Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
11 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
O'Keefe v. Utah State Retirement Boardgreen2 sentences2004"A corollary of this rule is that 'a statutory term should be interpreted and applied according to its usually accepted meaning, where the ordinary meaning of the term results in an application that is neither unreasonably confused, inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction of the express purpose of the statute." " O'Keefe, 956 P.2d at 281 (quoting Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814 P2d 581, 590 (Utah 1991)). 1 8 Pursuant to the 2001 version of section 41-6-44, under which Pixton was charged and convicted, a violation of the statute "is a third degree felony if it is committed[ ] within t 2001A corollary of this rule is that 'a statutory term should be interpreted and applied according to its usually accepted meaning, where the ordinary meaning of the term results in an application that is neither unreasonably confused, inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction of the express purpose of the statute." " Id. (quoting O'Keefe v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 956 P.2d 279, 281 (Utah 1998). $10 Although some jurisdictions permit imperfect self-defense to mitigate a homicide offense where the defendant had an actual, unreasonable belief that lethal force was necessary, other jurisdictions on | 2 | 3 |
Morton International, Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commissiongreen2 sentences2004"A corollary of this rule is that 'a statutory term should be interpreted and applied according to its usually accepted meaning, where the ordinary meaning of the term results in an application that is neither unreasonably confused, inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction of the express purpose of the statute." " O'Keefe, 956 P.2d at 281 (quoting Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814 P2d 581, 590 (Utah 1991)). 1 8 Pursuant to the 2001 version of section 41-6-44, under which Pixton was charged and convicted, a violation of the statute "is a third degree felony if it is committed[ ] within t 1998A corollary of this rule is that “a statutory term should be interpreted and applied according to its usually accepted meaning, where the ordinary meaning of the term results in an application that is neither unreasonably confused, inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction of the express purpose of the statute.” Morton Int’l, Inc. v. Auditing Din, 814 P.2d 581, 590 (Utah 1991); accord Archer v. Board of Lands & Forestry, 907 P.2d 1142, 1145 (Utah 1995); Commercial Inv. | 2 | 2 |
Badger v. MacGillivraygreen1 sentence2026See id. ¶25 A contract is not enforceable if it contains a condition and the condition has not been fulfilled. | 1 | 1 |
Archer v. Board of State Lands & Forestrygreen1 sentence1998A corollary of this rule is that “a statutory term should be interpreted and applied according to its usually accepted meaning, where the ordinary meaning of the term results in an application that is neither unreasonably confused, inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction of the express purpose of the statute.” Morton Int’l, Inc. v. Auditing Din, 814 P.2d 581, 590 (Utah 1991); accord Archer v. Board of Lands & Forestry, 907 P.2d 1142, 1145 (Utah 1995); Commercial Inv. | 1 | 1 |
Commercial Investment Corp. v. Siggardgreen1 sentence1998Corp. v. Siggard, 936 P.2d 1105, 1111 (Utah Ct.App.1997); B.L. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bellgreen2 sentences1994As a corollary of that principle, we construe statutes, if possible, to avoid the risk of running afoul of constitutional prohibitions." State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 82 (Utah 1982) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 , 103 S.Ct. 341 , 74 L.Ed.2d 383 (1982); State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 397 (Utah 1989). 1994As a corollary of that principle, we construe statutes, if possible, to avoid the risk of running afoul of constitutional prohibitions.” State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 82 (Utah 1982) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 , 103 S.Ct. 341 , 74 L.Ed.2d 383 (1982); State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 397 (Utah 1989). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Woodgreen2 sentences1994As a corollary of that principle, we construe statutes, if possible, to avoid the risk of running afoul of constitutional prohibitions." State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 82 (Utah 1982) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 , 103 S.Ct. 341 , 74 L.Ed.2d 383 (1982); State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 397 (Utah 1989). 1994As a corollary of that principle, we construe statutes, if possible, to avoid the risk of running afoul of constitutional prohibitions.” State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 82 (Utah 1982) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 , 103 S.Ct. 341 , 74 L.Ed.2d 383 (1982); State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 397 (Utah 1989). | 1 | 1 |
Utah Farm Production Credit Ass'n v. Coxgreen1 sentence1987A corollary to this rule is that the aggrieved party may not, either by action or inaction, aggravate the injury occasioned by the breach, but has a duty actively to mitigate his damages. *1215 Utah Farm Production Credit Association v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62, 64 (Utah 1981) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Boyergreen2 sentences1982In re Boyer, Utah, 636 P.2d 1085 *83 (1982); Ellis v. Social Services Department, Utah, 615 P.2d 1250 (1980); Gord v. Salt Lake City, Utah, 20 Utah 2d 138 , 434 P.2d 449 (1967). 1982In re Boyer, Utah, 636 P.2d 1085 (1982); Ellis v. Social Services Department, Utah, 615 P.2d 1250 (1980); Gord v. Salt Lake City, Utah, 20 Utah 2d 138 , 434 P.2d 449 (1967). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Bohne
neutral
1 sentence2001A corollary of this rule is that 'a statutory term should be interpreted and applied according to its usually accepted meaning, where the ordinary meaning of the term results in an application that is neither unreasonably confused, inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction of the express purpose of the statute." " Id. (quoting O'Keefe v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 956 P.2d 279, 281 (Utah 1998). $10 Although some jurisdictions permit imperfect self-defense to mitigate a homicide offense where the defendant had an actual, unreasonable belief that lethal force was necessary, other jurisdictions on | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Wood v. Utah
green
2 sentences1994As a corollary of that principle, we construe statutes, if possible, to avoid the risk of running afoul of constitutional prohibitions.” State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 82 (Utah 1982) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 , 103 S.Ct. 341 , 74 L.Ed.2d 383 (1982); State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 397 (Utah 1989). 1994As a corollary of that principle, we construe statutes, if possible, to avoid the risk of running afoul of constitutional prohibitions.” State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 82 (Utah 1982) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 , 103 S.Ct. 341 , 74 L.Ed.2d 383 (1982); State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 397 (Utah 1989). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Colorado Water Quality Control Commission v. Town of Frederick
green
1 sentence1994It is well settled under this doctrine that persons aggrieved by decisions of administrative agencies “may not, by refusing or neglecting to submit issues of fact to such agencies, by-pass them, and call upon the courts to determine ... matters properly determinable originally by such agencies.” Id. (quoting People v. Keith Ry. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Ellis v. SOCIAL SERVICES DEPT., ETC.
