corollary rule in Louisiana

2020Mitchell, 800 So. 2d at 814 - 815.

2019Mitchell, 800 So. 2d at 814 - 815.

2007Quoting Blashfield, Automobile Law and Practices 101.13 (Rev.3d Ed.1979), the supreme court in Seals, supra, explained the doctrine: As a corollary of the rule for determining legal responsibility for negligence, if a motorist or other traveler has exercised ordinary care as required by the *937 common law (or the highest degree of care as may be required), and has nevertheless been the occasion of inflicting injury on another, the accident is said to be inevitable, for which no liability attaches.

2001Quoting 2 Blashfield, Automobile Law and Practice 101.3 (Rev.3d Ed., 1979), the Louisiana Supreme Court in Seals v. Morris, supra , explained the doctrine as follows: As a corollary of the rule for determining legal responsibility for negligence, if a motorist or other traveler has exercised ordinary care as required by the common law (or the highest degree of care that may be required), and has nevertheless been the occasion of inflicting injury on another, the accident is said to be inevitable, for which no liability attaches.

1980E. g., Summerell v. Phillips, supra ; Maher v. City of New Orleans, 256 La. 131 , 235 So.2d 402 (1970); State ex rel.

1980E. g., Summerell v. Phillips, supra ; Maher v. City of New Orleans, 256 La. 131 , 235 So.2d 402 (1970); State ex rel.

2006"To create a legal obligation enforceable by the beneficiary there must be certainty as to the benefit to accrue to the beneficiary." Berry v. Berry, 371 So.2d 1346, 1347 (La.App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 373 So.2d 511 (1979).

2006“To create a legal obligation enforceable by the beneficiary there must be certainty as to the benefit to accrue to the beneficiary.” Berry v. Berry, 371 So.2d 1346, 1347 (La.App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 373 So.2d 511 (1979).

2021Id., 453 U.S. at 460-61 , 101 S.Ct. at 2864 (citations and footnote omitted).

2015See LSA-C.C. art. 477; Richard v. Hall, 874 So.2d at 144-45 . 20 Further, pursuant to LSA-C.C. art. 645, “[a] right of use is regulated by application of the rules governing usufruct and predial servitudes to the extent that their application is compatible with the rules governing a right of use servitude.” Two pertinent articles appearing in the rules governing predial servitudes include Articles 743 and 748, which provide: Art. 743.

2006In describing the principle of stricti juris, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated in Monteville v. Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Government, 567 So.2d 1097 (La.1990): The rule that statutes in derogation of a natural or common right are to be strictly interpreted is now generally recognized as being a corollary of the rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be interpreted strictly.

2001The doctrine suspends the running of prescription during the period of time when the action was not reasonably knowable by the plaintiff. *783 Bowers v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 95-2530 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/29/96) , 694 So.2d 967, 973 .

1997Ketteringham v. Eureka Homestead Society, 140 La. 176 , 72 So. 916 (1916).

1997Ketteringham v. Eureka Homestead Society, 140 La. 176 , 72 So. 916 (1916).

1996LaPlaque, supra, 93-1597, 4, 638 So.2d 354, 356 [citing " Jordan v. Employee Transfer Corp., 509 So.2d 420 (La.1987)"].

1993In Sorapuru v. Jeffers, 378 So.2d 524 (La.App. 4th Cir.1979), the insurance broker failed to process the insured's applications thus the insured was not covered.

1991Id.

1991Combs v. Hartford Insurance Co., 544 So.2d 583, 588 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 550 So.2d 630 (La.1989).

1990See Strother v. Lucas, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 410 , 9 L.Ed. 1137 (1838); Peters v. Hajacos, 91 W.Va. 88 , 112 S.E. 233 (1922); Million v. Metropolitan Casualty Ins.

1990See Strother v. Lucas, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 410 , 9 L.Ed. 1137 (1838); Peters v. Hajacos, 91 W.Va. 88 , 112 S.E. 233 (1922); Million v. Metropolitan Casualty Ins.

1983Plaintiff relies on Stracener v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, 410 So.2d 1220 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1982), affirmed 420 So.2d 1101 (La.1982) and Ellis v. Bemis Brothers Bag Company, 146 So.2d 667 (La.App. 4th Cir.1962), which pronounce the corollary to the rule of Nash v. Knoblock, supra; that is, if the evidence shows that the injury can be related to the whole hand rather than restricted to a finger, compensation is awarded for the disability of the hand.

1983Plaintiff relies on Stracener v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, 410 So.2d 1220 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1982), affirmed 420 So.2d 1101 (La.1982) and Ellis v. Bemis Brothers Bag Company, 146 So.2d 667 (La.App. 4th Cir.1962), which pronounce the corollary to the rule of Nash v. Knoblock, supra; that is, if the evidence shows that the injury can be related to the whole hand rather than restricted to a finger, compensation is awarded for the disability of the hand.

1983Plaintiff relies on Stracener v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, 410 So.2d 1220 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1982), affirmed 420 So.2d 1101 (La.1982) and Ellis v. Bemis Brothers Bag Company, 146 So.2d 667 (La.App. 4th Cir.1962), which pronounce the corollary to the rule of Nash v. Knoblock, supra; that is, if the evidence shows that the injury can be related to the whole hand rather than restricted to a finger, compensation is awarded for the disability of the hand.

1983Plaintiff relies on Stracener v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, 410 So.2d 1220 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1982), affirmed 420 So.2d 1101 (La.1982) and Ellis v. Bemis Brothers Bag Company, 146 So.2d 667 (La.App. 4th Cir.1962), which pronounce the corollary to the rule of Nash v. Knoblock, supra; that is, if the evidence shows that the injury can be related to the whole hand rather than restricted to a finger, compensation is awarded for the disability of the hand.

1982Sharp v. Kahn, 143 So. 514 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1932). [3] The doctrine of unavoidable or inevitable accident can be stated as follows: As a corollary of the rule for determining legal responsibility for negligence, if a motorist or other traveler has exercised ordinary care as required by the common law (or the highest degree of care as may be required), and has nevertheless been the occasion of inflicting injury on another, the accident is said to be inevitable, for which no liability attaches.