corollary rule in California

2018In the absence of such evidence, the People did not meet their burden to justify the warrantless search. “[T]o justify an investigative stop or detention the circumstances known or apparent to the officer must include specific and articulable facts causing him to suspect that (1) some activity relating to crime has taken place or is occurring or about to occur, and (2) the person he intends to stop or detain is involved in that activity.” (In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 893 ; People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231 ; Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 30 [ 20 L.Ed.2d at p. 911 ].) “Th

2018In the absence of such evidence, the People did not meet their burden to justify the warrantless search. “[T]o justify an investigative stop or detention the circumstances known or apparent to the officer must include specific and articulable facts causing him to suspect that (1) some activity relating to crime has taken place or is occurring or about to occur, and (2) the person he intends to stop or detain is involved in that activity.” (In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 893 ; People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231 ; Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 30 [ 20 L.Ed.2d at p. 911 ].) “Th

2024Co. of America (2010) 49 Cal.4th 315, 321 (Minkler).) “To further ensure that coverage conforms fully to the objectively reasonable expectations of the insured, the corollary rule of interpretation has developed that, in cases of ambiguity, basic coverage provisions are construed broadly in favor of affording protection, but clauses setting forth specific exclusions from coverage are interpreted narrowly against the insurer.

2024Co. of America (2010) 49 Cal.4th 315, 321 (Minkler).) “To further ensure that coverage conforms fully to the objectively reasonable expectations of the insured, the corollary rule of interpretation has developed that, in cases of ambiguity, basic coverage provisions are construed broadly in favor of affording protection, but clauses setting forth specific exclusions from coverage are interpreted narrowly against the insurer.

2024The corollary to this rule, of course, is that an investigative stop or detention predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch is unlawful, even though the officer may be acting in complete good faith.” (In re Tony C., supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 893 , fn. omitted.) 5 II.

2022We disagree. “[A]n officer may stop and detain a motorist on reasonable suspicion that the driver has violated the law.” (People v. Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078, 1082 .) The 9 subjective suspicion must be “objectively reasonable” and supported by “specific, articulable facts.” (Id. at p. 1083.) “The corollary to this rule, of course, is that an investigative stop or detention predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch is unlawful, even though the officer may be acting in complete good faith.” (In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 893 .) “We exercise independent judgment to determine the lega

2015“Our Supreme Court, anticipating imaginative counsel and the likelihood of artful drafting, has indicated that a third party is not the arbiter of the policy’s coverage. [Citations.] A corollary to this rule is that the insured may not speculate about [unpleaded] third party claims to manufacture coverage.” (Hurley Construction Co. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 533, 538 ; accord, Gunderson v. Fire Ins.

2011This approach misconstrues the principle of ‘potential liability’ under an insurance policy. ‘Although an insurer’s duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify, the duty to defend depends upon facts known to the insurer at the inception of the suit. [Citations.] . . . [f] Our Supreme Court, anticipating imaginative counsel and the likelihood of artful drafting, has indicated that a third party is not the arbiter of the policy’s coverage. [Citations.] A corollary to this rule is that the insured may not speculate about unpled third party claims to manufacture coverage.’ (Hurley Constru

2018In the absence of such evidence, the People did not meet their burden to justify the warrantless search. “[T]o justify an investigative stop or detention the circumstances known or apparent to the officer must include specific and articulable facts causing him to suspect that (1) some activity relating to crime has taken place or is occurring or about to occur, and (2) the person he intends to stop or detain is involved in that activity.” (In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 893 ; People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231 ; Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 30 [ 20 L.Ed.2d at p. 911 ].) “Th

2018In the absence of such evidence, the People did not meet their burden to justify the warrantless search. “[T]o justify an investigative stop or detention the circumstances known or apparent to the officer must include specific and articulable facts causing him to suspect that (1) some activity relating to crime has taken place or is occurring or about to occur, and (2) the person he intends to stop or detain is involved in that activity.” (In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 893 ; People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231 ; Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 30 [ 20 L.Ed.2d at p. 911 ].) “Th

2013The corollary to this rule, of course, is that an investigative stop or detention predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch is unlawful, even though the officer may be acting in complete good faith. [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (People v. Loewen (1983) 35 Cal.3d 117, 123 ; citing, inter alia, Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 22 .) Whether suspicion was reasonable must be determined by considering the totality of the circumstances.