green
2 sentences1982In re Boyer, Utah, 636 P.2d 1085 *83 (1982); Ellis v. Social Services Department, Utah, 615 P.2d 1250 (1980); Gord v. Salt Lake City, Utah, 20 Utah 2d 138 , 434 P.2d 449 (1967). 1982In re Boyer, Utah, 636 P.2d 1085 (1982); Ellis v. Social Services Department, Utah, 615 P.2d 1250 (1980); Gord v. Salt Lake City, Utah, 20 Utah 2d 138 , 434 P.2d 449 (1967). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Gord v. Salt Lake City
green
2 sentences1982In re Boyer, Utah, 636 P.2d 1085 (1982); Ellis v. Social Services Department, Utah, 615 P.2d 1250 (1980); Gord v. Salt Lake City, Utah, 20 Utah 2d 138 , 434 P.2d 449 (1967). 1982In re Boyer, Utah, 636 P.2d 1085 (1982); Ellis v. Social Services Department, Utah, 615 P.2d 1250 (1980); Gord v. Salt Lake City, Utah, 20 Utah 2d 138 , 434 P.2d 449 (1967). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Fowler v. Lanpher
neutral
2 sentences1981NOTES [1] The record contains testimony that nine or ten future annual payments were then expected, in the total amount of approximately $18,000 to $20,000. [2] A corollary rule, also referred to in Clayton v. Behle, supra, that all beneficiaries can terminate a trust even though its continuance is necessary to carry out a material purpose of the trust when the settlor(s) consent to its termination, Fowler v. Lanpher, 193 Wash. 308 , 75 P.2d 132 (1938); Bogert, Trusts & Trustees, § 1005 (2d ed. 1962); 4 Scott on Trusts, § 338 (3d ed. 1967), is inapplicable to this case because appellant, one o 1981NOTES [1] The record contains testimony that nine or ten future annual payments were then expected, in the total amount of approximately $18,000 to $20,000. [2] A corollary rule, also referred to in Clayton v. Behle, supra, that all beneficiaries can terminate a trust even though its continuance is necessary to carry out a material purpose of the trust when the settlor(s) consent to its termination, Fowler v. Lanpher, 193 Wash. 308 , 75 P.2d 132 (1938); Bogert, Trusts & Trustees, § 1005 (2d ed. 1962); 4 Scott on Trusts, § 338 (3d ed. 1967), is inapplicable to this case because appellant, one o | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Clayton v. Behle
green
2 sentences1981A corollary rule, also referred to in Clayton v. Behle, supra, that all beneficiaries can terminate a trust even though its continuance is necessary to carry out a material purpose of the trust when the settlor(s) consent to its termination, Fowler v. Lanpher, 193 Wash. 308 , 75 P.2d 132 (1938); Bogert, Trusts & Trustees, § 1005 (2d ed. 1962); 4 Scott on Trusts, § 338 (3d ed. 1967), is inapplicable to this case because appellant, one of the settlors, resisted termination. 1981NOTES [1] The record contains testimony that nine or ten future annual payments were then expected, in the total amount of approximately $18,000 to $20,000. [2] A corollary rule, also referred to in Clayton v. Behle, supra, that all beneficiaries can terminate a trust even though its continuance is necessary to carry out a material purpose of the trust when the settlor(s) consent to its termination, Fowler v. Lanpher, 193 Wash. 308 , 75 P.2d 132 (1938); Bogert, Trusts & Trustees, § 1005 (2d ed. 1962); 4 Scott on Trusts, § 338 (3d ed. 1967), is inapplicable to this case because appellant, one o | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Rivas Ex Rel. Rivas v. Pacific Finance Co.
green
2 sentences1979This Court in Rivas v. Pacific Finance Co., 16 Utah 2d 183, 185 , 397 P.2d 990 (1964), stated as a corollary to the requirement that a child exercise that degree of care appropriate for his age, “that when a child is known to be in a situation of possible danger, there is a duty to observe extra caution for his safety.” The Court then explained (id.): This is but a particularized application of the usual standard requirement of due care under the circumstances, the modifying circumstance being the fact that a child is involved. 1979This Court in Rivas v. Pacific Finance Co., 16 Utah 2d 183, 185 , 397 P.2d 990 (1964), stated as a corollary to the requirement that a child exercise that degree of care appropriate for his age, “that when a child is known to be in a situation of possible danger, there is a duty to observe extra caution for his safety.” The Court then explained (id.): This is but a particularized application of the usual standard requirement of due care under the circumstances, the modifying circumstance being the fact that a child is involved. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.