corollary principle in Massachusetts

1990As a corollary to the presumption of legitimacy, there evolved a rule, known as Lord Mansfield’s Rule, which provided “that where the legitimacy of a child born in lawful wedlock is in issue, in the absence of statutory authority neither the husband nor the wife may testify as to nonaccess between them.” Sayles v. Sayles, 323 Mass. 66, 67 (1948), quoting Taylor v. Whittier, 240 Mass. 514, 515-516 (1922).

1990As a corollary to the presumption of legitimacy, *688 there evolved a rule, known as Lord Mansfield's Rule, which provided "that where the legitimacy of a child born in lawful wedlock is in issue, in the absence of statutory authority neither the husband nor the wife may testify as to nonaccess between them." Sayles v. Sayles, 323 Mass. 66, 67 (1948), quoting Taylor v. Whittier, 240 Mass. 514, 515-516 (1922).

1990As a corollary to the presumption of legitimacy, there evolved a rule, known as Lord Mansfield’s Rule, which provided “that where the legitimacy of a child born in lawful wedlock is in issue, in the absence of statutory authority neither the husband nor the wife may testify as to nonaccess between them.” Sayles v. Sayles, 323 Mass. 66, 67 (1948), quoting Taylor v. Whittier, 240 Mass. 514, 515-516 (1922).

1990As a corollary to the presumption of legitimacy, *688 there evolved a rule, known as Lord Mansfield's Rule, which provided "that where the legitimacy of a child born in lawful wedlock is in issue, in the absence of statutory authority neither the husband nor the wife may testify as to nonaccess between them." Sayles v. Sayles, 323 Mass. 66, 67 (1948), quoting Taylor v. Whittier, 240 Mass. 514, 515-516 (1922).

2024Work v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 502 U.S. 956 (1991); Hunter v. Department of Air Force Agency, 846 F.2d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir. 1988); Hiyab, Inc., supra at 11-12; In re Barnes Found., 582 Pa. 370, 374 (2005).5 This rule is merely a corollary to the requirement that all motions to intervene be timely.

2024Work v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 502 U.S. 956 (1991); Hunter v. Department of Air Force Agency, 846 F.2d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir. 1988); Hiyab, Inc., supra at 11-12; In re Barnes Found., 582 Pa. 370, 374 (2005).5 This rule is merely a corollary to the requirement that all motions to intervene be timely.

2024Work v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 502 U.S. 956 (1991); Hunter v. Department of Air Force Agency, 846 F.2d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir. 1988); Hiyab, Inc., supra at 11-12; In re Barnes Found., 582 Pa. 370, 374 (2005).5 This rule is merely a corollary to the requirement that all motions to intervene be timely.

2024Work v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 502 U.S. 956 (1991); Hunter v. Department of Air Force Agency, 846 F.2d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir. 1988); Hiyab, Inc., supra at 11-12; In re Barnes Found., 582 Pa. 370, 374 (2005).5 This rule is merely a corollary to the requirement that all motions to intervene be timely.

2022Cf. Samuel Nichols, Inc. v. Molway, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 913 , 915 n.4 (1987) ("Descriptive labels such as 'bilateral' and 'unilateral' are far from universally self-defining and their utility can be limited by context"). [Note Dissent-4] A corollary rule is that, generally, the broker must do more than participate in arranging the transaction; he or she must be the "efficient cause of the sale." See Kaplan v. Henry Wenz, Inc., 331 Mass. 480, 486 (1954). [Note Dissent-5] At the outset, the majority suggests that the defendants have not raised the issue on which I base my dissent.

2014See Ali v. Boston, supra at 237 . 7 As a corollary to the requirement that a landowner must open the land to the public for certain enumerated purposes, the public use statute’s immunity applies only to “such members of the public” who enter the property for the purposes for which the owner has permitted general access.

2011See Champigny v. Commonwealth, 422 Mass. 249, 252-253 (1996) (“Different words often do mean different things”).

2011See Iodice v. Newton, 397 Mass. 329, 333-34 (1986). 6 In particular, a declaratory judgment claim does not cure the timeliness and numerosity problems identified above.

2011Affairs, 410 Mass. 100, 109-10 (1991)), but a corollary principle is that a plaintiff may not use a declaratory judgment action to circumvent jurisdictional deadlines imposed by the legislature upon the type of claims at issue.