2010The corollary to this rule, of course, is that an investigative stop or detention predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch is unlawful, even though the officer may be acting in complete good faith. [Citation.]" ( Id. at p. 893, fn. omitted.) In determining the reasonableness of a stop or detention, we must consider the totality of the circumstances. [7] ( People v. Loewen (1983) 35 Cal.3d 117, 128-129 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 846 , 672 P.2d 436 ].) "[A]n assessment of the whole picture must yield a particularized suspicion . . . that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing

2012I, § 28.) 5 “The corollary to this rule, of course, is that an investigative stop or detention predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch is unlawful, even though the officer may be acting in complete good faith. [Citation.]” (In re Tony C., supra, at p. 893, citing Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 22 .) In determining the lawfulness of a temporary detention, courts look at the “ ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” (United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 273 [

2012I, § 28.) 5 “The corollary to this rule, of course, is that an investigative stop or detention predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch is unlawful, even though the officer may be acting in complete good faith. [Citation.]” (In re Tony C., supra, at p. 893, citing Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 22 .) In determining the lawfulness of a temporary detention, courts look at the “ ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” (United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 273 [

2012I, § 28.) 5 “The corollary to this rule, of course, is that an investigative stop or detention predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch is unlawful, even though the officer may be acting in complete good faith. [Citation.]” (In re Tony C., supra, at p. 893, citing Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 22 .) In determining the lawfulness of a temporary detention, courts look at the “ ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” (United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 273 [

2012I, § 28.) 5 “The corollary to this rule, of course, is that an investigative stop or detention predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch is unlawful, even though the officer may be acting in complete good faith. [Citation.]” (In re Tony C., supra, at p. 893, citing Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 22 .) In determining the lawfulness of a temporary detention, courts look at the “ ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” (United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 273 [

2012I, § 28.) 5 “The corollary to this rule, of course, is that an investigative stop or detention predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch is unlawful, even though the officer may be acting in complete good faith. [Citation.]” (In re Tony C., supra, at p. 893, citing Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 22 .) In determining the lawfulness of a temporary detention, courts look at the “ ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” (United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 273 [

2012I, § 28.) 5 “The corollary to this rule, of course, is that an investigative stop or detention predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch is unlawful, even though the officer may be acting in complete good faith. [Citation.]” (In re Tony C., supra, at p. 893, citing Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 22 .) In determining the lawfulness of a temporary detention, courts look at the “ ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” (United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 273 [

2012I, § 28.) 5 “The corollary to this rule, of course, is that an investigative stop or detention predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch is unlawful, even though the officer may be acting in complete good faith. [Citation.]” (In re Tony C., supra, at p. 893, citing Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 22 .) In determining the lawfulness of a temporary detention, courts look at the “ ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” (United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 273 [

2012I, § 28.) 5 “The corollary to this rule, of course, is that an investigative stop or detention predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch is unlawful, even though the officer may be acting in complete good faith. [Citation.]” (In re Tony C., supra, at p. 893, citing Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 22 .) In determining the lawfulness of a temporary detention, courts look at the “ ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” (United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 273 [

2012I, § 28.) 5 “The corollary to this rule, of course, is that an investigative stop or detention predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch is unlawful, even though the officer may be acting in complete good faith. [Citation.]” (In re Tony C., supra, at p. 893, citing Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 22 .) In determining the lawfulness of a temporary detention, courts look at the “ ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” (United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 273 [

2012I, § 28.) 5 “The corollary to this rule, of course, is that an investigative stop or detention predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch is unlawful, even though the officer may be acting in complete good faith. [Citation.]” (In re Tony C., supra, at p. 893, citing Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 22 .) In determining the lawfulness of a temporary detention, courts look at the “ ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” (United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 273 [

