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25 Kentucky opinions name it 3 courts 1922–2024 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Harris v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1986In Deskins v. Commonwealth, Ky., 512 S.W.2d 520, 524 (1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1122 , 95 S.Ct. 806 , 42 L.Ed.2d 822 , this Court cited Harris v. Commonwealth, Ky., 285 S.W.2d 489, 492 (1956) stating: “A corollary rule is that the particulars should not be required when the motion appears to be merely an exploratory maneuver or when the accused apparently has knowledge of the facts or where the means of obtaining the facts are just as accessible to him as to the prosecution.” Under the facts of this case the information the defendant sought was more readily accessible to him, the employer a 1986In Deskins v. Commonwealth, Ky., 512 S.W.2d 520, 524 (1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1122 , 95 S.Ct. 806 , 42 L.Ed.2d 822 , this Court cited Harris v. Commonwealth, Ky., 285 S.W.2d 489, 492 (1956) stating: "A corollary rule is that the particulars should not be required when the motion appears to be merely an exploratory maneuver or when the accused apparently has knowledge of the facts or where the means of obtaining the facts are just as accessible to him as to the prosecution." Under the facts of this case the information the defendant sought was more readily accessible to him, the employer a | 1 | 2 |
Crawford v. Washingtongreen1 sentence2023Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004). 6 The out-of-court statement may of course separately be inadmissible hearsay. | 1 | 1 |
Mason v. Masongreen1 sentence2022Mason v. Mason, 68 Ky. 187, 193 (Ky. 1869). | 1 | 1 |
Quintana v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2009See also Quintana v. Commonwealth, 276 S.W.3d 753, 759-760 (Ky. 2008) (holding that one's refusal to open his door and talk to police when they knock does not justify any further intrusion by the police). 2009See also Quintana v. Commonwealth, 276 S.W.3d 753, 759-760 (Ky.2008) (holding that one’s refusal to open his door and talk to police when they knock does not justify any further intrusion by the police). | 1 | 1 |
Clifford v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2004Clifford v. Commonwealth, Ky., 7 S.W.3d 371, 374 (1999). 2004Clifford v. Commonwealth, Ky., 7 S.W.3d 371, 374 (1999). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2003Smith v. Commonwealth, Ky., 845 S.W.2d 534, 539 (1993) ( quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 , 604 n. 12, 98 S.Ct. 2954 , 2965 n. 12, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978)). 2003Smith v. Commonwealth, Ky., 845 S.W.2d 534, 539 (1993) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 , 604 n. 12, 98 S.Ct. 2954 , 2965 n. 12, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978)). | 1 | 1 |
Mu'Min v. Virginiagreen2 sentences2002Id. 455 U.S. at 115 n. 10, 71 L.Ed.2nd at 11 n. 10 ("[T]he Oklahoma death penalty statute permits the defendant to present evidence `as to any mitigating circumstances.' Lockett requires the sentencer to listen."); Morgan v. Illinois, supra note 6 at 504 U.S. at 739 , 112 S.Ct. at 2235 , 119 L.Ed.2d at 509 ("Any juror to whom mitigating factors are likewise irrelevant should be disqualified for cause, for that juror has formed an opinion concerning the merits of the case without basis in the evidence developed at trial."); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 , 106 S.Ct. 1669, 1671 , 90 L. 2002Id. 455 U.S. at 115 n. 10, 71 L.Ed.2nd at 11 n. 10 ("[T]he Oklahoma death penalty statute permits the defendant to present evidence `as to any mitigating circumstances.' Lockett requires the sentencer to listen."); Morgan v. Illinois, supra note 6 at 504 U.S. at 739 , 112 S.Ct. at 2235 , 119 L.Ed.2d at 509 ("Any juror to whom mitigating factors are likewise irrelevant should be disqualified for cause, for that juror has formed an opinion concerning the merits of the case without basis in the evidence developed at trial."); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 , 106 S.Ct. 1669, 1671 , 90 L. | 1 | 1 |
