65 Missouri opinions name it 3 courts 1905–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
First Community Bank v. Hubbell Power Systems, Inc.green2 sentences2025The corollary to this rule is that allegations of legal error in the underlying default judgment are generally "moot unless the default is set aside." Wooten v. Wentworth Entm't Grp., LLC, 552 S.W.3d 118, 123 (Mo. App. 2018); see also First Cmty. Bank v. Hubbell Power Sys., Inc., 298 S.W.3d 534, 538 (Mo. App. 2009) (explaining that, because a Rule 74.05(d) motion is an independent action, the circuit court correctly concluded the "allegations of error relating to that underlying [default] judgment are moot unless the default is set aside"). 2024The corollary to this rule is that allegations of legal error in the underlying default judgment are generally "moot unless the default is set aside." Wooten v. Wentworth Entm't Grp., LLC, 552 S.W.3d 118, 123 (Mo. App. 2018); see also First Cmty. Bank v. Hubbell Power Sys., Inc., 298 S.W.3d 534, 538 (Mo. App. 2009) (explaining that, because a Rule 74.05(d) motion is an independent action, the circuit court correctly concluded the "allegations of error relating to that underlying [default] judgment are moot unless the default is set aside"). | 2 | 2 |
Wooten v. Wentworth Entm't Grp., LLCgreen2 sentences2025The corollary to this rule is that allegations of legal error in the underlying default judgment are generally "moot unless the default is set aside." Wooten v. Wentworth Entm't Grp., LLC, 552 S.W.3d 118, 123 (Mo. App. 2018); see also First Cmty. Bank v. Hubbell Power Sys., Inc., 298 S.W.3d 534, 538 (Mo. App. 2009) (explaining that, because a Rule 74.05(d) motion is an independent action, the circuit court correctly concluded the "allegations of error relating to that underlying [default] judgment are moot unless the default is set aside"). 2024The corollary to this rule is that allegations of legal error in the underlying default judgment are generally "moot unless the default is set aside." Wooten v. Wentworth Entm't Grp., LLC, 552 S.W.3d 118, 123 (Mo. App. 2018); see also First Cmty. Bank v. Hubbell Power Sys., Inc., 298 S.W.3d 534, 538 (Mo. App. 2009) (explaining that, because a Rule 74.05(d) motion is an independent action, the circuit court correctly concluded the "allegations of error relating to that underlying [default] judgment are moot unless the default is set aside"). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Burkegreen2 sentences1989“Common experience teaches us a sexual offense can cause behavioral and personality changes in the complainant.” State v. Burke, 719 S.W.2d 887, 890 (Mo.App.1986). 1989"Common experience teaches us a sexual offense can cause behavioral and personality changes in the complainant." State v. Burke, 719 S.W.2d 887, 890 (Mo.App.1986). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Nealgreen2 sentences1985These three cases are aptly described and summarized in State v. Johnson, 549 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Mo.App. 1977), where the court notes, “The law recognizes a correlative principle, invoked by the defendant, that a person convicted of an offense and then put on trial for an element of that offense has been put twice in jeopardy for the same accusation.” Johnson further states, “Implicit within this formula is the corollary and exception that a single act of force against one person allows only one criminal prosecution against the actor, however the essential elements of the offenses may be describ 1977Richardson , 1. c. 540; Parsons , 1. c. 438; Neal , 1. c. 548. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Parsonsgreen2 sentences1985These three cases are aptly described and summarized in State v. Johnson, 549 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Mo.App. 1977), where the court notes, “The law recognizes a correlative principle, invoked by the defendant, that a person convicted of an offense and then put on trial for an element of that offense has been put twice in jeopardy for the same accusation.” Johnson further states, “Implicit within this formula is the corollary and exception that a single act of force against one person allows only one criminal prosecution against the actor, however the essential elements of the offenses may be describ 1977Richardson , 1. c. 540; Parsons , 1. c. 438; Neal , 1. c. 548. | 2 | 2 |