2000I, § 15; Gideon v. Wainuright (1963) 372 U.S. 335 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 9 L.Ed.2d 799 .) The trial judge has a duty "to protect the defendant's right to a counsel who is effective." ( Smith v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 547, 559 , 68 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 440 P.2d 65 .) An informed tactical decision made by defense counsel does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. ( In re Ibarra (1983) 34 Cal.3d 277, 284 , 193 Cal. Rptr. 538 , 666 P.2d 980 .) As a corollary rule, "ineptitude or lack of industry" on the part of counsel falls well short of the mark. ( In re Saunders (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1033,104

2000I, § 15; Gideon v. Wainuright (1963) 372 U.S. 335 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 9 L.Ed.2d 799 .) The trial judge has a duty "to protect the defendant's right to a counsel who is effective." ( Smith v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 547, 559 , 68 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 440 P.2d 65 .) An informed tactical decision made by defense counsel does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. ( In re Ibarra (1983) 34 Cal.3d 277, 284 , 193 Cal. Rptr. 538 , 666 P.2d 980 .) As a corollary rule, "ineptitude or lack of industry" on the part of counsel falls well short of the mark. ( In re Saunders (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1033,104

1983Not only must he subjectively entertain such a suspicion, but it must be objectively reasonable for him to do so: the facts must be such as would cause any reasonable police officer in a like position, drawing when appropriate on his training and experience ( People v. Superior Court ( Kiefer ) [1970] 3 Cal.3d [807,] 827 [ 91 Cal. Rptr. 729 , 478 P.2d 449 , 45 A.L.R.3d 559 ]), to suspect the same criminal activity and the same involvement by the person in question. (3) The corollary to this rule, of course, is that an investigative stop or detention predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunc

1983Not only must he subjectively entertain such a suspicion, but it must be objectively reasonable for him to do so: the facts must be such as would cause any reasonable police officer in a like position, drawing when appropriate on his training and experience ( People v. Superior Court ( Kiefer ) [1970] 3 Cal.3d [807,] 827 [ 91 Cal. Rptr. 729 , 478 P.2d 449 , 45 A.L.R.3d 559 ]), to suspect the same criminal activity and the same involvement by the person in question. (3) The corollary to this rule, of course, is that an investigative stop or detention predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunc

1983Not only must he subjectively entertain such a suspicion, but it must be objectively reasonable for him to do so: the facts must be such as would cause any reasonable police officer in a like position, drawing when appropriate on his training and experience ( People v. Superior Court ( Kiefer ) [1970] 3 Cal.3d [807,] 827 [ 91 Cal. Rptr. 729 , 478 P.2d 449 , 45 A.L.R.3d 559 ]), to suspect the same criminal activity and the same involvement by the person in question. (3) The corollary to this rule, of course, is that an investigative stop or detention predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunc

1983Not only must he subjectively entertain such a suspicion, but it must be objectively reasonable for him to do so: the facts must be such as would cause any reasonable police officer in a like position, drawing when appropriate on his training and experience ( People v. Superior Court ( Kiefer ) [1970] 3 Cal.3d [807,] 827 [ 91 Cal. Rptr. 729 , 478 P.2d 449 , 45 A.L.R.3d 559 ]), to suspect the same criminal activity and the same involvement by the person in question. (3) The corollary to this rule, of course, is that an investigative stop or detention predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunc

1969Too, a corollary to this rule is that findings should be definite and certain (Sharove v. Middleman, 146 Cal.App.2d 199, 201 [ 303 P.2d 900 ]), and “Where the findings are contradictory and irreconcilable with respect to matters which are material to the merits of the case, and the determination of them, one way or the other, is essential to the correctness of the judgment, the judgment cannot stand.” (Estate of Harvey, 164 Cal.App.2d 330, 334 [ 330 P.2d 478 ].) The finding that Yadnais was substantially damaged is entirely inconsistent with the judgment; certainly if this defendant had been “

