corollary rule in Kansas

2025Rather, a corollary rule to the one- action rule is "that a person who is not made a party to a comparative negligence case is not bound by the judgment." Mathis v. TG & Y, 242 Kan. 789, 791 , 751 P.2d 136 (1988) (citing Eurich v. Alkire, 224 Kan. 236 , 579 P.2d 1207 [1978]).

2025Rather, a corollary rule to the one- action rule is "that a person who is not made a party to a comparative negligence case is not bound by the judgment." Mathis v. TG & Y, 242 Kan. 789, 791 , 751 P.2d 136 (1988) (citing Eurich v. Alkire, 224 Kan. 236 , 579 P.2d 1207 [1978]).

2024When the sentencing journal entry contains something that is different from the sentence pronounced from the bench at the sentencing hearing, the journal entry "must be corrected to reflect the actual sentence imposed." Abasolo, 284 Kan. 299 , Syl. ¶ 3. 13 As a corollary to this principle, our Kansas Supreme Court has found that a district court loses jurisdiction to modify a sentence after it has been ordered from the bench, except to correct clerical or mathematical errors.

2009Stated another way: “The journal entry ‘is thus a record of the sentence imposed; but the actual sentencing occurs when the defendant appears in open court and the judge orally states the terms of the sentence.’ ” Abasolo v. State, 284 Kan. 299, 303 , 160 P.3d 471 (2007).

1991A corollary to this rule is that “an instruction on an included offense is not proper if from the evidence the jury could not reasonably convict of the lesser offense.” State v. Gregory, 218 Kan. 180, 183 , 542 P.2d 1051 (1975).

1991A corollary to this rule is that “an instruction on an included offense is not proper if from the evidence the jury could not reasonably convict of the lesser offense.” State v. Gregory, 218 Kan. 180, 183 , 542 P.2d 1051 (1975).

1977Long ago in Tootle v. Berkley, 60 Kan. 446 , 56 Pac. 755 , we held: “ ‘The purpose of the law is that no judge shall hear and determine a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial, and independent.’ (Syl. paragraph 1) “Mindful of the fundamental concept from which it stems we are impelled to conclude the corollary of the rule just above stated is that when circumstances and conditions surrounding litigation are of such nature they might cast doubt and question as to the fairness or impartiality of any judgment the trial judge may pronounce, such judge, even though he is not

1977Long ago in Tootle v. Berkley, 60 Kan. 446 , 56 Pac. 755 , we held: “ ‘The purpose of the law is that no judge shall hear and determine a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial, and independent.’ (Syl. paragraph 1) “Mindful of the fundamental concept from which it stems we are impelled to conclude the corollary of the rule just above stated is that when circumstances and conditions surrounding litigation are of such nature they might cast doubt and question as to the fairness or impartiality of any judgment the trial judge may pronounce, such judge, even though he is not

2026As a corollary of this principle, the State has an affirmative duty to disclose evidence favorable to a defendant when "'the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment.'" State v. Warrior, 294 Kan. 484, 506 , 277 P.3d 1111 (2012) (quoting Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 ).

2026As a corollary of this principle, the State has an affirmative duty to disclose evidence favorable to a defendant when "'the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment.'" State v. Warrior, 294 Kan. 484, 506 , 277 P.3d 1111 (2012) (quoting Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 ).

2026As a corollary of this principle, the State has an affirmative duty to disclose evidence favorable to a defendant when "'the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment.'" State v. Warrior, 294 Kan. 484, 506 , 277 P.3d 1111 (2012) (quoting Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 ).

2026A claim asserting the State has withheld evidence in violation of this disclosure rule— commonly called a Brady claim—has three essential components: "(1) The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; (2) that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) the evidence must be material so as to establish prejudice." State v. Hirsh, 310 Kan. 321 , Syl. ¶ 1, 446 P.3d 472 (2019).

2025Rather, a corollary rule to the one- action rule is "that a person who is not made a party to a comparative negligence case is not bound by the judgment." Mathis v. TG & Y, 242 Kan. 789, 791 , 751 P.2d 136 (1988) (citing Eurich v. Alkire, 224 Kan. 236 , 579 P.2d 1207 [1978]).

2025Rather, a corollary rule to the one- action rule is "that a person who is not made a party to a comparative negligence case is not bound by the judgment." Mathis v. TG & Y, 242 Kan. 789, 791 , 751 P.2d 136 (1988) (citing Eurich v. Alkire, 224 Kan. 236 , 579 P.2d 1207 [1978]).

2024State v. Johnson, 309 Kan. 992 , 996, 441 P.3d 1036 (2019).

2022In Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439 , 618 P.2d 788 (1980), cattle died from an herbicide which contained arsenic.

2022In Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439 , 618 P.2d 788 (1980), cattle died from an herbicide which contained arsenic.

2021Carter, 270 Kan. 426 at 440- 41.

2020As a corollary of this principle, "appellate courts do not have discretionary power to entertain appeals from all district court orders." Flores Rentals, 283 Kan. at 481 .

2009A corollary to this rule is that “[t]he court’s judgment and sentence in a criminal case do not derive their effectiveness from the journal entry, or from any act of the clerk; they are effective when announced.” State v. Royse, 252 Kan. 394, 397 , 845 P.2d 44 (1993).

2009A corollary to this rule is that “[t]he court’s judgment and sentence in a criminal case do not derive their effectiveness from the journal entry, or from any act of the clerk; they are effective when announced.” State v. Royse, 252 Kan. 394, 397 , 845 P.2d 44 (1993).

2004“In the First Amendment context a corollary of this principle is that a prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.” Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 , 41 L.

2004“In the First Amendment context a corollary of this principle is that a prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.” Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 , 41 L.

