corollary rule in Connecticut

2020The corollary to this rule is that absent substantial evidence in the record, a court may not affirm the deci- sion of the board.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quota- tion marks omitted.) Martland v. Zoning Commission, 114 Conn. App. 655, 663 , 971 A.2d 53 (2009).

2020The corollary to this rule is that absent substantial evidence in the record, a court may not affirm the deci- sion of the board.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quota- tion marks omitted.) Martland v. Zoning Commission, 114 Conn. App. 655, 663 , 971 A.2d 53 (2009).

2019The corollary to this rule is that absent substantial evidence in the record, a court may not affirm the decision of the board.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 246–47.

2016The corollary to this rule is that absent substantial evidence in the record, a court may not affirm the decision of the board." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Meriden v. Planning & Zoning Commission , 146 Conn.App. 240 , 247, 77 A.3d 859 (2013).

2017As a corollary to the privilege against self-incrimination, the United States Supreme Court held in Doyle v. Ohio , 426 U.S. 610 , 617-18, 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), that a state may not use a defendant's post- Miranda silence to imply that he is guilty of the crime charged.

2017As a corollary to the privilege against self-incrimination, the United States Supreme Court held in Doyle v. Ohio , 426 U.S. 610 , 617-18, 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), that a state may not use a defendant's post- Miranda silence to imply that he is guilty of the crime charged.

1986A corollary rule is that the words of a statute are to be construed with common sense and ‘according to the commonly approved usage of the language.’ General Statutes § 1-1; State v. Belton, 190 Conn. 496, 506 , 461 A.2d 973 (1983); State v. Roque, 190 Conn. 143, 151 , 460 A.2d 26 (1983).” State v. Pellegrino, 194 Conn. 279, 284 , 480 A.2d 537 (1984).

1986A corollary rule is that the words of a statute are to be construed with common sense and ‘according to the commonly approved usage of the language.’ General Statutes § 1-1; State v. Belton, 190 Conn. 496, 506 , 461 A.2d 973 (1983); State v. Roque, 190 Conn. 143, 151 , 460 A.2d 26 (1983).” State v. Pellegrino, 194 Conn. 279, 284 , 480 A.2d 537 (1984).

1986A corollary rule is that the words of a statute are to be construed with common sense and ‘according to the commonly approved usage of the language.’ General Statutes § 1-1; State v. Belton, 190 Conn. 496, 506 , 461 A.2d 973 (1983); State v. Roque, 190 Conn. 143, 151 , 460 A.2d 26 (1983).” State v. Pellegrino, 194 Conn. 279, 284 , 480 A.2d 537 (1984).

1986A corollary rule is that the words of a statute are to be construed with common sense and ‘according to the commonly approved usage of the language.’ General Statutes § 1-1; State v. Belton, 190 Conn. 496, 506 , 461 A.2d 973 (1983); State v. Roque, 190 Conn. 143, 151 , 460 A.2d 26 (1983).” State v. Pellegrino, 194 Conn. 279, 284 , 480 A.2d 537 (1984).

2025Second, the acquittee claims that § 17a-593 violates his equal protection rights under the Connecticut constitution and provides an independent analysis under State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 684–86, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992), in support of his argument that the state constitution provides him with greater protection than the federal constitution.

2025Second, the acquittee claims that § 17a-593 violates his equal protection rights under the Connecticut constitution and provides an independent analysis under State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 684–86, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992), in support of his argument that the state constitution provides him with greater protection than the federal constitution.

2025Page 10 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 12 ,0 0 Conn. 1 State v. Petteway eyes open’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. D’Antonio, 274 Conn. 658, 712 , 877 A.2d 696 (2005) (describing purpose of canvass).

2025Page 10 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 12 ,0 0 Conn. 1 State v. Petteway eyes open’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. D’Antonio, 274 Conn. 658, 712 , 877 A.2d 696 (2005) (describing purpose of canvass).

2024The corollary to this rule is that absent substantial evidence in the record, a court may not affirm the decision of the board.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Putnam Park Apartments, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 193 Conn. App. 42, 54 , 218 A.3d 1127 (2019). ‘‘When a zoning com- mission has stated a reason for denying a special permit application . . . the question for the court to pass on is simply whether the reasons assigned are reasonably supported by the record and whether they are pertinent to the considerations [that] the commission is required to apply under the zoning r

2018Admittedly, this court stated in Goldson that, "[i]f separate charges explicitly addressing different temporal aspects of the same conduct do not avoid the double jeopardy clause, surely an information and bill of particulars stipulating a single date and time cannot do so." State v. Goldson , supra, 178 Conn. at 425 , 423 A.2d 114 .

2018Admittedly, this court stated in Goldson that, "[i]f separate charges explicitly addressing different temporal aspects of the same conduct do not avoid the double jeopardy clause, surely an information and bill of particulars stipulating a single date and time cannot do so." State v. Goldson , supra, 178 Conn. at 425 , 423 A.2d 114 .

