11 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1976–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Garces v. Bradleygreen2 sentences2015See Garces v. Bradley, 299 A.2d 142, 144 (D.C.1973) (noting "the well settled rule that the law abhors a default, and the corollary of the rule that dispositions on the merits are favored"). 12 . 1984See Garces v. Bradley, supra, 299 A.2d at 144 (recognizing well-settled rule that the “law abhors a default, and the corollary of the rule [is] that dispositions on the merits are favored”). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Lee R. Smithgreen2 sentences2014As early as Rease, supra, 403 A.2d at 327-28 , we noted that prior consistent statements could be admitted “for rehabilitation purposes” where they “can be of very clear help to the factfinder in determining whether the witness is truthful” and where the proposed evidence “is directed only at the particular impeachment that occurred.” 4 Subsequently, in Johnson v. United States, 434 A.2d 415 (D.C.1981), we articulated much the same evidentiary standard in sustaining a trial court admittance of a prior consistent statement where the witness had been impeached specifically by a prior inconsisten 2014As early as Rease, supra, 403 A.2d at 327-28 , we noted that prior consistent statements could be admitted “for rehabilitation purposes” where they “can be of very clear help to the factfinder in determining whether the witness is truthful” and where the proposed evidence “is directed only at the particular impeachment that occurred.” 4 Subsequently, in Johnson v. United States, 434 A.2d 415 (D.C.1981), we articulated much the same evidentiary standard in sustaining a trial court admittance of a prior consistent statement where the witness had been impeached specifically by a prior inconsisten | 2 | 2 |
United States v. McDougaldgreen2 sentences2000This court has repeatedly held that “the law does not require ... access where witnesses for private reasons and absent government interference refuse to discuss the case with defense counsel.” In re B.L.B., 432 A.2d 722, 725 (D.C.1981); Khaalis v. United States, 408 A.2d 313, 336-39 (D.C.1979) (upholding trial court ruling that witness could not be cross-examined about his personal decision not to speak with defense counsel); United States v. McDougald, 350 A.2d 375, 378 (1976) (due process not violated where “witnesses for private reasons and absent government interference refuse to discuss 2000This court has repeatedly held that "the law does not require . . . access where witnesses for private reasons and absent government interference refuse to discuss the case with defense counsel." In re B.L.B., 432 A.2d 722, 725 (D.C.1981); Khaalis v. United States, 408 A.2d 313, 336-39 (D.C.1979) (upholding trial court ruling that witness could not be cross-examined about his personal decision not to speak with defense counsel); United States v. McDougald, 350 A.2d 375, 378 (1976) (due process not violated where "witnesses for private reasons and absent government interference refuse to discus | 2 | 2 |
Khaalis v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2000This court has repeatedly held that “the law does not require ... access where witnesses for private reasons and absent government interference refuse to discuss the case with defense counsel.” In re B.L.B., 432 A.2d 722, 725 (D.C.1981); Khaalis v. United States, 408 A.2d 313, 336-39 (D.C.1979) (upholding trial court ruling that witness could not be cross-examined about his personal decision not to speak with defense counsel); United States v. McDougald, 350 A.2d 375, 378 (1976) (due process not violated where “witnesses for private reasons and absent government interference refuse to discuss 2000This court has repeatedly held that "the law does not require . . . access where witnesses for private reasons and absent government interference refuse to discuss the case with defense counsel." In re B.L.B., 432 A.2d 722, 725 (D.C.1981); Khaalis v. United States, 408 A.2d 313, 336-39 (D.C.1979) (upholding trial court ruling that witness could not be cross-examined about his personal decision not to speak with defense counsel); United States v. McDougald, 350 A.2d 375, 378 (1976) (due process not violated where "witnesses for private reasons and absent government interference refuse to discus | 2 | 2 |
