corollary rule in Alabama

2005Wayte v. United States , 470 U.S. 598 (1985)." "` McCleskey v. Kemp , 481 U.S. 279 , 292 (1987) (footnote omitted). "`The same principle applies with regard to the examination of due-process claims.

2005Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985).” ‘“McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (footnote omitted). “ ‘The same principle applies with regard to the examination of due-process claims.

1998Campbell v. State, 28 Ala. App. 240 , 182 So. 89 (1938); Copeland v. State, 23 Ala. App. 91 , 121 So. 445 . (1929)." Id. at 743.

1980Campbell v. State, 28 Ala.App. 240 , 182 So. 89 (1938); Copeland v. State, 23 Ala.App. 91 , 121 So. 445 (1929).

1998Campbell v. State, 28 Ala. App. 240 , 182 So. 89 (1938); Copeland v. State, 23 Ala. App. 91 , 121 So. 445 . (1929)." Id. at 743.

1998Campbell v. State, 28 Ala. App. 240 , 182 So. 89 (1938); Copeland v. State, 23 Ala. App. 91 , 121 So. 445 . (1929)." Id. at 743.

1998Campbell v. State, 28 Ala. App. 240 , 182 So. 89 (1938); Copeland v. State, 23 Ala. App. 91 , 121 So. 445 . (1929)." Id. at 743.

1980Campbell v. State, 28 Ala.App. 240 , 182 So. 89 (1938); Copeland v. State, 23 Ala.App. 91 , 121 So. 445 (1929).

2000Co. v. Parham , 693 So.2d 409 (Ala. 1997)).

2000Co. v. Parham, 693 So.2d 409 (Ala.1997)).

2000"As a corollary to this rule, `[w]e have held that fraud is discoverable as a matter of law for purposes of the statute of limitations when one receives documents that would put one on such notice that the *Page 690 fraud reasonably should be discovered.'" Kelly , 628 So.2d at 458 (quoting Hickox v. Stover , 551 So.2d 259 , 262 (Ala. 1989), overruled by Foremost Ins.

2000“As a corollary to this rule, ‘[w]e have held that fraud is discoverable as a matter of law for purposes of the statute of limitations when one receives documents that would put one on such notice that the fraud reasonably should be discovered.’ ” Kelly, 628 So.2d at 458 (quoting Hickox v. Stover, 551 So.2d 259, 262 (Ala.1989), overruled by Foremost Ins.

1953This is merely a corollary to the principle long established in our decisions that on appeal from a decree ‘sustaining a demurrer to the bill’ and no reference is made in the decree to the grounds of demurrer going to a part or aspect of the bill, only grounds going to the sufficiency of the bill as a whole will be considered, Penton v. Brown-Crummer Investment Co., 222 Ala. 155 , 131 So. 14 , and where a bill sets up several distinct equities, if complainant is entitled to relief on one or more, a decree sustaining the demurrer generally is to be referred to the grounds of demurrer addressed

1953This is merely a corollary to the principle long established in our decisions that on appeal from a decree ‘sustaining a demurrer to the bill’ and no reference is made in the decree to the grounds of demurrer going to a part or aspect of the bill, only grounds going to the sufficiency of the bill as a whole will be considered, Penton v. Brown-Crummer Investment Co., 222 Ala. 155 , 131 So. 14 , and where a bill sets up several distinct equities, if complainant is entitled to relief on one or more, a decree sustaining the demurrer generally is to be referred to the grounds of demurrer addressed

1953Dickson v. Van Hoose, 157 Ala. 459 , 47 So. 718 , 19 L.R.A., N.S., 719.

1953Dickson v. Van Hoose, 157 Ala. 459 , 47 So. 718 , 19 L.R.A., N.S., 719.

1922A corollary of this rule is that, where any doubt arises as to the true sense and meaning of the words themselves, or as to their application under the particular circumstances, their import may be shown by parol proof dehors the instrument itself.” See, also, Chambers v. Ringstaff, 69 Ala. 140 ; Cassels’ Mill v. Strater Bros., 166 Ala. 283 , 51 South. 969 . [7] Contracts, not clear on their face, must be interpreted in the light of the circumstances surrounding the parties, when it was made, in arriving at their intention.

1909The contract being complete with or without this phrase, it will support a cause of action; and is not subject to demurrer for uncertainty of meaning of words or phrases which do not render it void.—1 Greenl. on Ev., 278; Chambers v. Ringstaff, 69 Ala. 140 ; Gunn v. Clendenin, 68 Ala. 294 ; Drake v. Goree, 22 Ala. 409 ; Smith v. Aikin. 75 Ala. 209 ; Jones v. Anderson, 76 Ala. 427 .

