 , which states that such provisions must be “strongly construed” against the insurance company); Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Moore, 958 S.W.2d 759, 763 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). | 1 | 1 |
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Wattsgreen1 sentence2013Allstate Insurance Co. v. Watts, 811 S.W.2d 883, 886 (Tenn. 1991) (citing Travelers Insurance Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 491 S.W.2d at 367 , which states that such provisions must be “strongly construed” against the insurance company); Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Moore, 958 S.W.2d 759, 763 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). | 1 | 1 |
Archer v. Stategreen1 sentence2005See Archer, 851 S.W.2d at 165 (a “challenge to the voluntariness of the pleas does not establish that the convictions based upon those pleas are void, rather than voidable”). | 1 | 1 |
Jenkins Subway, Inc. v. Jonesgreen1 sentence2002Cf. Jenkins Subway, Inc. v. Jones, 990 S.W.2d 713, 724-725 (Tenn.Ct.App.1998)(“A party is not relieved of liability for his nonperformance of a contract based upon the defense of impossibility of performance where the impossibility is caused by the party’s own conduct or where the impossibility is caused by developments which the party could have ‘prevented or avoided or remedied by appropriate corrective measures.’ ”). 4 We also elaborated in In re: Paul’s Bonding Co., 62 S.W.3d at 195 , that, in any event, a ground for relief asserted by the surety will not constitute an “extreme case” for p | 1 | 1 |
Parker v. Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co.green1 sentence2001A corollary rule of construction to ordinary plain meaning that is also applicable is found in Parker v. Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company, 582 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tenn. 1979): when the courts have repeatedly interpreted certain words in legal documents as having a particular meaning and the drafters of such legal documents continue to use such words with knowledge of the interpretation placed upon them by the courts it will be assumed that the draftsmen in using such words did so knowingly with the intention that such judicial gloss will be placed upon them. | 1 | 1 |
Terry Galowski v. Gerald A. Bergegreen1 sentence1999See, e.g., Galowski 78 F.3d at 1180 ; Loe v. United States, 545 F.Supp. 662, 666 (E.D.Va.1982); State v. Johnson, 4 Neb.App. 776 , 551 N.W.2d 742, 749 (1996); People v. Kinder, 126 A.D.2d 60 , 512 N.Y.S.2d 597, 600 (1987); State v. Johnson, 133 Wis.2d 207 , 395 N.W.2d 176, 182 (1986). 5 Thus, in evaluating the petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we must determine whether petitioner’s counsel had reasonable cause to raise the issue of his competency. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Kindergreen2 sentences1999See, e.g., Galowski 78 F.3d at 1180 ; Loe v. United States, 545 F.Supp. 662, 666 (E.D.Va.1982); State v. Johnson, 4 Neb.App. 776 , 551 N.W.2d 742, 749 (1996); People v. Kinder, 126 A.D.2d 60 , 512 N.Y.S.2d 597, 600 (1987); State v. Johnson, 133 Wis.2d 207 , 395 N.W.2d 176, 182 (1986). 5 Thus, in evaluating the petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we must determine whether petitioner’s counsel had reasonable cause to raise the issue of his competency. 1999See, e.g., Galowski 78 F.3d at 1180 ; Loe v. United States, 545 F.Supp. 662, 666 (E.D.Va.1982); State v. Johnson, 4 Neb.App. 776 , 551 N.W.2d 742, 749 (1996); People v. Kinder, 126 A.D.2d 60 , 512 N.Y.S.2d 597, 600 (1987); State v. Johnson, 133 Wis.2d 207 , 395 N.W.2d 176, 182 (1986). 5 Thus, in evaluating the petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we must determine whether petitioner’s counsel had reasonable cause to raise the issue of his competency. | 1 | 1 |