Morgan v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2002Id. 455 U.S. at 115 n. 10, 71 L.Ed.2nd at 11 n. 10 ("[T]he Oklahoma death penalty statute permits the defendant to present evidence `as to any mitigating circumstances.' Lockett requires the sentencer to listen."); Morgan v. Illinois, supra note 6 at 504 U.S. at 739 , 112 S.Ct. at 2235 , 119 L.Ed.2d at 509 ("Any juror to whom mitigating factors are likewise irrelevant should be disqualified for cause, for that juror has formed an opinion concerning the merits of the case without basis in the evidence developed at trial."); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 , 106 S.Ct. 1669, 1671 , 90 L. 2002Id. 455 U.S. at 115 n. 10, 71 L.Ed.2nd at 11 n. 10 ("[T]he Oklahoma death penalty statute permits the defendant to present evidence `as to any mitigating circumstances.' Lockett requires the sentencer to listen."); Morgan v. Illinois, supra note 6 at 504 U.S. at 739 , 112 S.Ct. at 2235 , 119 L.Ed.2d at 509 ("Any juror to whom mitigating factors are likewise irrelevant should be disqualified for cause, for that juror has formed an opinion concerning the merits of the case without basis in the evidence developed at trial."); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 , 106 S.Ct. 1669, 1671 , 90 L. | 1 | 1 |
Thomas v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2002Id. 455 U.S. at 115 n. 10, 71 L.Ed.2nd at 11 n. 10 ("[T]he Oklahoma death penalty statute permits the defendant to present evidence `as to any mitigating circumstances.' Lockett requires the sentencer to listen."); Morgan v. Illinois, supra note 6 at 504 U.S. at 739 , 112 S.Ct. at 2235 , 119 L.Ed.2d at 509 ("Any juror to whom mitigating factors are likewise irrelevant should be disqualified for cause, for that juror has formed an opinion concerning the merits of the case without basis in the evidence developed at trial."); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 , 106 S.Ct. 1669, 1671 , 90 L. | 1 | 1 |
Turner v. Murraygreen2 sentences2002See also Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 33 , 106 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 , 90 L.Ed.2d 27, 34-5 (1986) (describing the "broad inquiry" in an allegation of inadequate voir dire as "whether under all of the circumstances presented there was a constitutionally significant likelihood that, absent [this] questioning ... the jurors would not be indifferent."). [14] See Turner v. Murray, supra note 13 . [15] Rosales-Lopez v. United States, supra note 9. 2002See also Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 33 , 106 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 , 90 L.Ed.2d 27, 34-5 (1986) (describing the "broad inquiry" in an allegation of inadequate voir dire as "whether under all of the circumstances presented there was a constitutionally significant likelihood that, absent [this] questioning ... the jurors would not be indifferent."). [14] See Turner v. Murray, supra note 13 . [15] Rosales-Lopez v. United States, supra note 9. | 1 | 1 |
Skipper v. South Carolinagreen2 sentences2002Id. 455 U.S. at 115 n. 10, 71 L.Ed.2nd at 11 n. 10 ("[T]he Oklahoma death penalty statute permits the defendant to present evidence `as to any mitigating circumstances.' Lockett requires the sentencer to listen."); Morgan v. Illinois, supra note 6 at 504 U.S. at 739 , 112 S.Ct. at 2235 , 119 L.Ed.2d at 509 ("Any juror to whom mitigating factors are likewise irrelevant should be disqualified for cause, for that juror has formed an opinion concerning the merits of the case without basis in the evidence developed at trial."); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 , 106 S.Ct. 1669, 1671 , 90 L. 2002Id. 455 U.S. at 115 n. 10, 71 L.Ed.2nd at 11 n. 10 ("[T]he Oklahoma death penalty statute permits the defendant to present evidence `as to any mitigating circumstances.' Lockett requires the sentencer to listen."); Morgan v. Illinois, supra note 6 at 504 U.S. at 739 , 112 S.Ct. at 2235 , 119 L.Ed.2d at 509 ("Any juror to whom mitigating factors are likewise irrelevant should be disqualified for cause, for that juror has formed an opinion concerning the merits of the case without basis in the evidence developed at trial."); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 , 106 S.Ct. 1669, 1671 , 90 L. | 1 | 1 |