2015See People v. Tufunga, 21 Cal. 4th 935, 948 , 987 P.2d 168 , 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 143 (1999) (‘‘[a] conclusion . . . that a claim of right, for policy reasons, should no longer be recognized as a defense to robbery—even where the defendant can establish that he is taking back specific property to which he has lawful title or a bona fide claim of ownership—would mean such a defendant could be convicted of robbery based on theft of his own property, a proposition that would stand in patent conflict with both the commonsense notion that someone cannot steal his own property, and the corollary rule th

2015See People v. Tufunga, 21 Cal. 4th 935, 948 , 987 P.2d 168 , 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 143 (1999) (‘‘[a] conclusion . . . that a claim of right, for policy reasons, should no longer be recognized as a defense to robbery—even where the defendant can establish that he is taking back specific property to which he has lawful title or a bona fide claim of ownership—would mean such a defendant could be convicted of robbery based on theft of his own property, a proposition that would stand in patent conflict with both the commonsense notion that someone cannot steal his own property, and the corollary rule th

2011While there is no precise definition of either [substantive or procedural law], it is generally agreed that a substantive law creates, defines and regulates rights while a procedural law prescribes the methods of enforcing such rights or obtaining redress.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Samuels v. Commissioner of Correction, 117 Conn. App. 740, 744 , 980 A.2d 945 (2009).

2011While there is no precise definition of either [substantive or procedural law], it is generally agreed that a substantive law creates, defines and regulates rights while a procedural law prescribes the methods of enforcing such rights or obtaining redress.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Samuels v. Commissioner of Correction, 117 Conn. App. 740, 744 , 980 A.2d 945 (2009).

2009While there is no precise definition of either [substantive or procedural law], it is generally agreed that a substantive law creates, defines and regulates rights while a procedural law prescribes the methods of enforcing such rights or obtaining redress.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Skakel, 276 Conn. 633, 679-81 , 888 A.2d 985 , cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1030 , *745 127 S. Ct. 578 , 166 L.

2009While there is no precise definition of either [substantive or procedural law], it is generally agreed that a substantive law creates, defines and regulates rights while a procedural law prescribes the methods of enforcing such rights or obtaining redress.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Skakel, 276 Conn. 633, 679-81 , 888 A.2d 985 , cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1030 , *745 127 S. Ct. 578 , 166 L.

2006As a corollary to this principle, we also “have presumed that procedural or remedial statutes are intended to apply retroactively absent a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary . . . .” 43 Miano v. Thorne, 218 Conn. 170, 175 , 588 A.2d 189 (1991); accord In re Daniel H., supra, 237 Conn. 372 -73.

2006As a corollary to this principle, we also “have presumed that procedural or remedial statutes are intended to apply retroactively absent a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary . . . .” 43 Miano v. Thorne, 218 Conn. 170, 175 , 588 A.2d 189 (1991); accord In re Daniel H., supra, 237 Conn. 372 -73.

2006“While there is no precise definition of either [substan tive or procedural law], it is generally agreed that a substantive law creates, defines and regulates rights while a procedural law prescribes the methods of enforcing such rights or obtaining redress.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Carr v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 273 Conn. 573, 593 , 872 A.2d 385 (2005).

2006“While there is no precise definition of either [substan tive or procedural law], it is generally agreed that a substantive law creates, defines and regulates rights while a procedural law prescribes the methods of enforcing such rights or obtaining redress.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Carr v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 273 Conn. 573, 593 , 872 A.2d 385 (2005).

2006Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Premo, 153 Conn. 465, 470-71 , 217 A.2d 698 (1966).

2006Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Premo, 153 Conn. 465, 470-71 , 217 A.2d 698 (1966).

2005Thus, I believe that the majority's reliance on the rule enunciated in AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Plan & Zoning Commission, supra, 260 Conn. at 246 , 796 A.2d 1164 , that courts always have jurisdiction to effectuate their judgments, and the corollary rule that courts always have jurisdiction to modify injunctions, is misplaced.

2005Thus, I believe that the majority's reliance on the rule enunciated in AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Plan & Zoning Commission, supra, 260 Conn. at 246 , 796 A.2d 1164 , that courts always have jurisdiction to effectuate their judgments, and the corollary rule that courts always have jurisdiction to modify injunctions, is misplaced.

