corollary rule in Nebraska

1990In re Application U-2, 226 Neb. 594 , 413 N.W.2d 290 (1987).

1990In re Application U-2, 226 Neb. 594 , 413 N.W.2d 290 (1987).

2023In re Interest of Joshua M. et al., 251 Neb. 614 , 558 N.W.2d 548 (1997).

2023In re Interest of Joshua M. et al., 251 Neb. 614 , 558 N.W.2d 548 (1997).

2017Judgments § 892 (2009). - 592 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 297 Nebraska R eports CANO v. WALKER Cite as 297 Neb. 580 judgment creditor may make a valid and binding agreement, either at the time a judgment is entered or later, to release and satisfy the judgment on terms other than receiving full pay- ment of its amount.32 If the agreement to release or satisfy is executory, there is no release of the judgment until it is per- formed.33 The corollary to this rule is that once the relevant promises are performed, the agreement to release becomes effective.34 So, once the terms of the

1995Critchfield v. McNamara, ante p. 39, 532 N.W.2d 287 (1995); Humphrey v. Nebraska Public Power Dist., 243 Neb. 872 , 503 N.W.2d 211 (1993).

1995Critchfield v. McNamara, 248 Neb. 39 , 532 N.W.2d 287 (1995); Humphrey v. Nebraska Public Power Dist., 243 Neb. 872 , 503 N.W.2d 211 (1993).

1995Critchfield v. McNamara, ante p. 39, 532 N.W.2d 287 (1995); Humphrey v. Nebraska Public Power Dist., 243 Neb. 872 , 503 N.W.2d 211 (1993).

1995Critchfield v. McNamara, ante p. 39, 532 N.W.2d 287 (1995); Humphrey v. Nebraska Public Power Dist., 243 Neb. 872 , 503 N.W.2d 211 (1993).

1994Resources Dist., 246 Neb. 787 , 523 N.W.2d 510 (1994), is that it is not error to overrule an objection which is in part valid and in part invalid.

1994Resources Dist., 246 Neb. 787 , 523 N.W.2d 510 (1994), is that it is not error to overrule an objection which is in part valid and in part invalid.

1991We quote further from Rowley, supra at 475 , 505 A.2d at 503 : “An employee of an independent contractor injured on the employer’s premises by reason of a latent defect (known to the employer but not to the contractor or his employee) which existed when the work began has recourse against the employer.” The corollary of the rule expressed in that citation would be that an employee of an independent contractor or agent who had knowledge of the defect in the premises would have no recourse against the owner-principal in possession of the premises.

1990The corollary to the rule that this court does not consider assignments of error not argued in an appellant’s brief, State v. Bradley, ante p. 371, 461 N.W.2d 524 (1990), and Neb.

1982Hogg v. State, 44 App. Div. 2d 747, 354 N.Y.S.2d 729 (1974).

1982Texas Finance Co., 136 Tex. 149 , 146 S.W.2d 977 (1941), the court said: “ ‘An instrument of conveyance which conveys land definitely described in such instrument, and then excepts from which conveyance a road, railroad right of way ... as such, occupying a mere easement on, over, or across the land conveyed, conveys the fee to the entire tract, and the exception only operates to render the conveyance or grant subject to the easement.’ ” Similar language may be found in Cravens v. Jolly, 623 S.W.2d 569, 572 (Mo. App. 1981): “A corollary rule is that a grant of land with full covenants of warra

1982Texas Finance Co., 136 Tex. 149 , 146 S.W.2d 977 (1941), the court said: “ ‘An instrument of conveyance which conveys land definitely described in such instrument, and then excepts from which conveyance a road, railroad right of way ... as such, occupying a mere easement on, over, or across the land conveyed, conveys the fee to the entire tract, and the exception only operates to render the conveyance or grant subject to the easement.’ ” Similar language may be found in Cravens v. Jolly, 623 S.W.2d 569, 572 (Mo. App. 1981): “A corollary rule is that a grant of land with full covenants of warra

1980Id.

1977Dawson County State Bank v. Durland, 114 Neb. 605 , 209 N. W. 243 , states the corollary of that rule.

1977Dawson County State Bank v. Durland, 114 Neb. 605 , 209 N. W. 243 , states the corollary of that rule.

1959S., Prohibition, § 8, p. 26, as follows: “In general, three things are necessary to justify the issuance of a writ of prohibition; that the court, officer, or person against whom it is directed is about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power, that the exercise of such power by such court, officer, or person is unauthorized by law, and that it will result in injury for which there is no other adequate remedy.” In Payne v. Lee, 222 Minn. 269 , 24 N. W. 2d 259 , it was held that: “A writ of prohibition lies to prevent any inferior court from exceeding its legitimate power and authority.” Th

1959S., Prohibition, § 8, p. 26, as follows: “In general, three things are necessary to justify the issuance of a writ of prohibition; that the court, officer, or person against whom it is directed is about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power, that the exercise of such power by such court, officer, or person is unauthorized by law, and that it will result in injury for which there is no other adequate remedy.” In Payne v. Lee, 222 Minn. 269 , 24 N. W. 2d 259 , it was held that: “A writ of prohibition lies to prevent any inferior court from exceeding its legitimate power and authority.” Th