City of Frankfort v. Triplettgreen1 sentence1991This is merely a corollary of the rule that the courts will not give a strict literal construction to a statute if it would lead to an absurd or unreasonable conclusion.” City of Frankfort v. Triplett, Ky., 365 S.W.2d 328, 330 (1963). | 1 | 1 |
Simon v. Continental Insurance Co.green2 sentences1987In Simon v. Continental Insurance Co., Ky., 724 S.W.2d 210, 212 (1987), we stated that "[a]n essential tool in deciding whether an insurance policy is ambiguous, and consequently should be interpreted in favor of the insured, is the so-called `doctrine of reasonable expectations.'" As summarized in R.H. 1987In Simon v. Continental Insurance Co., Ky., 724 S.W.2d 210, 212 (1987), we stated that “[a]n essential tool in deciding whether an insurance policy is ambiguous, and consequently should be interpreted in favor of the insured, is the so-called ‘doctrine of reasonable expectations.’ ” As summarized in R.H. | 1 | 1 |
Deskins v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1986In Deskins v. Commonwealth, Ky., 512 S.W.2d 520, 524 (1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1122 , 95 S.Ct. 806 , 42 L.Ed.2d 822 , this Court cited Harris v. Commonwealth, Ky., 285 S.W.2d 489, 492 (1956) stating: “A corollary rule is that the particulars should not be required when the motion appears to be merely an exploratory maneuver or when the accused apparently has knowledge of the facts or where the means of obtaining the facts are just as accessible to him as to the prosecution.” Under the facts of this case the information the defendant sought was more readily accessible to him, the employer a 1986In Deskins v. Commonwealth, Ky., 512 S.W.2d 520, 524 (1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1122 , 95 S.Ct. 806 , 42 L.Ed.2d 822 , this Court cited Harris v. Commonwealth, Ky., 285 S.W.2d 489, 492 (1956) stating: "A corollary rule is that the particulars should not be required when the motion appears to be merely an exploratory maneuver or when the accused apparently has knowledge of the facts or where the means of obtaining the facts are just as accessible to him as to the prosecution." Under the facts of this case the information the defendant sought was more readily accessible to him, the employer a | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Woodson v. Manhattan Life Insurance Co. of New York
green
2 sentences2024Woodson, supra, at 838 . 2023Woodson, supra, at 839 . | 2 | 2023–2024 |
Commonwealth, Department of Highways v. Wood
green
2 sentences1967Com. of Ky., Dept. of Highways v. Wood, Ky., 380 S.W.2d 73 , and cases there cited. 1965Com. of Ky., Dept. of Highways v. Wood, Ky., 380 S.W.2d 73 , and cases there cited. | 2 | 1965–1967 |
Reed v. Hackworth
green
1 sentence2015Reversing a judgment in the royalty owner’s favor, the Reed Court invoked the common understanding of royalty as a share of raw production, and made the corollary presumption that “where, as here, the lease is silent concerning the place of market and the price, the royalty should be applied to the fair market value of gas at the well.” 287 S.W.2d at 913-14 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Florida v. Royer
green
2 sentences2009However, the corollary of that rule is that the “person may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way for doing so; and his refusal to listen or answer does not, without more, furnish those grounds [to seize his person].” Royer, 460 U.S. at 498 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 (Emphasis added). 2009However, the corollary of that rule is that the “person may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way for doing so; and his refusal to listen or answer does not, without more, furnish those grounds [to seize his person].” Royer, 460 U.S. at 498 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 (Emphasis added). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Lockett v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2003Smith v. Commonwealth, Ky., 845 S.W.2d 534, 539 (1993) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 , 604 n. 12, 98 S.Ct. 2954 , 2965 n. 12, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978)). 2003Smith v. Commonwealth, Ky., 845 S.W.2d 534, 539 (1993) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 , 604 n. 12, 98 S.Ct. 2954 , 2965 n. 12, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978)). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Rosales-Lopez v. United States
