corollary principle in Pennsylvania

2024“A corollary of this principle is that a party against whom no redress is sought need not be joined.” Sprague v. Casey, 550 A.2d 184, 189 (Pa. 1988). “[T]he main inquiry for determining whether a party is indispensable involves whether justice can be accomplished in the absence of the party.[]” Stedman, 221 A.3d at 758 (quoting Rachel Carson Trails, 201 A.3d at 279 ).

2012“A corollary of this principle is that a party against whom no redress is sought need not be joined.” Sprague v. Casey, 520 Pa. 38, 49 , 550 A.2d 184, 189 (1988) citing Kern v. Duquesne Brewing Co., 396 Pa. 279 , 152 A.2d 682 (1959); In re Culbertson’s Estate, 152 A. 540 (1930).

1979A corollary to the rule is that: “ ‘The parties [have] the right to make their own contract, and it is not the function of this Court to rewrite it, or to give it a construction in conflict with the accepted and plain meaning of the language used.’” Hagarty v. William Akers, Jr., Co., Inc., 342 Pa. 236, 239 , 20 A. 2d 317, 319 (1941).

1979A corollary to the rule is that: “ ‘The parties [have] the right to make their own contract, and it is not the function of this Court to rewrite it, or to give it a construction in conflict with the accepted and plain meaning of the language used.’” Hagarty v. William Akers, Jr., Co., Inc., 342 Pa. 236, 239 , 20 A. 2d 317, 319 (1941).

2021See also Comdyne I, Inc. v. Corbin, 908 F.2d 1142, 1149-50 (3rd Cir. 1990) (the corollary to the principle established in New Jersey and elsewhere, that one wronged by the actions of another is required to mitigate damages, is that a wronged party may recover for expenditures made in a reasonable effort to avert the harm caused by a defendant).

2021See also Comdyne I, Inc. v. Corbin, 908 F.2d 1142, 1149-50 (3rd Cir. 1990) (the corollary to the principle established in New Jersey and elsewhere, that one wronged by the actions of another is required to mitigate damages, is that a wronged party may recover for expenditures made in a reasonable effort to avert the harm caused by a defendant).

2011However, we are also bound by the corollary principle that if a sufficient legal remedy exists "a court is divested of equity jurisdiction." Pentlong v. GLS Capital, 573 Pa. 34, 43 , 820 A.2d 1240, 1245 (2003).

2011However, we are also bound by the corollary principle that if a sufficient legal remedy exists "a court is divested of equity jurisdiction." Pentlong v. GLS Capital, 573 Pa. 34, 43 , 820 A.2d 1240, 1245 (2003).

1985With respect to the threshold issue of arbitrability, our Supreme Court stated in County of Allegheny v. Allegheny County Prison Employees Independent Union, 476 Pa. 27 , 381 A.2d 849 (1977): As this Court noted in Board of Education of Philadelphia v. Federation of Teachers Local No. 3, 464 Pa. 92, 99 , 346 A.2d 35, 39 (1975), Pennsylvania labor policy not only favors but requires the submission to arbitration of public employee grievances “arising out of the interpretation of the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement”. [Citation omitted.] From this policy is derived the corollary p

1985With respect to the threshold issue of arbitrability, our Supreme Court stated in County of Allegheny v. Allegheny County Prison Employees Independent Union, 476 Pa. 27 , 381 A.2d 849 (1977): As this Court noted in Board of Education of Philadelphia v. Federation of Teachers Local No. 3, 464 Pa. 92, 99 , 346 A.2d 35, 39 (1975), Pennsylvania labor policy not only favors but requires the submission to arbitration of public employee grievances “arising out of the interpretation of the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement”. [Citation omitted.] From this policy is derived the corollary p

1972The first was set forth by this Court in Kline v. Harrisburg, 362 Pa. 438, 447 , 68 A. 2d 182 (1949) : ‘It is settled in Pennsylvania that in the absence of the granting of specific power from the Legislature municipalities do not have the authority to pass zoning ordinances.’ The second, a corollary rule, was also noted in Kline, supra, at 451: ‘It is to be remembered, however, as was stated in White’s Appeal, 287 Pa. 259, 266 (1926) that “While (zoning) regulations may not physically take the property, they do so regulate its use as to deprive the owner of a substantial right therein without

1970The first was set forth by this Court in Kline v. Harrisburg, 362 Pa. 438, 447 , 68 A. 2d 182 (1949) : “It is settled in Pennsylvania that in the absence of the granting of specific power from the Legislature municipalities do not have the authority to pass zoning ordinances.” The second, a corollary rule, was also noted in Kline, supra,, at 451: “It is to be remembered, however, as was stated in White’s Appeal, 287 Pa. 259, 266 (1926) that ‘While (zoning) regulations may not physically take the property, they do so *307 regulate its use as to deprive the owner of a substantial right therein w

1990From this policy, the corollary principle is derived that where an arbitrator has interpreted a CBA in favor of arbitrability of the grievance, “a reviewing court should be slow indeed to disagree.” Appeal of Chester-Upland School District, 55 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 102, 105-06 , 423 A.2d 437, 440 (1980), citing County of Allegheny v. Allegheny County Prison Employees Independent Union, 476 Pa. 27 , 381 A.2d 849 (1977).

1990From this policy, the corollary principle is derived that where an arbitrator has interpreted a CBA in favor of arbitrability of the grievance, “a reviewing court should be slow indeed to disagree.” Appeal of Chester-Upland School District, 55 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 102, 105-06 , 423 A.2d 437, 440 (1980), citing County of Allegheny v. Allegheny County Prison Employees Independent Union, 476 Pa. 27 , 381 A.2d 849 (1977).

