corollary rule in Maryland

2023Hosp., 105 N.E.2d 92 , 93 (N.Y. 1914) (Cardozo, J.), overruled on other grounds by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957)); Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 188, 210-11 (1993) (providing that, as a corollary to the doctrine of informed consent, there exists a “Maryland common-law right of a competent adult to refuse treatment.”).

2023Hosp., 105 N.E.2d 92 , 93 (N.Y. 1914) (Cardozo, J.), overruled on other grounds by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957)); Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 188, 210-11 (1993) (providing that, as a corollary to the doctrine of informed consent, there exists a “Maryland common-law right of a competent adult to refuse treatment.”).

1993See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207 , 741 P.2d 674, 682 (1987) (federal and state); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal.App.3d 1127 , 225 Cal.Rptr. 297, 301 (1986) (federal and state); In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156, 158 (Del.Ch.1980) (federal); In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1244-47 (D.C.1990) (federal); In re Guardianship of Browning, 543 So.2d 258, 267 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (state), aff'd, 568 So.2d 4 (Fla.1990); Brophy, 497 N.E.2d at 633 (federal); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728 , 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (1977) (federal); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10 , 3

1993See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207 , 741 P.2d 674, 682 (1987) (federal and state); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal.App.3d 1127 , 225 Cal.Rptr. 297, 301 (1986) (federal and state); In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156, 158 (Del.Ch.1980) (federal); In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1244-47 (D.C.1990) (federal); In re Guardianship of Browning, 543 So.2d 258, 267 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (state), aff'd, 568 So.2d 4 (Fla.1990); Brophy, 497 N.E.2d at 633 (federal); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728 , 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (1977) (federal); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10 , 3

1993See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207 , 741 P.2d 674, 682 (1987) (federal and state); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal.App.3d 1127 , 225 Cal.Rptr. 297, 301 (1986) (federal and state); In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156, 158 (Del.Ch.1980) (federal); In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1244-47 (D.C.1990) (federal); In re Guardianship of Browning, 543 So.2d 258, 267 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (state), aff'd, 568 So.2d 4 (Fla.1990); Brophy, 497 N.E.2d at 633 (federal); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728 , 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (1977) (federal); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10 , 3

1993See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207 , 741 P.2d 674, 682 (1987) (federal and state); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal.App.3d 1127 , 225 Cal.Rptr. 297, 301 (1986) (federal and state); In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156, 158 (Del.Ch.1980) (federal); In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1244-47 (D.C.1990) (federal); In re Guardianship of Browning, 543 So.2d 258, 267 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (state), aff'd, 568 So.2d 4 (Fla.1990); Brophy, 497 N.E.2d at 633 (federal); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728 , 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (1977) (federal); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10 , 3

1993See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207 , 741 P.2d 674, 682 (1987) (federal and state); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App.3d 1127 , 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 301 (1986) (federal and state); In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156, 158 (Del.

1993See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207 , 741 P.2d 674, 682 (1987) (federal and state); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal.App.3d 1127 , 225 Cal.Rptr. 297, 301 (1986) (federal and state); In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156, 158 (Del.Ch.1980) (federal); In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1244-47 (D.C.1990) (federal); In re Guardianship of Browning, 543 So.2d 258, 267 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (state), aff'd, 568 So.2d 4 (Fla.1990); Brophy, 497 N.E.2d at 633 (federal); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728 , 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (1977) (federal); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10 , 3

1983The corollary to this principle is that if a prosecutor who would have been disqualified is involved in his official capacity in the bringing of charges (by way of indictment or information) against the defendant, then upon timely objection the charges will be dismissed, or if such a prosecutor participates in his offícial capacity in the prosecution of the case, then upon timely objection any resulting conviction will be reversed and a new trial ordered.”Sinclair, 278 Md. at 254-55 , 363 A.2d at 475 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).

1983The corollary to this principle is that if a prosecutor who would have been disqualified is involved in his official capacity in the bringing of charges (by way of indictment or information) against the defendant, then upon timely objection the charges will be dismissed, or if such a prosecutor participates in his offícial capacity in the prosecution of the case, then upon timely objection any resulting conviction will be reversed and a new trial ordered.”Sinclair, 278 Md. at 254-55 , 363 A.2d at 475 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).

2013A corollary rule of construction is that if there is no clear indication to the contrary and it is reasonably possible, a statute is to be read so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase shall be rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.” 211 Md. at 361 , 127 A.2d at 627 (internal citations omitted). .

2013A corollary rule of construction is that if there is no clear indication to the contrary and it is reasonably possible, a statute is to be read so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase shall be rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.” 211 Md. at 361 , 127 A.2d at 627 (internal citations omitted). .

1979Harden v. Mass Transit Adm., 277 Md. 399, 406 (1976).