Loe v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1999See, e.g., Galowski 78 F.3d at 1180 ; Loe v. United States, 545 F.Supp. 662, 666 (E.D.Va.1982); State v. Johnson, 4 Neb.App. 776 , 551 N.W.2d 742, 749 (1996); People v. Kinder, 126 A.D.2d 60 , 512 N.Y.S.2d 597, 600 (1987); State v. Johnson, 133 Wis.2d 207 , 395 N.W.2d 176, 182 (1986). 5 Thus, in evaluating the petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we must determine whether petitioner’s counsel had reasonable cause to raise the issue of his competency. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Johnsongreen2 sentences1999See, e.g., Galowski 78 F.3d at 1180 ; Loe v. United States, 545 F.Supp. 662, 666 (E.D.Va.1982); State v. Johnson, 4 Neb.App. 776 , 551 N.W.2d 742, 749 (1996); People v. Kinder, 126 A.D.2d 60 , 512 N.Y.S.2d 597, 600 (1987); State v. Johnson, 133 Wis.2d 207 , 395 N.W.2d 176, 182 (1986). 5 Thus, in evaluating the petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we must determine whether petitioner’s counsel had reasonable cause to raise the issue of his competency. 1999See, e.g., Galowski 78 F.3d at 1180 ; Loe v. United States, 545 F.Supp. 662, 666 (E.D.Va.1982); State v. Johnson, 4 Neb.App. 776 , 551 N.W.2d 742, 749 (1996); People v. Kinder, 126 A.D.2d 60 , 512 N.Y.S.2d 597, 600 (1987); State v. Johnson, 133 Wis.2d 207 , 395 N.W.2d 176, 182 (1986). 5 Thus, in evaluating the petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we must determine whether petitioner’s counsel had reasonable cause to raise the issue of his competency. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Johnsongreen2 sentences1999See, e.g., Galowski 78 F.3d at 1180 ; Loe v. United States, 545 F.Supp. 662, 666 (E.D.Va.1982); State v. Johnson, 4 Neb.App. 776 , 551 N.W.2d 742, 749 (1996); People v. Kinder, 126 A.D.2d 60 , 512 N.Y.S.2d 597, 600 (1987); State v. Johnson, 133 Wis.2d 207 , 395 N.W.2d 176, 182 (1986). 5 Thus, in evaluating the petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we must determine whether petitioner’s counsel had reasonable cause to raise the issue of his competency. 1999See, e.g., Galowski 78 F.3d at 1180 ; Loe v. United States, 545 F.Supp. 662, 666 (E.D.Va.1982); State v. Johnson, 4 Neb.App. 776 , 551 N.W.2d 742, 749 (1996); People v. Kinder, 126 A.D.2d 60 , 512 N.Y.S.2d 597, 600 (1987); State v. Johnson, 133 Wis.2d 207 , 395 N.W.2d 176, 182 (1986). 5 Thus, in evaluating the petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we must determine whether petitioner’s counsel had reasonable cause to raise the issue of his competency. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Washingtongreen1 sentence1995Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507 , 104 S.Ct. 2543, 2545-47 , 81 L.Ed.2d 437, 442 (1984); Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 561 , 97 S.Ct. at 846 , 51 L.Ed.2d at 42 ; State v. Washington, 661 S.W.2d 900, 904 (Tenn.Crirn.App.1983), ce rt. denied, 467 U.S. 1208 , 104 S.Ct. 2394 , 81 L.Ed.2d 351 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
Mabry v. Johnsongreen2 sentences1995Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507 , 104 S.Ct. 2543, 2545-47 , 81 L.Ed.2d 437, 442 (1984); Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 561 , 97 S.Ct. at 846 , 51 L.Ed.2d at 42 ; State v. Washington, 661 S.W.2d 900, 904 (Tenn.Crirn.App.1983), ce rt. denied, 467 U.S. 1208 , 104 S.Ct. 2394 , 81 L.Ed.2d 351 (1984). 1995Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507 , 104 S.Ct. 2543, 2545-47 , 81 L.Ed.2d 437, 442 (1984); Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 561 , 97 S.Ct. at 846 , 51 L.Ed.2d at 42 ; State v. Washington, 661 S.W.2d 900, 904 (Tenn.Crirn.App.1983), ce rt. denied, 467 U.S. 1208 , 104 S.Ct. 2394 , 81 L.Ed.2d 351 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Marriage of Meiergreen2 sentences1993See Meier and Meier, 36 Or.App. 685, 685 , 585 P.2d 713, 716 (1978), rev’d on other grounds, 286 Or. 437 , 595 P.2d 474 (1979); Bernick v. Bemick, 31 Colo.App. 485 , 505 P.2d 14, 15 (1972); Long v. Long, 127 Wis.2d 521 , 381 N.W.2d 350, 356 (1986). 1993See Meier and Meier, 36 Or.App. 685, 685 , 585 P.2d 713, 716 (1978), rev’d on other grounds, 286 Or. 437 , 595 P.2d 474 (1979); Bernick v. Bemick, 31 Colo.App. 485 , 505 P.2d 14, 15 (1972); Long v. Long, 127 Wis.2d 521 , 381 N.W.2d 350, 356 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
| Marriage of Long v. Longgreen | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Marriage of Meiergreen2 sentences1993See Meier and Meier, 36 Or.App. 685, 685 , 585 P.2d 713, 716 (1978), rev’d on other grounds, 286 Or. 437 , 595 P.2d 474 (1979); Bernick v. Bemick, 31 Colo.App. 485 , 505 P.2d 14, 15 (1972); Long v. Long, 127 Wis.2d 521 , 381 N.W.2d 350, 356 (1986). 1993See Meier and Meier, 36 Or.App. 685, 685 , 585 P.2d 713, 716 (1978), rev’d on other grounds, 286 Or. 437 , 595 P.2d 474 (1979); Bernick v. Bemick, 31 Colo.App. 485 , 505 P.2d 14, 15 (1972); Long v. Long, 127 Wis.2d 521 , 381 N.W.2d 350, 356 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