Houston v. Zanergreen2 sentences2020In determining the amount of attorneys’ fees to which the guardian or conservator is entitled, the circuit court highlighted the factors to consider: “‘all circumstances of the guardianship, including the size of the estate, the productiveness of the estate, the disbursements from the estate, the nature and difficulty of the services performed, and what is a customary charge for similar services in the community.’” Id. (citing Houston, 683 S.W.2d at 280 ). 2019In determining the amount of attorneys’ fees to which the guardian or conservator is entitled, the circuit court is to consider “‘all circumstances of the guardianship, including the size of the estate, the productiveness of the estate, the disbursements from the estate, the nature and difficulty of the services performed, and what is a customary charge for similar services in the community.’” Houston v. Zaner, 683 S.W.2d 277, 280 (Mo. App. W.D. 1984) (quoting 5 Maus, Probate Law and Practice, § 1969, pp. 319–320). 14 In In re Estate of Walker, 16 S.W.3d 672, 676-678 (Mo. App. E.D. 2000), a co | 1 | 2 |
Middleton v. Missouri Department of Correctionsgreen2 sentences2019"The corollary to this rule is that a court should not interpret a statute so as to render some phrases mere surplusage." Bolt, 310 S.W.3d at 242 (quoting Middleton, 278 S.W.3d at 196 ). 2010“The corollary to this rule is that a court should not interpret a statute so as to render some phrases mere sur-plusage.” Middleton v. Missouri Dept. of Corr., 278 S.W.3d 193, 196 (Mo. banc 2009). | 1 | 2 |
City of Peculiar v. Hunt Martin Materials, LLCgreen2 sentences2016This is because reversal requires a finding "that all of the reasons that the circuit court articulated in its judgment were wrong." Id. (quoting City of Peculiar v. Hunt Martin Materials, LLC, 274 S.W.3d 588, 591 (Mo. App. W.D. 2009)). 2016This is because reversal requires a finding “that all of the reasons that the circuit court articulated in its judgment were wrong.” Id. (quoting City of Peculiar v. Hunt Martin Materials, LLC, 274 S.W.3d 588, 591 (Mo.App. | 1 | 2 |
Ramirez v. Walkergreen1 sentence2019In determining the amount of attorneys’ fees to which the guardian or conservator is entitled, the circuit court is to consider “‘all circumstances of the guardianship, including the size of the estate, the productiveness of the estate, the disbursements from the estate, the nature and difficulty of the services performed, and what is a customary charge for similar services in the community.’” Houston v. Zaner, 683 S.W.2d 277, 280 (Mo. App. W.D. 1984) (quoting 5 Maus, Probate Law and Practice, § 1969, pp. 319–320). 14 In In re Estate of Walker, 16 S.W.3d 672, 676-678 (Mo. App. E.D. 2000), a co | 1 | 1 |
Diez v. Pearsongreen1 sentence2015Diez v. Pearson, 834 S.W.2d 250, 253 (Mo.App. | 1 | 1 |
Spradlin v. City of Fultongreen2 sentences2009See Spradlin v. City of Fulton, 982 S.W.2d 255, 262 (Mo. banc 1998). 2009See Spradlin v. City of Fulton, 982 S.W.2d 255, 262 (Mo. banc 1998). | 1 | 1 |
Care and Treatment of Schottel v. Stategreen2 sentences2006That result, however, would not obtain under the above rules of construction, not to mention the corollary rule of construction that it is presumed "that the legislature did not intend to enact an absurd law." Care and Treatment of Schottel v. State, 159 S.W.3d 836, 842 (Mo. banc 2005). 2006That result, however, would not obtain under the above rules of construction, not to mention the corollary rule of construction that it is presumed “that the legislature did not intend to enact an absurd law.” Care and Treatment of Schottel v. State, 159 S.W.3d 836, 842 (Mo. banc 2005). | 1 | 1 |
C.A.W. Ex Rel. Welch v. Westongreen1 sentence2006C.A.W. v. Weston, 58 S.W.3d 909, 914 (Mo.App.2001). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Marriage of Fuldnergreen2 sentences2003In re Fuldner, 41 S.W.3d 581, 588 [8] (Mo.App.2001). 2003In re Fuldner, 41 S.W.3d 581, 588 [8] (Mo.App.2001). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Estate of Weinsaftgreen1 sentence2003Hammons, 924 S.W.2d at 850 [24]; Weinsaft, 647 S.W.2d at 183 [7]. | 1 | 1 |
Hammons v. Ehneygreen1 sentence2003Hammons, 924 S.W.2d at 850 [24]; Weinsaft, 647 S.W.2d at 183 [7]. | 1 | 1 |
Steven Christopher v. Cutter Laboratoriesgreen1 sentence1999Christopher v. Cutter Laboratories, 53 F.3d 1184, 1192 (11 th Cir.1995). | 1 | 1 |