Matter of BLBgreen2 sentences2000This court has repeatedly held that “the law does not require ... access where witnesses for private reasons and absent government interference refuse to discuss the case with defense counsel.” In re B.L.B., 432 A.2d 722, 725 (D.C.1981); Khaalis v. United States, 408 A.2d 313, 336-39 (D.C.1979) (upholding trial court ruling that witness could not be cross-examined about his personal decision not to speak with defense counsel); United States v. McDougald, 350 A.2d 375, 378 (1976) (due process not violated where “witnesses for private reasons and absent government interference refuse to discuss 2000This court has repeatedly held that "the law does not require . . . access where witnesses for private reasons and absent government interference refuse to discuss the case with defense counsel." In re B.L.B., 432 A.2d 722, 725 (D.C.1981); Khaalis v. United States, 408 A.2d 313, 336-39 (D.C.1979) (upholding trial court ruling that witness could not be cross-examined about his personal decision not to speak with defense counsel); United States v. McDougald, 350 A.2d 375, 378 (1976) (due process not violated where "witnesses for private reasons and absent government interference refuse to discus | 2 | 2 |
Intercounty Construction Corp. v. District of Columbiagreen2 sentences2003Corp. v. District of Columbia, 443 A.2d 29, 32 (D.C. 1982). 2003Corp. v. District of Columbia, 443 A.2d 29, 32 (D.C. 1982). | 1 | 1 |
1010 Potomac Associates v. Grocery Manufacturers of America, Inc.green2 sentences2003To support its investigation of the history of the pollution exclusion, the majority relies on the corollary principle that “extrinsic evidence may be considered to determine the circumstances surrounding the making of the contract so that it may be ascertained what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have thought the words meant.” 1010 Potomac Assocs., 485 A.2d at 205-06 (citations omitted); accord, Christacos, 583 A.2d at 194 ; see also Intercounty Constr. 2003To support its investigation of the history of the pollution exclusion, the majority relies on the corollary principle that "extrinsic evidence may be considered to determine the circumstances surrounding the making of the contract so that it may be ascertained what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have thought the words meant." 1010 Potomac Assocs., 485 A.2d at 205-06 (citations omitted); accord, Christacos, 583 A.2d at 194 ; see also Intercounty Constr. | 1 | 1 |
Christacos v. Blackie's House of Beef, Inc.green2 sentences2003To support its investigation of the history of the pollution exclusion, the majority relies on the corollary principle that “extrinsic evidence may be considered to determine the circumstances surrounding the making of the contract so that it may be ascertained what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have thought the words meant.” 1010 Potomac Assocs., 485 A.2d at 205-06 (citations omitted); accord, Christacos, 583 A.2d at 194 ; see also Intercounty Constr. 2003To support its investigation of the history of the pollution exclusion, the majority relies on the corollary principle that "extrinsic evidence may be considered to determine the circumstances surrounding the making of the contract so that it may be ascertained what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have thought the words meant." 1010 Potomac Assocs., 485 A.2d at 205-06 (citations omitted); accord, Christacos, 583 A.2d at 194 ; see also Intercounty Constr. | 1 | 1 |
Presley v. Commercial Credit Corporationgreen1 sentence1995See Presley v. Commercial Credit Corp., 177 A.2d 916, 918 (D.C.1962); Park Transfer Co. v. Lumbermen’s Mutual Casualty Co., 79 U.S.App.D.C. 48 , 142 F.2d 100 (1944). | 1 | 1 |
Akinyode v. Hawkinsgreen1 sentence1984Although a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, see, e.g., Garces v. Bradley, supra, 299 A.2d at 144 ; Akinyode v. Hawkins, 292 A.2d 795, 796 (D.C. 1972); Sitwell v. Government Employees Ins. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rease v. United States
green
2 sentences2014As early as Rease, supra, 403 A.2d at 327-28 , we noted that prior consistent statements could be admitted “for rehabilitation purposes” where they “can be of very clear help to the factfinder in determining whether the witness is truthful” and where the proposed evidence “is directed only at the particular impeachment that occurred.” 4 Subsequently, in Johnson v. United States, 434 A.2d 415 (D.C.1981), we articulated much the same evidentiary standard in sustaining a trial court admittance of a prior consistent statement where the witness had been impeached specifically by a prior inconsisten 2014As early as Rease, supra, 403 A.2d at 327-28 , we noted that prior consistent statements could be admitted “for rehabilitation purposes” where they “can be of very clear help to the factfinder in determining whether the witness is truthful” and where the proposed evidence “is directed only at the particular impeachment that occurred.” 4 Subsequently, in Johnson v. United States, 434 A.2d 415 (D.C.1981), we articulated much the same evidentiary standard in sustaining a trial court admittance of a prior consistent statement where the witness had been impeached specifically by a prior inconsisten | 2 | 1981–2014 |
