corollary rule in Washington

2008A corollary to the rule is that "the presence of a comma before the qualifying phrase is evidence the qualifier is intended to apply to all antecedents instead of only the immediately preceding one." Sehome Park, 127 Wash.2d at 781-82 , 903 P.2d 443 .

2008A corollary to the rule is that “the presence of a comma before the qualifying phrase is evidence the qualifier is intended to apply to all antecedents instead of only the immediately preceding one.” Sehome Park, 127 Wn.2d at 781-82 .

2008A corollary to the rule is that "the presence of a comma before the qualifying phrase is evidence the qualifier is intended to apply to all antecedents instead of only the immediately preceding one." Sehome Park, 127 Wash.2d at 781-82 , 903 P.2d 443 .

2004A corollary to that rule is that "the presence of a comma before the qualifying phrase is evidence the qualifier is intended to apply to all antecedents instead of only the immediately preceding one." Sehome Park Care Ctr., 127 Wash.2d at 781-82 , 903 P.2d 443 . [4] RCW 9A.42.020(1), the first degree criminal mistreatment statute, provides: A parent of a child, the person entrusted with the physical custody of a child or dependent person, or a person employed to provide to the child or dependent person the basic necessities of life is guilty of criminal mistreatment in the first degree if he o

2021“A corollary rule is that the State cannot require the defendant to disprove any fact that constitutes the crime charged.” W.R., 181 Wn.2d at 762 . “[W]hen a defense necessarily negates an element of the crime, it violates due process to place the burden of proof on the defendant.” Id. at 765 .

2021“A corollary rule is that the State cannot require the defendant to disprove any fact that constitutes the crime charged.” W.R., 181 Wn.2d at 762 . “[W]hen a defense necessarily negates an element of the crime, it violates due process to place the burden of proof on the defendant.” Id. at 765 .

2016State v. Cheatam, 150 Wn.2d 626, 652 , 81 P.3d 830 (2003); see Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 .

2016State v. Cheatam, 150 Wn.2d 626, 652 , 81 P.3d 830 (2003); see Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 . ¶ 15 One exception to this rule is that if the defendant testifies about an exculpatory theory or defense that could have been corroborated by an available witness, then, in limited circumstances, the State may call attention to the defendant’s failure to offer corroborating evidence.

2016State v. Cheatam, 150 Wn.2d 626, 652 , 81 P.3d 830 (2003); see Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 .

2016State v. Cheatam, 150 Wn.2d 626, 652 , 81 P.3d 830 (2003); see Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 . ¶ 15 One exception to this rule is that if the defendant testifies about an exculpatory theory or defense that could have been corroborated by an available witness, then, in limited circumstances, the State may call attention to the defendant’s failure to offer corroborating evidence.

2008In re Smith, 139 Wash.2d 199, 204 , 986 P.2d 131 (1999). ¶ 13 Under the corollary to the last antecedent rule, the legislature's insertion of a comma requires us to apply the "for which an arrest is required under RCW 10.31.100(2)(a) or (b)" language to each of the circumstances mentioned in former RCW 26.50.110(1).

2004Under the last antecedent rule and a corollary to that rule, [3] it appears that the "by withholding" requirement applies only to subsection (b), but the last antecedent rule is "`not inflexible or uniformly binding.'" In re Personal Restraint of Smith, 139 Wash.2d 199 , *945 205, 986 P.2d 131 (1999) (quoting State v. McGee, 122 Wash.2d 783, 788-89 , 864 P.2d 912 (1993)).

2008In re Smith, 139 Wash.2d 199, 204 , 986 P.2d 131 (1999). ¶ 13 Under the corollary to the last antecedent rule, the legislature's insertion of a comma requires us to apply the "for which an arrest is required under RCW 10.31.100(2)(a) or (b)" language to each of the circumstances mentioned in former RCW 26.50.110(1).