1979See generally, Bradshaw v. Prince George’s County, 284 Md. 294 , 3961 A. 2d 255 (1979); Harden v. Mass Transit Administration, 277 Md. 399 , 354 A. 2d 817 (1976); Slate v. Zitomer, 275 Md. 534 , 341 A. 2d 789 (1975), cert. den., 423 U. S. 1076 ; Maryland-Nat.

1978Judge Smith, speaking for the Court of Appeals in Thomas v. State, 277 Md. 314, 317 , stated: “We have said many times that a hornbook rule of statutory construction is that in ascertaining the intention of the Legislature all parts of a statute are to be read together to find the intention as to any one part and that all parts are to be reconciled and harmonized if possible and that a corollary to that rule is that if there is no clear indication to the contrary and it is reasonably possible, a statute is to be read so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase shall be rendered surplusage, sup

1975See, e.g., Kadan v. Bd. of Sup. of Elections, 273 Md. 406, 415 , 329 A. 2d 702 (1974); A. H.

2019Mazor v. State Dep’t of Correction, 279 Md. 355, 362 (1977) (“As a corollary of the rule that we accord words their ordinary meaning, we must accord sentences an ordinary grammatical structure.”).

1998“As a corollary of the rule that we accord words their ordinary meaning, we must accord sentences an ordinary grammatical structure.” Mazor, 279 Md. at 363 , 369 A.2d 82 .

1992In Jennings v. Government Employees Ins., 302 Md. 352 , 488 A.2d 166 (1985), the Court of Appeals held that “a clause in an insurance policy, which is contrary to the ‘public policy of this State, as set forth in ... the Insurance Code’ or other statute, is invalid and unenforceable.” Jennings, 302 Md. at 356 , 488 A.2d 166 , quoting Guardian Life Ins. v. Insurance Comm’r, 293 Md. 629, 643 , 446 A.2d 1140 (1982).

1992In Jennings v. Government Employees Ins., 302 Md. 352 , 488 A.2d 166 (1985), the Court of Appeals held that “a clause in an insurance policy, which is contrary to the ‘public policy of this State, as set forth in ... the Insurance Code’ or other statute, is invalid and unenforceable.” Jennings, 302 Md. at 356 , 488 A.2d 166 , quoting Guardian Life Ins. v. Insurance Comm’r, 293 Md. 629, 643 , 446 A.2d 1140 (1982).

1981See also, Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 241 Md. 137 , 215 A.2d 825 (1966). 4 .

1981See also, Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 241 Md. 137 , 215 A.2d 825 (1966). 4 .

1978Judge Smith, speaking for the Court of Appeals in Thomas v. State, 277 Md. 314, 317 , stated: “We have said many times that a hornbook rule of statutory construction is that in ascertaining the intention of the Legislature all parts of a statute are to be read together to find the intention as to any one part and that all parts are to be reconciled and harmonized if possible and that a corollary to that rule is that if there is no clear indication to the contrary and it is reasonably possible, a statute is to be read so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase shall be rendered surplusage, sup

1977See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 277 Md. 314, 317 , 353 A. 2d 256 (1976), and the cases there cited.

2019As a corollary to that principle, when a local jurisdiction exercises a power delegated to it by the General Assembly, the local jurisdiction’s power is “subject to the terms upon which it is delegated.” Hewitt v. County Comm’rs of Baltimore County, 220 Md. 48, 63 (1959); see also West Montgomery County Citizens Ass’n v. Maryland-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n, 309 Md. 183, 198-99 (1987) (invalidating county’s exercise of power “in any manner other than that specifically authorized” by the enabling statute).

2019As a corollary to that principle, when a local jurisdiction exercises a power delegated to it by the General Assembly, the local jurisdiction’s power is “subject to the terms upon which it is delegated.” Hewitt v. County Comm’rs of Baltimore County, 220 Md. 48, 63 (1959); see also West Montgomery County Citizens Ass’n v. Maryland-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n, 309 Md. 183, 198-99 (1987) (invalidating county’s exercise of power “in any manner other than that specifically authorized” by the enabling statute).

2013Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction § 46.6 (7th ed. 2007); see also, e.g., Briggs v. State, 413 Md. 265, 277 (2010) (giving weight to the Legislature’s use of a particular word “without any qualification”).

2009“Occasionally we see fit to examine extrinsic sources of legislative intent merely as a check of our reading of a statute’s plain language.” Robey v. State, 397 Md. 449, 454 , 918 A.2d 499, 502 (2007), citing Stanley v. State, 390 Md. 175, 185 , 887 A.2d 1078, 1084 (2005).

2009“Occasionally we see fit to examine extrinsic sources of legislative intent merely as a check of our reading of a statute’s plain language.” Robey v. State, 397 Md. 449, 454 , 918 A.2d 499, 502 (2007), citing Stanley v. State, 390 Md. 175, 185 , 887 A.2d 1078, 1084 (2005).