green
2 sentences2002Id. 455 U.S. at 115 n. 10, 71 L.Ed.2nd at 11 n. 10 ("[T]he Oklahoma death penalty statute permits the defendant to present evidence `as to any mitigating circumstances.' Lockett requires the sentencer to listen."); Morgan v. Illinois, supra note 6 at 504 U.S. at 739 , 112 S.Ct. at 2235 , 119 L.Ed.2d at 509 ("Any juror to whom mitigating factors are likewise irrelevant should be disqualified for cause, for that juror has formed an opinion concerning the merits of the case without basis in the evidence developed at trial."); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 , 106 S.Ct. 1669, 1671 , 90 L. 2002Id. 455 U.S. at 115 n. 10, 71 L.Ed.2nd at 11 n. 10 ("[T]he Oklahoma death penalty statute permits the defendant to present evidence `as to any mitigating circumstances.' Lockett requires the sentencer to listen."); Morgan v. Illinois, supra note 6 at 504 U.S. at 739 , 112 S.Ct. at 2235 , 119 L.Ed.2d at 509 ("Any juror to whom mitigating factors are likewise irrelevant should be disqualified for cause, for that juror has formed an opinion concerning the merits of the case without basis in the evidence developed at trial."); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 , 106 S.Ct. 1669, 1671 , 90 L. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Eddings v. Oklahoma
green
2 sentences2002Id. 455 U.S. at 115 n. 10, 71 L.Ed.2nd at 11 n. 10 ("[T]he Oklahoma death penalty statute permits the defendant to present evidence `as to any mitigating circumstances.' Lockett requires the sentencer to listen."); Morgan v. Illinois, supra note 6 at 504 U.S. at 739 , 112 S.Ct. at 2235 , 119 L.Ed.2d at 509 ("Any juror to whom mitigating factors are likewise irrelevant should be disqualified for cause, for that juror has formed an opinion concerning the merits of the case without basis in the evidence developed at trial."); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 , 106 S.Ct. 1669, 1671 , 90 L. 2002Id. 455 U.S. at 115 n. 10, 71 L.Ed.2nd at 11 n. 10 ("[T]he Oklahoma death penalty statute permits the defendant to present evidence `as to any mitigating circumstances.' Lockett requires the sentencer to listen."); Morgan v. Illinois, supra note 6 at 504 U.S. at 739 , 112 S.Ct. at 2235 , 119 L.Ed.2d at 509 ("Any juror to whom mitigating factors are likewise irrelevant should be disqualified for cause, for that juror has formed an opinion concerning the merits of the case without basis in the evidence developed at trial."); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 , 106 S.Ct. 1669, 1671 , 90 L. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Lillard v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1997Of course, it is a corollary to this principle that if the evidence was properly admitted, Taylor v. Dawson, 888 F.2d 1124 (6th Cir.1989), cf. Leibson v. Taylor, Ky., 721 S.W.2d 690 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Shaffer v. Morgan, Ky., 815 S.W.2d 402 (1991), or if the evidence did not prejudice the Commonwealth's case, Lillard v. Commonwealth, Ky., 267 S.W.2d 712 (1954), then the discharge of the jury was without manifest necessity and a retrial is precluded by the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy. 1997Of course, it is a corollary to this principle that if the evidence was properly admitted, Taylor v. Dawson, 888 F.2d 1124 (6th Cir.1989), cf. Leibson v. Taylor, Ky., 721.S.W.2d 690 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Shaffer v. Morgan, Ky., 815 S.W.2d 402 (1991), or if the evidence did not prejudice the Commonwealth’s case, Lillard v. Commonwealth, Ky., 267 S.W.2d 712 (1954), then the discharge of the jury was without manifest necessity and a retrial is precluded by the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Shaffer v. Morgan