Clifton Gregory v. United States
green
2 sentences2000This was the holding in Gregory v. United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 140 , 369 F.2d 185 (1966). 16 In that case, a prosecutor instructed two eyewitnesses not to speak to the defense attorney unless he were present. 2000This was the holding in Gregory v. United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 140 , 369 F.2d 185 (1966). 16 In that case, a prosecutor instructed two eyewitnesses not to speak to the defense attorney unless he were present. | 2 | 2000–2000 |
Firfer Et Ux. v. United States
green
1 sentence2025The general rule Generally, “[t]respassers may only recover for ‘intentional, wanton or willful injury or maintenance of a hidden engine of destruction.’” Holland, 431 A.2d at 599 (quoting Firfer, 208 F.2d at 528 ); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 333 (The general rule is that “a possessor of land is not liable to trespassers for physical harm 25 caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care (a) to put the land in a condition reasonably safe for their reception, or (b) to carry on his activities so as not to endanger them.”). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Holland v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad
green
1 sentence2025The general rule Generally, “[t]respassers may only recover for ‘intentional, wanton or willful injury or maintenance of a hidden engine of destruction.’” Holland, 431 A.2d at 599 (quoting Firfer, 208 F.2d at 528 ); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 333 (The general rule is that “a possessor of land is not liable to trespassers for physical harm 25 caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care (a) to put the land in a condition reasonably safe for their reception, or (b) to carry on his activities so as not to endanger them.”). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Johnson v. United States
green
1 sentence2014As early as Rease, supra, 403 A.2d at 327-28 , we noted that prior consistent statements could be admitted “for rehabilitation purposes” where they “can be of very clear help to the factfinder in determining whether the witness is truthful” and where the proposed evidence “is directed only at the particular impeachment that occurred.” 4 Subsequently, in Johnson v. United States, 434 A.2d 415 (D.C.1981), we articulated much the same evidentiary standard in sustaining a trial court admittance of a prior consistent statement where the witness had been impeached specifically by a prior inconsisten | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Speyer, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
green
2 sentences1997The ease of Speyer, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 222 Pa.Super. 261 , 295 A.2d 143 (1972), relied upon by the dissent for its conclusion, simply illustrates a corollary to the rule of collateral estoppel; “if a judgment of a court of first instance is based on determinations of two issues, either of which standing independently would be sufficient to support the result, the judgment is not conclusive with respect to either issue standing alone.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27, cmt. i. The determinations, not being “essential to the judgment,” have no issue preclusive effect in 1997The ease of Speyer, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 222 Pa.Super. 261 , 295 A.2d 143 (1972), relied upon by the dissent for its conclusion, simply illustrates a corollary to the rule of collateral estoppel; “if a judgment of a court of first instance is based on determinations of two issues, either of which standing independently would be sufficient to support the result, the judgment is not conclusive with respect to either issue standing alone.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27, cmt. i. The determinations, not being “essential to the judgment,” have no issue preclusive effect in | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Park Transfer Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co.
green
2 sentences1995See Presley v. Commercial Credit Corp., 177 A.2d 916, 918 (D.C.1962); Park Transfer Co. v. Lumbermen’s Mutual Casualty Co., 79 U.S.App.D.C. 48 , 142 F.2d 100 (1944). 1995See Presley v. Commercial Credit Corp., 177 A.2d 916, 918 (D.C.1962); Park Transfer Co. v. Lumbermen’s Mutual Casualty Co., 79 U.S.App.D.C. 48 , 142 F.2d 100 (1944). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Hughes v. United States
green
1 sentence1976Cf. Hughes v. United States, D.C.App., 308 A. 2d 238 , 242 n. 12 (1973). | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.