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13 Oklahoma opinions name it 3 courts 1925–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oklahoma courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.green2 sentences2014We recognize that "(Jt is a corollary to immunity from suit ... that this immunity cannot be waived by officials." United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. et al., 309 U.S. 506, 513 , 60 S.Ct. 653, 657 , 84 L.Ed. 894 (1940). 2014We recognize that "(Jt is a corollary to immunity from suit ... that this immunity cannot be waived by officials." United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. et al., 309 U.S. 506, 513 , 60 S.Ct. 653, 657 , 84 L.Ed. 894 (1940). | 2 | 3 |
Roundtree v. Batesgreen2 sentences1990This finding is in accord with the majority of jurisdictions which have considered the issue [19] and with this Court's holding in Roundtree v. Bates, 630 P.2d 1299, 1301 (Okla. 1981). 1990This finding is in accord with the majority of jurisdictions which have considered the issue 19 and with this Court’s holding in Roundtree v. Bates, 630 P.2d 1299, 1301 (Okla.1981). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oklahoma. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McKeever v. Parker
green
2 sentences1967Shintaffer v. Rorem, 167 Okl. 647 , 31 P.2d 559 ; In re Griffin’s Estate, 199 Okl. 676 , 189 P.2d 933 ; McKeever v. Parker, 204 Okl. 1 , 226 P.2d 425 . 1967Shintaffer v. Rorem, 167 Okl. 647 , 31 P.2d 559 ; In re Griffin’s Estate, 199 Okl. 676 , 189 P.2d 933 ; McKeever v. Parker, 204 Okl. 1 , 226 P.2d 425 . | 2 | 1965–1967 |
Rosenberg v. Union Iron Works
green
1 sentence2011Williams v. Wells Fargo & Express Co., 177 F. 352 (8th Cir.1910); Rosenberg v. Union Iron Works, 109 F. 844 (N.D.Calif.1901). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Williams v. Wells Fargo & Co. Express
green
1 sentence2011Williams v. Wells Fargo & Express Co., 177 F. 352 (8th Cir.1910); Rosenberg v. Union Iron Works, 109 F. 844 (N.D.Calif.1901). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Marino Industries Corp., Cross-Appellee v. The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., Cross-Appellant
green
2 sentences1995Marino Indus., 686 F.2d at 115 . 1995Marino Indus., 686 F.2d at 115 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Breeden v. Nigh
green
1 sentence1981Phelps v. Childers, supra; Bond v. Phelps, supra; Aubrey v. Huser, supra; Breeden v. Nigh, supra. The foregoing history merely assists in focusing the scope of your inquiry to the fundamental question posed: Are the duties imposed upon the Superintendent by the provisions of SB 401 foreign to or beyond the scope and range of and nongermane to the duties of the office so as to escape the language of Article XXIII, Section 10 and Article VI, Section 34? | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Griffin v. Dohner
green
2 sentences1967Shintaffer v. Rorem, 167 Okl. 647 , 31 P.2d 559 ; In re Griffin’s Estate, 199 Okl. 676 , 189 P.2d 933 ; McKeever v. Parker, 204 Okl. 1 , 226 P.2d 425 . 1967Shintaffer v. Rorem, 167 Okl. 647 , 31 P.2d 559 ; In re Griffin’s Estate, 199 Okl. 676 , 189 P.2d 933 ; McKeever v. Parker, 204 Okl. 1 , 226 P.2d 425 . | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Shintaffer v. Rorem
neutral
2 sentences1967Shintaffer v. Rorem, 167 Okl. 647 , 31 P.2d 559 ; In re Griffin’s Estate, 199 Okl. 676 , 189 P.2d 933 ; McKeever v. Parker, 204 Okl. 1 , 226 P.2d 425 . 1967Shintaffer v. Rorem, 167 Okl. 647 , 31 P.2d 559 ; In re Griffin’s Estate, 199 Okl. 676 , 189 P.2d 933 ; McKeever v. Parker, 204 Okl. 1 , 226 P.2d 425 . | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Woodbury v. Swan
neutral
2 sentences1963“The corollary rule is equally well established that a junior mortgagee cannot assert a tax title against a senior mortgagee. 19 R.C.L. 398; Fair v. Brown, 40 Iowa 209 ; Garrettson v. Scofield, 44 Iowa 35 ; Woodbury v. Swan, 59 N.H. 22 ; Smith v. Lewis, 20 Wis. 350 ; Middletown Savings Bank v. Bacharach, 46 Conn. 513 .” It therefore seems that in jurisdictions which hold that a mortgagee, so long as the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee exists, cannot acquire title to the mortgaged property as against the mortgagor in tax sale proceedings, also follow the rule that a junior mortgagee can 1963"The corollary rule is equally well established that a junior mortgagee cannot assert a tax title against a senior mortgagee. 19 R.C.L. 398; Fair v. Brown, 40 Iowa 209 ; Garrettson v. Scofield, 44 Iowa 35 ; Woodbury v. Swan, 59 N.H. 22 ; Smith v. Lewis, 20 Wis. 350 ; Middletown Savings Bank v. Bacharach, 46 Conn. 513 ." It therefore seems that in jurisdictions which hold that a mortgagee, so long as the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee exists, cannot acquire title to the mortgaged property as against the mortgagor in tax sale proceedings, also follow the rule that a junior mortgagee can | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Middletown Savings Bank v. Bacharach