green
2 sentences1997Of course, it is a corollary to this principle that if the evidence was properly admitted, Taylor v. Dawson, 888 F.2d 1124 (6th Cir.1989), cf. Leibson v. Taylor, Ky., 721 S.W.2d 690 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Shaffer v. Morgan, Ky., 815 S.W.2d 402 (1991), or if the evidence did not prejudice the Commonwealth's case, Lillard v. Commonwealth, Ky., 267 S.W.2d 712 (1954), then the discharge of the jury was without manifest necessity and a retrial is precluded by the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy. 1997Of course, it is a corollary to this principle that if the evidence was properly admitted, Taylor v. Dawson, 888 F.2d 1124 (6th Cir.1989), cf. Leibson v. Taylor, Ky., 721.S.W.2d 690 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Shaffer v. Morgan, Ky., 815 S.W.2d 402 (1991), or if the evidence did not prejudice the Commonwealth’s case, Lillard v. Commonwealth, Ky., 267 S.W.2d 712 (1954), then the discharge of the jury was without manifest necessity and a retrial is precluded by the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Leibson v. Taylor
green
1 sentence1997Of course, it is a corollary to this principle that if the evidence was properly admitted, Taylor v. Dawson, 888 F.2d 1124 (6th Cir.1989), cf. Leibson v. Taylor, Ky., 721 S.W.2d 690 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Shaffer v. Morgan, Ky., 815 S.W.2d 402 (1991), or if the evidence did not prejudice the Commonwealth's case, Lillard v. Commonwealth, Ky., 267 S.W.2d 712 (1954), then the discharge of the jury was without manifest necessity and a retrial is precluded by the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Mary Patricia Taylor v. Don Dawson, Jailer, Lincoln County Jail
green
2 sentences1997Of course, it is a corollary to this principle that if the evidence was properly admitted, Taylor v. Dawson, 888 F.2d 1124 (6th Cir.1989), cf. Leibson v. Taylor, Ky., 721 S.W.2d 690 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Shaffer v. Morgan, Ky., 815 S.W.2d 402 (1991), or if the evidence did not prejudice the Commonwealth's case, Lillard v. Commonwealth, Ky., 267 S.W.2d 712 (1954), then the discharge of the jury was without manifest necessity and a retrial is precluded by the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy. 1997Of course, it is a corollary to this principle that if the evidence was properly admitted, Taylor v. Dawson, 888 F.2d 1124 (6th Cir.1989), cf. Leibson v. Taylor, Ky., 721.S.W.2d 690 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Shaffer v. Morgan, Ky., 815 S.W.2d 402 (1991), or if the evidence did not prejudice the Commonwealth’s case, Lillard v. Commonwealth, Ky., 267 S.W.2d 712 (1954), then the discharge of the jury was without manifest necessity and a retrial is precluded by the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Mahoney v. Philadelphia Housing Authority
green
2 sentences1986In Deskins v. Commonwealth, Ky., 512 S.W.2d 520, 524 (1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1122 , 95 S.Ct. 806 , 42 L.Ed.2d 822 , this Court cited Harris v. Commonwealth, Ky., 285 S.W.2d 489, 492 (1956) stating: “A corollary rule is that the particulars should not be required when the motion appears to be merely an exploratory maneuver or when the accused apparently has knowledge of the facts or where the means of obtaining the facts are just as accessible to him as to the prosecution.” Under the facts of this case the information the defendant sought was more readily accessible to him, the employer a 1986In Deskins v. Commonwealth, Ky., 512 S.W.2d 520, 524 (1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1122 , 95 S.Ct. 806 , 42 L.Ed.2d 822 , this Court cited Harris v. Commonwealth, Ky., 285 S.W.2d 489, 492 (1956) stating: "A corollary rule is that the particulars should not be required when the motion appears to be merely an exploratory maneuver or when the accused apparently has knowledge of the facts or where the means of obtaining the facts are just as accessible to him as to the prosecution." Under the facts of this case the information the defendant sought was more readily accessible to him, the employer a | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Baker v. Atkins