| Vogel v. Director of Revenuegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Crossgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Ewanchengreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Reyesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Anderson v. Abernathygreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Adoption of W.B.L.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Degraffenreidgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Skipper v. South Carolinagreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Hicksgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Anderson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Stowe v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Johnsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Felts v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Pottergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Block v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Russell v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Teson v. Vasquezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Quigleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Batye v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Dennisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Curtin-Clark Hardware Co. v. Churchillgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Crook v. Dooleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mullins v. Eveland
green
2 sentences1981Bonsack Pearce, Inc. v. School District of Marceline, 226 Mo.App. 1238 , 49 S.W.2d 1085 (1932); Mullins v. Eveland, 234 S.W.2d 639 (Mo.App. 1950). 1978Bonsack & Pearce, Inc. v. School District of Marceline, 226 Mo.App. 1238 , 49 S.W.2d 1085 (1932); Mullins v. Eveland, 234 S.W.2d 639 (Mo.App.1950). | 2 | 1978–1981 |
Bonsack & Pearce, Inc. v. School District
green
2 sentences1981Bonsack Pearce, Inc. v. School District of Marceline, 226 Mo.App. 1238 , 49 S.W.2d 1085 (1932); Mullins v. Eveland, 234 S.W.2d 639 (Mo.App. 1950). 1981Bonsack Pearce, Inc. v. School District of Marceline, 226 Mo.App. 1238 , 49 S.W.2d 1085 (1932); Mullins v. Eveland, 234 S.W.2d 639 (Mo.App. 1950). | 2 | 1978–1981 |
Priest v. Nichols
green
2 sentences1914The corollary of this rule is that if the accident might have resulted from more than one cause, for one of which the master is liable and for the other he is not liable, it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove, in the first instance, that the injury arose from the cause for which the master is liable, for it is not the province of a court or jury to speculate or guess from which cause the accident happened. [Railroad v. Nelms, 83 Ga. 70 ; Searles v. Railroad, 101 N. Y. 661 ; Dobbins v. Brown, 119 N. Y. l. c. 193; Peirce v. Kile, 80 Fed. l. c. 867; Mining Co. v. Kitts, 42 Mich. l. c. 37; Pr 1905The corollary of this rule is that if the accident might have resulted from more than one cause, for one of which the master is liable and for the other he is not liable, it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove, in the first instance, that the injury arose from the cause for which the master is liable, for it is not the province of a court or jury to speculate or guess from which cause the accident happened. [Railroad v. Nelms, 83 Ga. 70 ; Searles v. Railroad, 101 N. Y. 661 ; Dobbins v. Brown, 119 N. Y. l. c. 193; Peirce v. Kile, 80 Fed. l. c. 867; Mining Co. v. Kitts, 42 Mich. l. c. 37; Pr | 2 | 1905–1914 |
Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Nelms
green
2 sentences1914The corollary of this rule is that if the accident might have resulted from more than one cause, for one of which the master is liable and for the other he is not liable, it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove, in the first instance, that the injury arose from the cause for which the master is liable, for it is not the province of a court or jury to speculate or guess from which cause the accident happened. [Railroad v. Nelms, 83 Ga. 70 ; Searles v. Railroad, 101 N. Y. 661 ; Dobbins v. Brown, 119 N. Y. l. c. 193; Peirce v. Kile, 80 Fed. l. c. 867; Mining Co. v. Kitts, 42 Mich. l. c. 37; Pr 1905The corollary of this rule is that if the accident might have resulted from more than one cause, for one of which the master is liable and for the other he is not liable, it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove, in the first instance, that the injury arose from the cause for which the master is liable, for it is not the province of a court or jury to speculate or guess from which cause the accident happened. [Railroad v. Nelms, 83 Ga. 70 ; Searles v. Railroad, 101 N. Y. 661 ; Dobbins v. Brown, 119 N. Y. l. c. 193; Peirce v. Kile, 80 Fed. l. c. 867; Mining Co. v. Kitts, 42 Mich. l. c. 37; Pr | 2 | 1905–1914 |
Epperson v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co.