| Bernick v. Bernickgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Oliver v. Union Transfer Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Safley, Chairman
green
2 sentences2025Id. at 339 (quoting State v. Safley, 172 Tenn. 385 , 112 S.W.2d 831 (1938)); see also Knox County Educ. 2025Id. at 339 (quoting State v. Safley, 172 Tenn. 385 , 112 S.W.2d 831 (1938)); see also Knox County Educ. | 2 | 1965–2025 |
Love v. Smith
green
2 sentences2016“A corollary of this principle is that expert witnesses in expressing their opinions of value should not be allowed to give their opinions as to the value of property for a particular purpose.” Id. (quotation omitted). 2016“A corollary of this principle is that expert witnesses in expressing their opinions of value should not be allowed to give their opinions as to the value of property for a particular purpose.” Id. (quotation omitted). | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Anderson Fish & Oyster Company v. Olds
green
2 sentences2006Anderson Fish & Oyster Co. v. Olds, 197 Tenn. 604 , 277 S.W.2d 344 ; State v. Dyer, 171 Tenn. 66 , 100 S.W.2d 653 . 2006Anderson Fish & Oyster Co. v. Olds, 197 Tenn. 604 , 277 S.W.2d 344 ; State v. Dyer, 171 Tenn. 66 , 100 S.W.2d 653 . | 2 | 1969–2006 |
State v. Dyer
neutral
2 sentences2006Anderson Fish & Oyster Co. v. Olds, 197 Tenn. 604 , 277 S.W.2d 344 ; State v. Dyer, 171 Tenn. 66 , 100 S.W.2d 653 . 2006Anderson Fish & Oyster Co. v. Olds, 197 Tenn. 604 , 277 S.W.2d 344 ; State v. Dyer, 171 Tenn. 66 , 100 S.W.2d 653 . | 2 | 1969–2006 |
Rodgers v. United States
green
2 sentences1968So, in Sedgwick on the Construction of Statutory and Constitutional Law, the author observes, on page 98, with respect to this rule: ‘ The reason and philosophy of the rule is, that mind of the legislator has been turned to the details of a subject, and he has acted upon it, a subsequent statute in general terms or treating the subject in a general manner, and not expressly contradicting the original act, shall not he considered as intended to affect the more particular or positive previous provisions, unless it is absolutely necessary to give the latter act such a construction, in order that 1968So, in Sedgwick on the Construction of Statutory and Constitutional Law, the author observes, on page 98, with respect to this rule: ‘ The reason and philosophy of the rule is, that mind of the legislator has been turned to the details of a subject, and he has acted upon it, a subsequent statute in general terms or treating the subject in a general manner, and not expressly contradicting the original act, shall not he considered as intended to affect the more particular or positive previous provisions, unless it is absolutely necessary to give the latter act such a construction, in order that | 2 | 1938–1968 |
Cronin v. Howe
green
1 sentence2025Id. at 339 (quoting State v. Safley, 172 Tenn. 385 , 112 S.W.2d 831 (1938)); see also Knox County Educ. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Jackson v. Miller
green
1 sentence2024“A corollary to this principle is that a claim ‘of which a party was ignorant when the release was given is not as a rule . . . embraced therein.’” Marlett v. Thomason, No. M2006-00038-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 1048950 , at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2007) (quoting Jackson, 776 S.W.2d at 118 ). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Travelers Insurance Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
green
1 sentence2013Allstate Insurance Co. v. Watts, 811 S.W.2d 883, 886 (Tenn. 1991) (citing Travelers Insurance Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 491 S.W.2d at 367 , which states that such provisions must be “strongly construed” against the insurance company); Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Moore, 958 S.W.2d 759, 763 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Taylor v. Taintor
green
1 sentence2002A corollary to the rule articulated in Taylor is that exoneration is precluded when the surety’s performance of its obligation under the bail bond is rendered impossible by the criminal defendant or the surety itself, Taylor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 370 & 374, a corollary that we believe flows alike from our restrictive interpretation of Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-11-204, except where otherwise provided by statute, see, e.g., Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-ll-201(b) (1997). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
In Re Paul's Bonding Co., Inc.