2004Under the last antecedent rule and a corollary to that rule, [3] it appears that the "by withholding" requirement applies only to subsection (b), but the last antecedent rule is "`not inflexible or uniformly binding.'" In re Personal Restraint of Smith, 139 Wash.2d 199 , *945 205, 986 P.2d 131 (1999) (quoting State v. McGee, 122 Wash.2d 783, 788-89 , 864 P.2d 912 (1993)).

2024And the corollary principle related to this rule provides that “the presence of a comma before the qualifying phrase is evidence the qualifier is intended to apply to all antecedents instead of only the immediately preceding one.” Id. 7 No. 86864-1-I/8 that “employers” include those persons or groups of persons acting as agents of the employer.

2021State v. Bunker, 169 Wn.2d 571, 578 , (2010); Berrocal v. Fernandez, 155 Wn.2d 585, 593 , 121 P.3d 82 (2005).

2019Id. at 422 .

2017Id. at 422 .

2014Ed. 2d 641 (1981) (a reference to a prisoner’s rights to resist interstate extradition under a detainer agreement, “ ‘as provided in’ ” another source of law, must be “construed as securing something more” than the rights already explicitly provided in the detainer agreement; otherwise, the “as provided in” language would be rendered superfluous); State v. Richardson, 81 Wn.2d 111, 116 , 499 P.2d 1264 (1972) (A statutory reference following “ ‘as provided in’ ” language in the implied consent statute “does elucidate in some detail the meaning of the words ‘qualified person’ and a reference to

2014Ed. 2d 641 (1981) (a reference to a prisoner’s rights to resist interstate extradition under a detainer agreement, “ ‘as provided in’ ” another source of law, must be “construed as securing something more” than the rights already explicitly provided in the detainer agreement; otherwise, the “as provided in” language would be rendered superfluous); State v. Richardson, 81 Wn.2d 111, 116 , 499 P.2d 1264 (1972) (A statutory reference following “ ‘as provided in’ ” language in the implied consent statute “does elucidate in some detail the meaning of the words ‘qualified person’ and a reference to

2007United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 575-76 , 109 S. Ct. 757 , 102 L.

2007United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 575-76 , 109 S. Ct. 757 , 102 L.

2007Menna, 423 U.S. at 62 & n. 2, 96 S.Ct. 241 (a guilty plea does not waive a facial double jeopardy violation). ¶ 19 A corollary to this rule is that, if a defendant collaterally challenges a facially valid conviction and seeks to expand the record to show that the conviction violates double jeopardy, a guilty plea may, in some circumstances, be deemed a waiver of the double jeopardy claim.

2007Menna, 423 U.S. at 62 & n.2 (a guilty plea does not waive a facial double jeopardy violation). ¶19 A corollary to this rule is that, if a defendant collaterally challenges a facially valid conviction and seeks to expand the record to show that the conviction violates double jeopardy, a guilty plea may, in some circumstances, be deemed a waiver of the double jeopardy claim.

2006Crown Controls, Inc. v. Smiley, 110 Wn.2d 695, 706 , 756 P.2d 717 (1988). ¶12 An undisclosed principal’s right to enforce the contract is subject to some exceptions, none of which applies here.

2006Crown Controls, Inc. v. Smiley, 110 Wn.2d 695, 706 , 756 P.2d 717 (1988). ¶12 An undisclosed principal’s right to enforce the contract is subject to some exceptions, none of which applies here.

2004Under the last antecedent rule and a corollary to that rule, [3] it appears that the "by withholding" requirement applies only to subsection (b), but the last antecedent rule is "`not inflexible or uniformly binding.'" In re Personal Restraint of Smith, 139 Wash.2d 199 , *945 205, 986 P.2d 131 (1999) (quoting State v. McGee, 122 Wash.2d 783, 788-89 , 864 P.2d 912 (1993)).

2004Under the last antecedent rule and a corollary to that rule, [3] it appears that the "by withholding" requirement applies only to subsection (b), but the last antecedent rule is "`not inflexible or uniformly binding.'" In re Personal Restraint of Smith, 139 Wash.2d 199 , *945 205, 986 P.2d 131 (1999) (quoting State v. McGee, 122 Wash.2d 783, 788-89 , 864 P.2d 912 (1993)).