2003Selecting the sentencing rationales is generally a policy choice to be made by state legislatures, not federal courts.” Ewing, 538 U.S. at 24-25 .

1992In reviewing the evidence to determine whether a lesser included instruction should have been given, this court must review the evidence in a light most favorable to the defendant.” State v. Perkins, 248 Kan. 760 , Syl. ¶ 11.

1991In re Estate of Koellen, 162 Kan. 395, 402 , 176 P.2d 544 (1947).

1991In re Estate of Koellen, 162 Kan. 395, 402 , 176 P.2d 544 (1947).

1968As a corollary to the principle that the sentencing court had a duty to impose sentence within a reasonable time after conviction, it was recognized as being within the court’s power to postpone sentence so long as imposition thereof was, in fact, contemplated in the future (State, ex rel., v. Sapp, 87 Kan. 740 , 125 Pac. 78 ); however, the court was not empowered to suspend imposition of sentence as a disciplinary measure with the understanding that sentence might or might not be subsequently rendered, depending on the good behavior of the defendant.

1968As a corollary to the principle that the sentencing court had a duty to impose sentence within a reasonable time after conviction, it was recognized as being within the court’s power to postpone sentence so long as imposition thereof was, in fact, contemplated in the future (State, ex rel., v. Sapp, 87 Kan. 740 , 125 Pac. 78 ); however, the court was not empowered to suspend imposition of sentence as a disciplinary measure with the understanding that sentence might or might not be subsequently rendered, depending on the good behavior of the defendant.

1967(See Smith v. State, 196 Kan. 438 , 411 P. 2d 663 ; Chappell v. State, 197 Kan. 407 , 416 P. 2d 786 ; Davis v. State, 197 Kan. 576 , 419 P. 2d 832 ; and cases therein cited.) The petitioner urges, nonetheless, that the trial court was obliged to hold a plenary hearing on his motion for the purpose of deter *297 mining whether his confession was legally obtained and properly admitted in evidence at his trial.

1967(See Smith v. State, 196 Kan. 438 , 411 P. 2d 663 ; Chappell v. State, 197 Kan. 407 , 416 P. 2d 786 ; Davis v. State, 197 Kan. 576 , 419 P. 2d 832 ; and cases therein cited.) The petitioner urges, nonetheless, that the trial court was obliged to hold a plenary hearing on his motion for the purpose of deter *297 mining whether his confession was legally obtained and properly admitted in evidence at his trial.

1967(See Smith v. State, 196 Kan. 438 , 411 P. 2d 663 ; Chappell v. State, 197 Kan. 407 , 416 P. 2d 786 ; Davis v. State, 197 Kan. 576 , 419 P. 2d 832 ; and cases therein cited.) The petitioner urges, nonetheless, that the trial court was obliged to hold a plenary hearing on his motion for the purpose of deter *297 mining whether his confession was legally obtained and properly admitted in evidence at his trial.

1967(See Smith v. State, 196 Kan. 438 , 411 P. 2d 663 ; Chappell v. State, 197 Kan. 407 , 416 P. 2d 786 ; Davis v. State, 197 Kan. 576 , 419 P. 2d 832 ; and cases therein cited.) The petitioner urges, nonetheless, that the trial court was obliged to hold a plenary hearing on his motion for the purpose of deter *297 mining whether his confession was legally obtained and properly admitted in evidence at his trial.

1967(See Smith v. State, 196 Kan. 438 , 411 P. 2d 663 ; Chappell v. State, 197 Kan. 407 , 416 P. 2d 786 ; Davis v. State, 197 Kan. 576 , 419 P. 2d 832 ; and cases therein cited.) The petitioner urges, nonetheless, that the trial court was obliged to hold a plenary hearing on his motion for the purpose of deter *297 mining whether his confession was legally obtained and properly admitted in evidence at his trial.

1967(See Smith v. State, 196 Kan. 438 , 411 P. 2d 663 ; Chappell v. State, 197 Kan. 407 , 416 P. 2d 786 ; Davis v. State, 197 Kan. 576 , 419 P. 2d 832 ; and cases therein cited.) The petitioner urges, nonetheless, that the trial court was obliged to hold a plenary hearing on his motion for the purpose of deter *297 mining whether his confession was legally obtained and properly admitted in evidence at his trial.

1964The appellee contends: “In the trial court and in this court appellant apparently relies principally upon the decision of this court in the case of Lester v. Doyle, 165 Kan. 354 , where it was held that where defendants sought to recover the difference in value of a truck immediately before and immediately after a collision, they could not recover for loss of use of the truck.

1961Thus, we have a finding that plaintiff was guilty of at least one act of contributory negligence in making the left turn in the middle of the block. *16 Plaintiff states in attempting to avoid the jury's answers to questions 3 and 4, supra, that: "The decisions in Kansas have uniformly held that negligence to bar a plaintiff's recovery must contribute to and be a proximate cause of the injury complained of (citing Hutchens v. McClure, 176 Kan. 43 , 269 P.2d 473 )." There can be no doubt concerning the rule stated and a corollary of that rule is that any negligence of the defendant which is suf

1961Thus, we have a finding that plaintiff was guilty of at least one act of contributory negligence in making the left turn in the middle of the block. *16 Plaintiff states in attempting to avoid the jury's answers to questions 3 and 4, supra, that: "The decisions in Kansas have uniformly held that negligence to bar a plaintiff's recovery must contribute to and be a proximate cause of the injury complained of (citing Hutchens v. McClure, 176 Kan. 43 , 269 P.2d 473 )." There can be no doubt concerning the rule stated and a corollary of that rule is that any negligence of the defendant which is suf