green
2 sentences1963“The corollary rule is equally well established that a junior mortgagee cannot assert a tax title against a senior mortgagee. 19 R.C.L. 398; Fair v. Brown, 40 Iowa 209 ; Garrettson v. Scofield, 44 Iowa 35 ; Woodbury v. Swan, 59 N.H. 22 ; Smith v. Lewis, 20 Wis. 350 ; Middletown Savings Bank v. Bacharach, 46 Conn. 513 .” It therefore seems that in jurisdictions which hold that a mortgagee, so long as the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee exists, cannot acquire title to the mortgaged property as against the mortgagor in tax sale proceedings, also follow the rule that a junior mortgagee can 1963"The corollary rule is equally well established that a junior mortgagee cannot assert a tax title against a senior mortgagee. 19 R.C.L. 398; Fair v. Brown, 40 Iowa 209 ; Garrettson v. Scofield, 44 Iowa 35 ; Woodbury v. Swan, 59 N.H. 22 ; Smith v. Lewis, 20 Wis. 350 ; Middletown Savings Bank v. Bacharach, 46 Conn. 513 ." It therefore seems that in jurisdictions which hold that a mortgagee, so long as the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee exists, cannot acquire title to the mortgaged property as against the mortgagor in tax sale proceedings, also follow the rule that a junior mortgagee can | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Smith v. Lewis
neutral
2 sentences1963“The corollary rule is equally well established that a junior mortgagee cannot assert a tax title against a senior mortgagee. 19 R.C.L. 398; Fair v. Brown, 40 Iowa 209 ; Garrettson v. Scofield, 44 Iowa 35 ; Woodbury v. Swan, 59 N.H. 22 ; Smith v. Lewis, 20 Wis. 350 ; Middletown Savings Bank v. Bacharach, 46 Conn. 513 .” It therefore seems that in jurisdictions which hold that a mortgagee, so long as the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee exists, cannot acquire title to the mortgaged property as against the mortgagor in tax sale proceedings, also follow the rule that a junior mortgagee can 1963"The corollary rule is equally well established that a junior mortgagee cannot assert a tax title against a senior mortgagee. 19 R.C.L. 398; Fair v. Brown, 40 Iowa 209 ; Garrettson v. Scofield, 44 Iowa 35 ; Woodbury v. Swan, 59 N.H. 22 ; Smith v. Lewis, 20 Wis. 350 ; Middletown Savings Bank v. Bacharach, 46 Conn. 513 ." It therefore seems that in jurisdictions which hold that a mortgagee, so long as the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee exists, cannot acquire title to the mortgaged property as against the mortgagor in tax sale proceedings, also follow the rule that a junior mortgagee can | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Fair v. Brown
green
2 sentences1963“The corollary rule is equally well established that a junior mortgagee cannot assert a tax title against a senior mortgagee. 19 R.C.L. 398; Fair v. Brown, 40 Iowa 209 ; Garrettson v. Scofield, 44 Iowa 35 ; Woodbury v. Swan, 59 N.H. 22 ; Smith v. Lewis, 20 Wis. 350 ; Middletown Savings Bank v. Bacharach, 46 Conn. 513 .” It therefore seems that in jurisdictions which hold that a mortgagee, so long as the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee exists, cannot acquire title to the mortgaged property as against the mortgagor in tax sale proceedings, also follow the rule that a junior mortgagee can 1963"The corollary rule is equally well established that a junior mortgagee cannot assert a tax title against a senior mortgagee. 19 R.C.L. 398; Fair v. Brown, 40 Iowa 209 ; Garrettson v. Scofield, 44 Iowa 35 ; Woodbury v. Swan, 59 N.H. 22 ; Smith v. Lewis, 20 Wis. 350 ; Middletown Savings Bank v. Bacharach, 46 Conn. 513 ." It therefore seems that in jurisdictions which hold that a mortgagee, so long as the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee exists, cannot acquire title to the mortgaged property as against the mortgagor in tax sale proceedings, also follow the rule that a junior mortgagee can | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Garrettson v. Scofield