2001In re Welfare of Dodge, 29 Wn.

2001In re Welfare of Dodge, 29 Wash.App. 486, 492 , 628 P.2d 1343 (1981).

1979Swope v. Sundgren, 73 Wn.2d 747 , 440 P.2d 494 (1968); Barrinuevo v. Barrinuevo, 47 Wn.2d 296 , 287 P.2d 349 (1955); Donaldson v. Greenwood, 40 Wn.2d 238 , 242 P.2d 1038 (1952); see note and cases cited in 26 Wash. L.

1979Swope v. Sundgren, 73 Wn.2d 747 , 440 P.2d 494 (1968); Barrinuevo v. Barrinuevo, 47 Wn.2d 296 , 287 P.2d 349 (1955); Donaldson v. Greenwood, 40 Wn.2d 238 , 242 P.2d 1038 (1952); see note and cases cited in 26 Wash. L.

1979Swope v. Sundgren, 73 Wn.2d 747 , 440 P.2d 494 (1968); Barrinuevo v. Barrinuevo, 47 Wn.2d 296 , 287 P.2d 349 (1955); Donaldson v. Greenwood, 40 Wn.2d 238 , 242 P.2d 1038 (1952); see note and cases cited in 26 Wash. L.

1979Swope v. Sundgren, 73 Wn.2d 747 , 440 P.2d 494 (1968); Barrinuevo v. Barrinuevo, 47 Wn.2d 296 , 287 P.2d 349 (1955); Donaldson v. Greenwood, 40 Wn.2d 238 , 242 P.2d 1038 (1952); see note and cases cited in 26 Wash. L.

1979Swope v. Sundgren, 73 Wn.2d 747 , 440 P.2d 494 (1968); Barrinuevo v. Barrinuevo, 47 Wn.2d 296 , 287 P.2d 349 (1955); Donaldson v. Greenwood, 40 Wn.2d 238 , 242 P.2d 1038 (1952); see note and cases cited in 26 Wash. L.

1979Swope v. Sundgren, 73 Wn.2d 747 , 440 P.2d 494 (1968); Barrinuevo v. Barrinuevo, 47 Wn.2d 296 , 287 P.2d 349 (1955); Donaldson v. Greenwood, 40 Wn.2d 238 , 242 P.2d 1038 (1952); see note and cases cited in 26 Wash. L.

1963Gardner v. Seymour, 27 Wn. (2d) 802, 180 P. (2d) 564 .” Appellant fully disclosed all information within his knowledge as to the origin of the fire.

1961Gardner v. Seymour, 27 Wn. (2d) 802, 180 P. (2d) 564 . *532 In this case, there was no attempt by the defendant to explain how the fire could have started, unless it sprang from the embers of the first fire.

2026Id.

2024Washington recognized the binding effect of a reasonable settlement in Evans v. Continental Casualty Co., 40 Wn.2d 614, 628 , 245 P.2d 470 (1952), in which the court concluded, where an insurer defends under a reservation of rights, “it is well established that the insured may settle and recover from the 15 No. 85400-3-I/16 insurer.” Evans traced the rule at least to St.

2024Washington recognized the binding effect of a reasonable settlement in Evans v. Continental Casualty Co., 40 Wn.2d 614, 628 , 245 P.2d 470 (1952), in which the court concluded, where an insurer defends under a reservation of rights, “it is well established that the insured may settle and recover from the 15 No. 85400-3-I/16 insurer.” Evans traced the rule at least to St.

2024But we do not apply the last antecedent rule “ ‘if other factors, such as context and language in related statutes, indicate contrary legislative intent.’ ” Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Slaugh, 177 Wn.

2021The court in Cleppe recognized the inherent “harshness” of a law strictly criminalizing all drug possession and sought to mitigate the unjust consequences of such a law by adopting the affirmative defense of unwitting possession. 96 Wn.2d at 381 .