2001It then noted that it was being asked "to apply a corollary principle: that a prior complying employer whose alleged negligence is at issue should not be liable in negligence if the alleged negligence occurred during, and in the course and scope of, the former complying employment, even if the workplace injury occurs after the employment relationship with that employer ends." 317 Or. at 441 , 857 P.2d at 99 .

2001It then noted that it was being asked "to apply a corollary principle: that a prior complying employer whose alleged negligence is at issue should not be liable in negligence if the alleged negligence occurred during, and in the course and scope of, the former complying employment, even if the workplace injury occurs after the employment relationship with that employer ends." 317 Or. at 441 , 857 P.2d at 99 .

1997Ashe v. Swenson , 397 U.S. 436 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970); Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 203 (1966).

1997Ashe v. Swenson , 397 U.S. 436 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970); Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 203 (1966).

1994Yet, the corollary to that rule is the exhortation that the sentencer may not refuse to consider or be precluded from considering `any relevant mitigating evidence.' Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 , 102 S.Ct. 869, 877 , 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (emphasis added [in Robison]). ". . . .

1994Yet, the corollary to that rule is the exhortation that the sentencer may not refuse to consider or be precluded from considering `any relevant mitigating evidence.' Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 , 102 S.Ct. 869, 877 , 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (emphasis added [in Robison]). ". . . .

1991Durham v. Sims, 279 Ala. 516, 517 , 187 So.2d 558, 559 (1966) ("[w]hether damages awarded for personal injuries are excessive depends on the facts of the particular case"); Birmingham Electric Co. v. Howard, 250 Ala. 421, 423 , 34 So.2d 830, 831 (1948).

1989The corollary of this rule is also true and applies here — where the evidence of the accused's guilt is slight or weak, though legally sufficient, the burden of showing probable prejudice from error will not be as great as in the case where the evidence of guilt is strong and substantial. "[M]atters that would be harmless error in some cases may be construed as reversible error where the scales are delicately balanced between guilt and innocence." 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error § 786, at 228 (1962), citing Glasser v. United States , 315 U.S. 60 , 62 S.Ct. 457 , 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942).

1989The corollary of this rule is also true and applies here — where the evidence of the accused's guilt is slight or weak, though legally sufficient, the burden of showing probable prejudice from error will not be as great as in the case where the evidence of guilt is strong and substantial. "[M]atters that would be harmless error in some cases may be construed as reversible error where the scales are delicately balanced between guilt and innocence." 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error § 786, at 228 (1962), citing Glasser v. United States , 315 U.S. 60 , 62 S.Ct. 457 , 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942).

1989The mere introduction of evidence as to how an accident could have occurred and its possible causes does not necessarily preclude application of res ipsa loquitur so long as that evidence does not clearly resolve the issue of culpability.' "39 Colo.App. at 379, 570 P.2d at 548 (emphasis added except the word 'possible'.) "Even though evidence was offered concerning the probabilities of the injury being caused by a piece of equipment or by inadequate supervision on the premises, there was no direct evidence establishing a specific act of negligence which was the only likely cause of the injury,

1989The mere introduction of evidence as to how an accident could have occurred and its possible causes does not necessarily preclude application of res ipsa loquitur so long as that evidence does not clearly resolve the issue of culpability.' "39 Colo.App. at 379, 570 P.2d at 548 (emphasis added except the word 'possible'.) "Even though evidence was offered concerning the probabilities of the injury being caused by a piece of equipment or by inadequate supervision on the premises, there was no direct evidence establishing a specific act of negligence which was the only likely cause of the injury,

1989"Overwhelming evidence of guilt does not render prejudicial error harmless . . ." Ex parte Lowe , 514 So.2d 1049 , 1050 (Ala. 1987).

1982Corp. v. Tukabatchee Area Council, Inc., Boy Scouts of America , 353 So.2d 1389 , 1391 (Ala. 1977).

1982This Court in Willis , 287 Ala. at 659 , 245 So.2d at 722 , held: "The real inquiry in the construction of a deed is to establish the intention of the parties, especially that of the grantor; but a corollary to this rule is that the intention must, if possible, be gathered from the language used in the instrument submitted for construction and that, when it can in this way be ascertained, arbitrary rules are not to be applied. * *" (Emphasis added.) We must also consider plaintiffs' contention in light of this rule of construction: "In ascertaining the intention of the parties, the plain and c

1979Co. v. Heidelberg , 228 Ala. 682 , 154 So. 809 (1934).

1979Co. v. Heidelberg , 228 Ala. 682 , 154 So. 809 (1934).

1976Dates v. State , 282 Ala. 457 , 212 So.2d 845 (1968).

1976Dates v. State , 282 Ala. 457 , 212 So.2d 845 (1968).