green
2 sentences1986In Deskins v. Commonwealth, Ky., 512 S.W.2d 520, 524 (1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1122 , 95 S.Ct. 806 , 42 L.Ed.2d 822 , this Court cited Harris v. Commonwealth, Ky., 285 S.W.2d 489, 492 (1956) stating: “A corollary rule is that the particulars should not be required when the motion appears to be merely an exploratory maneuver or when the accused apparently has knowledge of the facts or where the means of obtaining the facts are just as accessible to him as to the prosecution.” Under the facts of this case the information the defendant sought was more readily accessible to him, the employer a 1986In Deskins v. Commonwealth, Ky., 512 S.W.2d 520, 524 (1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1122 , 95 S.Ct. 806 , 42 L.Ed.2d 822 , this Court cited Harris v. Commonwealth, Ky., 285 S.W.2d 489, 492 (1956) stating: "A corollary rule is that the particulars should not be required when the motion appears to be merely an exploratory maneuver or when the accused apparently has knowledge of the facts or where the means of obtaining the facts are just as accessible to him as to the prosecution." Under the facts of this case the information the defendant sought was more readily accessible to him, the employer a | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Pellicci v. United States
green
2 sentences1986In Deskins v. Commonwealth, Ky., 512 S.W.2d 520, 524 (1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1122 , 95 S.Ct. 806 , 42 L.Ed.2d 822 , this Court cited Harris v. Commonwealth, Ky., 285 S.W.2d 489, 492 (1956) stating: “A corollary rule is that the particulars should not be required when the motion appears to be merely an exploratory maneuver or when the accused apparently has knowledge of the facts or where the means of obtaining the facts are just as accessible to him as to the prosecution.” Under the facts of this case the information the defendant sought was more readily accessible to him, the employer a 1986In Deskins v. Commonwealth, Ky., 512 S.W.2d 520, 524 (1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1122 , 95 S.Ct. 806 , 42 L.Ed.2d 822 , this Court cited Harris v. Commonwealth, Ky., 285 S.W.2d 489, 492 (1956) stating: "A corollary rule is that the particulars should not be required when the motion appears to be merely an exploratory maneuver or when the accused apparently has knowledge of the facts or where the means of obtaining the facts are just as accessible to him as to the prosecution." Under the facts of this case the information the defendant sought was more readily accessible to him, the employer a | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Northern Assurance Company v. Griffin
neutral
2 sentences1980Northern Assurance Co. v. Griffin, 236 Ky. 296 , 33 S.W.2d 7 (1930); Colker v. Connecticut Fire Ins. 1980Northern Assurance Co. v. Griffin, 236 Ky. 296 , 33 S.W.2d 7 (1930); Colker v. Connecticut Fire Ins. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Yocom v. Karst
green
1 sentence1978Yocom v. Karst, Ky., 528 S.W.2d 697 (1975). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Carr v. Home Indemnity Co. green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Young v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Browning v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Keith v. Commonwealth neutral | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Paxton v. LINCOLN INCOME LIFE INSURANCE CO. green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Tharp v. Urban Renewal & Community Development Agency green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Commonwealth of Ky., Dept. of Highways v. Wilkins green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Joseph Morey v. Bernice Morey neutral | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Tolliver v. Tolliver neutral | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Cox v. Taylor's Administrator green | 1 | 1937–1937 |
| Saylor v. Commonwealth neutral | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.