2007The corollary of the principle stated in Seltzer v. Board of Appeals of Orleans, supra, is that “landowners may not create dimensional nonconformity if the use of adjoining land they own can avoid or diminish the nonconformity.” Burke v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Harwich, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 957, 958, 960 (1995), citing Vetter v. Zoning Bd. of Appeal of Attleboro, 330 Mass. 628, 630 (1953); Alley v. Building Inspector of Danvers, 354 Mass. at 7-8 ; Seltzer v. Board of Appeals of Orleans, supra; Planning Bd. of Norwell v. Serena, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 689, 690 (1989), S.C., 406 Mass. 1008 (1990).

2007What Callison did, in selling off parcels 28-4 and 28-5, while retaining ownership of parcel 28-2; and what Coneeny did, in building on parcel 28-5 without including the land from parcel 28-4 (then owned by his daughter, see DiStefano v. Stoughton, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 642, 644-645 [1994]), is rightly characterized as “zoning misbehavior.” Murphy v. Kotlik, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 410, 414 (1993).

2007The corollary of the principle stated in Seltzer v. Board of Appeals of Orleans, supra, is that “landowners may not create dimensional nonconformity if the use of adjoining land they own can avoid or diminish the nonconformity.” Burke v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Harwich, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 957, 958, 960 (1995), citing Vetter v. Zoning Bd. of Appeal of Attleboro, 330 Mass. 628, 630 (1953); Alley v. Building Inspector of Danvers, 354 Mass. at 7-8 ; Seltzer v. Board of Appeals of Orleans, supra; Planning Bd. of Norwell v. Serena, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 689, 690 (1989), S.C., 406 Mass. 1008 (1990).

2007What Callison did, in selling off parcels 28-4 and 28-5, while retaining ownership of parcel 28-2; and what Coneeny did, in building on parcel 28-5 without including the land from parcel 28-4 (then owned by his daughter, see DiStefano v. Stoughton, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 642, 644-645 [1994]), is rightly characterized as “zoning misbehavior.” Murphy v. Kotlik, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 410, 414 (1993).

2007The corollary of the principle stated in Seltzer v. Board of Appeals of Orleans, supra, is that “landowners may not create dimensional nonconformity if the use of adjoining land they own can avoid or diminish the nonconformity.” Burke v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Harwich, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 957, 958, 960 (1995), citing Vetter v. Zoning Bd. of Appeal of Attleboro, 330 Mass. 628, 630 (1953); Alley v. Building Inspector of Danvers, 354 Mass. at 7-8 ; Seltzer v. Board of Appeals of Orleans, supra; Planning Bd. of Norwell v. Serena, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 689, 690 (1989), S.C., 406 Mass. 1008 (1990).

2005They view testimony of an open oxygen valve as an essential predicate for the offer of the opinions and as a corollary of the requirement of Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 26 (1994): that the trial judge as gatekeeper must determine the applicability of the proffered expert opinions (or contested methodology) to the underlying facts of the case.

1990Roviaro v. United States, supra; Commonwealth v. Ennis, supra; Portomene v. United States, supra; United States v. Conforti, supra. Also involved is the corollary principle that “[a] fair and full cross-examination to develop facts in issue or relevant to the issue is a matter of absolute right and is not a mere privilege to be exercised at the sound discretion of the presiding judge, and the denial of the right is prejudicial error.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, supra at 543 , quoting Gossman v. Rosenberg, 237 Mass. 122, 124 (1921).

1983The judge temporarily blocked the city’s path by ruling that those monies could not be recovered because they had been paid voluntarily under a claim of right with full knowledge of all the relevant facts. 4 See, e.g., Carey v. Fitzpatrick, 301 Mass. 525, 527 (1938); Hinckley v. Barnstable, 311 Mass. 600, 604-605 (1942).

1983The judge temporarily blocked the city’s path by ruling that those monies could not be recovered because they had been paid voluntarily under a claim of right with full knowledge of all the relevant facts. 4 See, e.g., Carey v. Fitzpatrick, 301 Mass. 525, 527 (1938); Hinckley v. Barnstable, 311 Mass. 600, 604-605 (1942).

1981As a corollary to this standard, the Supreme Judicial Court in Jenkins v. Jenkins, 304 Mass. 248, 250 (1939), added: “In providing for the custody of a minor child, while the feelings and wishes of the parents should not be disregarded, the happiness and the welfare of the children] should be the controlling consideration.

1981It is the duty of the judge to consider the welfare of the children] in reference not merely to the present, but also to the probable future, and it is a subject peculiarly within the discretion of the judge.” For a recent restatement of these principles, see Vilakazi v. Maxie, 371 Mass. 406, 409 (1976).