2005Thus, to prevail under the Equal Protection Clause, [the petitioner] must prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

2000A corollary to this rule is that "[t]ime requirements are mandatory and, if not complied with, render the appeal subject to abatement." Valley Cable Vision, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission , 175 Conn. 30 , 32 , 392 A.2d 485 (1978). "`Statutes and special laws . . . fixing a rather brief time in which appeals may be taken to the courts from the orders and decisions of [municipal] boards are evidently designed to secure in the public interest a speedy CT Page 14188 determination of the issues involved; and to make it possible to proceed in the matter as soon as the time to take an appeal has

2000A corollary to this rule is that "[t]ime requirements are mandatory and, if not complied with, render the appeal subject to abatement." Valley Cable Vision, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission , 175 Conn. 30 , 32 , 392 A.2d 485 (1978). "`Statutes and special laws . . . fixing a rather brief time in which appeals may be taken to the courts from the orders and decisions of [municipal] boards are evidently designed to secure in the public interest a speedy CT Page 14188 determination of the issues involved; and to make it possible to proceed in the matter as soon as the time to take an appeal has

2000A corollary to this rule is that "[t]ime requirements are mandatory and, if not complied with, render the appeal subject to abatement." Valley Cable Vision, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission , 175 Conn. 30 , 32 , 392 A.2d 485 (1978). "`Statutes and special laws . . . fixing a rather brief time in which appeals may be taken to the courts from the orders and decisions of [municipal] boards are evidently designed to secure in the public interest a speedy CT Page 14188 determination of the issues involved; and to make it possible to proceed in the matter as soon as the time to take an appeal has

2000A corollary to this rule is that "[t]ime requirements are mandatory and, if not complied with, render the appeal subject to abatement." Valley Cable Vision, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission , 175 Conn. 30 , 32 , 392 A.2d 485 (1978). "`Statutes and special laws . . . fixing a rather brief time in which appeals may be taken to the courts from the orders and decisions of [municipal] boards are evidently designed to secure in the public interest a speedy CT Page 14188 determination of the issues involved; and to make it possible to proceed in the matter as soon as the time to take an appeal has

2000A corollary to this rule is that "[t]ime requirements are mandatory and, if not complied with, render the appeal subject to abatement." Valley Cable Vision, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission , 175 Conn. 30 , 32 , 392 A.2d 485 (1978). "`Statutes and special laws . . . fixing a rather brief time in which appeals may be taken to the courts from the orders and decisions of [municipal] boards are evidently designed to secure in the public interest a speedy CT Page 14188 determination of the issues involved; and to make it possible to proceed in the matter as soon as the time to take an appeal has

2000A corollary to this rule is that "[t]ime requirements are mandatory and, if not complied with, render the appeal subject to abatement." Valley Cable Vision, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission , 175 Conn. 30 , 32 , 392 A.2d 485 (1978). "`Statutes and special laws . . . fixing a rather brief time in which appeals may be taken to the courts from the orders and decisions of [municipal] boards are evidently designed to secure in the public interest a speedy CT Page 14188 determination of the issues involved; and to make it possible to proceed in the matter as soon as the time to take an appeal has

1999This statement is but a corollary of the rule [our Supreme Court has] consistently followed under which statements in withdrawn or superseded pleadings, including complaints, may be considered as evidential admissions by the party making them, just as would any extrajudicial statements of the same import.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dreier v. Upjohn Co., 196 Conn. 242, 244 , 492 A.2d 164 (1985).

1999This statement is but a corollary of the rule [our Supreme Court has] consistently followed under which statements in withdrawn or superseded pleadings, including complaints, may be considered as evidential admissions by the party making them, just as would any extrajudicial statements of the same import.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dreier v. Upjohn Co., 196 Conn. 242, 244 , 492 A.2d 164 (1985).

1997As noted in Model Business Corporation Annotated, supra , a corollary of this rule is illustrated by a case like Greenberg v. Harrison, 143 Conn. 519 (1956) which held that directors must be physically present at board meetings and cannot vote by proxy, id.

1997As noted in Model Business Corporation Annotated, supra , a corollary of this rule is illustrated by a case like Greenberg v. Harrison, 143 Conn. 519 (1956) which held that directors must be physically present at board meetings and cannot vote by proxy, id.

1996The majority today inexplicably departs from the well settled corollary principle that “[w]e will not infer that the legislature intended to enact a significant change in existing law without an unequivocally expressed manifestation of legislative intent.” 5 State v. Cobb, 234 Conn. 735, 750 , 663 A.2d 948 (1995); New Haven v. State Board of Education, 228 Conn 699, 719, 638 A.2d 589 (1994); Kinney v. State, 213 Conn. 54, 66 , 566 A.2d 670 (1989).

1996The majority today inexplicably departs from the well settled corollary principle that “[w]e will not infer that the legislature intended to enact a significant change in existing law without an unequivocally expressed manifestation of legislative intent.” 5 State v. Cobb, 234 Conn. 735, 750 , 663 A.2d 948 (1995); New Haven v. State Board of Education, 228 Conn 699, 719, 638 A.2d 589 (1994); Kinney v. State, 213 Conn. 54, 66 , 566 A.2d 670 (1989).