neutral
2 sentences1963“The corollary rule is equally well established that a junior mortgagee cannot assert a tax title against a senior mortgagee. 19 R.C.L. 398; Fair v. Brown, 40 Iowa 209 ; Garrettson v. Scofield, 44 Iowa 35 ; Woodbury v. Swan, 59 N.H. 22 ; Smith v. Lewis, 20 Wis. 350 ; Middletown Savings Bank v. Bacharach, 46 Conn. 513 .” It therefore seems that in jurisdictions which hold that a mortgagee, so long as the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee exists, cannot acquire title to the mortgaged property as against the mortgagor in tax sale proceedings, also follow the rule that a junior mortgagee can 1963"The corollary rule is equally well established that a junior mortgagee cannot assert a tax title against a senior mortgagee. 19 R.C.L. 398; Fair v. Brown, 40 Iowa 209 ; Garrettson v. Scofield, 44 Iowa 35 ; Woodbury v. Swan, 59 N.H. 22 ; Smith v. Lewis, 20 Wis. 350 ; Middletown Savings Bank v. Bacharach, 46 Conn. 513 ." It therefore seems that in jurisdictions which hold that a mortgagee, so long as the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee exists, cannot acquire title to the mortgaged property as against the mortgagor in tax sale proceedings, also follow the rule that a junior mortgagee can | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Standard Brands, Inc. v. Gregor
green
1 sentence1962Payne Drilling Co. v. Shoemake, 183 Okl. 10 , 79 P.2d 806 ; Standard Brands, Inc. v. Gregor, Okl., 328 P.2d 181, 183 . | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Payne Drilling Co. v. Shoemake
green
2 sentences1962Payne Drilling Co. v. Shoemake, 183 Okl. 10 , 79 P.2d 806 ; Standard Brands, Inc. v. Gregor, Okl., 328 P.2d 181, 183 . 1962Payne Drilling Co. v. Shoemake, 183 Okl. 10 , 79 P.2d 806 ; Standard Brands, Inc. v. Gregor, Okl., 328 P.2d 181, 183 . | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Hudgens v. State Ex Rel. Mills, Co. Attorney
green
2 sentences1956It is enough that he introduce such evidence as, in the absence of all counter-testimony, will afford reasonable grounds for presuming that the allegation is true, and when it is done the onus probandi will be thrown on his adversary.” Brokeshoulder v. Brokeshoulder, 84 Okl. 249 , 204 P. 284 , 34 A.L.R. 441 . 1956It is enough that he introduce such evidence as, in the absence of all counter-testimony, will afford reasonable grounds for presuming that the allegation is true, and when it is done the onus probandi will be thrown on his adversary.” Brokeshoulder v. Brokeshoulder, 84 Okl. 249 , 204 P. 284 , 34 A.L.R. 441 . | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Brokeshoulder v. Brokeshoulder
green
1 sentence1956It is enough that he introduce such evidence as, in the absence of all counter-testimony, will afford reasonable grounds for presuming that the allegation is true, and when it is done the onus probandi will be thrown on his adversary.” Brokeshoulder v. Brokeshoulder, 84 Okl. 249 , 204 P. 284 , 34 A.L.R. 441 . | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Sanders v. State
neutral
1 sentence1925As a corollary to this rule, where it is shown that plaintiff has suffered damages, ‘ but from the nature of the case they cannot be shown with reasonable certainty, only nominal damages are recoverable.” And in the case of Gourley v. Lookabaugh, 48 Okla. 65 , 149 Pac. 1169 . this court announced the following rule: “In an action for breach of contract, if proven, the plaintiff may recover nominal damages, even though no appreciable injury has been shown.” No cross-appeal was taken, hence the question of whether the contract was joint and several, or several only, is not before us. | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Gourley v. Lookabaugh
green
1 sentence1925As a corollary to this rule, where it is shown that plaintiff has suffered damages, ‘ but from the nature of the case they cannot be shown with reasonable certainty, only nominal damages are recoverable.” And in the case of Gourley v. Lookabaugh, 48 Okla. 65 , 149 Pac. 1169 . this court announced the following rule: “In an action for breach of contract, if proven, the plaintiff may recover nominal damages, even though no appreciable injury has been shown.” No cross-appeal was taken, hence the question of whether the contract was joint and several, or several only, is not before us. | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.