1969Too, a corollary to this rule is that findings should be definite and certain (Sharove v. Middleman, 146 Cal.App.2d 199, 201 [ 303 P.2d 900 ]), and “Where the findings are contradictory and irreconcilable with respect to matters which are material to the merits of the case, and the determination of them, one way or the other, is essential to the correctness of the judgment, the judgment cannot stand.” (Estate of Harvey, 164 Cal.App.2d 330, 334 [ 330 P.2d 478 ].) The finding that Yadnais was substantially damaged is entirely inconsistent with the judgment; certainly if this defendant had been “

1962Perry v. Jacobsen, 184 Cal.App.2d 43, 49 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 177 ] states: “It is the settled ‘rule that findings are required on all material issues raised by the pleadings and evidence, unless they are waived, and if the court renders judgment without making findings on all material issues, the ease must be reversed. ’ (James v. Haley, 212 Cal. 142, 147 [ 297 P. 920 ]; Edgar v. Hitch, 46 Cal.2d 309, 312 [ 294 P.2d 3 ]; Estate of Ingram, 99 Cal.App. 660, 662 [ 279 P. 208 ].) A corollary to this rule is that findings should be definite and certain.

1962Perry v. Jacobsen, 184 Cal.App.2d 43, 49 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 177 ] states: “It is the settled ‘rule that findings are required on all material issues raised by the pleadings and evidence, unless they are waived, and if the court renders judgment without making findings on all material issues, the ease must be reversed. ’ (James v. Haley, 212 Cal. 142, 147 [ 297 P. 920 ]; Edgar v. Hitch, 46 Cal.2d 309, 312 [ 294 P.2d 3 ]; Estate of Ingram, 99 Cal.App. 660, 662 [ 279 P. 208 ].) A corollary to this rule is that findings should be definite and certain.

2015I, § 28.) “The corollary to this rule, of course, is that an investigative stop or detention predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch is unlawful, even though the officer may be acting in complete good faith.” (In re Tony C., supra, at p. 893, citing Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 22 .) We consider “‘the totality of the circumstances’” of the case to determine whether Eastman had a “‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.’” (United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 273 .) The Attorney General argues Eastman was justified in detaining the Minor based on

2012I, § 28.) 5 “The corollary to this rule, of course, is that an investigative stop or detention predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch is unlawful, even though the officer may be acting in complete good faith. [Citation.]” (In re Tony C., supra, at p. 893, citing Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 22 .) In determining the lawfulness of a temporary detention, courts look at the “ ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” (United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 273 [

2011This approach misconstrues the principle of ‘potential liability’ under an insurance policy. ‘Although an insurer’s duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify, the duty to defend depends upon facts known to the insurer at the inception of the suit. [Citations.] . . . [f] Our Supreme Court, anticipating imaginative counsel and the likelihood of artful drafting, has indicated that a third party is not the arbiter of the policy’s coverage. [Citations.] A corollary to this rule is that the insured may not speculate about unpled third party claims to manufacture coverage.’ (Hurley Constru

2002Exchange (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1114 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 272 ] (Gunderson), italics omitted; see also Hurley Construction Co. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 533 , 538 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 629 ] (Hurley) [“Our Supreme Court, anticipating imaginative counsel and the likelihood of artful drafting, has indicated that a third party is not the arbiter of the policy’s coverage. [Citations.] A corollary to this rule is that the insured may not speculate about unpled third party claims to manufacture coverage”].) We think these latter precedents are in point in the circumstances

2018"In interpreting section 998... the offering party [has] the burden of demonstrating that the offer is a valid one under section 998. [Citation.] The corollary to this rule is that a section 998 offer must be strictly construed in favor of the party sought to be subjected to its operation." ( Barella v. Exchange Bank , supra , 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 799 , 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 167 ; *849 Elite Show Services, Inc. v. Staffpro, Inc. , supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 268 , 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 184 .) III.

2018"In interpreting section 998... the offering party [has] the burden of demonstrating that the offer is a valid one under section 998. [Citation.] The corollary to this rule is that a section 998 offer must be strictly construed in favor of the party sought to be subjected to its operation." ( Barella v. Exchange Bank , supra , 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 799 , 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 167 ; *849 Elite Show Services, Inc. v. Staffpro, Inc. , supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 268 , 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 184 .) III.