green
2 sentences1914The corollary of this rule is that if the accident might have resulted from more than one cause, for one of which the master is liable and for the other he is not liable, it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove, in the first instance, that the injury arose from the cause for which the master is liable, for it is not the province of a court or jury to speculate or guess from which cause the accident happened. [Railroad v. Nelms, 83 Ga. 70 ; Searles v. Railroad, 101 N. Y. 661 ; Dobbins v. Brown, 119 N. Y. l. c. 193; Peirce v. Kile, 80 Fed. l. c. 867; Mining Co. v. Kitts, 42 Mich. l. c. 37; Pr 1905The corollary of this rule is that if the accident might have resulted from more than one cause, for one of which the master is liable and for the other he is not liable, it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove, in the first instance, that the injury arose from the cause for which the master is liable, for it is not the province of a court or jury to speculate or guess from which cause the accident happened. [Railroad v. Nelms, 83 Ga. 70 ; Searles v. Railroad, 101 N. Y. 661 ; Dobbins v. Brown, 119 N. Y. l. c. 193; Peirce v. Kile, 80 Fed. l. c. 867; Mining Co. v. Kitts, 42 Mich. l. c. 37; Pr | 2 | 1905–1914 |
Searles v. . Manhattan Railway Company
green
2 sentences1914The corollary of this rule is that if the accident might have resulted from more than one cause, for one of which the master is liable and for the other he is not liable, it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove, in the first instance, that the injury arose from the cause for which the master is liable, for it is not the province of a court or jury to speculate or guess from which cause the accident happened. [Railroad v. Nelms, 83 Ga. 70 ; Searles v. Railroad, 101 N. Y. 661 ; Dobbins v. Brown, 119 N. Y. l. c. 193; Peirce v. Kile, 80 Fed. l. c. 867; Mining Co. v. Kitts, 42 Mich. l. c. 37; Pr 1905The corollary of this rule is that if the accident might have resulted from more than one cause, for one of which the master is liable and for the other he is not liable, it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove, in the first instance, that the injury arose from the cause for which the master is liable, for it is not the province of a court or jury to speculate or guess from which cause the accident happened. [Railroad v. Nelms, 83 Ga. 70 ; Searles v. Railroad, 101 N. Y. 661 ; Dobbins v. Brown, 119 N. Y. l. c. 193; Peirce v. Kile, 80 Fed. l. c. 867; Mining Co. v. Kitts, 42 Mich. l. c. 37; Pr | 2 | 1905–1914 |
Brungard v. RISKY'S INC.
green
1 sentence2024Further, because this Court's 2007 amendment to Rule 74.05(d) provides a motion to set aside a default judgment is an independent action resulting in an independent judgment, Brungard, 240 S.W.3d at 687 , the issues in an appeal from a judgment denying relief under Rule 74.05(d) are limited to whether the circuit court abused its discretion by finding there was no good cause or meritorious defense. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
In the Matter of Virgil D. Williams Janet Rosenauer, Andrew County Public Administrator, as his Guardian and Conservator v. Betty Lou Williams
green
2 sentences2020The court noted the corollary to this rule, that attorneys' fees may not be collected from the estate “unless it is made to appear affirmatively that the services were necessary, or were of benefit to the estate.” Id. 2020In determining the amount of attorneys’ fees to which the guardian or conservator is entitled, the circuit court highlighted the factors to consider: “‘all circumstances of the guardianship, including the size of the estate, the productiveness of the estate, the disbursements from the estate, the nature and difficulty of the services performed, and what is a customary charge for similar services in the community.’” Id. (citing Houston, 683 S.W.2d at 280 ). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Swan v. Ingersoll
green
1 sentence2019"The corollary to this rule is that a court should not interpret a statute so as to render some phrases mere surplusage." Bolt, 310 S.W.3d at 242 (quoting Middleton, 278 S.W.3d at 196 ). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Grove v. Reynolds
green
1 sentence2019As a corollary to this rule, attorneys’ fees may not be collected from the estate “unless it is made to appear affirmatively that the services were necessary, or were of benefit to the estate.” Id. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Lincoln Credit Co. v. Peach
green
1 sentence2011Id. (citing Parsons Constr. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Tune v. Synergy Gas Corp.
green
1 sentence2004This rule, as discussed in Tune by the Supreme Court, is not subject to the trial court’s discretion assuming that the defendant has not waived his objection in some manner. 883 S.W.2d at 20 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Wolf v. Missouri State Training School for Boys
green
2 sentences1998Wolf, 517 S.W.2d at 148 . 1998Wolf, 517 S.W.2d at 148 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Cagle v. Regal Plastics Co. green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Patterson v. Illinois green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Smith green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Porter v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Eddings v. Oklahoma green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| State v. McCafferty green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Laclede Gas Co. v. First National Bank in St. Louis green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Olden v. Hendrick neutral | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Foster v. State green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Greene v. Massey green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Burks v. United States green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Ashe v. Swenson green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Hudson v. Louisiana green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Shields v. Powers neutral | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Gott v. Powell neutral | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Vogler v. Montgomery green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Colburn v. Yantis green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Sidwell v. Kaster green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Webster v. Sterling Finance Co. green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Jones v. St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad neutral | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Wood v. Ogden neutral | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Carr v. Carr green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Witherspoon v. Illinois green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Anderson v. Curls green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Jack Brandt, Ltd. v. Morris green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Deeds v. Foster green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Williams ex rel. Williams v. Tuttle neutral | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.