1981The corollary to this test is that since “... counsel does not forego an alternative which offers a substantially greater potential for success when he fails to assert a baseless claim, counsel cannot be found to have been ineffective for failing to make such an assertion.” Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259, 277 , 372 A.2d 687, 695 (1977).

1981The corollary to this test is that since “... counsel does not forego an alternative which offers a substantially greater potential for success when he fails to assert a baseless claim, counsel cannot be found to have been ineffective for failing to make such an assertion.” Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259, 277 , 372 A.2d 687, 695 (1977).

2024“A corollary of this principle is that a party against whom no redress is sought need not be joined.” Sprague v. Casey, 550 A.2d 184, 189 (Pa. 1988). “[T]he main inquiry for determining whether a party is indispensable involves whether justice can be accomplished in the absence of the party.[]” Stedman, 221 A.3d at 758 (quoting Rachel Carson Trails, 201 A.3d at 279 ).

2024In conducting this inquiry, “the nature of the particular claim and the type of relief sought should be considered.” Rachel Carson Trails, 201 A.3d at 279, n.32 .40 We also “note the general principle that, in an action for declaratory judgment, all persons having an interest that would be affected by the declaratory relief sought ordinarily must be made parties to the action.” City of Phila., 838 A.2d at 581-82 . 40 Whether a party is indispensable also is said to include an examination of whether the absent parties have a right or interest related to the claim; if so, the nature of the right

2022Where a jury is fully and adequately instructed on the elements of a crime, and where it appears that a charge on mere presence is not essential to their understanding of the case, the trial court may refuse to issue a specific instruction on mere presence. - 10 - J-S01001-22 Commonwealth v. La, 640 A.2d 1336, 1344 (Pa.Super. 1994) (cleaned up).

2021Compare Commonwealth v. Hamlett, 234 A.3d 486 , 489 (Pa. 2020) (holding that Superior Court’s sua sponte finding of harmless error to affirm criminal convictions is part of the right-for-any-reason doctrine) with Commonwealth v. Clair, 326 A.2d 272, 273 (Pa. 1974) (prohibiting invocation of the basic-and-fundamental-error doctrine in criminal matters; stating that such matters are more properly resolved through the post-conviction-relief process). - 10 - J-S48005-20 In this case, the trial court did not decide if the Commonwealth violated Brady or the Rules of Criminal Procedure, because Felde

2020BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1358 (8th ed. 2004)); accord Brown v. Spilman, 155 U.S. 665, 669-70 , 15 S. Ct. 245, 247 (1895).1 A corollary to this rule is that an aggrieved property 1The term “capture” is also drawn from an analogy to wild animals.

2020BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1358 (8th ed. 2004)); accord Brown v. Spilman, 155 U.S. 665, 669-70 , 15 S. Ct. 245, 247 (1895).1 A corollary to this rule is that an aggrieved property 1The term “capture” is also drawn from an analogy to wild animals.

2018See, e.g., Nichols v. City of Corry , 53 Pa.Cmwlth. 248 , 417 A.2d 836 (1980) (the trial court properly excluded testimony of city council members about their intent in passing an ordinance because "[i]t has long been settled, as a corollary to the rule that legislators are generally immune from suit, that members of a legislative body are not subject to inquiry incident to any challenge of its legislation.").

2018See, e.g., Nichols v. City of Corry , 53 Pa.Cmwlth. 248 , 417 A.2d 836 (1980) (the trial court properly excluded testimony of city council members about their intent in passing an ordinance because "[i]t has long been settled, as a corollary to the rule that legislators are generally immune from suit, that members of a legislative body are not subject to inquiry incident to any challenge of its legislation.").

2015"Unfair prejudice" is defined as " ... a tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis or to divert the jury's attention away from its duty of weighing tile evidence impartially." Id., Official Comment; Commonwealth v. Wright, 599 Pa. 270, 325 , 961 A.2d 119, 151 (2008).

2015"Unfair prejudice" is defined as " ... a tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis or to divert the jury's attention away from its duty of weighing tile evidence impartially." Id., Official Comment; Commonwealth v. Wright, 599 Pa. 270, 325 , 961 A.2d 119, 151 (2008).

2013In this connection, if the merits of a case can be determined without prejudice to the rights of an absent party, the court may proceed.” Sprague v. Casey, 520 Pa. 38, 48-49 , 550 A.2d 184, 189 (1988) (citations omitted); see also Banfield v. Cortes, 922 A.2d 36 (Pa.Cmwlth.2007). .

2011Accord Commonwealth v. Moore, 580 Pa. 279 , 860 A.2d 88 , 101 n. 1 (2004) (Saylor, J., concurring).

2011Accord Commonwealth v. Moore, 580 Pa. 279 , 860 A.2d 88 , 101 n. 1 (2004) (Saylor, J., concurring).

2011Co. v. Law Offices of Carole F. Kafrissen, P.C., 186 F.Supp.2d 567, 571-72 (E.D.Pa.2002) ("A corollary to the rule, crafted by Pennsylvania courts, cloaks communications from the attorney to the client with privilege if disclosure of the communication would reveal the communications from the client to the attorney."). [11] In this last regard, it was certainly implicit in Appellants' averments that the withheld documents contained legal advice, as, for example, they advanced a line of argument centered on the application of the advice-of-counsel defense.

2011Co. v. Law Offices of Carole F. Kafrissen, P.C., 186 F.Supp.2d 567, 571-72 (E.D.Pa.2002) ("A corollary to the rule, crafted by Pennsylvania courts, cloaks communications from the attorney to the client with privilege if disclosure of the communication would reveal the communications from the client to the attorney.”). .