green
1 sentence2002Cf. Jenkins Subway, Inc. v. Jones, 990 S.W.2d 713, 724-725 (Tenn.Ct.App.1998)(“A party is not relieved of liability for his nonperformance of a contract based upon the defense of impossibility of performance where the impossibility is caused by the party’s own conduct or where the impossibility is caused by developments which the party could have ‘prevented or avoided or remedied by appropriate corrective measures.’ ”). 4 We also elaborated in In re: Paul’s Bonding Co., 62 S.W.3d at 195 , that, in any event, a ground for relief asserted by the surety will not constitute an “extreme case” for p | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Weatherford v. Bursey
green
2 sentences1995Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507 , 104 S.Ct. 2543, 2545-47 , 81 L.Ed.2d 437, 442 (1984); Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 561 , 97 S.Ct. at 846 , 51 L.Ed.2d at 42 ; State v. Washington, 661 S.W.2d 900, 904 (Tenn.Crirn.App.1983), ce rt. denied, 467 U.S. 1208 , 104 S.Ct. 2394 , 81 L.Ed.2d 351 (1984). 1995Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507 , 104 S.Ct. 2543, 2545-47 , 81 L.Ed.2d 437, 442 (1984); Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 561 , 97 S.Ct. at 846 , 51 L.Ed.2d at 42 ; State v. Washington, 661 S.W.2d 900, 904 (Tenn.Crirn.App.1983), ce rt. denied, 467 U.S. 1208 , 104 S.Ct. 2394 , 81 L.Ed.2d 351 (1984). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Lucas v. Illinois
green
1 sentence1995Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507 , 104 S.Ct. 2543, 2545-47 , 81 L.Ed.2d 437, 442 (1984); Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 561 , 97 S.Ct. at 846 , 51 L.Ed.2d at 42 ; State v. Washington, 661 S.W.2d 900, 904 (Tenn.Crirn.App.1983), ce rt. denied, 467 U.S. 1208 , 104 S.Ct. 2394 , 81 L.Ed.2d 351 (1984). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Washington v. Tennessee
neutral
1 sentence1995Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507 , 104 S.Ct. 2543, 2545-47 , 81 L.Ed.2d 437, 442 (1984); Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 561 , 97 S.Ct. at 846 , 51 L.Ed.2d at 42 ; State v. Washington, 661 S.W.2d 900, 904 (Tenn.Crirn.App.1983), ce rt. denied, 467 U.S. 1208 , 104 S.Ct. 2394 , 81 L.Ed.2d 351 (1984). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Holland v. Office of Personnel Management
neutral
1 sentence1995Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507 , 104 S.Ct. 2543, 2545-47 , 81 L.Ed.2d 437, 442 (1984); Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 561 , 97 S.Ct. at 846 , 51 L.Ed.2d at 42 ; State v. Washington, 661 S.W.2d 900, 904 (Tenn.Crirn.App.1983), ce rt. denied, 467 U.S. 1208 , 104 S.Ct. 2394 , 81 L.Ed.2d 351 (1984). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Wayte v. United States green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Gage v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Company green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Alloway v. Nashville green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Miranda v. Arizona green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Anderson v. Outland green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| McCuiston v. Haggard neutral | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Woodroof v. City of Nashville green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Lee State Bank v. McElheny green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| Grubb v. Mayor Aldermen, Morristown green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Richardson v. Richards neutral | 1 | 1904–1904 |
| Radley v. O'Leary green | 1 | 1904–1904 |
| McCall v. Jones green | 1 | 1904–1904 |
| Smith v. Auld green | 1 | 1904–1904 |
| Tierney v. Abbott neutral | 1 | 1904–1904 |
| Tiffany v. Stewart neutral | 1 | 1904–1904 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.